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This thesis addresses contemporary strategies of Hindutva politics in Mumbai 
under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) regime of Narendra Modi after 2014. 
It does so by developing an account of two major policies of the Modi-era: 
Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (‘Clean India Mission’) and the International Day of 
Yoga. First, the thesis renders an account of Hindutva as benefitting from the 
formation of a specific ‘Hindu chain of reasoning’ (Vanaik, 2017) with deep 
historical roots in the late-colonial encounter under British rule. It is argued 
that the resonances and evocations of anti-colonial ‘cultural’ nationalism have 
shaped nationalist politics in Bombay, from the late-colonial period to the 
present. Having offered a critical analysis of Hindutva as a powerful, 
omnipresent current within the politics of Indian nationalism, the thesis then 
accounts for the historical formation of the ‘political street’. I argue that focus 
on the political street – as a key venue of nationalist politics – informs 
contemporary reflections on the effectiveness of Hindutva after 2014.  
 
Second, through close analysis of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and the 
International Day of Yoga, the thesis makes the case that while normalised as 
patriotism, duty to the nation and its development, Swachh Bharat and the 
International Day of Yoga pivot on a well-coordinated political strategy that 
aims to generate a sense of imagined political community. These strategies 
converge in the performance of the nation in the street. The thesis accordingly 
reveals the centrality of class and caste power to Hindutva politics and the 
logics of a ‘new’ strategy of theatrical, performative politics that is produced 
through apparently uncontroversial spaces and seemingly innocuous everyday 
practices in Mumbai. In conclusion, I place Hindutva in global context and 
outline a set of closing thoughts, questions and openings for further work, 
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Note on field data 
 
The field data – observations, informal conversations, interviews and 
photographs – that feature within chapters four and five of this thesis took 
place in Mumbai between November 2019 and February 2020. Where names 
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Introduction to a story of the political street 
 
‘Collective feelings, grievances, and 
belonging have no better place for 
expression than urban streets.’  
- Asef Bayat (2010, p.13) 
 
‘For us, all 130 Crore Indians are 
Hindus’.1  
- RSS Chief Mohan Bhagwat.  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Nationalism, in whatever form, by proxy of its intrinsic modernity, must 
invent its own past (see Anderson, 2006; Calhoun, 2007; Hobsbawm and 
Ranger, 1983). Hindutva, as many have pointed out, functions through 
violence and coercion against Muslims, Dalits and women. Cases of extreme 
violence perpetrated by Hindutva groups affiliated to the ruling Bharatiya 
Janata Party (BJP) against India’s minority communities (Muslims in 
particular) women and lower castes have sharply accelerated in recent years 
(see Ramachandran, 2020; Teltumbde, 2018). Simply put, Hindutva is a 
violent ideology and the politics of Hindutva rest on the threat of violence2 
(Blom Hansen, 1999; Chatterji, Blom Hansen and Jaffrelot, 2019; Desai, 2016; 
Guha, 2007; Roy, 2014; Nilsen, Nielsen and Vaidya, 2019; Purushotham, 
2019; Teltumbde, 2018). This thesis nonetheless argues that to understand 
how and why the ideology of Hindutva has been so effective after 2014, 
following the rise of Narendra Modi’s BJP to power it’s absolutely crucial to 
better understand how Hindutva is also reproduced through seemingly 
uncontroversial spaces and apparently innocuous everyday practices. To this 
end, the thesis tells a story about the ‘colonisation’ of urban streets and public 
                                                 
1 See ‘130 crore Indians are Hindu society: Mohan Bhagwat’, The Hindu, 25 December 2019 
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/130-crore-indians-are-hindu-society-mohan-
bhagwat/article30397898.ece, last accessed 12 May 2020. 
2 The most recent account of extreme communal violence orchestrated by the BJP and affiliated 
Hindutva groups was the February 2020 violence in south Delhi. See Sagar (2021).  
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spaces by nationalist politics, through close examination of Swachh Bharat 
Abhiyan (‘Clean India Mission’) and the International Day of Yoga in the 
‘political streets’ (Bayat, 2010) of central Mumbai, with special reference to the 
theatrical and performative production of an imagined political community of 
Hindus in the city. The rise to power of Narendra Modi is key to this story.  
In 2014, following a well-financed, pro-business election campaign, Modi’s 
BJP swept to power in India. In his victory speech Modi promised that “good 
days were coming” and played up his reputation as a ‘development man’ 
(vikas purush) to an elated crowd in his home constituency of Vadodara. 
Unlike the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty of the Congress, Modi claimed to be: “a 
labourer, a worker. The country has never seen such a labourer as me? is there 
any doubt in your mind about my capacity for hard work?” The stated mission 
of his BJP government was to ensure “everyone’s progress, walking together”.3 
Accordingly, following the call of UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson 
in 2013, for major action on sanitation and the elimination of open defecation 
in the developing world by 20254, almost immediately following his election 
victory, Modi responded in spectacular fashion. In October 2014, the BJP 
officially launched the country’s largest and most ambitious cleanliness drive 
to date.  
 
A nation-wide development campaign for the period 2014-2019, Swachh 
Bharat Abhiyan was a pitch to clean up the streets, roads and infrastructure of 
India’s cities, towns and villages and declare the country open defecation free 
by 2nd October 2019 – the 150-year anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi’s birth.5 
                                                 
3 See ‘Indian election result: 2014 is Modi's year as BJP secures victory’, The Guardian, 16 May 2014 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/16/india-election-2014-results-live, last accessed 20 
August 2020. 
4 Poor public sanitation is a root cause of the transmission of deadly disease and the stunting of 
juvenile growth. It has a detrimental effect on human wellbeing, heightens social anxiety and 
exacerbates the risk of sexual assault. According to the WHO, cholera, dysentery, diarrhoea, hepatitis 
A, typhoid and polio are all exacerbated by poor sanitation. See WHO Factsheet, 14 June 2019 
https://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/sanitation, last accessed 02 May 2020. 
5 Swachh Bharat has two main thrusts: Swachh Bharat Abhiyan ("gramin" or rural), which operates 
under the Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation, and Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (urban), which 
operates under the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs. In this thesis I focus exclusively on the 
latter. 
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The missions official concern is with toilet construction, investment in solid 
waste management and the execution of a wide-ranging public relations 
campaign. Above all, the official aim of Swachh Bharat is to connect public 
health and sanitation to major objectives of the elimination of open defecation 
and manual scavenging (the manual removal of untreated human excreta from 
dry latrines and sewers). Modi’s mission has been enthusiastically received, 
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, for instance, has stated that Swachh 
Bharat ‘provides a global model for sanitation reform’.6 Linked to the 
perceived success of Swachh Bharat, Modi was awarded a Gates Foundation 
Award in September 2019. The ambitious decision to launch Swachh Bharat 
early in the new governments first term appeared to confirm Modi’s 
credentials as ‘development man’ on a mission.  
 
India faces a whole series of development challenges in the twenty-first 
century, chief among which is the need to radically improve its frail public 
health system in the context of mass urbanisation. While the Indian economy 
has undergone significant revival since 1991, the spread of the social benefits 
of economic growth has been radically uneven. Between 1951 and 1980 the 
bottom 50% of India’s population captured 28% of national growth. Between 
1980 and 2015, this situation was reversed, as ‘the top 0.1% of earners 
captured a higher share of total growth than the bottom 50% (12% vs. 11%), 
while the top 1% received a higher share of total growth than the middle 40% 
(29% vs. 23%)’ (Chancel and Piketty, 2018, p. 1). The result of this remarkable 
shift as it relates to public health has been catastrophic. The Modi government 
has proposed to raise the public health budget to just 2.5 percent of GDP by 
2025.7 This shortfall has become starkly obvious in the context of COVID-19. 
                                                 
6 See the strategy overview of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, ‘What We Do: Water Sanitation & 
Hygiene: Strategy Overview’, https://www.gatesfoundation.org/what-we-do/global-growth-and-
opportunity/water-sanitation-and-hygiene, last accessed 02 May 2020. A vocal cheerleader of the 
Indian PM, billionaire philanthropist Bill Gates has congratulated Modi personally, praising his 
“continued commitment to improve health, nutrition, and development”. See ‘Bill Gates Congratulates 
PM Modi on Poll Win’, NDTV.com, 25 May, 2019 https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/bill-gates-
congratulates-pm-modi-on-poll-win-2042713, last accessed 2 May 2020.  
7 Compare this to low income countries in south Asia such as Bhutan, Sri Lanka and Nepal that spend 
2.5%, 1.6% and 1.1% respectively – the global average is 6%. See ‘India’s Health Crisis: National 
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By contrast, great energy has been invested into the promotion of yoga as a 
holistic system of public health assurance. Ratified by the UN General 
Assembly at Modi’s request, a UN resolution was passed on 11th December 
2015 stating that the event would be celebrated annually on 21st June. 
Delivering the inaugural keynote address to the General Assembly, UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon argued that yoga is good for health and spirit, 
[and] that ‘[it] does not discriminate; to varying degrees all people can 
practice regardless of their strength, age or ability’.8 Furthermore, the 
Secretary General uncritically endorsed Modi’s earlier statement to the 
General Assembly that “yoga is not just about exercise, it is a way to discover 
oneness with yourself, the world and nature”. A communique from Ban Ki-
Moon’s office in 2015 claimed that ‘observance of the International Day of 
Yoga highlights the important role healthy living plays in the realization of the 
Sustainable Development Goals, adopted last year by all 193 United Nations 
Member States’.9 According to this discourse, yoga – a means of personal 
development and positivity in body and mind – is uniquely placed to act as a 
vehicle for the production of collective consciousness to deal with global 
challenges.  
 
These brief contextual outlines of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and the 
International Day of Yoga point to something important about a remarkable 
transformation unfolding following Modi’s landslide victory in 2014. Critiques 
of the Modi regime have pointed out that India is fast becoming a 
‘majoritarian’ Hindu state at the same time as it is becoming more globalised 
                                                 
Health Profile 2018’, DownToEarth.org.in, https://www.downtoearth.org.in/dte-
infographics/india_s_health_crisis/index.html national health profie 2018, last accessed 12 May 
2020. See also, National Health Profile 2018, 13th Issue. Government of India: Central Bureau of 
Health Intelligence,  http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/NHP%202018.pdf , last 
accessed 12 May 2020. 
8 See UN Web TV, 21 June 2015, http://webtv.un.org/meetings-events/watch/ban-ki-moon-un-
secretary-general-on-the-international-day-of-yoga/4311219298001/?term=Screenshot , last accessed 
12 May 2020 
9 See ‘Message on the International Day of Yoga’, United Nations Information Service, 21 June 2016, 
http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/en/pressrels/2016/unissgsm756.html, last accessed 12 May 
2020.  
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than ever before (Chatterji, Blom Hansen and Jaffrelot, 2019; Nilsen, Nielsen 
and Vaidya, 2019). This thesis tells a story of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and the 
International Day of Yoga not in terms of ‘development’, public health and 
wellbeing, but as part of a political strategy towards the production of an 
imagined political community of Hindus. While ‘development’ is evidently a 
concern, it is not considered by the BJP in the usual sense of concentrated 
public works and investment in social and economic infrastructures. Rather, it 
is considered in terms of the development of a sense of imagined political 
community towards transfiguration of India into a Hindu nation (Hindu 
rashtra). 
 
1.2 Research questions and the argument 
The guiding principle of these two case studies – focusing on 
sanitation/cleanliness and yoga – connects to a structure of argument that 
places concerns with the discipline of the body, production of moral 
community and notion of Hinduism as a ‘world-dynamic’ force, as the hard 
core of Hindutva politics (2.3). In the hands of the BJP, the ideology of 
Hindutva promotes Indian (read: Hindu) culture to ‘integrate’ and ‘organise’ 
an idealised vision of the Hindu nation (Hindu rashtra). Through discipline, 
organisation (sangathan) and selfless service to the nation (seva) India is to 
be rendered into a Hindu state (Bhatt, 2001, 140). In the Hindu tradition 
‘seva’ denotes selfless service, towards society, the individual, one’s guru or 
God. In the context of Hindutva, ‘seva’ stems from a concern with the 
dissemination of ‘Hindu awareness and national discipline’ (Jaffrelot, 2005, p. 
216).10 Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and the International Day of Yoga intertwine 
‘traditional’ Hindu themes of cleanliness, purity of society and of the self. 
Taken together, they disseminate the message and practice of ‘selfless service’ 
to the nation and ‘Indian’ culture. At the same time, they connect with 
                                                 
10 Jaffrelot is quoted in Bhattacharjee (2021). The RSS organises a wide spectrum of humanitarian 
service organisations, from disaster relief to forest conservation projects around the principle of ‘seva’ 
(see Bhattacharjee 2019; Dyahadroy 2009; Thachil 2016). 
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contemporary urban aspirations for beautification, health and wellness. In this 
regard, both campaigns figure as forms of political mobilisation that work in 
seemingly uncontroversial spaces and through apparently innocuous everyday 
practices. Most importantly, while both campaigns appear as benign and non-
threatening, in the last instance they are backed by the threat of violence. 
Through analysis of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and the International Day of 
Yoga, I focus on how Hindutva becomes effective and crystallises through the 
‘colonisation’ of urban streets and public spaces. The thesis considers the 
following research question(s):  
• How and why is the ideology of Hindutva so effective? what tools are 
used to mobilise diverse populations towards the production of 
imagined community in the political streets of Mumbai? And what 
role, if any, does the ‘colonisation’ of urban public spaces play? 
 
To answer these questions, I proffer a materialist political sociology of the 
‘political street’ and its formation, that is concerned with how the ideology of 
Hindutva crystallises and becomes effective through political performances in 
and through urban public space at particular moments in particular places. I 
tell this story with special reference to the city of Mumbai. 
 
Mumbai makes for an interesting case study for exploratory research because 
it allows for a detailed reconstruction of how Hindutva politics have been 
produced in India’s major commercial city, well known for its role as a hub 
mediating global flows of capital, ideology, media, technology and people 
(Appadurai 1996). In my view, the city is at the vanguard of modern political 
forms and serves the purpose of this thesis without negating the experience of 
other Indian cities. Mumbai has a long history of nationalist, socialist, 
communist, regionalist and caste-based political traditions. It is also a city that 
developed from a small coastal fishing village into its present form by way of 
the imperial logics of British colonial rule. Built on an archipelago of seven 
islands following large scale land reclamation, by the mid-nineteenth century, 
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Bombay became a major port-city of British empire.11 The city was the place of 
the first meeting of the Indian National Congress and produced some of its 
leading politicians, from both ‘moderate’ and ‘extremist’ factions. It has been 
the site of some of the most radical and mass-based social movements and 
political currents in late-colonial and post-colonial India, from the Indian 
National Congress; the Communist Party of India (CPI); Mahar (Dalit) 
movement and Dalit Panthers to the Hindu Mahasabha; RSS and Shiv Sena.12 
Bombay has been a centre of mass organisational forms, anti-colonial, 
nationalist and working class militancy since the long period of British rule 
(Omvedt, 1994, p. 139).  
 
Like many cities, Mumbai is characterised by the existence of rich and poor in 
close proximity. Yet Mumbai is a radically dense city in which multiple worlds 
occupy the same spaces. Further still, it is a city not simply characterised by its 
architecture, but with reference to the shifting temporal landscape of the 
political street.13 While monumental architecture most certainly plays a key 
role in the establishment of a nation (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; 
Hobsbawm, 1990; see also Anderson, 2020), in contemporary Mumbai, it is 
not the only spectacle through which urban aspirations are represented. The 
flux of the street, dynamics of urban public space and undulating sociality of 
the streets play a powerful role. Home to one of the most aggressive real estate 
markets in the world (Appadurai, 1996; 2001; Weinstein, 2014), as the city 
expands, ‘it’s open spaces are shrinking’, this means that ‘the democratic 
‘space’ that ensures accountability and enables dissent is also shrinking’ (Das, 
2014). In this regard, I argue that the city’s streets and open public spaces are 
critical to the dissemination of multiple and various forms of politico-cultural 
expression. 
                                                 
11 In this thesis the names Bombay and Mumbai (after 1995) are both used. It is worth noting that 
many residents of the city still use the refer to ‘Bombay’. I use Bombay with reference to the city 
before 1995 and Mumbai when I refer to the city in the post-1995 period.  
12 While the RSS was formed in Nagpur, many of its early supporters and leading lights were involved 
in Bombay politics.  
13 See Rahul Mehrotra’s commentary in Maher, T. L. 2011. ‘Extreme Urbanism 1: Reimagining 
Mumbai’s Back Bay’. Vimeo, https://vimeo.com/33709110, last accessed 15th September 2020.  
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With this in mind, this thesis focuses on the ‘colonisation’ of urban public 
space by the ideology of Hindutva. With special reference to performative, 
theatrical politics, I tell a story about how Hindutva becomes effective through 
analysis of a mosaic of some of Mumbai’s most important open public spaces: 
the city’s beaches and seafronts, from Versova down to Mahim, Dadar Beach 
and Marine Drive; open public spaces such as Azad Maidan, Shivaji Park and 
the Gateway of India. I focus on the former mill lands of Lower Parel and the 
busy transport hub of Dadar railway station. I also refer in chapter four to the 
popular suburban residential areas of Chembur and Govandi in eastern 
Mumbai. The sinews of the city are of course the network of streets that abut 
and conjoin these spaces (see figure 1). I claim that this kind of analytical focus 
is important because urban public space – its use, as well as the questions of 
being, belonging, culture and identity that animate it – is political. Simply put, 
I argue that ‘there is a politics of space because space is political’ (Lefebvre, 
1973, p. 59).14 
 
 
                                                 
14 Lefebvre is quoted in Elden (2007, p. 107). 
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Figure 1: The spaces of the thesis. (Map adapted by the author and Lewis Bull 
from an original design: ‘Mumbai’s Open Spaces Map’ by P.K Das & 
Associates). 
 
The crux of my argument here, then, is that understood as crucibles of shared 
feeling and public opinion, city streets and open public spaces are key to the 
formation of collective political expression (Bayat, 2017, p. 105). The focus of 
this study is the formation of the urban public sphere through a story of the 
political street. The ‘actual’ street is a space of radical heterogeneity, 
segregation and fracture, in particular, along lines of class, gender, caste and 
religion. At the same time urban public space doubles as a space of 
connection, mutual aid and solidarity. The ‘political’ street accounts for the 
ways in which segregations and difference are sewn together and ‘sutured’ 
around collective political projects. In this context, the thesis that follows 
explores how the ideology of Hindutva has become so effective, what tools are 
deployed towards the production of imagined community in the political 
street, and how these processes converge in the ‘colonisation’ of urban public 
space. The thesis is consequently about the city and ‘the urban’, but more so, 
about what Asef Bayat (2010; 2017) calls the ‘political street’.  
 
To tell a story about how Hindutva becomes effective through a particular set 
of spaces also necessitates an understanding of history, context and the 
‘conjuncture of conditions.’ This thesis engages in the study of history, then, 
but selectively and in a highly uneven manner. Though the history of the city 
and its political economy is an important aspect of the research, I do not 
engage in an attempt to reconstruct the social history of the city as a whole. 
Rather, I focus on the excavation of particular histories, political strategies 
and socio-political narratives in the formation of the political street. In times 
of social instability and political change, from the late-colonial 
‘internationalist moment’ (Goswami, 2012; Lewis, 2016; Raza et al, 2014; 
Zachariah, 2005) to the present era of globalised neoliberalism, Hindu 
nationalist forms have come to dominate the political life of urban India 
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through various forms of street performance, from everyday religious ritual to 
the overtly political. 
 
As I discuss in more depth in chapter three, Bombay/Mumbai has a long 
history of nationalist, working class and caste-based organisation and 
radicalism, connected to questions of public space and often backed by the 
threat of violence. As Robert Rahman (2019, pp. 273-274) has pointed out, in 
the late-colonial period, the Indian National Congress made concrete efforts to 
extend and stitch together Indian ‘accustomed space’ through ‘the 
organisation of festivals and collective activities in public spaces’.15 The aim 
was to territorially colonise the urban public spaces of the British Raj. Since 
the late-colonial period, then, nationalist mobilisation has attempted to weave 
the rich social tapestries of the city together and imagine the city – and by 
extension a particular vision of political community – in its totality (Rahman, 
2019, p. 273). Accordingly, this thesis advances a historical argument that 
connects Ganpati Utsava, civil disobedience and the communist moment in 
the city to Swachh Bharat and the International Day of Yoga – with a view to 
situating the study of Hindutva in Mumbai within the wider context of 
political economy and the colonisation of urban public space. Accordingly, I 
substantiate the claims of the thesis through an analysis of historically 
transforming social relations, economic conditions and the political 
constellation (see Koivisto and Lahtinen, 2012).  
 
To study contemporary Hindutva politics the neoliberal conjuncture must be 
accounted for. The concept of an historical conjuncture delineates ‘a space of 
time within which a particular combination (or conjunction) of causes 
exercises a predominant (causal and imaginative) influence over the course of 
events and the production of ideas’ (Rosenburg, 2005, p. 29). As Antonio 
Gramsci put it, it is in the context of specific conjunctures that ‘antagonistic 
forces organise’ and struggle over a ‘new reality’. On the ground, political 
                                                 
15 See also Masselos (1991).  
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struggles develop through a ‘series of ideological, religious, philosophical, 
political, and juridical polemics, whose concreteness can be estimated by the 
extent to which they are convincing and shift the previously existing 
disposition of social forces’.16 To study the conjuncture, then, is to account for 
the circumstances that determine socio-historical moments in space and time.  
From this point of departure, I take the position that the present is neither 
autonomous or immutable. At the same time, I claim that it is problematic to 
simply take the present as given and extrapolate backwards through time in a 
bid to better understand (Hobson, Lawson and Rosenberg, 2010, p. 17).  
 
Given the emphasis of this thesis on urban public space as a key medium of 
Indian politics and the importance of specific conjunctures to the development 
of socio-political struggles, I start by accounting for the formation of the 
political street in three movements that were critical to the anti-colonial 
struggle in late-colonial Bombay: Ganpati Utsava, anti-colonial civil 
disobedience and the Bombay communist movement. My argument here is 
that a ‘Hindu chain of reasoning’ (Vanaik, 2017) that has animated Indian 
nationalism from its origins to the present, crystallised in the political street in 
the late-colonial context of tensions between India and Empire. Following this 
analysis, I argue that in a remarkably similar way, the seemingly unstoppable 
resurgence of Hindutva politics that began in the 1990s and has been 
consolidated under the Bharatiya Janata Party regime of Narendra Modi after 
2014, has crystallised in the political street amidst the tensions between India 
and the globalisation of neoliberalism.  
 
Why turn back to the formation of the political street rather than simply think 
about its formation in the present? My claim is not that a striking path 
dependency in the trajectory of Indian nationalism stretches from the late-
colonial period to the present.17 But rather, that the nationalist themes that 
                                                 
16 Gramsci is quoted in Koivisto and Lahtinen (2012, pp. 269-270). 
17 Politico-historical conjunctural analysis differs from explanations of why the ideology of Hindutva 
has been so successful that emphasise the early infusion of the Indian nationalist movement with a 
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crystallised as Indian modernity took relatively stable form in the late-colonial 
period (Sarkar, 1989, p. xvi) have been reconstituted in the neoliberal 
conjuncture. The central claim of the thesis in this regard is that mapping the 
regulating rhythms of dominant social forces in urban spaces – and 
concomitant rhythmic dissonances – provides a critical entry point for an 
analysis of the production of passages into political subjectivity. Tracing the 
development of the political streets of central Mumbai from late-colonial 
Bombay to the present, the thesis that follows offers a window into the ways in 
which Hindutva becomes effective through the political streets of 
contemporary Mumbai; fully integrated with global capitalism on the one 
hand, and hierarchically structured around conservative Hindu 
fundamentalist values on the other. Through the concept of the conjuncture, 
then, we can examine conditions of political intervention to better understand 
the relations between neoliberal political economy and the historical contexts 
in which Hindutva has evolved and crystallised.  
 
Hindutva in the neoliberal city  
 
The city is a place where capital becomes concentrated, surplus is produced, 
and social difference comes together; the focal point of consumption and 
everyday life. At the same time, the street is the primary arena of complex 
interaction and crucible of social difference. In terms of the production of 
cultural hybridity and new conditions of political possibility but also in terms 
of contestation and antagonism (Bayat, 2010, 2017; Harvey, 2006; Lefebvre, 
2003). Though Mumbai is a city shaped of course by social conditions of 
‘difference’ peculiar to the dynamics of a postcolonial society, I claim that it is 
                                                 
distinctive Hindu vernacular (see Ahmad, 2004; 2015; Anderson, 2013; Vanaik, 2017). For instance, 
in recent years, Perry Anderson (2013) has argued that due to the shortcomings of the national 
movement, modern India has become ‘a fundamentally Hindu polity with deep autocratic tendencies’. 
Problematically, as Sanjay Ruparelia (2014, p. 163) points out, affording such a ‘mighty path-
dependency’ to the early national movement risks the implication that all the ‘patterns of deprivation, 
inequality, and coercion that afflict India today reflect the sin of its origins.’ Emphasising the 
importance of conjunctural analysis, this thesis circumvents the evident problems of conducting a 
sweeping macro-level, long-wave historical-sociological analysis in a country as social complex and 
hugely diverse as India.  
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a city shaped more so by neoliberalism, to the extent that neoliberalism refers 
to a historically specific political project for the consolidation of class power 
and shift towards a globalised pattern of the flexible accumulation of capital 
(Harvey, 2005).18  
 
Thomas Blom Hansen (1999, pp. 11-12) has pointed out that the appeal of 
Hindutva does not lie in its appropriation of religious sentiments and 
symbolism of Hinduism as such. But rather, in its meaningful connection with 
the pervasive sense of uncertainty, fear or urban disorder and general 
ambivalence that characterises modern life. Analysing the politics of Swachh 
Bharat and the International Day of Yoga on the ground, I argue that taken 
together, they represent a recalibration of political strategy, where Hindutva 
has been recharged and hooked up to bourgeois hopes and desires for the 
recognition of India on the world stage and the revival of its past mythical 
glory; for the beautification of urban space; and the want to participate in 
globalised neoliberal aesthetics and lifestyle choices.  
 
Yet Hindutva does not simply reflect the divisions and cleavages of Indian 
neoliberalism. Neither does it serve exclusively as a political vehicle for the 
ambitions and influences of political leaders. Rather, the politics of Hindutva 
articulates the social cleavages of neoliberal India in an attempt to ‘remake’ 
Indian state-society relations (see de Leon, Desai and Tuğal, 2015). By 
‘political articulation’ de Leon, Desai and Tuğal refer to ‘the process by which 
parties’ ‘suture’ together coherent blocs and cleavages from a disparate set of 
consistencies and individuals, who, even by virtue of sharing circumstances, 
may not necessarily share the same political identity’ (de Leon, Desai and 
Tuğal, 2015, p. 2). The creative potential of political parties and the ‘means of 
articulation’ – specific tools used to mobilise diverse populations – are crucial 
within this process. The power of theatrical performance in the street and its 
                                                 
18 I assess the question of neoliberalism in light of the spectre of postcolonial urbanism in depth in 
chapter two (2.4).  
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importance for the media strategy of the BJP – in the form of Swachh Bharat 
and the International Day of Yoga – is not spontaneous but requires planning: 
an organising infrastructure and the colonisation of the political street. Simply 
put, this thesis argues that Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and the International Day 
of Yoga are key aspects of a political strategy to actively articulate cleavages, 
interests and a particular ideal of imagined community and ‘Hindu social 
order’, through a politics of performative theatricality rooted in the political 
street.  
 
Drawing upon a political sociological approach to the production of knowledge 
and working with a conceptual apparatus adapted primarily from Asef Bayat’s 
(2010) concept of the political street, as well as Henri Lefebvre’s writings on 
everyday life (1995; 2014) and aspects of Antonio Gramsci’s theory of politics 
(1971), I claim that a focus on how the politics of Hindutva crystallises through 
moments of theatricality and performance in the political street, offers a 
distinct vantage point for considering how and why the politics of Hindutva 
have been so effective in the Modi era. The thesis also sheds light on the 
methods and tools that are used by Hindutva ideologues to mobilise diverse 
urban populations. This introductory chapter will proceed as follows. First, I 
discuss the context of the study and its significance (1.3) before moving on to 
set out the theoretical framework of the thesis (1.4.) I then discuss questions of 
methodology (1.5). Finally, I provide a chapter by chapter overview of the 
thesis (1.6).  
 
1.3 Context of the study and its significance 
 
In many ways the significance of this study lies in the fact that the politics of 
Hindutva are far from unique. Commitment to cultural and political pluralism 
has been conspicuous in its absence in many of the world’s liberal democracies 
in the last decade. Instead, faith in political ‘strong men’ and promises of a 
return to a golden-era of stability and prosperity have taken centre stage. In 
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the United States, the illusive promise to “Make America Great Again” 
captured hearts and minds in 2016 to catapult businessman and television 
personality Donald Trump into the White House. In a similar fashion, 
President of Brazil Jair Bolsonaro was elected on the back of scapegoating 
minorities and calling for a return to the days of dictatorship. In Hungary, 
after a landslide victory in 2010, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has worked to 
incrementally supress the opposition, take over the media and centralise 
power, all the while stoking an anti-Semitic image of the ‘globalist’ enemy.19 
Even more similar to the Indian experience, Recep Tayipp Erdoğan’s Adalet ve 
Kalkinma Partisi (AKP) stoke Turkish nationalism by cracking down on 
dissent and the civil and political rights of Turkey’s Kurdish minority. In 
Israel, under the leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu, Likud and the politics of 
the far-right grow bolder and bolder in both their actions and demands. While 
not strictly coming to power, a whole raft of far-right parties have emerged 
across the European political landscape, gaining national seats and political 
representation in the European parliament.20 It is undeniable that in recent 
years something resembling a “populist wave” has crashed over many of the 
worlds so-called liberal democracies.21  
 
Right-wing “populism” is not of course without historical roots. As a loose 
configuration of political ideas, it hails from the dissemination of totalitarian 
ideals of race, purity, blood and soil, assembled alongside the rise of mass 
politics in the twentieth century and international circulation of these political 
                                                 
19 The abstraction of ‘the enemy’ is frequently materialised in the figure of the famous Hungarian-
American Jewish financier and investor George Soros, who runs a number of initiatives in his native 
Hungary. For Donald Trump the enemy is ‘liberals’ backed by the ‘fake news media’. Bolsonaro singles 
out ‘leftists’ and ‘homosexuals’ in particular.  
20 Examples include Golden Dawn in Greece; Rassemblement National (National Rally) in France; 
Lega Nord in Italy and the German Alternative für Deutschland (AFD). While the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) certainly fits with this trend, within the confines of the ‘first past the post’ 
system in the UK, it has been less successful in terms of winning seats in parliament. Nonetheless, the 
sentiments represented by the party have proved popular with English voters. Though UKIP have 
been effectively wiped out following the decision of UK voters to exit the European Union, arguably, 
UKIP’s brand of racist anti-immigration politics were successfully metabolised by Boris Johnson’s 
Conservative Party in the lead up to the 2019 UK General Election which he won by a landslide.  
21 There is a huge and expanding literature on populism. See for example, Colás (2004); Eatwell and 
Goodwin (2018); Hadiz (2016); Hadiz and Chryssogelos (2017); Moffitt (2016); Müller (2016).  
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ideas (see Finchenstein, 2017; Raza et al, 2014; Saull et al 2015). Religious 
idiom and revivalist tones are complimented by modern Enlightenment 
themes of liberty, emancipation, rights and political power. In the case of 
Hindutva, ideas of race, nation, and elite fears of mass popular sovereignty are 
tightly intertwined with the historical development of Western imperial 
constellations (Bayly, 2008; Bhatt, 1997; 2001; Thapar, Noorani and Menon, 
2016; Zachariah, 2005).  
 
On the back of this history, in the past several decades, the BJP has engaged in 
a project for the transfiguration of India into a Hindu nation. With Narendra 
Modi placed as supreme leader, the BJP are in reality the political front of the 
far larger Hindu supremacist national volunteer organisation, the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The RSS, often referred to as ‘the Sangh’, is the 
most successful right-wing organisation in the world, and with its family of 
organisations – the ‘Sangh Parivar’ – is set up to organise all areas of Indian 
society into a Hindu rashtra (Ahmad, 2020). Taking Fascism and Nazism as 
their inspiration, the RSS seeks the production of a uniform Indian society.22 
For the RSS, strength ‘comes only through organisation’ and the ‘ideal of the 
Sangh is to carry the nation to the pinnacle of glory, through organising the 
entire society and ensuring the protection of Hindu Dharma’.23 ‘Hindu 
Rashtra’, then, serves as a euphemism for the restoration of a fictional golden 
past based in totalitarian upper caste rule, akin to the infamous Nazi 
constellation of ‘ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer’ (‘one people, one nation, one 
leader’) (Teltumbde, 2018, p. 44; 264).24  
 
As Hannah Arendt (2017) powerfully argued in The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, conditions of social atomisation that characterise mass 
                                                 
22 On the connections between Hindutva and historical fascism, see for instance, Ahmad (2015; 
2020); Bhatt (2001); Casolari (2000); Sarkar (1993) Vanaik (2017).  
23 Taken from http://rss.org//Encyc/2012/10/22/rss-vision-and-mission.html, last accessed, 12 May 
2020. 
24 Yet, at the aggregate level, under the leadership of the current RSS Chief (sarsanghchalak), Mohan 
Bhagwat, the RSS plays a critical role as the fountainhead of BJP power.  
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societies of modern society, enable political ‘strong men’ to emerge and tell a 
compelling story that explains why ‘the people’ are unhappy and lay out the 
fictional roots of injustice for all to see. Hindutva – and indeed Swachh Bharat 
and the International Day of Yoga – must be placed within this broader global 
history of democracy and its troubled relationships with the politics of far-
right “populist” authoritarian nationalisms. What this broad context of far-
right politics tells us about India, is that the ‘domestic’ coordinates of Indian 
society are inexplicably linked with global circulations of ideas, changes in 
political strategy and shifts in economy and society. With this context in mind, 
I argue that the politics of contemporary Hindutva are to be considered in the 
context of the far-reaching implementation of a raft of policies aiming for the 
liberalisation of the economy in 1991.  
 
Caste and class in neoliberal India  
 
Alongside the rapid consolidation of the power of corporate India, the post-
liberalisation period has been characterised by the rise of lower castes and 
classes into the echelon of small and medium business owners and 
professionals. Such groups have simultaneously benefitted from greater access 
to higher education, formal employment and housing. These shifting 
dynamics have simultaneously coincided with a loss of symbolic (and 
financial) distinction previously afforded to upper castes. With the Congress 
largely deemed corrupt and ineffective, I argue with Chatterji, Blom Hansen 
and Jaffrelot, (2019, pp. 8-9) that support for Hindutva is connected with this 
inversion of power. Like many of the cases of the so-called populist wave 
indexed above, Modi has been able to mobilise conservative Indians alarmed 
by the ‘growing assertiveness of plebeians’ (especially minorities) as well as 
those that he calls the ‘neo middle classes’ themselves.25 In this context, to 
understand the politics of Hindutva, I suggest that attention must be paid to 
                                                 
25 By ‘neo-middle class’ Modi refers in the main to lower caste and class migrants to Indian cities in 
search of good jobs in the private sector, following liberalisation after 1991. See Chatterji, Blom 
Hansen and Jaffrelot (2019, pp. 8-9).  
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the ways in which class struggle manifests in dialectical combination with the 
persistence of the caste system (Teltumbde, 2018, p. 116). 
 
The word ‘caste’ was applied to the Hindu system of social stratification by the 
Portuguese in the sixteenth century upon their arrival in the subcontinent. 
Derived from the Latin castus, in Portuguese, casta means ‘lineage’, ‘pure’, or 
‘chaste’. The Portuguese understanding of caste thus relates to something 
approximating ‘race’. Anand Teltumbde (2010, p. 12) provides a neat 
description: ‘caste, as such, is a form of social stratification involving a mode 
of hierarchically arranged, closed endogamous strata, membership to which is 
ascribed by descent and between which contact is restricted and mobility 
impossible.’ The Indian word for caste is Jaati and when we talk of ‘caste’ 
what is really under consideration is Jaati. The Jaati system of vocational 
guilds, some one thousand years ago, became organised in relation to 
principles of purity and impurity. And each Jaati – of which there are literally 
thousands – has its own norms of conduct (rules around marriage, social 
interaction, permissible food and occupation etc.). From each Jaati follows a 
series of sub-castes rendering the system immensely complicated (Teltumbde, 
2010, pp. 12-14).  
 
Caste is frequently confused with the four-fold varna system codified in the 
Vedic-Brahmin Manusmriti (Laws of Manu). In hierarchical order, the four 
varnas or savarna (caste Hindus) include Brahmins (priests; intellectuals); 
Kshatriyas (warriors; administrators); Vaishyas (farmers; traders); and 
Shudras (workers; labourers). ‘Outcaste’ from the Hindu fold are those who 
do not belong to any varna (avarna): ‘Untouchables’ or later, ‘Dalits’ 
(‘depressed’ or ‘broken’ peoples), who are seen to be polluting of caste Hindu 
society. Dalit communities are assigned the most ‘unclean’ tasks within a 
broad division of labour: the removal of waste; tending of funeral pyres; 
butchery; and working with animal carcasses to produce leather (Teltembde, 
2010, p. 14). 
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First of all, it is critical to note that caste relations are not static and 
unchanging. For example, many aspects of caste, in particular, those of ritual 
practice, have almost entirely disappeared with the advance of capitalist social 
relations. The rise of the laboring Shudra castes is also important to note. 
Following the creation of a class of wealthy farmers in the 1960s – the so-
called ‘Green Revolution’ – ritual practices separating ‘twice-born’ castes and 
the Shudra castes have more or less collapsed. In this context, in many 
instances, Shudras have become immensely powerful and, in some areas and 
regions, dominant. The Maratha caste of Maharashtra is a particular case in 
point (Teltumbde, 2018, p. 105). The consequences of the expansion of 
capitalism in India on caste relations overtime, has been that the caste system 
has been largely reduced ‘to a class like formation of caste and non-caste or 
non-Dalits and Dalits’ (Teltumbde, 2018, p. 105).  
 
That being said, the full and wide spectrum of caste identities continue to 
structure life-worlds across the subcontinent. The production of any imagined 
political community of Hindus therefore evidently requires a negotiation with 
caste but also with class. For instance, though class stratification within castes 
is evident,26 at the same time, caste consciousness continues to exert a 
powerful grip over socio-cultural identities in a way that cuts through 
potential class distinctions. On this note there exists no straightforward route 
to the formation of class consciousness that cuts across caste (see Kapidia, 
1995, p. 12). Accordingly, in the thesis that follows, I understand the class-
caste dialectic of contemporary Indian society in the terms famously pointed 
out by E.P Thompson (1965, p. 357), as ‘not this or that part of the machine, 
but the way the machine works once it is set in motion’.27  
                                                 
26 See for example the relatively small but rising number of Dalit capitalists that exist alongside and 
within the same spaces as Dalit manual scavengers (Prakash, 2015; Teltumbde, 2018; Yengde, 2019).  
27 Thompson articulated a view of class as a ‘happening’, stating that he did not see ‘class as a 
“structure”, nor even as a “category”, but as something which in fact happens (and can be shown to 
have happened) in human relationships’ (Thompson, 1968, pp. 9-10; see also Efstathiou, 2014, pp. 
409-410). Thompson is quoted in Teltumbde (2018, p. 91).  
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Thus, while I claim that caste is not the central axis of the politics of Hindutva, 
I argue that caste matters, and Hindutva is casteist. For example, as we see in 
chapter four, caste matters especially in relation to practices of cleanliness and 
sanitation. Yet this does not mean that Swachh Bharat Abhiyan is necessary a 
simple reflection of caste relations. Neither is it necessary to try and isolate the 
evidently complex and shifting contradictory and fluid dynamics of caste. 
Instead, to better understand how the ideology of Hindutva becomes effective 
through the performative ‘colonisation’ of urban spaces, the dialectic of class 
and caste that animates Indian social relations demands for the focus of 
resolution to be adjusted away from a reification of static and mechanical 
categories, and towards analysis of social relations of production in the 
political street. 
 
1.4 Hindutva between the sacred and the urban: the literature 
 
As we will see throughout the thesis, Hindutva is not a religious movement. 
But rather, a political movement that expounds a historically specific religio-
cultural paradigm that aims for the social transformation of Indian society. 
Through analysis of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and the International Day of 
Yoga as powerful ‘means of articulation’, the thesis seeks to contribute to 
political sociological understandings of how and why the ideology of Hindutva 
has become so effective. To do so, I afford a prominent role to the colonisation 
of urban public space as a means articulate the social cleavages of 
neoliberalism and to mobilise diverse populations behind a political project 
for the remaking of Indian state-society relations. This section of the chapter 
critically discusses existing political-geographical and sociological literatures 
that address spatial strategies of Hindutva and the politics of ‘the local’. 
Following this discussion, I set out a theoretical framework to guide the 
present work that pivots on the connections between the production of 
imagined political communities (Anderson, 2006) and the ‘political street’ 
(Bayat, 2010) in more depth (1.5).  
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The banality of neighbourliness  
 
Writing on the nexus between Hindutva and the spatio-temporal reproduction 
of urban life, for Satish Deshpande (2000)28 the religious, or ‘sacred’, the 
political, and urban space are explicitly coupled together. Drawing on Michel 
Foucault’s (1984) concept of heterotopia, Deshpande provides an analysis of 
Hindutva as a particular ‘spatial strategy’ that seeks to redefine Indian 
national space through the transformation of local public space into ‘sacred’ 
Hindu space. ‘Heterotopic spaces’, as Foucault argued, confirm the existence 
of concrete sites, outside of established systems of norms: what he called 
‘heterotopias of deviation’. These sites ‘always presuppose a system of opening 
and closing that both isolates them and makes them penetrable’ (Foucault, 
1984, p. 47). In relation to all the space that remains, the role of heterotopia is 
to create a space that is Other from the prevailing system of norms within 
which the daily lives of individuals are regulated (Foucault, 1984, p. 48).  
 
Drawing on this reading of space, Deshpande (2000, p. 171) claims that 
‘ideological practices involved in the construction of heterotopias’ give distinct 
coloration to the production of Hindutva as spatial strategy. On this account, 
the success of a spatial strategy is predicated upon the connection of ‘abstract 
(imagined) spaces to concrete (physical) spaces’ (Oza, 2007, p. 153). Thus, 
beyond the usual focus on spectral, episodic experiences of communal politics 
(and violence) that are frequently offered up to understand processes of 
collective identity formation, Deshpande is interested in the ways that 
‘mundane, everyday experiences’ are recruited to the cause. On this basis, a 
powerful argument emerges to stress that the appeal of Hindutva resides in 
the ‘sedimented banalities of “neighborliness.” This is to be theorised, 
according to Deshpande (2000, p. 198), in terms of ‘the long term, ‘live in’ 
                                                 
28 Deshpande also rehearses these arguments in Contemporary India: A Sociological View (2003). 
However, due to the lack of significant modification in this work, I have chosen to cite the argument as 
it was originally presented.  
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intimacy of residential relationships among persons and families, and between 
them and their local environment’.  
 
The proposition of the ‘banality of neighbourliness’ is rich and conceptually 
promising. However, it fails to recognise that the theory of heterotopia as a 
concept for ‘mapping’ theoretical space is not without its problems. Through 
recourse to a grammar of spatial metaphor, Foucault sought to express the 
relations that are possible between power and knowledge and the processes by 
which they function (Smith and Katz, 1993, p. 72). Yet, in his later life, he 
expressed a concern that heterotopia might render space ‘as the dead, the 
fixed, the undialectical, the invisible’ (Foucault, 2007, p. 177). This admission 
speaks directly to David Harvey’s (2007, p. 45) Lefebvrian argument that 
space must be viewed dialectically. In other words, the premise that ‘life-
world’ and ‘place’ are constructed in relation to each other, and through the 
operation of material sociological processes, intersect across ‘spatiotemporal 
scales’. In this context, space, place and life-world ‘hang together’ (see Harvey, 
1996, pp. 350-352). Social relations in the city must be read as generative of 
this relational dialectic. Heterotopia, by contrast, entails a static rather than 
dialectical understanding of space that fails to capture lived experience and its 
articulation with urban, regional, national and global scales of social life (see 
Goonewardena, 2005, p. 69; Lefebvre, 2003, p. 100).  
 
In my view, Deshpande is entirely correct to cite the decline of the Congress, 
the developmental state, the emergence of a ‘new media’ landscape and the 
expansion and consolidation of national television networks as crucial to the 
reinvigoration of Hindutva during the 1980s and 1990s.29 The seizure of 
territory and colonisation of space – both imagined and real – is key to the 
intentions of Hindutva forces. However, while noting the salience of these 
developments, it is remarkable that the ‘sacred geography’ of Hindutva is 
                                                 
29 On the connections between Hindutva and the ‘new media’ landscape after 1991, see especially 
Brosius (2005) and Rajagopal (2001a).  
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somewhat crudely juxtaposed with the ‘economic geography’ of Nehruvian 
secular space (Deshpande, 2000, p. 184). The ‘national’ public sphere of 
secular civil society is characterised by the circulation of themes of ‘state-
sponsored socialism, secularism and non-alignment’ – with communal 
practices relegated to the periphery (Deshpande, 2000, pp. 184-185). 
 
Two problems arise here. First, regarding Deshpande’s proposed dichotomy 
between secular and communal spheres, historically and sociologically 
speaking there has been no such clear cut.30 In a very real sense, Indian 
‘secular’, ‘cosmopolitan’ nationalism has become about the desire to belong to 
a particular nation. At the same time as Hindutva emphasises Hindu culture 
as the common denominator for the ‘Indian way of life’, cosmopolitanism has 
become connected to ideas of cultural superiority (Brosius, 2010, p. 172). 
Second, Deshpande’s juxtaposition does not allow for articulation between so-
called ‘economic’ and ‘sacred’ geographies. Deshpande’s argument, that ‘the 
“banalities” of local geographical loyalties disrupt the cosmopolitan ideal of 
‘Nehruvian developmentalism’, then, collapses as soon as one acknowledges 
the fact that localised political movements depend on ‘non-local’ sources of 
power’ (Harvey, 2000, p. 543).  
 
For example, while it must be remembered that India’s transition to 
neoliberalism has been premised on the retraction of Nehruvian socialist 
discourse and the ‘disarticulation’ of state-led development, as Manali Desai 
(2015, p. 152) points out, ‘the party that framed the terms of Nehruvian 
developmentalism [the Congress] was itself responsible for undertaking the 
first steps to dismantle this legacy’. Both the Congress and the BJP were 
instrumental in the move towards pro-business, pro-liberalisation politics. At 
the same time, market liberalisation was accompanied by the attempted 
political articulation and mobilisation of religious, caste and secular pro-poor 
                                                 
30 This argument has been made ad nauseum by historians of the subcontinent. See for example 
Anderson (2013), Bhagavan (2008) and Vanaik (1997). I follow up on this train of thought in chapter 
three.  
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constituencies both “from above” and “from below” (Desai, 2015, pp. 13-15). 
Further still, in the Modi era, with its rhetoric of “good times”, neoliberal 
capitalism – dressed up in the garb of Hindutva – is articulated as the 
unchallengeable vehicle for the ambitions and urban aspirations of the Indian 
people (Kaur, 2015).  
 
Indeed, the efforts of Hindutva forces in the Modi era have sought to align 
Hindutva politics on the ground with a new techno-friendly, high 
consumption vision of India configured around a ‘capitalist transformation of 
the nation form’ (Kaur, 2020). In this regard, the spatial strategy of Hindutva 
appears to be less about the production of ‘sacred space’ per se and more 
about the construction of a pro-liberalisation coalition of disparate 
constituencies, articulated around Hindutva themes of Hinduism and 
nationalism as a major political alternative to ‘secular’, ‘Nehruvian’ and 
‘socialist’ themes long associated with the Congress (Desai, 2015).  
 
Even so, it remains eminently possible to incorporate the concept of the 
banality of neighborliness into a materialist, political sociological angle of 
vision. Emphasis on the ‘banality’ of mundane, everyday experiences in 
relation to the production of ‘self-evident [religio-cultural] common sense’, 
forms a productive line of enquiry into the urban politics of Hindutva. 
Christophe Jaffrelot, for instance, has developed a nuanced understanding of 
the ‘saffronisation of the public sphere’. In a similar vein to Deshpande, he 
argues that under Modi a progressive ‘banalisation’ of Hindu nationalism 
taking place that increasingly permeates even the most mundane and trivial 
aspects of everyday life. India, Jaffrelot claims in dialogue with Edward 
Anderson, is moving in the direction of an ethno-democracy that increasingly 
rests on the sentiments of the Hindu majority (Anderson and Jaffrelot, 
2018).31  
                                                 
31 Notably, this argument is congruent with Perry Anderson’s (2013) observations in The Indian 
Ideology.   
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Jaffrelot’s point is significant to the extent that it couples together questions of 
nationalism, religion and urban experience without the strictures of 
‘heterotopic space.’ What is needed, then, is an approach that accounts for the 
banality of neighbourlines – the importance of lived urban experience for the 
political articulation of Hindutva – that is sensitive to the dialectical 
production of nationalist politics, in relation to the logics of capitalist 
accumulation. Given the emphasis on the role of urban public space taken up 
within this thesis, of particular interest here is the work of Peter Van Der Veer 
(2015; 2016) on the connections between religion, locality and the 
‘postcolonial city’. 
 
The production of locality  
 
Goh and Van der Veer (2016, p. 367) lament that ‘the relationship between the 
sacred and the urban remains understudied’. It is certainly true that as 
religious studies scholars, sociologists and political geographers continue to 
speak past each other, research into vernacular expressions of Hindutva that 
manifest in the politicisation and sacralisation of urban spaces is lacking.32 
For Van der Veer, it is Marxist urban geographers that have done the most to 
advance the study of the city over the past several decades.33 However, it is 
further suggested that Marxist analysis contains a problematic tendency to 
understand the relationship between the production of subjectivity and urban 
experience through theories of space and place.34 The problem with this, 
argues Van der Veer, is that these thinkers do so at an unacceptably high level 
of abstraction. The argument is presented as follows: ‘Marxist theory is too 
focused on both economic transformation and resistance to be able to come to 
grips with the variety of urban aspirations that are not directly related to class 
                                                 
32 Yet, see for instance Brosius (2010) and Srivastava (2015).    
33 This point has been strongly contested by scholars of ‘postcolonial urbanism’, the work of whom I 
discuss in depth in chapter two (2.4).   
34 Van der Veer points to the work of Andy Merrifield (2002) and his citation of Henri Lefebvre’s 
(2003) The Urban Revolution.  
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or indeed the economy’ (Van der Veer, 2015, p. 3). The important point to take 
away here, is that Hindutva is not usefully conceived of in the abstract. It must 
be analysed in terms of its historically particular geopolitical and vernacular 
expressions (see Anderson and Longkumer 2018). 
 
By way of example, Van der Veer claims that while the work of David Harvey, 
demonstrates awareness of the ‘situatedness’ of urban struggles and the 
‘embodiment’ of labour, ‘he fails to leave aside his abstract Marxism for a 
closer view of the variety of urban aspirations’ (Van de Veer, 2015. p. 4). While 
Van der Veer concedes that Marxist scholarship and its insights into the 
politics of space captures major elements of the larger picture of the urban 
process, he claims that it is shot through with a lack of attention to ‘practical, 
everyday urban aspirations’ and demonstrates a ‘disinterest in an ethnography 
of micro-processes’. In consequence, Marxist approaches are deemed 
unsuitable for a rigorous analysis of the nexus between politics, religion and 
culture in the postcolonial city.  
 
Yet, it is problematic to detach urban aspirations in the city from the 
reproduction of everyday life, in which capitalist social relations are the 
central aspect of the daily reproduction of human bodies. For example, 
consumerism itself has become a new ground for religiosity as urban life 
bumps up against the procedural logics of the state and capital (Nanda, 2009; 
Srivastava, 2017). The urban aspirations of Mumbaikars are increasingly 
mediated by religiosity, from the rendering of corporate culture around new 
interpretations of religious myths (see for example, Gooptu, 2017; Rudnyckyj, 
2010) to, as we see in chapters four and five practices of cleanliness and the 
‘yogic way of life’ respectively. I account for Van der Veer’s critique in my own 
work through an ethnographic approach to the politics of Hindutva in the 
political street. In an attempt to bridge this gap in his own work, Van der Veer 
(2015, p. 2) instead turns his attention to conceptual work on the ‘production 
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of locality’ in the writings of anthropologist and social theorist Arjun 
Appadurai (1996).  
 
For Appadurai, localities are not given but produced, as ‘structures of feeling’ 
within the broader context of political economy (Appadurai, 1996 p. 188; Van 
der Veer, 2015, p. 2). Offering a framework to examine ‘the settings in and 
through which social life is produced’, Appadurai’s concern is with the role of 
locality in the context of the nation-state, in the face of increasing 
destabilisation under the pressures of global flows of capital, media, 
commodities and labour in the era of ‘globalisation’. He takes specific interest 
in the ‘production of local subjects’ – pointing in particular to ceremonies and 
rituals of naming, segregation, embodied markers and symbols of religious 
devotion, as ‘complex social techniques for the inscription of locality onto 
bodies’ (Appadurai, 1996, p. 179). Accordingly, the materiality of ‘the local’ is 
produced through ongoing practice, as ‘space and time are themselves 
localised through complex and deliberate practices of performance, 
representation and action’ (Appadurai, 1996, p. 179-181). Instructive as this 
may be, the effect is that the concrete abstraction of ‘the economy’ – or more 
precisely, of capital – is replaced by the floating abstraction of ‘the local’.  
 
The scholarship discussed above offers distinctive vantage points to 
understand how and why the ideology of Hindutva has become so effective 
after 2014. However, I claim that these approaches fail in what I take to be a 
central theoretical task of the thesis – to provide a conceptual framework to 
theorise the politics of Hindutva in the wider context of global political 
economy – in which the city of Mumbai is situated as a hub mediating global 
flows of capital, ideology, media, technology and people (see Appadurai, 
1996). I base this on the simple premise that ‘things do not exist outside the 
relationships to which they become constituted’.35 Contemporary, creative and 
                                                 
35 This point is made by Erik Swyngedouw. See ‘Political Ecology and the Contested Politics of Urban 
Metabolism by Erik Swyngendouw’, You Tube, 4 November 2015 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r5cLdosjnJY&t=952s, last accessed 12 May 2020. 
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performative strategies of Hindutva politics work to generate a sense of 
(Hindu) imagined community through the colonisation of urban spaces. 
Considered as a ‘means of articulation’ the performative politics of Swachh 
Bharat and the International Day of Yoga work to structure social cleavages 
and help ‘usher’ the social order of the Hindu rashtra into being (see de Leon, 
Desai and Tuğal, 2015, p. 4). With this set of claims in mind, let us turn to set 
out the conceptual framework of the thesis.  
 
1.5 Hindutva imagined community and the political street: the 
conceptual framework 
 
The nation, as Benedict Anderson (2006) argued, is an imagined political 
community that binds together those it deems citizens through the 
construction of a shared history and sovereign geography. The nation is 
imagined ‘because even the members of even the smallest nation will never 
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in 
the minds of each lives the image of their communion’ (Anderson, 2006, p. 6). 
This is not to say that the nation is fictional, but rather that it is the result of a 
particular unconscious style of abstract imagining. It is limited because it 
consists of ‘finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations’; it is 
sovereign because the concept of the nation emerged as a legitimate means of 
political organisation in the context of Enlightenment and revolution against 
hierarchical dynastic rule (Anderson, 2006, p. 7).36 The relevance of ‘imagined 
community’ for the Indian nation-state is reflected in the multiplicity of 
                                                 
36 Anderson’s concept of nationalism as a Western ‘modular’ form that has become universal has been 
criticised as Eurocentric. Anderson (2006, p. 4) noted that nationalism is ‘modular, capable of being 
transplanted with varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, [and 
being] merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations. Scholars 
such as Partha Chatterjee (1993;1996) have criticised this argument on the grounds that ‘the nation’ is 
not simply imagined from a modular (read: Western) form. The basic point here is that imagined 
community is imagined differently across different locales, and therefore not universal. Instead, it is a 
phenomenon that varies across time and space. While I take the point that anti-colonial nationalisms 
in the Indian context have imagined their own domains of sovereignty (Chatterjee, 1996, p. 217), I do 
not take Andersons concept as incompatible with the fact of socio-historical ‘difference’. For a similar 
argument. On the compatibility of Marxism and analysis of Indian society, see Chibber, (2013). See 
also, chapter two (2.4).  
 38 
linguistic and ethno-nationalist movements since independence that have 
drawn from the diversity of ethnic, social and historical memories of 
geopolitical community across the subcontinent.  
 
Since 2014, the imagined political community of Hindutva has been 
discursively constructed by the Modi regime in often imprecise, ambiguous 
terms: through speeches, media, documentation and textbooks.37 This thesis 
focuses on the role of the colonisation of urban public space in this process. 
Swachh Bharat and the International Day of Yoga are accordingly considered 
as ‘means of articulation’ that bring together diverse constituents into the 
Hindutva project for the remaking of Indian state-society relations. The task of 
this section of the chapter, is to set the analytical lens of the thesis from the 
urban and the city as such, to the political street. 
 
A central theoretical claim of the thesis, in this regard, is that the work of Asef 
Bayat (2010; 2017) provides a fruitful entry point to better understand how 
the politics of Hindutva crystallise through the theatrical, performative 
colonisation of urban public spaces. Though Bayat’s research is not south Asia 
specific, his observations and the constitutive elements of his work are far 
from compromised when the Middle Eastern cities at the centre of his analysis 
– Cairo, Istanbul and Tehran – are compared with cities of the Indian 
subcontinent. It is certainly true, for instance, that on any given working day 
in contemporary Mumbai 
 
‘one is astounded by the presence of so many people 
operating in the streets – walking, running around, 
standing, sitting, negotiating, driving, or riding on buses 
and trains’ (Bayat, 2010, p. 12). 
 
                                                 
37 See for example Sarkar (2019) and Thapar (2014) on the writing and teaching of history.   
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Across the megacities of the global south the street acts as a theatre of social 
conflict. It’s the place where collective solidarities are formed, breakdown, are 
crystallised and extended. In the context of many cities of the south (and 
indeed beyond) the urban poor are ‘compelled to operate, subsist, or simply 
live’ in the streets and public spaces of the city. Accordingly, public space 
‘becomes an indispensable asset, for capital, for people to survive, operate and 
reproduce life (Bayat, 2017, p. 96). Though Mumbai is host to a wide range of 
communities bound by religion, caste and ethnic identities and a high degree 
of segregation by neighbourhood and area of the city exists, Mumbaikars 
notably remain bound by intertwined lives, common social intercourse and 
shared historical circumstances (see Bayat, 2010, p. 12). 
Geographers of urban India have pointed out the particularities of ‘difference’ 
that constitute the social profile of Indian cities (Derickson, 2014; Parnell and 
Robinson, 2012; Robinson, 2015; Roy, 2015). Bombay/Mumbai is radically 
heterogeneous but at the same time marked by segregations around what Jim 
Masselos (1991) called ‘collective accustomed space’. Through socio-spatial 
practices – festivals and parades, aesthetic, culinary, religious and caste-based 
practices etc – social groups colonise urban space Masselos (1991, p. 39).38 
Mumbai can in this light be understood as a tightly woven urban socio-spatial 
landscape: quiet, upmarket, upper caste dominated residential streets connect 
to Hindu-dominated markets. These spaces coexist with the multiplicity of 
Muslim mohallas (Contractor, 2017b), lower-caste dominated ‘slums’ 
(Sharma, 2000) and Dalit quarters (Solanki, 2016) that constitute the spaces 
of the city – each example represents an engagement in the production of 
accustomed space. In this context, while the ‘actual’ street in concrete form is 
constituted by difference as much as solidarity and community, the concept of 
the political street allows us to focus on the means of articulation that aim to 
                                                 
38 Collective accustomed space is defined as ‘a perception of urban space derived through accustomed 
activity and accustomed time’ (Masselos, 1991, p. 39). See also Rahman (2019); Green (2019); Solanki 
(2016).  
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produce an imagined political community of Hindus out of the heterogeneity 
of urban public space.  
First of all, to better understand the dynamics of the political street, it is 
critical to note the fact that India’s everyday urban public spaces have 
definable gendered limits. Despite its relatively ‘cosmopolitan’ character 
Mumbai is of course no exception. This is not to say that women are in anyway 
absent or invisible. Indeed, the sight of women living and hustling on the 
streets of Mumbai, riding the city’s auto-rickshaws, buses and trains, working 
in retail and corporate jobs and moving through the city’s markets and malls is 
unremarkable. Yet even upper caste young professional women are well aware 
of the need to keep their wits about them. The city is very different place at 
night for women regardless of social status and class positionality (see 
Butcher, 2017; Phadke et al, 2011; Roy and Ong, 2011). The bodies that 
animate the political street are thus in the main, unmistakably male.  
 
In addition to recognising its gendered composition, when we talk about the 
political street we have to connect concrete spatial concerns to the ways in 
which communication increasingly connects with media saturation. As Bayat 
(2010, pp. 12-13) points out, given the density of modern cities and the rise of 
advanced communication technologies, the political street is the place par 
excellence for the formation of collective grievances. Access to cheap mobile 
data and the proliferation of low-cost handsets means that India’s internet 
population is largely ‘mobile’.39 As a result, digital gadgets – primarily smart 
phones – have become an increasingly visible part of everyday life in urban 
India. In this context, feelings and notions of belonging can swiftly generate 
‘extensive forging of sectarian, albeit “distanciated” communities along ethnic 
or religious lines’ (Bayat, 2010, p. 13). While social media can effectively 
aggregate multiple logics of resistance and dissent in public space (Juris, 2012; 
                                                 
39 See, BBC News. 2019. ‘Mobile data: Why India has the world’s cheapest’, BBC News, 18 March 
2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-47537201, last accessed 15 June 2020.  
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see also Rao, 2020) it also serves as a catalyst for the organisation, 
mobilisation and dissemination of BJP propaganda.  
 
In short, then, the political street intersects with social and mainstream media 
terrains. Accordingly, I argue with Assa Doron and Robin Jeffrey that in this 
context ‘it is possible to transmit messages relentlessly to very large sections of 
the population, as Modi and [the BJP] know well’ (Doron and Jeffrey, 2018, p. 
27). The widespread emergence of smart phones in India has profoundly 
affected the everyday social practices and connectivity of citizens (Doron and 
Jeffrey, 2013. pp. 2-10). With the financialisation of big data that characterises 
neoliberal ‘platform capitalism,’40 platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and 
Instagram have simultaneously become platforms for BJP propaganda.41 I 
show that in the case of Swachh Bharat and the International Day of Yoga, BJP 
media strategy draws energy from the political street.  
 
The iconography of ‘Brand Modi’ here is critical. While still Chief Minister of 
Gujarat, during the 2007 Gujarat state election campaign, Modi underwent a 
physical makeover, swapping his low-key stylisation as RSS organiser 
(paracharak) for that of well-groomed fashionista to position him as a 
modern, pragmatic “youth icon” (see figure 2). This coincided with the 
strategic consolidation of his ‘development man’ (vikas purush) persona. 
‘Brand Modi’ is at the centre of the aesthetic modernisation of the BJP.42 
Modi’s savvy use of social media platforms has placed him firmly as a man 
ahead of his times, and his team skilfully use platforms such as Twitter (from 
                                                 
40 At ‘the most general level’ platforms are digital infrastructures that position themselves as 
intermediaries to enable different users – ‘customers, advertisers, service providers, producers, 
suppliers, and even physical objects’ to interact. These platforms more often than not allow users to 
‘build their own products, services and market places’ (Srnicek, 2017, p. 43). 
41 While most Indian political parties now enjoy a substantial social media presence, the BJP have 
since at least 2012 largely outflanked other parties. In large part this situation has risen out of the 
popularity of Narendra Modi and his social media savvy campaigning.   
42 As Subir Sinha notes, BJP social media strategy is accordingly highly sophisticated. For instance, 
themes and terms used in Modi’s 2014 election campaign speeches were crowd sourced from posts, 
memes and comments collated from BJP social forums and platforms (Sinha, 2018, pp. 4165-4167). 
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2012) to reach out to Indian youth.43 Affinity and interaction with Bollywood 
stars and cricketers paired with explicit endorsement of youth culture and 
themes, have earned him millions of followers, re-tweets and massively 
boosted his popularity.44 Modi’s image straddles twin narratives: on the one 
hand he is presented as representative of traditional values and on the other, 
he is the face of a ‘new’ techno-friendly globalised India (Pal, 2015, p. 379). At 
the same time, the effect has been to associate Modi with Hindu cultural 
themes and paint other political leaders (Rahul Gandhi in particular) as aloof 




Figure 2: Brand Modi: from RSS man and Chief Minister of Gujarat (2001-2014) to 
fashion forward PM and world leader (2014- present).  
 
Following the smartphone revolution,45 cyberspace has progressively suffused 
public space; electronic media play an increasingly key role in the production 
of the public sphere. If according to Marshall Berman (1982, p. 196) the 
‘essential purpose’ of the street is ‘sociability and communication’, then in 
contemporary neoliberal conditions, following the proliferation of mobile 
devices/smart phones as powerful mediums of communication and 
information flows, media space and urban space increasingly conjoin (see 
Mcquire, 2008, p. 132). What this means is that mobile and social media 
                                                 
43 See for instance the ongoing propaganda/spin campaign on Twitter led by the BJP IT cell chief Amit 
Malviya. See Chaudhuri (2020). 
44 At the time of writing, compared to other world leaders, Modi (61.8 million) is currently only 
behind Barack Obama (122.1 million) and Donald Trump (85.7 million) in terms of Twitter followers. 
45 See Hands (2019) as well as Seymour (2019) with special reference to Twitter. 
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information flows connect to urban public space and can influence and 
organise spatial practices in various ways. The political street, then, is as much 
a space of technology, communication, and organisation as it is gendered and 
predominantly ‘male’. As we will see, further still, the concept of the political 
street is particularly apposite for our analysis given that well over half 
Mumbai’s population live in densely packed “slums” and on the pavements, 
living their days pursuing livelihoods out in the open.46  
 
Mumbai: the city ‘in extremis’ 
 
Mumbai is firmly characterised by ‘pavement culture’ where street vendors, 
informal labourers, municipal workers, beggars and street children merge 
within a multi-faceted street-based outdoor economy. This in turn results in 
many affluent urban professionals mixing into the dynamics of the informal 
economy and worlds of the urban poor in the streets on a regular basis. Taking 
Bayat’s cue that the street is the primary venue of politics and social conflict, it 
is thereby reasonable to claim that the street is inherently political. For 
communities that inhabit the streets, efforts are made to territorialise urban 
space. Social cleavages of class, caste and religion play a most important role. 
Mobilisation in the political street can in this light be understood as the 
production of ‘collective accustomed space’ (Masselos, 1991, p. 39). This 
relates to the circulation of symbols and signs, but also to embodied spatial 
practices (Gökariksel, 2009).  
 
This emphasis on political struggle and the street as a vital space where social 
antagonisms play out compliments the work of Henri Lefebvre. Lefebvre 
approached questions of politics in a dialectical relational mode, placing 
simultaneous emphasis on the ‘universalising tendencies’ of commodification 
and ‘moments of utopian possibility manifested within the contradictions of 
                                                 
46 There is some controversy around the usage of the term ‘slum’. See Gilbert (2007). The term is 
deployed throughout this thesis to denote the vast informal settlements in Mumbai, on the basis that 
the term used regularly by officials, NGOs and many ‘slum dwellers’ themselves. 
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everyday life’ (Kipfer, 2002, p. 126). In Lefebvre’s (2003) account, late-
capitalist ‘everyday life’ is the stage on which sociopolitical contradictions play 
themselves out. In the case of Mumbai, these logics and patterns have 
animated accounts of the ‘maximum city’ (Mehta, 2004). Alive and bustling, 
Mumbai is a city ‘in extremis’ where the “crowd” is a synecdoche for the city 
itself (Chaudhuri, 2006, p. 15). In this context, the primary venue for 
sociability and communication is the political street. 
 
In capitalist conditions, ancient symbolisms and views of the world, either in 
present form as works of art, architectural expressions and religious 
iconography, or as received language, symbolism and representation, are 
‘stripped of all value’ (Marx, 2015). Following Marx, Lefebvre argues that 
‘deprived of symbols’ men [sic] ‘feel they are at the mercy of things, of signals, 
of sounds (Lefebvre, 1995, p. 181).47 The logic of capital results in ‘the 
devastating conquest of the lived by the conceived, by abstraction’ (Lefebvre, 
2006, p. 10). As land and labour are commodified, historical space is 
secularised and stripped of its symbolic content and ritual. Accordingly, it is 
‘the market’ as opposed to ‘the ceremonial site becomes the primary locus of 
social activity’ (Wilson, 2013, p. 368). In this context  
 
‘each symbol acts as an affective and organic nucleus. It is 
not an innate archetype from the depths of time or being, 
nor is it a myth or some obscure existentialist matrix. It is 
a perceptible and perceived reality, the centre of a cycle 
and a socio-cosmic rhythm: the nucleus of family life, the 
                                                 
47 It is here that we can most clearly see the influence of Martin Heidegger on Lefebvre’s thought. In 
Heidegger’s terminology Alltäglicht, or ‘Everydayness’ is the space of custom, daily concerns and ‘idle 
talk’ (gerede). At different points in his work Lefebvre cites Heidegger’s idea of “poetic dwelling” 
positively and it is highly significant within his concept of the lived experience of everyday life. As 
Adam Sharr (2007, pp. 2-3) notes, ‘Heidegger mounts a broad critique of the technocratic western 
world, a call to arms, to reintegrate building with dwelling and the making of place with the activities 
and qualities of its habitation’. In this regard, the concept of everyday life should be seen as the 
application of Marx’s notion of alienation to Heidegger’s concept of everydayness: ‘everyday life is 
such that man is alienated’ (Elden, 2004, p. 113).  
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centre of the activity of the group throughout the day, the 
week or the year’ (Lefebvre, 2014, p. 347). 
 
Mumbaikars ‘remake the city and their world in countless ways’ (Prakash, 
2008, p. 12) as everyday urban experience confronts public cultural mediums, 
from cinema to mainstream and social media, artistic expression, public 
events and popular music. Yet simultaneously, the neoliberal city is moulded 
by elite desires to improve competitiveness, capital flow, and to marketise and 
develop spaces of social existence in the interests of capital. The neoliberal city 
fosters technocratic governance, policy and institutionalised politics. But it is 
also a space of political articulation. Amidst the radical heterogeneity of 
society, political parties bind together the ‘constituents of the social’; 
narratives of imagined political community become successful through 
effective articulation (de Leon, Desai and Tuğal, 2015, pp. 26-27). It is in this 
context that I argue that the territoriality of urban space effectively dissolves 
through the creative and performative theatricality of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan 
and the International Day of Yoga, as diverse strata of Mumbai society come 
together in the production of an imagined political community of Hindus.  
 
Hindutva is not, therefore, crudely reproduced in a passive and purely 
aesthetic way. It is active and well organised political project with historically 
specific means of articulation at its disposal. Through the spectacular and 
performative theatricality of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and the International 
Day of Yoga urban public spaces of the city are ‘colonised’. Henri Lefebvre 
used the term ‘colonisation’ to denote twin processes of the saturation of 
everyday life by capital and as the organisation of hierarchical territorial 
relations by the state. Understood in a strictly technical sense – the political 
organisation of space rather than a delimited category of European territorial 
expansion – ‘colonisation’ theorises the political organisation of territorial 
relations and state strategies of producing space (Kipfer and Goonewardena, 
2013, p. 2013). Through analysis of Swachh Bharat and the International Day 
of Yoga, this thesis aims to show that Narendra Modi’s BJP operates at the 
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level of the urban to (however incompletely) organise the hierarchical 
separation of social space and ‘forge unity out of disparity’ in and through the 
political street (see de Leon, Desai and Tuğal, 2015, p. 27).  
 
The political street, then, is an appropriate reference point from which to 
examine the politics of Hindutva in the neoliberal city. It is in the streets of the 
city; on the pavements; street corners and public transport; in the shops and 
parks and squares, that public opinions and common sentiments converge. 
The streets function as the interface of media and public space and primary 
spaces of sociability and communication. Everyday experiences in the political 
street extend beyond the physicality of the concrete to ‘signify crucial symbolic 
utterances […] and convey collective sentiments of nation and community’ 
(Bayat, 2010, p. 13; 2017, p. 105). Simply put, the lens of the political street 
focuses on the role of cultural production in the formation of social consent, 
self-identification and collective solidarity in urban public spaces. In the 
chapters that follow, I show that the precision of this analysis sheds light on 
Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and the International Day of Yoga in relation to the 
strategic-political objectives of Hindutva. The utility of this framework rests in 
its ability to capture the politics Hindutva within the urban rhythms of 
neoliberalism. 
 
1.6 Methodological reflections and case study selection 
 
This section of the chapter sets out to address some of the challenges faced in 
the writing of this thesis through a discussion of questions of method, 
epistemology and case study selection. There are multiple possible ways of 
approaching the question of how the ideology of Hindutva crystallises and 
becomes effective through the colonisation of the political street. Yet in any 
research project a methodological framework must be established. The politics 
of Hindutva are often discussed as if predicated upon a set of ideological 
positions that can be readily applied across India’s expansive cultural and 
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regional geography, including the multiple geographies of the Indian diaspora. 
I claim that it makes little sense to speak of Hindutva in separation from the 
social contexts in which it percolates (see Anderson and Longkumer, 2018, 
Blom Hansen, 1996). What follows is thus an attempt to make sense of a 
particular geographical variation of the connections between nationalist 
politics, religio-cultural expression and the political street, in relation to a 
more general process of capitalist accumulation and social struggle (Harvey, 
2006, p. 78).  
 
The initial thinking driving the research proposal for this work was to analyse 
Hindutva in comparative perspective with the Islamic-nationalist Milli Görüş 
(‘National View’) movement in Turkey.48 In the early stages of the research, I 
prepared a paper comparing the social bases of religious nationalism in India 
and Turkey, to be presented at a PhD workshop of the Historical Sociology and 
International Relations working group of the British International Studies 
Association at the University of Sussex. In this paper I asked how religious 
nationalists came to act as the principle agents of cultural production and 
community welfare in Bombay and Istanbul in the 1990s? And how in this 
climate, marginalised social groups voiced dissent and articulated matters of 
social justice? Though the paper was well received, criticism was forthcoming 
regarding the level of abstraction the argument was pitched at. These 
comments exposed me to the pitfalls of my comparative approach. In the 
main, the workshop raised a number of questions for me regarding to how I 
might try and capture how political strategy taps into the richness of everyday 
experience, beyond an attempt to draw parallels across to separate instances 
of far-right politics. I decided that this strategy ran the risk of superficiality 
and generalisation at the expense of contextual detail.  
                                                 
48 Though the primary focus would remain Hindutva, this idea was developed through engagement 
with Aijaz Ahmad’s (1995, p. 26) critique of the propensity of scholars to eschew comparative research 
and consider Indian politics as ‘unique’ and the alarming frequency in which discussions of Indian 





Though there are fascinating parallels between the Indian and Turkish 
experiences there are also some huge differences. In the context of my own 
research, I felt that I had been spending a lot of time trying to fit the two 
experiences together, as opposed to examining either case in sufficient depth. 
After initially registering this experience as a failure in my research design, 
through supervision and in dialogue with colleagues I realised that the 
exchanges in Sussex were invaluable. Despite the rich possibilities of the 
comparative angle I had proposed, at this stage in my efforts as a scholar – 
and in pursuit of doctoral research – it became clear to me that it would be 
more fruitful to draw illustrative comparisons to the politics of Hindutva to 
support my argument. It would be important to situate the Indian experience 
in the wider context of global political economy, but more so, to deliver on 
depth, detail and substance through explication of a single core case study. I 
return to this comparison in some depth in chapter six.  
 
Lurking within the argument outlined in the previous sections, is the question 
of case study selection and why the case studies of Swachh Bharat and the 
International Day of Yoga were chosen in the first place? In a bid to register 
the politics of Hindutva with everyday urban experience, I began an initial 
foray into the world of Indian cricket.49 In his seminal book on cricket and 
Empire, Beyond a Boundary (2005), C.L.R James lampoons the absurdity of 
histories of England that omit Victorian England’s most popular and 
influential character, the eminent cricketer W.G Grace. A similar observation 
can be made about India. After all, cricket, as Ashis Nandy (1989) famously 
put it, ‘is an Indian game accidently discovered by the British’. How, in this 
light, one might feasibly ask, can the modern history of Indian nationalism be 
understood without reference to Sachin Tendulkar? Mass spectator sport in a 
media saturated age is of course intimately connected with expressions of 
                                                 
49 There is a wide-ranging literature on nationalism and cricket in India. See in particular, Guha 
(2002) and Nandy (1989).  
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recognition, pride and national identity. National sports are popular cultural 
forms that shape individual and collective opinions and world-views (Barthes, 
2007). James’ argument for the importance of popular culture to political 
analysis is an attempt to grapple with the question of what makes people tick: 
‘what do men [sic] live by?’ (James, 2019). Given my aim to identify terrains of 
everyday social relations in the city through which nationalist identity and 
meaning is actively produced, cricket appeared to be an appropriate target.  
 
However, as my research into the formation of Hinduism and social history of 
Hindutva deepened, I began to uncover key themes – of the disciplined Hindu 
body, moral community/caste hierarchy and the idea of Hinduism as a world-
dynamic force – in the reproduction of Hindutva. I elaborate on these themes 
at length in chapter two (2.1). As the research progressed, I began to feel that 
these insights were being lost through an extended foray into the politics of 
sport and nationalism. Taking ‘cricket nationalism’ as a main focus of the 
research, however fruitful in its own right, would have run the risk of altering 
the coordinates of the thesis entirely. In this light, I decided that the case 
studies should a) connect directly to the activities of the Modi regime, b) 
directly relate to the reproduction of the themes I had identified through 
historical excavation, and c) generate sufficient evidence to test the primary 
arguments of the thesis.50 Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and the International Day 
of Yoga are exemplary cases of the performance of the nation in the street. 
They reflect service to the nation through public sanitation, health and 
spiritual cleanliness of the body respectively.  
 
Epistemology, fieldwork and sources  
 
It is evidently true that social research and the production of knowledge that 
results is never value-neutral. The intellectual curiosity underpinning this 
                                                 
50 This set of criteria was adapted from a PhD thesis prepared by Richard Seymour (2016, p. 84) at the 
London School of Economics.  
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research came from a three-month trip to India in 2014. Following the recent 
rise to power of Narendra Modi, many of the people I met expressed jubilation 
that India was poised to find its place in the world. Equally, many I engaged 
with spoke with trepidation and fear about the rise of ‘fascist’ Hindu 
nationalism in a country they believed was secular and liberal to the core. The 
prospect of a seemingly resurgent Hindutva in relation to the rising ‘populist 
wave’ battering liberal democracies elsewhere in the world, piqued an interest 
I decided could be fruitfully pursued through doctoral research. The thesis 
that follows is thus an interpretive project that is mediated by my own 
experience as much as my own political views. Taking this into consideration, 
it is fair to say that my approach has been guided by a rejection of the 
communalism of the RSS-BJP and a political commitment to the annihilation 
of caste in solidarity with Indian progressives.  
 
Based on the research questions guiding the present research, I decided that 
the methods employed should be qualitative in nature. The conceptual 
framework outlined above is animated by qualitative methods of ‘thick’ 
description, photography, informal, semi-structured interviews and document 
analysis. While it could be argued that that this approach occludes potentially 
fruitful quantitative approaches to the production of knowledge, it is my 
theoretical wager that the complexities of how political consciousness 
crystallises are best approached in a relational, dialectical manner (Bayat, 
2010; Harvey, 1989; 1994; 2007; 2008; Kipfer and Goonewardena, 2013; 
Lefebvre, 2003; 2014; Teltumbde, 2018; Wilson, 2013).  
 
As was discussed briefly in section 1.2 of this chapter, this thesis advances a 
historical argument to better understand the production of imagined 
community through the colonisation of urban public space in the political 
streets of Bombay/Mumbai. In the early stages of the research – to the extent 
that chapter three forms the historical backbone of the thesis – an element of 
archival work was undertaken in the India Office Records (IOR) at the British 
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Museum in London, beginning in May 2019 and ending in July 2019. This 
material included pamphlets, articles, letters and correspondence produced by 
the Indian National Congress. As well as judicial and police reports, letters 
and correspondence produced by the apparatus of British colonial rule. In 
addition to close study of the many rich works that focus on the social history 
of Bombay, the aim here was to build a picture for myself of the shifting social 
relations and nationalist politics of space that defined anti-colonial 
nationalism in Bombay during the late-colonial period. Additionally, chapter 
three draws extensively from the oral history of the Bombay mill districts 
collected in the edited volume One Hundred Years, One Hundred Voices 
(2005) which was also consulted between May and July 2019. This helped 
gain a picture of the everyday life of communist Bombay that was guided and 
contextualised by the narratives of political struggle voiced by the mill workers 
themselves.  
 
A range of secondary sources were also consulted through the period of 
researching the thesis in order to build as broad a picture of the subject matter 
as possible. Thus, in addition to consulting various government, non-
government and project specific documents (on Swachh Bharat and the 
International Day of Yoga), special reference was made to the work of scholars 
of Indian politics and Hindutva such as Aijaz Ahmad (2004; 2015), B.R 
Ambedkar (1946; 2014; 2016), Chetan Bhatt (1997; 2001), Rajnarayan 
Chandavarkar (1994; 1998; 2009), Manali Desai (2012; 2015; 2016), Thomas 
Blom Hansen (1999; 2001), Christophe Jaffrelot (1996; 2007) and Anand 
Teltumbde (2005; 2018). I also made extensive use of the materials and 
holdings at the British Library, University of London’s Senate House and the 
South Asia collections at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS). 
Additionally, I spent a significant amount of time online and in the library at 
the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) looking through the newspaper 
archives of the Times of India, editions of Economic & Political Weekly, The 
Caravan and back catalogues of independent news websites Scroll.in, 
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Outlook, India Today and The Wire, searching and reading for opinion and 
commentary on Swachh Bharat, the politics of yoga and Hindutva in general. 
Many conversations with students and staff at TISS greatly enhanced this 
work.  
 
Chapters four and five were primarily based on fieldwork conducted in 
Mumbai between November 2019 and February 2020. It is worth taking a bit 
of space to discuss this process in detail. The aim of undertaking the fieldwork 
element of the research was to attempt to answer my research question(s) by 
employing my selected set of methods, as opposed to simply interpreting what 
I found and then trying to filter it back through the conceptual framework 
outlined above. Instead, I looked to approach the research process and 
importance of ‘doing theory’ as an open-ended structure of argumentation, 
that would be ‘sensitive to encounters with the complex ways in which social 
processes are materially embedded in the web of life’ (Harvey, 2006, p. 78). 
Following a reading of David Harvey’s writings on his approach to research 
methodology, I decided that my aim should be to make sure that my approach 
to political sociology would be ‘informed and advanced by case study work’ 
and not the other way around (see Harvey, 2006, pp. 78-79).  
 
Researching the subject of Hindutva in contemporary India raises a series of 
problems, not least the fact that the current regime is characterised by a 
profoundly anti-intellectual disposition. Freedom of expression, dissident 
intellectual culture and that which the RSS-BJP deems to be ‘anti-national’ 
activity is not tolerated. Media outlets, scholars and universities have been 
subject to censorship, repression and violence. At the extreme end of the 
spectrum, open critics of Hindutva, from the social activist and writer 
Narendra Dabholkar, to the journalist-activist Gauri Lankesh, have been 
murdered in cold blood by individuals close to the Sangh Parivar. With 
regards to my own research, following the growing anti-intellectual culture in 
the country and attempts by the government to supress international 
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criticism, the process of obtaining an Indian research visa was a difficult 
process. Visas are frequently denied – or simply kicked into the long grass – 
on the grounds that proposals relate to issues deemed politically sensitive. 
Additionally, people ‘deviating’ from there declared intentions while in India, 
in particular those participating in activism and/or protest, have had their 
visas revoked with immediate effect.51 In my own case, after considerable 
difficulties and a very long wait, simplified and watered-down version of my 
research visa proposal was eventually accepted.  
 
As a consequence, during my time in Mumbai – which coincided with mass 
anti-government protests connected to the Citizenship (Amendment) Act – I 
was forced to tread carefully and attempt to avoid contention, lest I 
compromise the opportunity to conduct research in the field. Additionally, due 
to the politically sensitive nature of my subject matter, I opted for a strategy of 
not openly advertising the content of a research project that would 
undoubtedly be deemed ‘anti-national’. On the ground, I spent a significant 
amount of time with the various beach clean-up movements in the city; 
learning from and working with activists concerned with the issue of manual 
scavenging; and at The Yoga Institute at Santa Cruz.  
 
Over eight consecutive weekends I visited various beach clean-up movements 
at Dadar, Mahim and Versova. I took part in the clean ups, conducted 
observations, wrote field notes and took photographs. From time to time, in 
place of general conversation, informal interviews were conducted with 
various beach volunteers. Interviewees were selected on the basis of their 
proximity to the beach clean-up movements and their status as ‘volunteers’.  
                                                 
51 For example, Jakob Lindenthal, a German exchange student studying at the Indian Institute of 
Technology (ITT) at Chennai, was effectively deported for joining anti-CAA protests and posting 
critical opinions about the legislation on social media. The official explanation was that he had 
violated the terms of his visa. During my time in Mumbai at the Tata Institute of the Social Sciences 
(TISS) several warnings were sent to foreign students via email and I was warned personally by 
International Relations Office staff to stay away from all protests or ‘face the consequences’. 
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In the end, I also managed to get close access to the people at the centre of 
Mahim Beach Clean-up. Informal interviews took place with Indraneil 
Sengupta and Rabia Tewari, the founders of Mahim Beach Clean-up after two 
of the weekend clean-ups. Regarding the research into manual scavenging and 
Swachh Bharat semi-structured interviews with SKA activists took place over a 
series of several weeks. Again, the aim was to speak to people that had 
knowledge of manual scavenging and the status of sanitation workers on the 
ground. I also accompanied these activists to a BMC sanitation worker 
meeting in south Mumbai. The meeting doubled as the launch of Kaamgar 
Patrika magazine. Here I was able to field questions towards and informally 
interview several sanitation workers working in the district. I also 
accompanied SKA activists to investigate the 2019 Govandi death case, where 
I further interviewed the activists I had been in contact with. For reasons of 
anonymity and safety of the activists their names have been changed within 
the thesis (see page 7). In all cases of interview – informal or semi-structured, 
my project was explained, and consent forms designed by the Birkbeck College 
Graduate Research School were issued.  
 
My research at The Yoga Institute was based on taking part in a one week 
‘Yogic way of life’ course. However, in the context of being surrounded by avid 
supporters of Narendra Modi, I confined myself to talking about Indian yoga 
and the international day of yoga over political questions. Observation was 
aimed at the production of thick description. While I did more formally 
interview the director of the Institute, Hansa Yogendra, this was done on the 
basis of finding out more about how it operates, its curriculum and its 
outreach activities without broaching politically sensitive questions. After the 
course had finished I continued to attend the Institute every Wednesday for a 
yoga class and attended the morning Satsang (Sunday morning gathering and 
prayers) several times before I left Mumbai. While it could be argued that 
elements of my engagement over the course of the fieldwork conducted at the 
Yoga Institiye was insincere, my response is to simply assert that it would have 
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been impossible to conduct the research openly and brazenly given the current 
political climate.  
 
In terms of ‘method’, then, it could be said that the material generated through 
these streams of research loosely fits with the principles of ethnography. This 
aspect of the research resembles what Clifford Geertz (1973) famously called 
thick description. To avoid the reproduction of overly empirical ‘menial 
observations’, my aim was to develop an interpretative methodology with a 
commitment to historical circumstances, clarification and contextual detail. 
Additionally, in a bid to capture, record and communicate ‘thick descriptions’ 
of my subject matter, photography, images and film were brought into the 
ambit of the research (see Kharel, 2015). Taken as a whole, the methodological 
approach of the thesis can be classified as an attempt to present a ‘thick’ 
description of events composed of facts, data, images and information, but one 
that also consists of observation, commentary and interpretation. As will 
hopefully become clear in what follows, the ultimate aim has been to produce 
an argument that is at once historical, contextual and relational.  
 
Even so, my experience conducting fieldwork in Mumbai raised a set of 
problems that I had not anticipated. Most important to me was the problem of 
unequal social relations between myself and the activist-researchers I engaged 
with in the city. Regarding chapter four, the research process involved 
engaging with activists and organisations working on the issue of manual 
scavenging. The perspectives, narratives and stories of many of these activists 
– and my experiences while tagging along with them as a researcher – have 
contributed immensely to the production of this thesis. My access to 
knowledge and the first-hand experiences I gained were almost entirely 
brokered by others. Yet, problematically, these researchers, activists and 
workers are rendered more or less invisible – apart for when directly quoted 
within an interview or field note – within the text that follows. It is thus 
important to clarify the role of others in facilitating and influencing the 
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orientation of my own research in Mumbai. I also feel that it is important to 
take heed of the spirit of collaboration offered to me by the activist-scholars 
that I worked alongside, in a bid to make myself and the knowledge I have 
generated through research useful in the fight against caste discrimination and 
manual scavenging.52 Collaborative work is in the pipeline and the 
relationships and friendships that I made continue to flourish. My hope is that 
this goes some way towards offsetting my own (selfish) interest going to 
Mumbai, namely, the pursuit of doctoral research.  
 
Second, having thought out the research design of the project while based in 
London, my aim in Mumbai was to immerse myself in the general political 
climate and investigate the politics of Swachh Bharat and yoga for myself. 
However, in the event, the methods I selected were altered and negotiated 
through engagement with the subject matter of research while in the field. 
When it came to seeking people to speak with and informally interview, social 
media (Twitter in particular) ended up becoming an important tool to discover 
the when and where of what was going on in Mumbai regarding the activities 
and events relevant to my research. Social media also allowed me to get in 
touch with and track the beach clean-up movements discussed in chapter four 
and their role in the environmental activism in the city. What I didn’t expect, 
was the propensity of the beach clean-up movements to regularly ‘post’ or 
‘Tweet’ opinions and political statements on social media. This ended up 
generating a significant amount of material that I would go on to use to 
support my arguments. In a similar way, increased engagement with social 
media channels led me to pay much more attention to the social media 
                                                 
52 For an excellent discussion of the problems associated with ‘brokering researchers’ – and a guide to 
where I have taken my cues on the matter– see the article ‘Moving Out of the Backstage: How Can We 
Decolonize Research?’ Disorder of Things, 22 October 2019, 
https://thedisorderofthings.com/2019/10/22/moving-out-of-the-backstage-how-can-we-decolonize-
research/, last accessed 12 May 2020. I take a further cue here from activist-scholars such as bell 
hooks who have, for example, urged researchers to consider spaces outside the confines of academic 
exchange as venues for the publication of work, free of ‘high abstraction’ and obscure, ‘jargonistic 
language’ with the aim of engaging a wider public (hooks, 1994, 64). 
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strategy of the office of Narendra Modi, again yielding fruitful material to 
support the arguments of the thesis in chapters four and five.   
 
1.7 Structure of the thesis  
 
 
The thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter two offers preliminary definitions in a 
bid to serve conceptual clarity around key terms deployed within the thesis. To 
begin with I run through the historical formation of Hinduism, in order to 
proffer a definition of Hindutva and its relation to Hinduism. The crux of the 
argument is that the Hindu ‘chain of reasoning’ established as the defacto 
culture of Indian national identity during the late-colonial period continues to 
shape nationalist politics in the present. The chapter then turns to sketch out a 
brief history of Indian neoliberalism. Here I focus on the transition from a 
Fordist economy of industrial production to one of flexible neoliberal 
accumulation that characterises the contemporary city. In particular, by 
mapping the Great Textile Strike of 1982-83 and corresponding shift from 
mills to malls (or rather, Bombay to Mumbai). By tracing the transformation 
of social worlds wrought by neoliberalism and its discontents after 1980, I set 
the scene for critical analysis of contemporary performative strategies of 
Hindutva politics (Swachh Bharat and the International Day of Yoga) in 
chapters four and five. Finally, the chapter accounts for the role of the Indian 
National Congress as an enabling force in the resurgence of Hindutva politics 
after 1980. I do so with reference to the political articulation of ‘soft’ Hindutva 
politics by the Congress as a means to stay relevant in the post-Nehruvian, 
neoliberal era.  
 
Chapter three examines the formation of the political street between India and 
Empire, with special reference to the historical relationship between 
Hinduism, nationalism and the city. To better understand why the ideology of 
Hindutva is so effective, I examine the role of Ganpati Utsava, nationalist civil 
disobedience in the city, and the Bombay communist movement in the 
formation of the political street. My argument is that these three movements 
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represent a theatrical colonisation of urban public space, forged between anti-
colonialism and exclusionary Hindu nationalism that continues to resonate in 
the present. The chapter, then, maps a history of mass politics in the city to 
show how a Hindu chain of reasoning has shaped performance of the nation in 
the street from everyday religious ritual, to the overtly political, from the late-
colonial period to the present. The overall contribution of this chapter to the 
thesis is to offer historical and sociological context to the means of articulation 
(Swachh Bharat and the International Day of Yoga) analysed in chapters four 
and five. Taken together, chapters two and three prepare the ground for an 
examination of ‘new’ strategies of Hindutva politics that converge in the 
performance of the nation in the street in contemporary Mumbai.  
 
Chapters four and five offer detailed case studies Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and 
the International Day of Yoga respectively. Chapter four develops an analysis 
of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan in Mumbai as a pivotal aspect in the political 
strategy of Hindutva forces to transfigure India into the Hindu rashtra. I argue 
that the underlying motivations of Swachh Bharat are twofold: the better 
management of urban space and reinforcement of caste-based Hindu social 
order. Critically, these motivations generate a sense of imagined political 
community that centres on the idea of a resurgent Hindu nation and operates 
through the colonisation of urban space by Hindutva. To substantiate these 
claims, the chapter examines how the politics of Hindutva become effective 
through the metabolisation of bourgeois environmentalist practices and 
incorporation of the reconstituted practice of manual scavenging into the 
coherent narrative of a ‘Clean India’. These practices, I argue, are combined 
into a powerful politics of spatial purification, as the Gandhian discourse that 
‘cleanliness is next to godliness’ is appropriated and shaped to generate a mass 
performance of the nation tied to the politico-theistic ambitions of the BJP.  
 
In chapter five, I extend the analysis of the performance of the nation in the 
street to the International Day of Yoga. Under the leadership of Narendra 
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Modi, the RSS-BJP have decisively moved to claim yoga for Hindutva. On the 
one hand, the Sangh has moved to standardise yoga as reflective of Hindutva 
values, and on the other, commandeer globalised neoliberal lifestyle choices 
and bodily desires– of health, physical fitness and holistic wellness – into the 
Hindutva project. As a result, Hindutva forces piggyback on the global 
popularity of yoga to produce a spectacular sense of imagined political 
community that pivots on the colonisation of urban public spaces. Through 
promotion of an increasingly standardised, patriotic yoga; dissemination of 
Hindutva-friendly values through the International Day of Yoga; and 
propagation of the narrative of India as ‘Vishwa Guru’ (spiritual guide) to the 
world, Indian (read: Hindu) national pride and being-in-the-world is 
underscored. Ultimately, then, this chapter shows how the politics of Hindutva 
intersect with the global commodification of yoga and the late-colonial 
imaginary of Hinduism as a ‘world-dynamic’ force to generate a sense of 
imagined political community at home.  
 
Chapter six, the concluding chapter of the thesis, takes some space to recap 
and elaborate on the primary argument and key themes of the thesis – that 
performance of the nation in the street is a critical part of the political strategy 
for the realisation of the RSS project, where what matters is not the facts, but 
the fictional consistency of the narrative. Subsequently, I return to the existing 
literature set out in chapter one and mark out how the thesis has contributed 
to scholarly discussion. Next, I offer some concluding thoughts and opinions 
with special reference to the question of shortcomings, unresolved areas and 
openings for future research. Recalling the context and significance of the 
thesis, I end by considering potential sources of counter-politics in the 
political street. Finally, I place this examination of ‘new’ strategies of Hindutva 
politics that converge in the performance of the nation in the street in global 







Preliminary definitions: Hindutva, neoliberalism and 
Congress decline as enabling force 
 
‘Amorphous and protean, Hinduism cannot be 
used for prolonged political mobilization on 
confessional grounds alone, as the BJP has 
discovered; whatever primeval furies it evokes 
must be combined with rational calculations 
based on other factors, such as class and caste 
loyalties’. 
- Pankaj Mishra (2013b, p. 142) 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter sketches out a set of concepts and definitions that are put to work 
within the thesis by drilling down to discuss the key themes elaborated in 
chapter one. The focus is on definitions of Hindutva, Indian neoliberalism and 
the enabling role of the Congress in the rise of Hindutva politics. At the same 
time, I tell a story of Hindutva, neoliberalism and the decline of the Indian 
National Congress as key to the formation of the contemporary political street. 
Altogether, the chapter supports the argument that at the same time as 
Hindutva has become the defacto culture of the nation, it has become a critical 
means of political articulation of both the Sangh and the Congress against 
neoliberalism and its discontents.  
 
I begin by mapping the relationship between Hinduism as a religio-cultural 
system and the formation of a singular, unitary Hinduism in conjunction with 
the emergence of Indian nationalist thought (2.2). I focus in particular on the 
significance of Orientalism and primordial understandings of ‘the nation’ in 
the historical formation of these social categories. Subsequently, I discuss how 
Hindutva draws aspects of a singular, unitary Hinduism into a historically 
specific articulation of nationalist politics (2.3). I then shift gear to argue that 
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India is very much a part of global trends in the uneven extension of neoliberal 
capitalist development. To this end, I offer a definition of Indian neoliberalism 
as a ‘slow and cautious’ political project for the reconstitution of ruling class, 
upper caste power (see Desai, 2012, p. 29; Harvey, 2005). In doing so, I also 
show that the history and logics of capitalist accumulation cannot be 
disconnected from the politics of social development and lived patterns of 
everyday life that shape urban India, with special reference to Mumbai (2.4). 
Finally, I take some space to elaborate the role of the Congress party after 
1980 in the positioning of Hindutva as defacto culture of the nation in the 
context of Indian neoliberalism (2.5). Despite the seeming complexity of this 
arrangement, the present chapter has a modest aim. What follows is not an 
attempt to capture the origins and development of Hindutva in all its 
complexity. Nor is it to provide a narrative history around its rise. Instead, the 
aim is to address a set of themes that emerged in the late-colonial period that I 
suggest are central to the politics of Hindutva in neoliberal Mumbai.  
 
2.2 The historical formation of Hinduism 
 
To understand how Hinduism has been appropriated and reconfigured by 
Hindutva as a political force to make claims on power, national identity and 
the future of the nation-state, it will be necessary to understand the historical 
formation of a Sanskritised unified Hinduism. This means accounting for the 
historical formation of Hinduism within the tensions between India and 
Empire. Prior to the seizure of Bengal by the East India Company and the 
incorporation of India into British empire a century later, far from a 
monolithic religious system, ‘Hinduism’ was more akin to ‘a juxtaposition of 
flexible religious sects’ (Zavos, 2000, p. 25). There is thus a long history of 
Hinduism as a way of life for the majority of people in India. Properly 
understood as a complex religio-cultural system, Hinduism, with its distinct 
concepts of dharma (duty, morality or ‘way of life’); karma (the principle of 
cause and effect); samsara (reincarnation); and moksha (liberation) pervades 
key aspects of life for the vast majority of the population. Hinduism contains 
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distinct lineages. For example, followers of Krishna (Vaishnavas) are distinct 
from followers of Shiva (Shaivites) and a whole raft of festivals, holy sites, 
shrines, gods and pilgrimage routes are in circulation, shared and celebrated 
by some and relatively unimportant to others. The Hindu religion therefore 
contains a wide range of complex idiosyncratic expressions and practices 
across sects, communities and regions. In this regard, the term “Hinduism” 
has always been conditioned by highly contextualised meanings and uses (see 
for example, Anderson, 2013; Knott, 2016; Thapar, 2014; Vertovec, 2000, 
p.4). 
 
‘Hindu’ in its form as a name depicting a set of religious practices appeared in 
Indian sources around the fourteenth century AD. Its origins rest in it being a 
geographical concept to denote the people living beyond the Sindhu (Indo-
Aryan/Vedic Sanskrit name for the Indus river). By the fourteenth century, 
according to the Mughals, ‘Hindu’ came to describe all those living beyond the 
Indus that were not Muslims (Thapar, 2014, p. 10). When the British arrived 
in India they were ‘appalled and impressed’ by the mass of gods, religious 
sects and cults they found in equal measure. Their response, in collaboration 
with Western-educated Indian elites, was to bring the range of Hindu sects 
under one umbrella and impose ‘uniformity’ through the social engineering of 
‘a newly minted “Hinduism” (Mishra, 2002).  
 
The ‘successful’ colonisation of the Indian subcontinent by British imperial 
forces was reliant on the manufacture of social difference based in signifiers of 
race, religion and caste. With limited resources and “man power” drawn in 
from across the Empire, the ability of the British forces to gain a hold in India 
rested in the ability of the colonisers to promote disunity within the 
subcontinent. The patchwork of distinct societies that inhabited the vast land 
mass – characterised by internal ethnic, caste, linguistic, dynastic, social and 
confessional fragmentation – posed no serious resistance to British territorial 
ambitions and as a result, colonial policy set out to exacerbate and crystallise 
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these differences (Anderson, 2013, pp. 11-12). Drawing from ethnographic 
studies and the writings of colonial administrators, the colonisers officially 
reified ethnic, caste and religious identities (Dirks, 2001). In consequence, all 
those Indians who were not Muslim or Christian became “Hindu” by default. 
The historical formation of a unitary Hinduism is indebted to the 
crystallisation of these social categories. With this in mind, let us turn to a 
discussion of the intertwined projects of British imperialists and conservative 
Indian elites in the formation of Hinduism as a unitary religion. 
 
Orientalist imperial visions 
 
A popularised vision of how the British saw the state of India can be gleaned 
from James Mill’s imperial classic, The History of British India (1975 [1817]). 
Mill argued that India represented a ‘hideous state of society’. His vision of the 
subcontinent as static and unchanging led him to claim that ‘in beholding the 
Hindus of the present day, we are beholding the Hindus of many ages past; 
and are carried back, as were, into the deepest recesses of antiquity’ (Mill, 
1975, pp. 246-248). A similar expression of imperial racial taxonomy – 
consistent with the variant of liberal ‘progress’ in vogue at the time – is found 
in Thomas Babington Macaulay’s acknowledgement that the British colonists 
in India ‘behaved like Spartans confronting Helots’. Macaulay admitted in no 
uncertain terms that ‘we are here dealing with a ‘race of sovereigns’, or 
‘sovereign caste’, wielding absolute power over its ‘serfs’. This is not of course 
to say that he doubted the right of the British to rule over the ‘natives’ in the 
colonies (Losurdo, 2014, p. 250). It is, nonetheless, revealing to note that 
British imperial tropes were routinely laden with references to classical 
civilisations. 
 
Indeed, ‘stories of Greece and Rome’ writes Duncan Bell (2016, p. 122) 
‘provided a common frame of reference, a claim of authority, and a productive 
repertoire of images and arguments for a classically educated elite to interpret 
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contemporary culture and politics’. The ability to conquer India planted the 
idea of British Empire as a standard bearer for material, scientific and 
intellectual progress at the centre of Victorian intellectual life. Masters of their 
environment, the prevailing feeling among British imperialists was that the 
“Anglo-Saxon race” was ideally qualified to rule. This conception of Anglo-
Saxon political community amongst British liberal political thinkers filtered 
into the notion of a “Greater Britain” that would unify Britain and its white 
settler colonies (Bell, 2011; 2016). This imagined community did not, however, 
extend to British India. The problematic of race that the system of Empire 
threw up, duly informed British conceptions of India’s ‘difference’ (Metcalf, 
1994, p. x). At the same time, visions of Anglo-Saxon ‘Aryan’ supremacy 
became more deeply rooted.  
 
The discursive construction of British authority/superiority over the colonial 
world was not, of course, developed in a vacuum. It was pioneered on the 
ground by scholar-administrators of Empire, in close configuration with the 
practice of governance and consolidation of anthropology as an academic 
discipline. Typical in this sense is the anthropological reification of ethnic and 
caste identity and its impact on British colonial military policy. Following the 
Indian mutiny of 1857, a perceived sense of ‘martial fitness’ and ‘inbred 
martial skill’ was conferred upon – and thus seen to distinguish – select 
groups (on the assumption of their ‘Aryan’ decent) in north India and Nepal. 
These ‘castes’ were thought of in contrast to the ‘effeminate’ races of south 
India. ‘Martial identities’, then, became bound up with colonial governance 
and economy (Barkawi, 2017, p. 21; Metcalf, 1994; p. 125). Produced through 
physical interaction with Indian society and bolstered by popular academic 
disciplines; language, race and religion became the vital triad identifying the 
uniqueness of a ‘civilisation’ (Roychowdhury and Randhawa, 2015, p. 102).53  
 
                                                 
53 Roychowdhury and Randhawa (2015) note the history of religions and comparative linguistics, 
alongside developing disciplines of biological evolutionism and physical anthropology as of central 
importance.  
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This all amounted to Orientalist ideas of Aryan supremacy and effeminate 
races, becoming the primary framework for the interpretation of South Asian 
societies.54 A timeless sense of division between Muslim, Hindu and other 
non-Hindu communities, and the notion of Brahmanical values as tantamount 
to an Indian ‘culture’, informed imperial visions of an ‘Asiatic’ society. Further 
still, these distilled British ideas of Indian society were coeval with the growth 
of ethnological race science in the wider colonial world (Bayly, 2008, p. 126). 
For the British, the ‘expressive core of culture-civilization’ was ‘Sanskrit, 
Aryan, Hinduism’ (Vanaik, 2017, p. 418). At a substantial level, then, British 
colonial rule served to valorise the idea of the subcontinents primordial and 
essentially ‘religious’ character. For our present purposes, what this means, is 
that colonial governance significantly contributed to the discursive 
amalgamation of diverse peoples into a singular ‘Hindu’ identity.  
 
Primordial Indian visions  
 
The Orientalist triptych of Sanskrit-Aryan-Hinduism was not, however, the 
work of the colonists alone. It was crystallised into a distinctly primordial 
conception of Hinduism – and by extension the idea of a nation of Hindus – 
by Indian elites. This section of the chapter fleshes out the proposition that 
‘native’ Indian elites were not passive recipients of colonial knowledge. As 
moralists and social reformers, they actively engaged in Orientalist debates 
and advanced many of the key tenets underpinning these ideas. As we will see 
                                                 
54 A brief note on the term Orientalism. The production of colonial knowledge has been subjected to 
close academic scrutiny. The most famous critic of the production of colonial knowledge in relation to 
the domination of colonised peoples has been Edward W. Said. Said’s primary argument in 
Orientalism (1978) can be usefully deployed to draw a line between the discursive-literary production 
of racialised, ‘inferior’ beings and their material exploitation within the historical system of 
colonialism by imperial powers. However, given the materialist approach of this thesis, in my view, 
the Saidian framework is unsuitable. Despite its evident power, the novelty of Said’s approach, as Fred 
Halliday (1993, p. p. 148) pointed out, was to negate an earlier body of scholarship anchored in the 
Marxist tradition and make a clean break with materialist analysis. The result is a kind of pervasive 
‘Orientalist’ ambience that ascribes a virtually unlimited domination to the exercise of colonial 
power/knowledge (Sarkar, 2012, p.241). By contrast, I draw more from the critique of Orientalist 
scholarship set forth by Abdel-Malik (1963) as well as Maxine Rodinson (2015). For a tight critique of 
Said’s work, deeply critical of his method albeit from a position of solidarity with his politics, see Aijaz 
Ahmad’s (1994) In Theory: nations, classes, literatures. 
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in chapter three, this knowledge came together in the political street. 
Primarily, these ideas were propagated through the engagement of Indian 
elites with the mushrooming nationalist organisations and societies of their 
social milieu. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, British colonial 
domination took on a relatively stable form across the subcontinent. At the 
same time, autonomous popular movements and intelligentsia based All-India 
nationalism emerged as powerful counterpoints to colonial domination 
(Sarkar, 1989, p. xvi). For much of the Indian intelligentsia, Hinduism became 
explicably intertwined with the emerging question of national identity. 
Through the paradigm of European Orientalist scholarship, the idea of 
religious community as the ‘basic identity of Indian society’ took root. 
Brahmanical textual sources formed the cornerstone (Thapar, 2014, p. p.78). 
 
In the mission to define the Indian nation in juxtaposition to British colonial 
rule, three themes of colonial scholarship struck a chord with nationalist 
thinkers. First, nationalists on all sides appear to have taken the Orientaist 
idea of Hinduism and Islam as monolithic and separate religions as given. In 
the main, Hinduism and Islam were taken as entirely separate uniform 
systems of belief, as opposed to flexible open-ended experiences that 
developed in a historical context of cultural exchange and social intercourse.55 
As we will see, in the hands of an influential stream of nationalist thinkers, 
‘the nineteenth-century perception of religion in India moved from its earlier 
relative fluidity at the popular level into a defined pattern with indelible 
boundaries’ (Thapar, 2014, p. 124). The idea of Hindu and Muslim 
communities as separate cultures with little to no cultural commonality was 
broadly codified into different strains of nationalist thought on the 
subcontinent. Thus, Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s Muslim League characterised 
Indian Muslims as ‘a nation’, while the Congress blended aspects of secular 
and Hindu nationalism, even while claiming to stand for secular nationalism 
                                                 
55 See for instance Green (2011).  
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unequivocally against the communalism of the Muslim League (Vanaik, 2017, 
pp. 998-999).  
 
Second, in the context of European ‘race science’, ideas of Aryanism 
powerfully informed Hindu revivalist currents. Among the scholarly currents 
that contributed to these ideas, nationalist interpretations of ‘Aryan race 
theory’ began to appear in the journals of newly minted anthropological 
societies as early as 1863. Take for instance, Gannender Mohun Tagore, a 
professor of Hindu law and Bengali language at University College London 
(1861-5), who wrote in The Transactions of the Ethnological Society of 
London of the contrast between the ‘wild independence’ of Indian aboriginal 
tribes and the ‘superior genius’ of the ‘Aryan race’.56 Beyond the anecdotal, 
various historians of colonial India have noted that many colonial-era 
anthropologists, concerned with a racial-ethnographic reading of caste, 
identified a hierarchical caste-based social landscape where some groups were 
more historically “evolved” than others.57 “Brahminised” Indians, Susan Bayly 
(2008, pp. 128-129) explains,  
 
‘were identified by ethnologists as those who possessed 
superior Aryan blood, meaning that they were supposedly 
descended from the same racial ‘stock’ as the white 
European, whose key ethnological endowment was the 
capacity to achieve ‘nationhood’. 
 
These ideas came to animate key nationalist intellectuals and politicians, 
including proponents of Hindutva ideas.58 The idea of a deep lineage of Vedic 
                                                 
56 Quoted in Bayly (2008, p. 126).  
57 It is worth noting the remarkable similarity in the logic of this argument to that communicated by 
the likes of James Mill and his contemporaries, as discussed above.  
58 Key nationalist thinkers, from Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902) to the Bombay judge and social 
reformer Mahadev Govind Ranade (1842-1901), founder of the Arya Samaj Dayananda Saraswati 
(1824-1883) and revolutionary nationalist Aurobindo Ghose (1872-1950) modified the term ‘Aryan’ in 
conjunction with their ideas of religious revivalism, social reform and nationalist thought (Bhatt, 
2001, p. 14). An important source of ‘practices of self-identification’ in this mode can be traced to the 
increasing importance of ‘representation by religious community’, as critical to livelihoods and access 
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Aryan civilisation, then, became a largely unquestioned fact for large swathes 
of the Indian intelligentsia and a ‘linear paradigm’ for the form of an emergent 
national identity for India (Bhatt, 2001, p. 14). The consequence of this 
conjuncture was that ideas of race, religion and caste became integral to the 
question of Indian independence, the proposed character of the future nation 
and ideas of the place and role of Hinduism in world history. Fundamentally 
racist ideas of Aryan supremacy were thus in popular circulation throughout 
British empire and beyond. It was only later that these themes would go on to 
animate the racialised ideology of Nazi Germany (Ilaiah, 2016). While strict 
connotations of ‘race’ and the logics of white supremacy underpinning 
Aryanism were abandoned, the ‘xenological’ connotations of the term 
remained (Bhatt, 2001, p. 15). The important point to take away here – as will 
be discussed below – is that these themes inspired the development of a 
distinct ideology of Hindu nationalism under the aegis of ‘Hinduness’ – or 
Hindutva – and propagation of the ‘Hindu way of life’.  
 
Finally, passionate debates over the role of caste in Hinduism and its place in 
the future nation, gripped Indian political thought in broad sense (see Bayly, 
2008). Critically, a significant stratum of Indian elites concerned with the 
making of the Hindu nation avowed the Aryan ‘race genius’ of the Hindus in 
defence of caste. A key example is that of the influential Hindu missionary and 
social reformer, Swami Vivekananda.59 A pivotal figure in the historical 
formation of Hindu nationalism, it is true that Vivekananda made disparaging 
                                                 
to economic resources under British colonial rule (Thapar, 1989, p.229). The aftermath of the 1857 
rebellion caused particular unease amongst the British and gave birth to a new desire on behalf of the 
coloniser to ‘understand the native mind’, to the extent that the very future of British rule in India was 
seen to be at stake. In this context, how to deal with and control the vast diversity of Indian peoples 
became a question of central concern (Gopal, 2019, p. 44). To be sure, this process was undergirded 
by the concerns of the British colonial state after 1857, especially regarding the classification and 
calculation of the subcontinent’s peoples ‘each possessing its own “essences” and qualities’ (Bayly, 
2008, p. 98). Post-1857, company rule was reconstituted under the auspices of the British crown, 
resulting in what Nicholas Dirks (2001) has called the ‘Ethnographic State’. 
59 Born into an English educated bourgeois family in Calcutta in 1863, Narendranath Datta gained the 
monastic name ‘Vivekananda’ as a follower of the influential saint Ramakrishna (1836-1886). Datta 
rose to prominence to earn his title following his popular speeches on Hinduism and yoga at the 
Chicago Parliament of Religions in 1893. His proficiency in both Bengali and English greatly aided his 
reception in the West. 
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comments on caste, but it is also noteworthy that on balance, he vigorously 
supported caste as an Indian social institution of central importance. For 
Vivekananda, it was  
 
‘in the nature of society to form itself into groups… Caste is 
a natural order; I can perform one duty in social life, and 
you another; you can govern a country, and I can mend an 
old pair of shoes, but that is no reason why you are greater 
than I, for can you mend my shoes?... Caste is good. That 
is the only natural way of solving life’.60 
 
Vivekananda was not alone in this view of an ancient ‘moral community’ of 
Hindus. Many of those involved in nation building believed that Hindus took 
caste to be a ‘divinely mandated institution’ and engaged its practice as a 
‘central fact of [their] social and spiritual life’.61 Along with the endorsement of 
the Varna system many nineteenth century nationalist thinkers appear to have 
imbibed the proposition of Brahmins as ‘intellectually, morally, culturally or 
‘ethno-logically’ superior to the shudras, and the Aryan dvija (‘twice-born’ 
castes of brahmins, kshatriyas and vaishyas) as superior to the non-Aryans 
(Anaryans)’ (see Bhatt, 2001, p. 15). Accordingly, a racialised notion of caste, 
replete with notions of discipline and hierarchy was positioned by nation 
builders such as Vivekananda as the social glue of Hindu moral community: 
on the social foundations of caste, the glorious ‘Hindu nation’ was to be built. 
In this register, ‘Hindus’ were to be understood as a race of people bound 
together by a shared but hierarchical conception of primordial belonging. 
What Vivekananda’s thought represents, is the amalgamation of Hindu piety 
and caste with the aims and political objectives of building a modern nation.  
 
                                                 
60 See Vivekananda Collected works III: pp. 245-246. Cited in Bayly (2008, p.165). 
61 As we will see in chapter four, this acceptance of the caste system as the divinely mandated social 
glue of Indian society runs through the thought of Indian elites from M.K Gandhi to Narendra Modi.   
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Taken together, Orientalist/primordial visions resonate in the present. As we 
have seen, in times of late-colonial interaction, scores of upper caste Hindus 
collaborated with the British to shape what Pankaj Mishra (2009) labels a 
‘Sanskritized “unified Hinduism” under Brahmin hegemony.’ And indeed, 
 
‘this British-Brahmin version of Hinduism – one of the 
many invented traditions born around the world in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries – has continued to 
find many takers among semi-Westernised Hindus 
suffering from an inferiority complex vis-à-vis the 
apparently more successful organised religions of 
Christianity, Judaism and Islam. The Hindu nationalists 
today, who long for India to become a muscular power, 
stand in a direct line of nineteenth century Indian reform 
movements devoted to purifying and reviving a Hinduism 
perceived as having grown too fragmented and weak.’  
 
For Hindu nationalists, from late-colonial times to the present, the Hindu 
people are the rightful and original inhabitants of the subcontinent. The 
subcontinent marks the territorial home of a once great Hindu civilisation, 
subjugated and conquered first by Muslim invaders and later by the British. 
This view is the cornerstone of Hindutva ideology elaborated in the political 
thought of thinkers from V. D Savarkar,62 to second RSS Chief M.S Golwalkar, 
BJP leader L.K Advani and indeed Narendra Modi and current RSS Chief 
Mohan Bhagwat (see Jaffrelot, 2007). As we will see, Mishra’s claims are 
important because they shed light on the ‘British-Brahmin’ formation of 
Hinduism and its legacy in the present as a political force geared to make 
                                                 
62 The intellectual totem of Hindutva, Savarkar was highly influential in his time in large part thanks 
to his coinage of the term ‘Hindutva’ and the wide dissemination of his writings on the subject. 
Savarkar’s most famous text is Essentials of Hindutva [1923] renamed and reprinted in 1928 as 
Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? Animated by overlapping preoccupations with militarism, Hindu 
‘emasculation’ and ideas of racial and caste hierarchy, Savarkar’s writings have acquired the status of 
“classics” of the Hindutva world view.  
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claims on power, state and society by the Sangh. Having sketched an account 
of how the historical formation of a singular, unitary Hinduism was shaped by 
colonial forces and primordial Indian voices, the task remains to map 
Hindutva as a school of thought that envisions India in Hindu terms as a 
matter of political priority.  
 
2.3 Mapping Hindutva.  
 
The historical legacy of the formation of Hinduism into a unitary ‘religion’ is 
characterised by a distinct chain of reasoning (Vanaik, 2017). I argue in this 
section of the chapter that Hindutva draws upon this chain of reasoning for 
political-strategic ends. The conundrum of understanding the relationships 
between Hinduism and Hindutva has led a number of scholars to claim the 
need to distinguish between Hinduism – broadly conceived – and Hindutva, 
while at the same time recognising the interconnections between the two.  
 
For instance, writing in the 1990s, in response to the political gains of the 
Hindutva movement, cultural theorist and psychologist Ashis Nandy (1988) 
argued that there is good reason to conceive of the Hindu religion as split into 
two: a distinction is made between ‘religion and faith’ and ‘religion as 
ideology’. By religious faith, Nandy (1988, p.322) means religion as way of life 
(dharma). Religious ideology, on the other hand, refers to the symbolism of 
religion as a means to contest political or socioeconomic interests. The crux of 
Nandy’s argument is that complex, contradictory and discordant expressions 
of religious Hinduism, must be separated out from the mobilisation of 
religious cosmology, symbolism and cultural markers, that are to be 
understood as the political tools of Hindutva. Nandy’s dichotomy has also 
been taken up and reconfigured by sociologist Sudipta Kaviraj, where a 
distinction between ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ religion, is made between the religiosity 
of piety, faith and metaphysical belief in the sublime and what he terms 
‘political religion’. Mobilising this conceptual apparatus allows Kaviraj to point 
out that it is political religion that is mobilised for electoral politics, where ‘the 
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thinness of the definition’ is ideally suited for political mobilisation (Kaviraj, 
2010, p. 352).  
 
Hindutva is therefore concerned with the nation-state, mass politics and 
power. Both Nandy and Kaviraj speak of Hindutva in terms of a malleable 
form of political subjectivity, that is less concerned with the sublime than it is 
the realm of politics and power. These positions are not dissimilar to the 
nineteenth century attempt at production of a more singular, unified 
Hinduism discussed above. As Romila Thapar (2016, p. 52) points out, 
‘Hindutva has the characteristics of a sect that reformulates selected beliefs to 
create, in this case, a socio-political organization with an attempt at ideological 
coherence.’ While it is impossible to ignore the diversity of Hinduism – an 
open-ended experience of popular devotion and religious expression – it is 
therefore important to note that Hindutva’s monolithic construction of 
Hinduism (in a bid for political power) takes its cue from earlier moves to 
reform and produce a more essentialist unitary Hinduism (Vanaik, 2017, p. 
455).  
 
Antonio Gramsci’s (1971, p.132)63 attempt to grapple with ‘the question of 
religion or world-view’ helps make sense of this process. Gramsci was well 
aware of the role of religious ethics as ‘sources of legitimisation of the status 
quo, but also as a medium for political struggles that aim for the 
transformation of society’ (Grelle, 2017, p. 2). Accordingly, the benefit of 
Gramsci’s thoughts on religion is that he refers us to ‘the problem of religion 
taken not in the confessional sense but in the secular sense of a unity of faith 
between a conception of the world and a corresponding norm of conduct’ 
(Gramsci, 1971, p. 326). Rearranged in the present in often curious 
amalgamation with seemingly contradictory forms, folklore and popular 
cultural forms bear the traces – or ‘residues’ – of previously dominant cultural 
                                                 
63 The relation between common sense and religion elaborated here builds upon the discussion in 
Crehan (2002, pp. 110-111). 
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paradigms. This means that relatively coherent sets of religious and ethical 
ideas take root, are taken for granted, and easily mobilised for political ends.  
 
This can be seen in the concept of the ‘national-popular’. A critical question for 
Gramsci was ‘when […] the conditions for awakening and developing a 
national-popular collective will [can] be said to exist? (Gramsci, 1971, p. 
130).64 According to Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, the concept of 
the national-popular should be taken to describe ‘some form of “historical 
bloc” ‘between national and popular aspirations in the formation of which 
intellectuals – in the wide Gramscian use of the term – play an essential 
mediating role’. To put it another way, the national-popular is a sociocultural 
concept that relates to the position of the masses within the culture of ‘the 
nation’ (Hoare and Nowell-Smith, 1971, p. 421). In the case of Hindutva, this 
means formation of a political vehicle for the transformation of Indian society 
that operates through the weaponisation of the “common sense” of unitary 
Hinduism (see Gramsci, 1971, pp. 323-26; 419-25).  
 
On the social contours of common sense, Gramsci (1971, p. 326) is worth 
quoting here in full: 
 
‘every social stratum has its own ‘common sense’ and its 
own ‘good sense’, which are basically the most widespread 
conceptions of life and of man. Every philosophical 
current leaves behind a sedimentation of ‘common sense’: 
this is the document of its historical effectiveness. 
                                                 
64 When considering the meaning of this term it needs to be remembered that Gramsci was a 
communist militant, that while concerned with the theory and analysis of the ‘national-popular’, was 
motivated above all by communist praxis: the task of forming a national-popular consciousness in the 
aid of proletarian revolution. Notably, the notioion of the national-popular connects with the concept 
of ‘war of position’. This category is explained in relation to that fact that ‘a social group can, and 
indeed must, already exercise ‘leadership’ before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of 
the principles for the winning of such power)’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 57). War of position, in the sense in 
which it will be deployed in this thesis, relates to the struggle – at once intellectual, cultural and 
political – of social forces to gain decisive influence over society.  
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Common sense is not something ridged and immobile, but 
is continually transforming itself, enriching itself with 
scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which 
have entered ordinary life. ‘Common sense’ is the folklore 
of philosophy, and is always half-way between folklore 
properly speaking and the philosophy, science and 
economics of the specialists. Common sense creates the 
folklore of the future, that is as a relatively ridged phase of 
popular knowledge at a given time and place’. 
 
The common sense of Hinduism, its symbolism and iconography, then, is duly 
mobilised by dominant nationalist forces into what Achin Vanaik (2017, p. 
472) has understood as a common chain of reasoning. The chain is articulated 
as follows:  
 
‘ethos/spirit is the heart of Hinduism, which is at the heart 
of, or coterminous with, Hindu culture (which defines 
Indian culture), which is at the heart of the Hindu nation 
(which defines the Indian nation).’ 
 
India’s nationalist figures may not endorse the full chain of reasoning, but the 
vast majority and its popular expression most certainly subscribes – past and 
present – either implicitly or explicitly, to some of the links in the chain 
(Vanaik, 2017, p. 472). For instance, for the Congress it is true enough that a 
definition of ‘Indianness’ is at the official core of the nationalist project. 
However, for those of the Hindu right, the future of ‘the nation’ boils down to 
the question “who is a Hindu?” and therefore, a definition of ‘Hinduness’, or 
rather, ‘Hindutva’ over ‘Indianness’ (Vanaik, 2017, p. 472). The Hindu chain of 
reasoning, then, is a pivotal element of Indian nationalist common sense. 
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This being said, Hindutva ideology is represented above all by the politics of 
the RSS. Founded in 1925 by Keshav B. Hegewar (1889-1940) (drawing on the 
politics and writings of V.D Savarkar) the RSS was a direct reaction to the 
non-violent anti-colonial strategy of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-
1948). With their open and transparent aim to organise (and politicise) Hindu 
society, early RSS men were concerned about the politics of non-cooperation 
in the 1920s, citing Gandhi’s method as a primary example of ‘non-discipline’ 
(Chaturverdi, 2010). Two further events are of particular importance. First, 
the peaking of the non-Brahmin movement in Maharashtra and the 
interpretation of the ‘rise of the depressed castes’ as disruptive of Hindu unity. 
And second, the perception of Muslim organisational strength and the spectre 
of ‘murderous designs’ against the ‘Hindu nation’ (Bhatt, 2001, p. 117).  
 
The RSS organised in response to these perceived threats to unite the 
disparate population of the subcontinent as a forerunner to independence 
from colonial rule and to counter “weakness” by organising Hindus against 
Islam and Christianity.65 To protect against the dissemination of Buddhist and 
Jain principles of “extreme non-violence” (a condition that had allegedly been 
facilitated through Hindu subordination by Christians, and crucially “Islam”), 
Hindutva ideologues claim that the Hindu ‘race’ must rediscover a “war-
strategy” to guard against invasion and the very real threat of Hindu 
annihilation (Chaturvedi, 2010, p. 433). These ‘foreign enemies’ are above all, 
considered a threat to Hindu claims to the subcontinent.  
 
In short, ‘organised Hindutva’ emerged right from the beginning as an upper 
caste reaction to efforts at self-assertion by downtrodden groups within the 
Hindu fold and a reaction to the ‘Muslim enemy’ (Basu et al, 1993). If the idea 
of the Muslim ‘Other’ forms a critical aspect of the ideological core of 
Hindutva, then the caste system forms the social glue of Hindu society. This is 
particularly evident if we consider the Mandal Commission report. In the wake 
                                                 
65 For the RSS, ‘Hinduism’ includes Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains.  
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of the report, the RSS was forced to deal with questions of inequality in Indian 
society. Pivoting away from what it considered to be a leftist discourse based 
around the problem of samata (equality) the Sangh sought to distinguish its 
own thoughts on the matter by launching the Samajik Samrasta Manch in 
April 1983 at Pune.66  
 
The RSS samrasta vision of harmony between castes was born of this 
movement and approaches something like an RSS endorsed ideal of equality 
(Narayanan, 2020). It is perhaps best summarised in former RSS chief M.S 
‘Guruji’ Golwalkar’s slogan “Sab jaati mahaan, sab jaati samaan” (all castes are 
great and all castes are equal) (see Teltumbde, 2018, p. 334). Though the 
official position of the RSS has changed over time, according to present 
organisational discourse under the leadership of Mohan Bhagwat, the RSS 
neither supports nor rejects caste. In reality, however, RSS efforts towards 
samrasta serve to defend the status quo of caste hierarchy under the umbrella 
of Hindutva. Derived from earlier discourses of caste as central to the 
formation of a singular, unitary Hinduism, Hindutva forces place the RSS 
samrasta vision at the centre of an organised effort to forge a consolidated 
Hindu unity. Here ‘social harmony’ between castes, as opposed to the critique 
and annihilation of caste, is seen as the antidote to the problem of equality and 
means to preserve the integrity of Hindu society (Temtumbde, 2018, p. 333; 
354). 
 
Unlike Hinduism, Hindutva, then, is irrevocably concerned with the question 
of (nationalist) mass politics (Palshikar, 2019). Drawing from the crucible of a 
singular, unitary Hinduism, Hindutva develops and reconstitutes three 
interconnected core themes as pillars of a powerful, all-encompassing 
imagined political community of Hindus, outlined as follows: 
 
                                                 
66 The common Hindi word for equality is samata.  
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(i) The disciplined Hindu body is the primary social 
unit of the nation. In contrast to late-colonial 
conceptions of Hindus as weak and effeminate, ideals of 
virility; physical strength and fitness; cleanliness and 
social hygiene are cultivated and glorified as a means to 
restore Hindu pride and build the Hindu rashtra.    
 
(ii) The Hindu rashtra is to be constituted as a disciplined 
moral community of Hindus drawing on the RSS 
samrasta vision that ‘all castes are great [and] all castes 
are equal’. The caste system is rendered as the divinely 
mandated social glue of the Hindu nation. 
 
(iii) Drawing from late-colonial ideas of the superiority of 
the Indo-Aryan race, Hindutva seeks restoration of a 
(fictional) golden Vedic age and dissemination of Hindu 
spirituality as India’s gift to the world. Following 
establishment of the Hindu rastra and völkish 
constellation of ‘one people, one nation, one leader’ 
(under the supreme leadership of Narendra Modi) the 
‘world-historical’ mission of Hinduism will be 
realised.  
 
The political strategy of the BJP – and, I argue, by extension Swachh Bharat 
and the International Day of Yoga –  is articulated around these thematics. 
Here we see the basic premise of RSS ideology; a strong and virile mass Hindu 
culture must be built before it will be possible for the nation to find its feet and 
face its enemies (see Ahmad, 2015). Hinduism is seen as the constitutive 
element of Indian culture and all other ‘non-native’ religions are alien. For the 
RSS, Indian culture is ‘so deeply defined by its Hindutva essence, that no non-
Hindu can be fully admitted’ (Ahmad, 2020, p. 22). Binding ideas of 
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discipline, Hindu moral community and the idea of Hinduism as a world-
dynamic force together with Hindutva ideology, is the primordial myth of 
Aryan-Hindu civilisation. Hindutva not only bares the traces of Orientalist 
scholarship and primordialist Indian thought, but directly reproduces it. 
Having discussed the relations between Hinduism and having defined 
Hindutva as it will be deployed in the thesis, the final section of the chapter 
(2.5) moves to discuss the role of the Congress and collapse of Nehruvian 
socialism in the emergence of Hindutva as the defacto culture of the nation. 
First, let us turn to a discussion of the Indian experience of neoliberal 
development, as the backdrop to the resurgence of Hindutva politics after 
1980 – and thus Swachh Bharat and the International Day of Yoga – with 
special reference to central Mumbai.  
 
2.4 Indian neoliberalism and its discontents 
 
This section of the chapter shifts gear to offer a working definition of 
neoliberalism and discusses its unfolding in the Indian context, before 
continuing to sketch out the effects of neoliberal restructuring for the 
transformation of social worlds in central Mumbai. The section sets the scene 
for discussions of ‘new’ theatrical strategies of Hindutva politics that have 
risen out of the tensions between Indian society and the globalisation of 
neoliberalism that forms the back drop to chapters four and five.  
 
The capitalist mode of production develops in different contexts and periods 
in time and space. Indeed, the power of capital extends to the social relations 
of everyday life, yet, cooperation, friendship, intimate relations, culture, and 
so on are practices that are not strictly commodified and subsumed by 
capitalist expansion. Social change is not therefore connected in a crude and 
simplistic way to economic transformations. Instead, human agency is 
radically contingent and particular historical conditions give rise to multiple 
political possibilities. This is not, of course, to say that capital exists over and 
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above society. In this context, the term ‘neoliberalism’ is at once inseparable 
from the process of the global restructuring of capitalist accumulation and 
concomitant reshuffling of class relations after 1973, and by extension, from 
the minutiae of everyday social relations (Harvey, 1996; 2005; Swyngedouw, 
1997; Smith 2004). As David Harvey (2005, p. 2) explains,  
‘neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political 
economic practices that proposes that human well-being 
can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, 
free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to 
create and preserve an institutional framework 
appropriate to such practices.’  
Neoliberalism thus represents a class project articulated in and through the 
actions and demands of a ruling class. This is not to say that neoliberalism is 
totalising and complete. But rather, that it is an uneven and gradual project 
that comes up against various forms of resistance and is therefore modular 
rather than uniform (Desai, 2012, p. 29). In the last instance, neoliberalism 
represents a political project towards ‘the restoration of class power’ and 
accumulation of wealth in the hands of the dominant classes in the form of 
corporate profits and financialised capital (Harvey, 2005, p, 16). 
Contemporary neoliberal India registers jaw-dropping inequality, as an 
expanding elite become ever more distant from the mass of the population. 
Given the remarkable failure of the state to deliver essential basic services 
against the backdrop of a rising billionaire class, income and livelihood across 
Indian society is radically uneven.67 
With respect to the question of capitalist accumulation, urban policy and the 
regulation of social life in contemporary cities, neoliberalism takes shape in 
                                                 
67 See for example Crabtree (2019) and Teltumbde (2018).  
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local conditions through capitalist led pro-growth urban development policies. 
Everyday political struggles and the heterogeneity of the social take place 
against this backdrop, of rapidly shifting urbanisation and uneven spatial 
development (Brenner and Schmidt, 2015; Harvey, 2006; Smith, 2004). In 
this context, the urban has been transformed in the wake of ‘worldwide social, 
economic, regulatory and environmental transformations of the post-1980s 
period’ (Brenner and Schmidt, 2015, p. 153). The complex geography of cities 
connects through regulatory practices of neoliberal urbanism across localities, 
as processes of neoliberalisation ‘collide with other (extra-neoliberal) social 
processes as well as with inherited patterns of development’ – neoliberal 
development mutates in response to different local conditions (Parnell and 
Robinson, 2012, p.599). In the Indian context, class power interfaces with the 
dominance of upper caste Hindus (see Roy, 2014a; Teltumbde, 2018; Yengde, 
2019).68  
Such analysis of the multi-layered connected geography of neoliberal urban 
development finds its most trenchant critics among postcolonial urbanists 
(see Derickson, 2014; Robinson, 2015; Roy, 2015) and centres on a treatment 
of ‘difference’ and critique of Eurocentrism. As Kanishka Goonewardena 
(2018, p. 5) notes, ‘this kind of postcolonial perspective not only emphasizes 
differences between cities, but also argues that Northern theory is incapable of 
addressing the specificities of the Southern urban condition’.69 Off the back of 
this position, a methodological injunction to chart the distinctive aspects of 
particular urban locales of the ‘global south’ – against universalist accounts of 
neoliberal urbanism – takes the form of thick descriptions of everyday life and 
subaltern politics ‘as theoretically self-evident counterpoints to the apparent 
                                                 
68 Though caste hierarchy is complex as well as contradictory, the inherited privileges of caste society 
– and in particular those falling to the Brahmin caste – translate into an entirely disproportionate 
near-domination of Indian public life. Take for example the powerful matrix of dominance in media 
positions, cabinet composition and the corporate sector (see Yengde, 2019, pp. 344-354).  
69 By ‘Northern theory’ the postcolonial urbanists refer to liberalism and Marxism, though more often 
than not, the term appears to be a metonym for Marxism.  
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totalizations of Euro-American frameworks’ (Brenner and Schmid, 2015, p. 
161).  
Postcolonial urbanism takes its cue on these matters from wider debates and 
parallel arguments against class analysis that have taken place within 
subaltern historical studies and postcolonial cultural theory (Brenner and 
Schmid, 2015, p. 161).70 In the name of “provincializing Europe” (see 
Chakrabarty, 2000) postcolonial scholars of the urban look to excavate 
‘embodied and everyday moments’ in the cities of the South (Derickson, 2014, 
p. 2). The overall aim, according to leading postcolonial urbanist Ananya Roy 
(2015), is to displace what is seen to be the ‘universal grammar of cityness, 
modified by (exotic) empirical variation’ derived from Marxist theory. 
Postcolonial urbanism is instead animated by the task of ‘undertaking a 
political economy attentive to historical difference as a fundamental and 
constitutive force in the making of global urbanisation’ (Roy, 2015, p. 8).   
 
                                                 
70 The decline of class analysis has been part of a wider global pattern, with postmodern and 
postcolonial approaches to the study of society assuming the mantel of radical theory (see Chibber, 
2006, pp. 357-358). The results have been particularly acute with regards to the academic study of 
South Asian politics and society. To be sure, the debates around the role of ‘theory’ in the study of 
south Asian society are complex (see Chibber, 2013). However, when it comes to south Asian studies 
and the analysis of Indian society in particular, the approach advocated by the Subaltern Studies 
group of historians has been extraordinarily influential. There is no need to delve into a detailed and 
exhaustive explication of the positions of Subalternist scholars here. However, it is worth noting that 
that master themes of the Subaltern school – the idea of an ‘autonomous domain’ of subaltern politics, 
and the problematic of a self-contained ‘subaltern culture’ – correctly highlight the importance of 
culture but fail to account for the pervasive character of the caste system as the lifeworld of Indian 
society. In brief, Ranajit Guha, the founder of the Subaltern Studies project, declared in his founding 
statement that the subaltern approach was a revolt against ‘Cambridge School’ themes. The revisionist 
aim of the Subalternist was to unearth ‘the politics of the people.’ The so-called Cambridge School of 
historiography, on the contrary, approached the study of Indian society and Indian nationalism, 
through a lens of “high politics”, the role of elites, and a focus on colonial-era institutions and their 
proximate effects on the national movement (see Low, 1977). Over time, the Subaltern school shifted, 
from a focus on Gramscian themes of the subaltern and hegemony, towards works inspired by Michel 
Foucault’s studies on the relations of power-knowledge (Ludden, 2002, p. 7). It is this latter stream 
that has come to define the theoretical orientation of the school and most contemporary approaches 
that endorse ‘postcolonial’ analysis. Symbolically at least, the move away from the Subalternists 
original Gramscian orientation was cemented by the endorsements of celebrated literary theorists 
Edward W. Said and Gayatri Chakravarty Spivak, in the edited volume Selected Subaltern Studies 
(1988). The influence of these endorsements should not be over exaggerated, as Chibber (2006, p. 
374) suggests. However, the volume certainly played an important role in the legitimisation and 




As expressed by Parnell and Robinson (2012, p. 597) postcolonial analysis of 
the urban means taking the ‘autonomous logics of state formation and 
intervention’ as the starting point of analysis and as separate to the broader 
dynamics of capital accumulation. For Ghertner (2014) the implications of this 
injunction are that India’s ‘urban revolution’ cannot be explained with simple 
reference to the Euro-American template of ‘Northern theory.’ If the multiple 
experiences of metropolitan modernity outside of the Euro-American 
experience are to be better analysed and understood, for the postcolonial 
urbanists, ‘Northern theory’ must be eschewed (see Goonewardena, 2018). To 
theorise the urban processes afflicting cities of the global South, extra-
capitalist power, the role of traditional elites and the developmental/activist 
state must be foregrounded (Parnell and Robinson, 2012, p. 597). 
Yet, to capture the global urban condition means accounting for the nature of 
a capitalist world system that pivots around an incessant drive towards capital 
accumulation. Following Brenner and Schmid (2015, p. 161), I want to argue 
that this requires an understanding of (neoliberal) capitalism not ‘as merely a 
background for urban development, but [as representing] a constitutive 
formation – a self-forming, internally contradictory evolving whole’ in which 
difference, locality and place are ‘inscribed and mediated.’ As Indian 
neoliberalism was officially launched with the implementation of the New 
Economic Plan (NEP) in 1991, the demands of Indian capital – both domestic 
and foreign-diasporic – were largely met.71 The stage was thus set for the 
                                                 
71 Following the official shift to neoliberalism in the form of the New Economic Plan (NEP) India’s 
political economy was shocked into wide-ranging transformation, as central governments grip on the 
private sector – the so-called “licence-permit raj” – was ‘virtually eliminated’. On the licence permit 
Raj, see Chibber (2003) and Kolhi (2006a; 2006b; 2010). In the process, New Delhi lost the ability to 
influence, direct and distribute investment geographically across the union. In consequence, after 
1991, Indian states began to compete with one another to attract domestic and foreign private 
investment (Murali, 2017, pp. 250-1). As Kanta Murali has argued, following the introduction of the 
NEP, the relative success of states in harnessing investment has depended on the policy responses of 
states and the class configuration of the ruling electoral coalitions within states. In the case of 
Maharashtra, the pro-business agenda of the BJP-Shiv Sena coalition (after 1995) dominated over 
redistributive concerns. Successive administrations have continued on the same path and as a result, 
the benefits of post-liberalisation growth in Mumbai have been far from inclusive. Pervasive 
inequality and social marginalisation have continued to expand at a rapid pace.  
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introduction of speculative practices and investment of domestic and foreign 
capital to exploit cheap labour and natural resources (Das, 2015, p. 716).  
 
This is not to say that neoliberal capitalist urbanisation entails increasing 
homogenisation, or for that matter, as Neil Lazarus (2016, p. 98) points out, 
‘the progressive universalisation of Western norms, values and modes of social 
life’. Indeed, in so far as the historical geography of capitalism is marked by 
highly differentiated uneven development, capitalism is anything but a purely 
homogenising dynamic (Chibber, 2013, p. 245).72 In the context of the city, the 
political street serves as the primary arena of sociopolitical contention, of 
‘everyday cosmopolitanism’ – where the member of religious, ethnic, racial 
and caste grouping mix and mingle – but also the shared public space where 
collective sentiments of nation and community crystallise (Bayat, 2010, p. 13). 
These myriad social processes nonetheless take form in the context of 
neoliberal urbanity. To better understand the political contradictions thrown 
up by the complex rearticulation of socio-economic space wrought by 
neoliberalism in India, let us turn to a discussion of capitalist restructuring 
and the transformation of social worlds in Mumbai.  
 
From mills to malls (or Bombay to Mumbai) 
 
The Indian experience of neoliberal development testifies to how the economic 
restructuring of capitalist states after 1973 took place resolutely, albeit 
unevenly, across the global economy. After 1980, the process of urban 
development in Bombay came to reflect an alliance between commercial and 
financial interests and state power. Together, these interests successfully 
combined to subvert the planning process and re-shape the city in the 
interests of capital (Blom Hansen, 2001; Bannerjee-Guha, 2009). At the same 
time, trends of rural-to-urban migration kick started by the 
institutionalisation of Import-Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), and 
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accelerated urban development towards a highly unstable pattern of ‘hyper-
urbanisation and slumification’ (Davis, 2006). This intensification of 
contradictions in the urban environment spawned a social context of 
marginalisation, poverty and dispossession that, in turn, generated the 
formation of new demands on the state and new claims on the city (Sassen, 
1996). The critical event in the restructuring of Bombay’s political economy 
and production of new spaces of urban experience came in the form of the 
‘Great Textile Strike’ of 1982-1983.  
 
To be sure, the Bombay textile industry had been undergoing major bouts of 
restructuring since the 1960s. Before serious modernisation drives kicked into 
gear, a differentiation of units in the city had already taken place as part of the 
industry underwent automation (Patel, 2004, pp. 334-335). This delivered a 
significant retrenchment of labour and formal employment in the industry 
declined by half. As Sujata Patel (2004, pp. 334-335) explains, ‘even though 
workload and productivity increased, wages did not rise’. At the same time, 
wages of ‘those in capital-intensive industries remained relatively high.’ The 
restructuring of the industry accelerated as a consequence of the Great Strike.  
 
Labour unrest started to brew as workers became more aware of the lag 
between wages, bonus payments and conditions in other industries, against 
the relatively meagre package offered in the mills. As a result, textile workers 
began to organise under the leadership of the charismatic and militant union 
leader Datta Samant (Bakshi, 1986, p. 9).73 In the event, almost two-hundred 
thousand workers and approximately sixty-five percent of the mills 
participated in the strike action. In total, the strike lasted a full eighteen 
months, becoming one of the longest strikes in Indian labour history.  
 
Despite the long history of industrial action in Bombay, the 1982 strike was 
the most decisive for the future of the industry and the social worlds of labour 
                                                 
73 On the details and dilemmas of Samants leadership, see Pendse (1981).  
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that powered it. The strike and its fall out marked a pivotal moment in the 
modern history of the city in terms of the patterns of productive activity and 
opportunities for livelihood. But more importantly, in terms of massive 
retrenchment and social marginalisation for large swathes of the cities 
working class population. As Ravi Gadge (2016, p. 161) has pointed out, ‘it is 
estimated that prior to the strike there were about 232,000 workers employed 
in the industry. The failure of the strike led to a massive retrenchment of 
workers. Almost 106,000 workers lost their jobs’. The outcome of the strike 
therefore represents perhaps the biggest job loss in the history of modern 
industry in India. In the end, the war of attrition launched by the workers and 
spearheaded by Datta Samant collapsed to pave the way for a decisive victory 
for industrial capital.  
 
A crucial reason for focus on the mill industry is that its decline has radically 
reshaped the streets and public spaces of central Mumbai. The newly 
redundant textile workers did not have much chance of finding formal 
employment, instead turning to informal processes as a means of livelihood 
(Patel, 2004, p. 335).74 The decline of factory labour and rise of mass 
informality in place of the old industrial centre, then, represented a dramatic 
transformation and profound restructuring of the social worlds of Bombay 
labour. In the wake of the 1982-83 strike, the development of the Indian 
economy and its ‘transition to high-growth’ has taken place through mass 
unemployment and a dramatic shift to ‘low income security informal work’ 
(Barnes, 2015, p. 36). As of 2019, eighty-five percent of India’s non-
agricultural workforce is ‘informal’ and thus without any form of social 
insurance (ILO, 2019, p. 1). In Mumbai, the consequences of the strike bear 
this out. Most notably, in the transition from a productive economy to a 
speculative one. The closure of the once sprawling mill complexes has revealed 
                                                 
74 However, rather than a process of de-industrialisation as has been typical in many former 
manufacturing hubs located in the ‘Global North’. In Bombay, in the main, manufacturing activities 
merely shifted to the fringes of the city, albeit in the form of a shift to production driven by informal 
enterprises and the employment of informal labour practices (Barnes, 2015, p. 75).  
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acres of prime land for real estate development, as tens of thousands of 
relatively secure jobs have been lost (Appadurai, 1996; D’Monte, 2005; 
Ghadge, 2016). 
 
At a more conceptual level, we see that alongside the transition from Fordism 
to flexible accumulation, comes a disorientation and radical shift in the 
qualities of social and cultural life. Systems of production and the advancing 
commodification of everyday life connect with a yearning to embed an 
increasingly individualistic society within a set of familiar common values 
(Harvey, 1990, p. 288). According to Lefebvre (2004, 2014) while living 
human beings reproduce themselves through ‘natural’ cyclical rhythms, they 
are also profoundly affected by linear socio-economic time. As a result, 
meaning and interpretation of the city and its spaces are shaped by 
experiences of space, time and praxis. In this regard, we can assert that the 
transition from mills to malls – or Bombay to Mumbai – has driven a 
transformation of social lives and restructuring of ‘worlds of labour’ (see 
Chakrabarti et al, 2016, p. 105; Joshi, 2003). By the mid-1980s, the mill lands 
had become deeply embattled spaces. Major redevelopment began following 
the earmarking of the area as prime real estate in the city’s 1990 development 
plan. And in the years since, the beating heart of industrial Bombay has 
progressively become the ‘modern’ space of central Mumbai, replete with 
luxury apartments, office space and commercial ventures. 
 
Take for instance the case of the old Phoenix Mills at Lower Parel (see figure 
3). In 1996, the once sprawling industrial complex was literally transformed 
into a mall. As one crosses the Sanapati Bapat Marg flyover and passes the 
rows of dilapidated chawls, ‘High Street Phoenix’ is notable and gleaming on 
the right-hand side. Entry is gained by passing through security armed with 
metal detectors and an airport-style bag X-ray. The density of bodies is 
radically thinner compared to the surrounding streets. The hustle of those 
streets is replaced by throngs of youngsters in designer clothes clutching 
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smartphones. Those inside the compound are affluent, well dressed and can 
be heard chatting in English. In the Starbucks coffee shop young men can be 
heard discussing time well spent in the United States and the benefits (and 
pitfalls) of translating knowledge acquired from studying an MBA into start-
up business ventures.75 To be sure, this air-conditioned enclave is surrounded 
in part by the high-density informal economy typical of Mumbai streets and 
nestled within the former mill areas. Nonetheless, arrival by taxi or car 
provides escape from the realities of the claustrophobic city, in the form of 
consumption of global brands and access to the modern cinema that sits on 
top of the retail outlets. High Street Phoenix is a symbolic marker par 
excellence of the shift from Fordist capitalism centred on industry to a pattern 
of consumption-driven ‘flexible’ accumulation’. 
 
 
Figure 3: The old Phoenix Mills chimney. Now part of central Mumbai’s 
premier shopping location, “High Street Phoenix.” 
 
The case of High Street Phoenix raises the question of how changes in the built 
(and thus socio-economic) environment connect to the production of political 
subjectivity. An answer to this question presents itself in Mumbai based artist 
Sudhir Patwardhan's Lower Parel (see figure 4). Patwardhan’s painting 
brilliantly captures a moment of transition, casting subtle focus on the shifting 
                                                 
75 Fieldnote: 05/12/19. High Street Pheonix. 
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nature of urban reality, in a way that documents the intersection of neoliberal 
economic restructuring with lived experience. At first glance the scene appears 
to form an integrated whole. The horizon depicts a derelict mill complex and 
chimney towards the left. In the top right-hand corner, we see a skyscraper 
under construction. A bridge linked to a series of staircases connects the street 
above with the busy market place below. A closer look shows each element of 
the picture to be distinct and stand out on the basis of its texture and colour 
(Hoskote, 2010, p. 35). Critically, while the people depicted in the market 
place appear as a ‘tentatively coherent group’ they are ‘likewise carefully 
individualised’ (Hoskote, 2010, pp. 35-36). Patwardhan’s work is insightful 
because it paints a vision of the city in a nutshell. The painted scene bears 
witness to a reshaping of the labouring human being, against the background 
of profound reverberations of (neoliberal) global restructuring, emergence of 
mass informality and weaving of unbridled competition into the urban fabric. 
 
 
Figure 4: Lower Parel by Sudhir Patwardhan (2001). 
 
Two figures emerge in Patwardhan’s scene, the newly affluent individual and 
the marginalised urban poor. Formally industrial Lower Parel is the new host 
to a series of gated, air-conditioned spaces of consumption, from luxury 
apartments to new corporate offices and High Street Phoenix. Socioeconomic 
change has created conditions in which new wants, needs and desires have 
emerged (see Harvey, 2005). In its broadest sense Lower Parel represents an 
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altered epistemological space. Entrepreneurialism has been forced onto the 
working classes and taken up with glee by the affluent. This new rhythmicity 
brings with it entrepreneurism, individual consumption and material luxury 
on the one hand, and high unemployment and low job security on the other. 
Neoliberal Mumbai has risen up out of the urban decay and eerie ruins of 
industrial production.76 While the presence of the organised working classes 
has receded into fragmented informality, newly affluent citizens have moved 
into the foreground.  
 
We have seen in the previous section of the chapter that Hindutva was formed 
in the tensions of India and Empire. With this context in mind, in the 
contemporary neoliberal era chapters four and five will show that Hindutva 
has been reconfigured into a ‘new’ strategy of power in the wake of the global 
spread of isomorphic forms of the neoliberal state (see Desai, 2007, p. 1). 
Economic liberalisation after 1991 triggered elite desires for technocratic 
governance and ‘militant disaffection’ among the urban and rural poor. 
Simultaneously, fractions of the Indian bourgeoisie and upper castes that felt 
under pressure from the process felt besieged by the rise of the lower castes 
and classes (Mishra, 2013b, p. 142). The rise of the lower castes and classes 
and anxieties of the upper castes following their relative loss of status (both 
symbolic and financial) has created new conditions of political possibility. 
Alongside these shifts, many of the lower castes and classes– whom Modi calls 
the ‘neo middle class’ – have been mobilised in support of development and 
jobs (Chatterji, Blom Hansen and Jaffrelot, 2019, p. 9). This is not to say that 
the interests of neoliberalism and Hindutva dovetail into a seamless whole, 
but that these projects are complimentary in so far as they share the same 
vision and goal of a ‘bounded, unitary and individual-based conception of 
society, as opposed to a community-based society’ (Gopalakrishnan, 2006, p. 
2803).  
 
                                                 
76 The productive centre of the city is now Dharavi. See Sharma (2000) and Weinstein (2014). 
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The last task of this chapter is to discuss the Indian National Congress, its 
decline after 1980 and its role as an enabling force aiding the rise of Hindutva. 
In tandem with the rising social discontents of Indian neoliberalism, Congress 
party dominance and the ideology of Nehruvian socialism broke apart in the 
aftermath of the Emergency (1975-1977) and under the pressure of mass 
movements of the lower castes and classes (Corbridge and Harriss, 2000; 
2012; Desai, 2012; 2015). Following India’s gradual shift towards economic 
liberalisation, the political landscape opened to the influence and organisation 
of the BJP as the major opposition to the Congress. As we will see, broad 
rejection of the Congress on the basis of it being deemed corrupt and 
ineffective cleared the way for Hindutva to become the ideological locus of a 
newly resurgent India after 1991.  
 
2.5 Congress decline as enabling force 
 
From its inception, as Subir Sinha (2019, pp. 88-89) notes, the Indian 
National Congress has been both a political party and a movement in its own 
right. A broad-church home to Gandhians, socialists, liberals and right-wing 
nationalists (members of the Hindu Mahasabha) at the same time. All manner 
of political positions and religious denominations were represented under the 
same umbrella, from the formation of the Congress in 1885, until 
independence in 1947 and beyond. Yet the attempt of the party to represent 
the Indian ‘people-as-a-whole’ in opposition to colonial rule was only ever 
partially successful, ‘large swathes of the population’ remained outside and in 
opposition to the Congress project (Sinha, 2019, p. 88). As will be discussed in 
depth in chapter three, the Indian National Congress has long blended both 
secular and Hindu sentiments into an articulation of ‘Indian’ nationalism. In 
many respects, ‘exclusionary Hinduism’ in the articulation of nationalist mass 
movement, as we will see, can be traced back to the Congress in its transition 
from a liberal pressure group to a mass party. Nonetheless, with this point in 
mind, to better understand how Hindutva became the dominant political 
ideology in the articulation of a resurgent neoliberal India, it will be necessary 
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to account for the decline of the Congress as the commanding force of Indian 
politics, as the onset of global (neoliberal) restructuring began to bite. 
 
In terms of development, after 1947 Indian economic growth had been 
concentrated in large scale infrastructure projects and import-substitution 
manufacturing. However, despite the official (Nehruvian) socialist orientation 
of Indian economic development, the spread of social benefits was highly 
uneven, enriching Indian elites on the one hand and enlarging the educated 
‘middle classes’ on the other, all the while further marginalising and 
impoverishing the vast majority of the urban and rural poor (see Drèze and 
Sen, 2013). At the dawn of independence, Indian capital waged a highly 
effective struggle to hamstring the institutional capacity of the developmental 
state before it even got off the ground. Such was the adverse reaction of the 
Indian business classes to state-led development, that desperately needed long 
term investment in education and public health was purposefully subverted 
(Chibber, 2003). The conservativism of Indian political elites during this time 
was staggering. As Pankaj Mishra (2013a, p. 51) explains: 
 
‘for people who claimed to be, and are still mistakenly 
derided, as “socialist”, India’s [Nehruvian] rulers neither 
matched the educational accomplishments of some 
socialist countries, nor did they help unleash, like their 
counterparts in South Korea and Japan, entrepreneurial 
energies in the country’s protected private sector, which 
accounted for the bulk of manufacturing output’.  
 
However inadequate in terms of alleviation of poverty and social development, 
after Nehru’s death in 1964, the so-called ‘Nehruvian consensus’ began to 
fracture and the party entered a period of fragmentation. A split in the party 
between the Congress (R) and Congress (O) followed, the former supporting 
Indira Gandhi’s emergence as Prime Minister in 1967, and the latter opposing 
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it. In the following years, Indira Gandhi came to solidify her position and 
reputation following India’s comprehensive victory in the Indo-Pakistan war 
(1971) and India’s first successful nuclear bomb test at Pokhran, Rajasthan 
(1974). However, the 1970s threw up a series of crises for the Congress in 
terms of India’s economic performance, the legitimacy of the party and the 
rise oppositional anti-Congress politics (Sinha, 2019, p. 93). 
 
By the mid-1970s the global economy had plunged into deep recession. A 
punishing phase of global “stagflation” (high inflation + unemployment) 
gripped domestic economies – as fiscal crises cascaded across various locales, 
state expenditures were radically contracted. In this context, with the onset of 
a serious crisis of capitalist accumulation, the ISI regime began to run into 
serious trouble (Harvey, 2006, p. 14). In India, the ISI regime began to crack 
under the pressure of rising social forces and an increasingly assertive 
segment of the capitalist class, that ‘came to see the system of internal controls 
and artificial monopolies as an obstacle to their own expansion’ (Chibber, 
2003, pp. 252-253). Indira Gandhi’s preoccupation with the maintenance of 
political power over economic management had led to a series of 
disappointing economic outcomes. Between 1965 and 1979, industrial growth 
decelerated, and public investment declined. Congress’ protection of the ISI 
regime, restrictions on technology imports, strict limiting of exports and 
hostility to foreign investment, resulted in periodic balance of payments 
difficulties and serious barriers to economic growth (Kohli, 2010, pp. 125-
128). Meanwhile, public revenue was funnelled towards the maintenance of 
patronage networks geared to support Congress rule (see Kaviraj, 1986; Kohli, 
2010). Alongside the gradual implosion of ISI as a viable strategy of capitalist 
accumulation, then, came a fracturing in the political alliances that sustained 
the model.  
 
The crisis in India had severe political implications. Most prominently, 
prolonged economic stagnation rendered Indira Gandhi’s highly touted pledge 
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to ratchet up redistributive policies and “alleviate poverty” increasingly 
untenable, ultimately consigning it to failure (Kohli, 2010, pp. 125-128). By 
1972, the Congress was facing rising accusations of corruption and nepotism 
both in the states and at the centre. In the context of increasingly difficult 
economic conditions and a sharp spike in the price of basic commodities, 
affecting relatively affluent professionals and the poor alike, anti-poverty and 
anti-corruption protests gripped urban centres across the subcontinent, the 
prime target was Indira Gandhi herself.77 The unrest was widespread: students 
and workers led protests against misgovernance and corruption in their home 
states from Gujarat to Bihar (Guha, 2007, pp. 477-478).  
 
Further still, rising discontent in response to deteriorating socio-economic 
conditions resulted in the formation of an anti-government bloc in the shape 
of the ‘JP movement’. Mass demonstrations erupted as students and workers 
took to the streets against rising poverty and corruption, as popular 
movements began to loosely coalesce under the leadership of Indira Gandhi’s 
former friend, “Gandhian Socialist” Jayaprakesh Narayan (‘JP’). In June 1975, 
Mrs Gandhi’s troubles deepened as Allahabad High Court found her and the 
Congress guilty of electoral irregularities. Ultimately, the potent alliance of the 
JP Movement, the socialists, and especially the RSS, led to the declaration of 
the Emergency. The JP movements call for “total revolution,” from the 
standpoint of Indira Gandhi and the Congress high command, appeared as a 
war cry of pre-meditated ‘full-scale insurrection’ (Ahmad, 2004, p. 345, Bhatt, 
2001, p. 163).  
 
Matters soon came to a head. Indira Gandhi buckled under the pressure of the 
inflationary situation and the weight of her own paranoia and declared 
                                                 
77 A prime example of corruption allegations, and particular sticking point for opposition activists, was 
Indira Gandhi’s approval of her son Sanjay’s car manufacturing project. Sanjay Gandhi was gifted 300 
acres of land from the Congress chief minister of Haryana for a very low price. Most incriminating of 
all, as Guha (2007, p. 470) points out, was the fact that while ‘eighteen applications were received for 
a licence to make small cars; only that of the Prime Minister’s son was approved despite his having no 
past experience in this regard’.   
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Emergency rule. For Mrs Gandhi, it was the duty of the Congress, to ‘save the 
country from itself’ and protect the future of Indian democracy from the 
‘communal’ and ‘anti-national’ forces of disintegration that were threatening 
to tear the social fabric of the nation apart (Guha, 2007, p. 493-495). The 
Emergency lasted twenty-one months. Between June 1975 and February 1977, 
elections were postponed, the press censored, and over 100,000 people from 
all over India were jailed under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act 
(MISA). Strikes and rallies were banned and the main political opposition 
leaders, JP, Morarji Desai, and Atal Vajpayee (the latter two were key figures 
in the future Janata Alliance that was to rout the Congress in the first post-
Emergency election) were placed under arrest.  
 
Critically, during this period the government began to shift away from the 
“Nehruvian consensus” and the strictures of ISI, talking up the benefits of a 
“pragmatic” economic policy, the virtues of market forces and export-led 
growth (see Kaviraj, 1986, p. 1706). Indira Gandhi’s ultimate aim, as with any 
suspension of democracy and implementation of martial law, was the 
maintenance of national unity in a way that keeps the ruling political class in 
place. Yet, paradoxically, as we will see, the Emergency prepared the ground 
for future anti-Congress projects to flourish. In the context of Congress decline 
after 1980, the aim of Hindutva forces was to accelerate a political project 
premised on the restoration of upper caste power and promotion of Hindutva 
values. This took place through the simultaneous delegitimisation of 
‘Nehruvian’ socialism and the ‘political authoritarianism’ of the Congress 
(Desai, 2012, p. 56). The result was a concerted attempt by the Congress to 
stay relevant in post-Nehruvian India, through articulation of a politics of 
‘soft’ Hindutva.  
 
The politics of ‘soft’ Hindutva 
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In the period after 1980, then, the Congress began to more systematically drop 
commitments to Nehruvian socialism and state-led development. At the same 
time, the party began to more openly court – in place of long held secular 
visions of the nation (however inadequate) – Hindutva themes. With Indira 
Gandhi’s return to power after the Emergency in 1980, the Congress began to 
lose mass Muslim votes,78 as party strategy moved towards the formation of a 
mass ‘Hindu bloc’ in a bid to face off secessionist threats in Assam and the 
Punjab.79 Moreover, Mrs Gandhi looked to garner the Hindu vote in an 
attempt to outgun the BJP, her main rival in the ‘cow belt’ of the Hindi 
speaking north. This strategy was not new. For instance, Indira Gandhi had 
notably attempted to exploit the symbolism of Bharat Mata (Mother India) 
‘for her own glorification’ back in the late 1960s (Van der Veer, 1994, p. 125).  
 
However, after her return to power in the early 1980s, the Congress’ 
propagation of Hinduism and militant nationalism accelerated, as she moved 
to set up high profile visits to Hindu temples and shrines in her early weeks in 
government (Ahmad, 2004, p. 346). This began with an appeal to Hindu 
communal sentiments in Jammu and Kashmir (an attempt to see off the 
challenge of the main opposition National Conference in 1982). This strategy 
was then followed up in the form of militant opposition to Punjabi separatism. 
Further still, Mrs Gandhi’s decision to launch a full-frontal assault on Punjabi 
Sikh militants in the Golden Temple in 1984 confirmed her to many as a 
champion of ‘Hindu interests’ (Ahmad, 2004; Anderson, 2013; Malik, 1987, p. 
                                                 
78 It is frequently reported that the Indian Muslim community form a homogeneous block of votes and 
Bombay Muslims have tended to vote for the Congress in post-colonial India. However, Bombay 
Muslims through time have never been a monolithic community (see Green, 2011). ‘They’ have always 
been divided by regional identity and along sectarian, caste and class lines. 
79 An insurgency led by the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) against the ‘internal 
colonisation’ of Assam at the hands of the Indian government was launched in 1979. Insurgent 
movements in Manipur and Nagaland began in the late 1950s. The states of the Indian north east were 
placed under the administration of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in September 1958 after 
being categorised “disturbed areas”. The Act, which approximates martial law, remains in force to this 
day. The Khalistan movement for a separate state for Sikhs in the Punjab region of India gained 
traction in the late 1970s and reached its zenith in a series of militant activities in the 1980s. This 
chain of events eventually led to the assassination of Indira Gandhi in 1984 by her two Sikh 
bodyguards. The insurgency collapsed in the 1990s under a heavy crackdown by the Indian 
government.   
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151). The Congress thus decisively stoked feelings of vulnerability amongst the 
Hindu majority and asserted the integrity of Hindu society through the 
cultivation of bullish nationalist sentiments.  
 
Though of clear importance, it was not Indira Gandhi’s courting of religious 
personalities and visitation of religious sites, but commitment to militant 
nationalism and her hard-line opposition to separatist claims that won the 
Congress the Hindu vote (Puri, 1985, p. 149). In a remarkably similar vein to 
Hindutva ideologues, Indira Gandhi ‘aspired to a physically powerful nation’. 
Strikingly, her nationalism was inspired by ‘ancient’ Indian glories ‘that [took] 
scant account of the non-Hindu contribution’ (Puri, 1985, p. 149). The 
beginnings of a shift towards ‘soft’ Hindutva politics thus marked an altered 
political landscape. As state-led developmentalism began to crack, the pro-
poor rhetoric of the Congress was increasingly replaced by a discourse of 
(Hindu) national identity, security and ‘anti-national’ threat. The Congress, 
then, decisively moved to a rhetorical stance of protecting India from so-called 
‘anti-national’ forces. In these conditions, anti-national increasingly began to 
look like a by-word for anti-Hindu (Guha, 2007, pp. 493-495). It was the duty 
of the Congress to ‘save the country from itself’ and protect the future of 
Indian democracy from the ‘communal’ and ‘anti-national’ forces of 
disintegration that were threatening to tear the social fabric of the nation 
apart. This unsurprisingly played directly into the hands of the Sangh.  
 
After Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984, the legitimacy of Hindutva 
received a further vitalising shot in the arm from her son Rajiv. Even in the 
face of the growing anti-Muslim fervour of the RSS-led Ram Janmabhoomi 
campaign, it was Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress that allowed ‘Shilanyas’ 
(consecration) of the Ram temple in November 1989, claiming to the public 
that he would usher in ‘Ram Rajya’, effectively legitimising the campaign and 
paving the way for its infamous climax in December 1992 (Banerjee, 2007, p. 
3194; also see Sinha, 2019). Paired with his intervention in the Shah Bano 
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case,80 Rajiv Gandhi’s time in power resulted in ‘a closer entanglement of 
politics and religion’ (Hasan, 2012) and evident break with the so-called 
secular plural traditions of the Congress. As Zoya Hasan (2012) has noted, 
these actions led to a severe critique of the Congress as ‘pseudo-secular’ on the 
grounds that it had supported reform of Hindu personal law, while 
endeavouring to not interfere with that of Muslims. This series of events led 
the Congress to appease Hindutva militants in the case of the Ayodhya 
dispute.  
 
The destruction of the Babri Masjid would come under the watch of the next 
Congress Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. In these heady days, the inertia of 
the Congress and failure to deploy the army and central police forces to 
protect the Babri Masjid – no doubt for fear of alienating the Hindu vote – all 
but confirmed the emergence of a soft Hindutva approach, in direct 
contradiction with the official secular position of the Congress. In practice, 
then, the Congress was increasingly soft on Hindu fundamentalist currents 
and increasingly drew from the same tool box of Hindu religious sentiments as 
the Sangh. This same message of anti-national threat is now peddled by the 
BJP on a daily basis, and like the cultivation of this discourse by the Congress, 
the lines between the notion of ‘India-under-siege’ and ‘Hindu-society-under-
siege’ are purposefully fuzzy (see Guha, 2007, p. 493-495). 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the dominant position of the BJP after 2014, the 
charge of soft Hindutva has continued to be levelled at the Congress, in 
present times at Indira’s grandson (and Rajiv’s son) Rahul Gandhi. Perhaps 
the clearest instance of these logics has been the out and out decision of Rahul 
Gandhi’s Congress to borrow from the ‘elements’ of Hindutva activated by 
Modi in order to challenge the BJP (Sinha, 2019). In an intensive campaign set 
                                                 
80 Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (known as the Shah Bano case) ended in the Indian 
supreme court judging that maintenance be awarded under the Criminal Procedure Code to a 
divorced Muslim woman, undermining Muslim personal law. Under pressure from conservative 
Muslim leaders, Rajiv Gandhi intervened to nullify the judgement.  
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to counter the BJP’s favoured barb of the “pro-Muslim” character of the 
Congress in 2017, like his grandmother, Rahul Gandhi went on a tightly 
choreographed, highly publicised, ‘temple run’ where he was seen visiting 
temples and praying with Brahmin priests, garlanded with a Hindu tilaka 
painted on his forehead (see figure 5). The Congress have gone to great lengths 
to present Rahul Gandhi as a (sacred-thread wearing) ‘janendari Brahmin’. In 
the run up to the Gujarat state legislative elections in 2017, the party 
machinery went as far as sending out automated messages to their followers 
featuring the loaded rhetorical question: ‘don’t you know that Rahul Gandhi is 
a janendari Hindu”? (Jha, 2019). Predictably, the BJP have disputed this 
claim. More interesting, is that Rahul Gandhi has not backed down, such is the 
apparent importance of coming across to the electorate as a leader with upper 
caste Hindu credentials.  
 
 
Figure 5: ‘Janendhari Brahmin’ and Congress vice-president Rahul Gandhi 
prays at the Dwarkadhish Temple in Dwarka, Gujarat, 2017. 
 
It is tempting in this light to suggest that following the rise of the BJP after 
2014, the Congress – in its desperation – has set off on a mission to gain 
credibility on the terrain set out by the Sangh and thrown itself into a 
competition to ‘out-saffron’ the BJP. Yet this argument elides the importance 
of the enveloping crisis after 1973 and India’s subsequent road to economic 
liberalisation. The mainstream of Indian politics left ‘socialist’ aspirations 
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behind after the Emergency against the backdrop of socio-economic change. 
In turn, a political space opened up for Hindutva to become critical to the 
articulation of a resurgent neoliberal India. In this regard, ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ 
Hindutva are very much two sides of the same coin. Accordingly, the period 
after 1980 represents the culmination of a slow and gradual metamorphosis – 
a revolution at the top – in the form of a shift in power from the Congress to 
the BJP.  
 
Nonetheless, it is most certainly the case that the Congress is no doubt 
pragmatically communal as and when it suits their interests, unlike the Sangh 
who are most certainly – and indeed openly – ideologically bent on the 
transfiguration of India into the Hindu rashtra. Yet it is also true that the 
professed secularism of the Congress has been notably lacking in both colonial 
and postcolonial periods. In this regard, the Congress has long paved the way 
for Hindutva forces to become more deeply entrenched within Indian society. 
After 1980 in particular, with the pursuit of ‘soft’ Hindutva political for 
electoral gain, in the face of liberalisation and decline of socialist narratives, 
Hindutva has become pivotal to the political articulation of neoliberalism and 




The primary aim of this chapter has been to define key concepts that are put to 
work in the thesis that follows. The opening section of the chapter argued that 
Hindutva is a political ideology – that situates itself as the defacto culture of 
the nation – that emerged within the tensions between India and Empire. 
Through an examination of the historical formation of a singular and unitary 
Hinduism, it was demonstrated that Orientalist imperial visions and the 
nationalist visions of conservative Indian elites combined to set in motion a 
distinctly primordial and racialised understanding of Hinduism, that emerged 
in opposition to British as well as ‘Islamic’ Empire. Born of this political 
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conjuncture ideas of caste, race and religion became key in the formation of 
the future Indian nation.  
 
On the back of this history, it was argued that the RSS gives militant political 
form to a Hindu ‘chain of reasoning’ (Vanaik, 2017) born within the late-
colonial conjuncture of circumstances that beset the Indian subcontinent. The 
Hindu chain of reasoning relates to what Gramsci understood as ‘common 
sense’ – a relatively coherent set of religious and ethical ideas that can be 
mobilised towards ends of politics and power. In turn, key themes of 
discipline, moral community and the concept of Hinduism as a ‘world-
dynamic’ force that were produced through this process became cornerstones 
of Hindutva. Set against the threat of (predominantly Muslim) enemy forces 
Hindutva, then, is concerned above all with the nation-state, mass politics and 
the seizure of political power. Through the organisational backbone of the 
RSS, Hinduism is mobilised into a nationalist ideology and blended with 
themes of national culture, blood and soil.  
 
Having offered a definition of Hindutva, the next section of the chapter shifted 
gear to offer a working definition of neoliberalism and its unfolding in central 
Mumbai. The transformation of social worlds in Bombay/Mumbai wrought by 
the globalisation of neoliberalism were discussed with reference to the shift 
‘from mills to malls’ that has characterised the landscape of the central city. In 
the context of neoliberal urbanity, the anxieties of professional classes and 
upper castes have heightened under pressure from the rise of the lower classes 
and castes associated with rural-to-urban migration and the rising to 
prominence of those who Modi calls the ‘neo middle classes’ (Chatterji, Blom 
Hansen and Jaffrelot, 2019, p. 9). Offering a history of social change in the city 
and definition of neoliberalism, the discussion that comprised this section set 
the scene for the analyses of ‘new’ theatrical strategies of Hindutva politics 
within the tensions of Indian society and the globalisation of neoliberalism 
that are the focus of chapters four and five.  
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The final section of the chapter elaborated the decline of the Congress after 
1980 and the party’s role as an enabling force in the rise to prominence of 
Hindutva. Despite the many unfulfilled promises of Nehruvian socialism, the 
project was committed to a discourse of secularism, socialism and 
redistribution. Following its long decline after 1964, the fiscal crises and 
economic turbulence enveloping the global economy after 1973, and 
corresponding breakdown of the Indian ISI regime, the official discourse of 
redistributive policies and avowed mission to ‘alleviate poverty’ shifted off the 
Congress agenda decisively. As the Congress came under intense political 
pressure from mass demonstrations and the rise of the JP Movement, Indira 
Gandhi buckled and declared a state of Emergency. Which, in turn, gave rise 
to a strong current of anti-Congress politics spearheaded by Hindutva forces. 
These anti-Congress political currents pivoted on denunciation of both 
‘Nehruvian’ socialism and the political authoritarianism of Indira Gandhi.  
 
The fall out of these turbulent times led to the deployment by the Congress of 
‘soft’ Hindutva politics. In an attempt to hold onto power and outflank new 
rivals – primarily the BJP – Indira Gandhi began to more actively propagate 
Hinduism and ‘Hindu interests’ paired with an aggressive form of militant, 
(anti-separatist) nationalist politics. This marked the beginnings of a shift 
towards ‘soft’ Hindutva politics as pro-poor rhetoric was negated by appeals to 
(Hindu) national identity and solidarity in the face of ‘anti-national’ security 
threats to the integrity of the nation. The trend continued and indeed 
accelerated under Rajiv Gandhi and continues under the leadership of Rahul 
Gandhi. In the wake of socio-economic transformation and the long period of 
Emergency rule, a political space opened up for Hindutva to become central to 
the articulation of a newly resurgent neoliberal India. The Congress, rather 
than represent strong opposition to Hindutva, has been an enabling force in 
its rise.  
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As we will see, in the case of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and the International 
Day of Yoga, focus on the performance of the nation in the street means a 
focus on urban streets and public spaces. As we have seen, the political 
objectives and strategic goals of Hindutva must be understood as enmeshed in 
the contradictions of neoliberal urbanity. Noting the importance of the 
conjuncture of conditions discussed in chapter one, the next chapter accounts 
for the social and historical context of the political street that has made the 
performative, theatrical politics of Hindutva discussed in chapters four and 




































Bombay between India and Empire: three movements in 
the formation of the political street. 
 
‘Nationalism has to be understood by aligning it, 
not with self- consciously held political 
ideologies, but with the large cultural systems 
that preceded it, out of which — as well as 
against which - it came into being’.  
– Benedict Anderson (2006, p. 12). 
 
‘Streets are not just places where conflicts are 
shaped and/or expressed. They are also venues 
where people forge collective identities and 
extend their solidarities beyond their immediate 
familiar circles to include the unknown, the 
stranger.’ 
 – Asef Bayat (2017, p. 104). 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
 
To begin to answer how and why the ideology of Hindutva has been so 
effective, to examine the tools deployed to mobilise heterogeneous populations 
and inquire into what role, if any, the colonisation of urban spaces plays in this 
process, we need to consider the historical formation of the political street. 
‘Modern’ India, as Sumit Sarkar (1989, p. xvi) explains, did not begin with the 
dissolution of Mughal Empire and with Plassey, but during the decades of the 
latter half of the nineteenth century where ‘colonial political and economic 
domination attained its finished apparently stable form’. In terms of 
counterpoints to colonial rule that developed in tandem – from popular 
movements to ‘intelligentsia-based all-India nationalism’ – nationalist power 
has long been dominant over other political forms in Bombay/Mumbai and for 
the ‘ordinary residents’ of the city, Prashant Kidambi notes, street politics and 
performance – from protests and riots to festivals and processions – have 
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given ‘a tangible identity to the nation’ (Kidambi, 2019; see also Masselos, 
1976; 1982; 1991).  
 
This chapter accounts for the formation of the political street in three 
movements that were critical to the anti-colonial struggle in Bombay, but also 
played important roles in the formation of exclusionary Hindu politics: 
Ganpati Utsava, the anti-colonial civil disobedience and the city’s communist 
movement. Streets and public spaces have long been the primary venue of 
political organisation in the city. On this basis, I argue that among diverse 
cultural-religious traditions, urban socio-political identities and the rhythms 
of everyday life, primordial Hindu mythology and anti-Muslim sensibilities 
have long structured mass political movements in the city. At the same time, 
leaving an indelible mark on the public culture of the city’s streets and public 
spaces. The major contribution of the chapter is to set the theatrical 
colonisation of urban public spaces – the centre focus of this thesis – against a 
broader historical context that connects anti-colonial nationalism to the 
politics of exclusionary Hindu nationalism. With this in mind, the chapter 
offers a solid historical and political-sociological context from which to 
uncover and explore the politics of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and the 
International Day of Yoga.  
 
Though dominated by the Indian National Congress, visions for the future of 
the nation substantially differed between nationalist fractions and the regional 
context of the various anti-colonial movements in currency. Nonetheless, like 
the forces of Hindutva, anti-colonial and nationalist political currents as well 
as the Communist Party of India (CPI) shared a common desire to ‘remould 
Indian society and even the ‘Hindu community’ (Vanaik, 2017, p. 471). In this 
sense, the chapter shows how Hindutva has come to dominate the political life 
of the city off the back of a long history of performative politics rooted in 
Hinduism as a ‘chain of reasoning’ (as elaborated in chapter two) from 
everyday religious ritual, to the overtly political. 
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I begin the chapter by discussing the formation of the (Hindu) political street 
by way of anti-colonial struggle against British rule in Bombay. In doing so I 
make two claims: first, through a discussion of the Ganpati Utsava festival at 
the turn of the twentieth century (3.2) and nationalist civil disobedience 
campaign in the early 1930s (3.3), I argue that the ‘war of manoeuvre’ 
launched by the Indian National Congress against colonial rule drew its energy 
through an equally important ‘war of position’ against Bombay Muslims. 
Through a process of anti-colonial struggle, the Congress politically mobilised 
their followers, drawing power and discipline and moulding the movement 
around the formation of a new imagined community in a Hindu vernacular. I 
then discuss the equally important legacy for the political street of the gradual 
implosion of the Bombay communist movement, the politics of Hindu social 
order, and the communalism and casteism that were left in the wake of 
communist collapse (3.4).  
 
The extension of ‘Indian accustomed space’ (Rahman, 2019, p. 273) through 
festivals and collective activities and political organisation in urban public 
spaces – Ganpati Utsava, Civil disobedience and the politics of the CPI – was 
aimed against British rule, but also pivoted on the dissemination of Hindu 
primordial mythology and anti-Muslim sentiments. The concrete segregations 
and ‘difference’ manifest in the ‘actual’ street were to a significant degree 
sutured through the production of the political street. In this context, the 
contribution of this chapter to the thesis as a whole, lies in the provision of a 
long-wave historical and sociological context to the political articulation of the 
theatrical, performative mobilisation of imagined community in the political 
street analysed in chapters four and five.  
 
3.2 Ganpati Utsava: Hindu unity and the ‘alien’ Muslim foreigner  
 
This first section of the chapter looks at the making of Ganpati Utsava (Ganesh 
Festival) in 1894 and its organisation against the popular Muslim Mohurrum 
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festival in Bombay. While orthodox Brahmin political leaders were important 
in the foundation of Ganpati Utsava, more importantly, the festival was forged 
through the lived experience of the political street and negation of the Bombay 
Mohurrum as a popular festival attended by multiple and heterogeneous 
religio-cultural and social groups. As Ganpati Utsava was transformed from 
domestic religious observance into a political form of ‘urban public Hindu 
devotionalism’ (Bhatt, 2001, p. 32), Hindu unity was socially engineered in the 
political street and set against the “alien” Muslim foreigner. In what follows, I 
discuss the Bombay Mohurrum and then its negation following the formation 
of the Ganpati Utsava. Finally, I discuss the role of Congress “extremist” Bal 
Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920) in the formation of a militant Hindu street 
politics – though the engineering of performative politics in a distinctly Hindu 
vernacular – that as we will see, in chapters four and five, continues to have a 
lasting impact on the city. 
 
The Bombay Mohurrum 
 
Theoretically more of a Shia than a Sunni festival, the Muslim Mohurrum 
observances are an expression of mourning following the martyrdom of a 
grandson of the prophet Muhammad, Husayn ibn ‘Alī, who died at Kerbala in 
680 AD. In late-colonial Bombay,81 Sunni communities took part in the 
Mohurrum with lament, while infusing a number of distinct ‘festive’ 
innovations into the period of mourning. Each Moholla (neighbourhood) 
installed model tombs (tabuts) during the days of Mohurrum, attracting city-
wide attention as outsiders went around each different Moholla to visit the 
spectacular array of tabuts. Each tabut had its own toli – a group from each 
Moholla that would form the parade, mostly consisting of working-class 
youths, with petty criminal (badmash) elements. As the ten days of 
observance and holding of religious meetings and activities (mejlis) ended, the 
tabuts were paraded from their home turf to the other Moholla’s. This 
                                                 
81 This account draws primarily on the work of Cashman (1975) and Masselos (1976; 1991).  
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frequently provoked conflict and fights as the various processions attempted 
to move through other neighbourhoods. On the final day, the tabuts came 
together into a grand procession to Chowpatty Beach, where they were 
immersed in the sea in front of large numbers of spectators. According to 
some estimates, numbers could reach up to an approximate third of the city’s 
entire population (Masselos, 1991, p. 52). Owing to this format, across the 
Muslim quarters of the city, the Mohurrum took on the appearance of a 
festival as opposed to religious observance. As Jim Masselos (1976, p. 82) has 
pointed out, merrymaking, dancing and song animated and bound together 
the collective practices of the revellers:  
 
‘there were clowns, mimics, acrobats and fakirs who, 
in combination with the tolis, gave to the observance 
of the tragedy of Kerbala an outward mass 
manifestation of a “saturnalia of not only the 
Mahomedans but of all the roughs of Bombay of all 
creeds”.82 
 
Bombay’s Mohurrum – essentially the city’s premier Muslim carnival (Green, 
2011, p. 53) – brought a multiplicity of religious attitudes onto the city streets. 
These differences comprised sectarian and doctrinal differences between 
Muslims in accordance with the order of proceedings; rivalries between 
Mohollas and different communities and antagonisms between individuals 
and groups (Masselos, 1976; 1991). Social fractures within the Muslim 
population and diversity of Bombay Islams were brought out onto the surface 
and it was not uncommon for such differences to boil over into open conflict. 
Most importantly, even European observers, writing as early as the mid-
nineteenth century, noted that the Mohurrum represented a challenge and 
even ‘reversal of colonial public order’ (Green, 2011, p. 53; Kidambi, 2007). 
 
                                                 
82 From the Bombay Gazetter, 25 Feb (1907 p. 4), quoted in Masselos (1976, p. 82) 
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The Mohurrum observances in the city of course changed over time along with 
shifts in the urban environment. After 1904, when Sunni toliwallas attacked 
some Bohra shopkeepers and following incidences of rioting and violence over 
the following years – in particular in 1908, after a Shia Julhai toli disturbed 
Muslims praying in a Sunni mosque – a rethinking of policing in relation to 
the Mohurrum was launched by police commissioner S.M Edwards in 1910. As 
a result, a series of new regulations, all but banning the tabuts (with the effect 
of eliminating the problem of tolis) came into force in 1913. By 1912, the Times 
of India was already reporting that “in view of the revised rules recently 
promulgated by the Commissioner of Police” amongst the participants, “there 
seemed to be a general disposition not to do anything which would go against 
the rules”. This, according to the Times of India, owed in large part to “the 
absence of the rowdy element that usually identifies itself with the Mohurrum 
festival in Bombay”.83 To be sure, the decade leading up to the turn of the 
twentieth century witnessed an acceleration of evermore intrusive colonial 
policing strategies: marking a shift from ‘indirect’ control to a ‘direct’ 
approach, targeting the close control of urban neighbourhoods and the 
emerging ‘native’ public sphere. The timing of this shift was directly related to 
growing communal unrest and its explosion into urban riots in 1893.84 
However, there was another reason for the decline of the Mohurrum and the 
end of its time as Bombay’s major festival: the rise of the Ganpati Utsava.  
 
The spatial politics of Ganpati Utsava 
 
It makes sense to examine the decline of the Bombay Mohurrum in relation to 
the emergence of the Ganpati Utsava on the scene, to the extent that many of 
                                                 
83 Times of India Illustrated Weekly Jan 10 (1912 p. 28). 
84 The Acting Commissioner of Police, R.H Vincent posited the view that the Bombay cow protection 
societies had a significant effect on the ferment of the 1893 riots in the city. His suggestion that the 
origin of the riots lay in the “anti-cow killing agitation of the Hindus” was echoed in the Anglo-Indian 
press and by several important city officials. Unsurprisingly, Tilak’s newspaper the Maharatta did not 
share this view, arguing that the Hindus of the city had acted in self-defence and the Muslims and 
Bombay police were to blame for letting the disturbance escalate. For Tilak, the moral drawn from the 
events, was that Anglo-Indian officials were concerned to support “Mahomedans against Hindus” 
(Cashman, 1975, p.68). 
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the practices of Mohurrum were repurposed in an attempt to unite the city’s 
Hindus. As we will see, the role of Congress politician Bal Gangadhar Tilak in 
the transformation of the festival in the mid-1890s was that of gifted publicist, 
champion and disseminator of the cause across Maharashtra, from Bombay 
City and Poona to the rural hinterlands.85 Given his relative distance from 
organisational matters – and the rural peasantry and urbanised working 
classes in general – it is fair to say that Tilak’s major contribution to the birth 
of the festival relates to his famously ‘infectious commentary’ on 
proceedings.86 Tilak joined forces with a coterie of Poona-based Brahmins 
united around orthodox Hinduism, a militant style of politics and opposition 
to British rule. Ganpati Utsava was politicised, militant and arranged around 
mythological Hindu themes explicitly geared to stir up animosity and hatred 
for the “alien” Muslim foreigner (Kaur, 2004, pp. 190-195). The iconography 
of Ganesha – worshipped by many Hindu sects of both the upper and lower 
castes – was popularised and politicised, according to Tilak, in order to 
“bridge the gap between the Brahmins and non-Brahmins.”87  
 
Marking a transition from a strictly family affair within the domestic sphere to 
a gala event in the political street, in the 1890s, Ganpati idols (murti) that 
were installed during the festival presented Ganesha in warrior (Kshatriya) 
form (see figure 6). In the lively arena of the political street, collective 
sentiments around the cultural production of the festival converged. 
Frequently depicted vanquishing demons, the iconography of Ganesha – the 
“remover of obstacles” – was constructed to draw attention to the ‘glorious 
                                                 
85 After 1978, Poona became officially known as Pune, though the latter name has long been in 
currency.  
86 There is some debate around Tilak’s involvement in the festival on the ground (see Kaur, 2002; 
2004). On the question of Tilak’s interventions, Raminder Kaur (2004, p. 187) cautions against the 
production of accounts that align with principles of “elite mobilisation” and pay credence to the “great 
men” school of history. Tilak’s pre-eminence in relation to the festival should not be understated, but 
neither should the role of other principle figures in ‘starting’ the festival be ignored. However, it is 
worth noting that Tilak is credited as the originator of the festival in typical Hindu nationalist 
accounts. Either way, it is undoubtedly the case that he has become well known as the original and 
pre-eminent Ganpati festival organiser 
87 Tilak is quoted at https://www.indiatoday.in/fyi/story/ganesh-chathurthi-bal-gangadhar-tilak-
339232-2016-09-05, last accessed 20 September 2020. 
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past’ of a Hindu Maharashtra, linking together the essence of Hinduism and 
idealised purity of “Hindu Raj” (Kaur, 2002, pp. 71-72). The xenophobic 
discourse of foreign aliens that underpinned the festival, was directed at the 
European coloniser but also enabled Muslims to be constituted as Other, in so 
far as the festival pivoted on the creation and assertion of Hindu identity and 
the ‘nationalisation of the masses’ in Maharashtra (Blom Hansen, 1999, p. 75). 
By way of the celebration of martial Hindu identity that animated the festival, 
Muslim presence was accordingly re-configured as a remnant of the past 
injustices of Mughal rule and a threat to Hindu society in the present (Bhatt, 
2001, p. 33; Cashman, 1975, p. 83-84). The introduction of the popular 
elephant headed god Ganesha into the political culture of the city, then, 
blended religious symbolism and festivities with street level political action 
into a potent brew. In this regard, on the one hand, the propagation of 
Ganesha in warrior form indicates the formation of a politicised, militant 
Hinduism in late-colonial Bombay.88 On the other, it indicates the formation 
of the (Hindu) political street through the ‘Othering’ of urban Muslim 
communities.  
 
                                                 
88 In a similar way, after 2014, led by the Hindutva outfit Bajrang Dal (‘Army of Hanuman’), the 
Hindu god Hanuman has been transformed from genial monkey-god to an angry, mean looking, 
militant warrior. In 2016, a new-look militant Hanuman, set against a saffron background, was 
designed by a young Mangaluru based graphic designer. The image went viral almost immediately 
and was quickly taken up and co-opted into the iconography of Bajrang Dal. ‘Hanuman 2.0’ also 
swiftly garnered the attention and praise of Narendra Modi (Misquith, 2018). Such is the popularity of 
the image – especially among youth – that it now adorns t-shirts, public transport, walls and the 
window shields and bumpers of cars and motorbikes all over India. Militant, muscular images from 
Ganesh to Hanuman, and of course, Lord Rama, adorn the pantheon of Hindutva (Pande, 2018). 
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Figure 6: the militant murti: the Ganesha form portrayed slaying a Rakshasa 
(demon). Image from the Chatrapati Rajaram Ganpati Mandal, established 
1892.89   
 
In the context of India and Empire, Ganpati Utsava acted as a major catalyst 
towards the emergence of a particular formation of Hindu common sense in 
the political street. Simply put, a relatively coherent elaboration of political 
Hinduism was articulated in and through the celebrations. Although not yet 
articulated in a fully-worked out form, the idea of a future Hindu nation in 
Bombay was thus stitched together through the practice of the festival. To be 
sure, Ganpati Utsava formed an element of the ‘political sharpening’ of a 
regional, linguistic (elite Brahmin-led) Maharashtrian ‘nationalism’ 
engineered by Tilak. However, it was also combined with a strategy for the 
(re)invigoration of Hindu traditions and iconography towards a form of all-
India nationalism in opposition to colonial rule (Bhatt, 2001, p. 32). In this 
regard, Tilak’s efforts to shift Ganpati Utsava from the home into the political 
street, represented a shift in the Congress regarding its relation to the masses.  
 
                                                 
89 This image is taken from Kaur (2004 p. 194). 
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In Gramscian terms, we can say that Ganpati Utsava effected a ‘connection of 
feeling between intellectuals and people-nation’ (Gramsci, 2000, p. 350). The 
political street to borrow from Prashant Kidambi (2019) provided ‘a tangible 
identity to the nation’ in this context. While historically Ganesha had 
principally been the deity of Chitpavan Brahmin communities, the primordial 
narrative of Hindu nationalism pushed by Tilak elided caste distinctions, to 
mobilise the iconography of Ganesha towards a mass political movement of 
‘lower caste’ Hindus (Bhatt, 2001, p. 36). Of the various aspects of Tilak’s 
plans for the transformation of Ganpati Utsava, the coordinates of this 
strategy for mass inter-caste mobilisation around the notion of a primordial 
Hinduism is most important. Remapping the matrix of popular “Hindu” 
sensibilities and values, Tilak and co were able to establish the terrain on 
which national transformation might take place. In this light, Ganpati Utsava 
offers a concrete example of how through the praxis of nationalist 
organisation, Hinduism was identified and filtered into the production of 
‘national-popular’ culture in the political street.  
 
Critically, then, it was not until the transformation of Ganpati Utsava in the 
early 1890s – as it was moved out of the home and into the street – that the 
festival became overtly political.90 On Richard Cashman’s (1975, p. 77) 
account, a set of novel innovations into proceedings combined to shape the 
fundamentals of the festival. First of all, a collective group aspect was forged 
through the installation of decorated pavilions (mandaps) and commission of 
a public Ganpati sculpture (sarvajanik) to become the focal point of collective 
worship. Both were funded by the collection of subscriptions from the 
adjoining streets and markets of each neighbourhood. On the tenth and final 
day of the festival, the sarvajanik Ganpatis took part in the final immersion 
celebration at Chowpatty Beach together.  
 
                                                 
90 The following account of the birth of Ganpati Utsava draws upon Richard Cashman’s (1975) 
influential The Myth of the Lokamanya: Tilak and Mass Politics in Maharashtra.  
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Second, like the tolis of Mohurrum, the 1890s re-launch of Ganpati Utsava 
introduced a movement of singers (melas) to each of the sarvajanik Ganpatis. 
According to Cashman, these singers were ‘often dressed in lavish garb and 
sometimes dressed as Shivaji’s soildiers, armed with bamboo sticks and 
decorated with popular emblems of Hinduism’. Third, and critically, for the 
first time, the melas became politically loaded against the politically 
manufactured idea of the (Muslim) alien foreigner. Take for instance the 
verses exhorting Hindus to boycott the Mohurrum festival sung by the melas 
in 1894:  
 
Oh! why have you abandoned today the Hindu religion? 
How have you forgotten Ganapati, Shiva and Maruti? 
What have you gained from worshipping the tabuts? 
What boon has Allah conferred upon you 
That you have become Mussalmans today? 
Do not be friendly to a religion which is alien 
Do not give up your religion and be fallen. 
Do not at all venerate the tabuts,  
The cow is our mother, do not forget her.91  
 
Somewhat paradoxically, Ganpati Utsava borrowed heavily from the 
Mohurrum celebrations while its champions such as Tilak urged Hindus to 
boycott the proceedings of the latter (Kaur, 2004, pp. 190-195). By copying 
dominant aspects of the festivities, the champions of the newly minted 
political festival aimed to recruit Hindu musicians, dancers and artists that 
had previously attended Mohurrum. An interesting aside is that alongside 
production of a ‘feeling of Hinduness’ yoked to nationalist sentiments, a more 
pragmatic political aim also preoccupied the festival organisers. Through the 
organisation of mass protest, Tilak and his contemporaries were able to 
                                                 
91 Quoted in Cashman (1975, p. 77-78). 
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suggest that Hindus were unhappy with the perceived pro-Muslim bias of the 
colonial state, and angry at the non-recognition of Brahmins as the natural 
interlocutors of the British elites. Likewise, they were able to challenge the 
British view that Brahmins were out of touch with the masses and that Hindu 
society was divided (Cashman, 1975, p. 79). It would therefore be inaccurate to 
frame Tilak and his coterie as simply “men of the people” – there was a high 
degree of self-interest in their political strategy.  
 
Nonetheless, both festivals were indeed ‘popular’ and well attended: the 
character of both Mohurrum and Ganpati Utsava in Bombay contributed to 
the production of an expressive landscape of ‘collective accustomed space’ 
(Masselos, 1991, p. 39). While both festivals consisted of an array of devotional 
practices, only one would win out to have a lasting political imprint on the 
public culture of the city. In spatial terms, both festivals worked to ‘create 
allied neighbourhoods that [form] part of each other’s accustomed space 
(Masselos, 1991, p. 42). The marshalling of Ganpati Utsava against the Muslim 
Mohurrum should thus be viewed as an instance of conflict over, and political 
mobilisation towards, the management of urban space.  
 
In Ganpati Utsava, the idea of the nation was forged through collective ritual 
in the political street. Political mobilisation around the symbol of Ganesh – 
from within the early Congress fold – generated a powerful configuration of 
common sense anchored in the production of a pervasive atmosphere of 
‘Hinduness’. When the spatial politics of Swachh Bharat and the International 
Day of Yoga are discussed in chapters four and five, we will see the modern 
analogues to this early example of ‘exclusionary Hinduism’ and its use as a 
political tool of mass mobilisation to create divisions and apportion 
communities according to ‘nominal religious affiliation’ (see Bhatt, 2001, p. 
33). The exclusionary Hinduism of Hindutva in the political streets of central 
Mumbai, then, can be traced in part to the political strategy of the Congress 
‘extremists’ back in the 1890s. Before moving on to discuss the role of the civil 
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disobedience campaign in the formation of the ‘Hindu’ street, let us turn to a 
discussion of the politics of Bal Gangadhar Tilak in wider context. 
 
The ‘extremist’ Bal Gangadhar Tilak 
 
Bal Gangadhar Tilak was a respected and influential member of the Indian 
National Congress that was active in the organisation from 1890, on and off, 
until his death in 1920. He was a major figure and part of a newer generation 
of leaders that aimed directly for independence (swaraja) against the official 
party line of so-called Congress ‘moderates’, who aimed for reform and 
representation under the umbrella of British rule. By 1897, Tilak’s politics had 
landed him in serious trouble with the colonial authorities. He was prosecuted 
for sedition and jailed for eighteen months. It was in the wake of this series of 
events that he earned the label ‘extremist’ from the British and the title 
lokamanya (‘beloved leader of the people’) from supportive elements of the 
national movement. 
 
Following considerable pressure exerted by a series of nationalist petitions 
and agitations, Tilak was granted conditional release under Section 401 of the 
code of criminal procedure. However, given the particular weight of his 
“extreme” and dangerous views, colonial officials of the Bombay 
administration viewed the “seditious” Poona Brahmin with deep suspicion. 
The official mind of the colonial state records the apparent danger that Tilak 
was seen to pose, the government agreed to his release only on two conditions:  
 
(i) that he will not countenance or take part directly or 
indirectly in any demonstrations in regard to this 
release or in regard to his conviction or sentence. 
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(ii) that he will do nothing by act, speech or writing to 
excite disaffection towards government.92 
 
Beyond keeping Tilak away from the organisation of popular protest, the 
evident aim of the colonial authorities was to silence one of their most 
trenchant and popular critics. Yet he was soon to land himself in hot water 
again. Following the partition of Bengal in 1905, Tilak rose further within the 
Congress fold, this time to national prominence as a staunch advocate of 
boycott and passive resistance – methods that as we will see, Gandhi’s civil 
disobedience movement would later take up with great effect. Around this 
time and owing to Tilak’s outspoken views and methods of agitation, clashes 
with Congress moderates became more frequent and in 1908, following his 
commentary on the Alipore Bomb Case,93 he was again charged with sedition 
and sentenced to six years in prison. This time, however, Tilak was promptly 
deported to Mandalay to serve his sentence in isolation from the developing 
Indian nationalist scene.  
 
Tilak’s enthusiasm for swaraj was deemed by the colonial authorities to be a 
particularly dangerous form of seditious extremism. Yet even a brief glance at 
his personal writings reveals a more nuanced, ideologically driven portrait of 
the man. For instance, his book The Orion, or ‘Researches into the Antiquity of 
the Vedas’ [1893], espouses a primordalist view of Hinduism drawn from late-
colonial Orientalist premises (see Bhatt, 2001). In The Orion, Hinduism is 
presented as “Aryan” and the natural and rightful successor to ancient Vedic 
culture. Tilak was thereby an important popular figure (and member of the 
Congress fold) to play an early role in the dissemination of ‘Orientalist 
precepts’ and attach a primordial Hindu mythology to the idea of the nation 
(Bhatt, 2001, p. 32). Not just in thought but in practice. As we have seen, in 
                                                 
92 India Office Records (IOR). ‘Confidential proceedings on the release of Tilak’ IOR/L/PJ/6/497, File 
2377: 18 Nov 1898 and ‘The release of Tilak’ IOR/L/PJ/6/490, File 1930: 17 Sep 1898 
93 Formally “Emperor vs. Aurobindo Ghosh and Others”, the Alipore bomb case refers to the trial of 
Bengali nationalists under the official charge of “waging war against the government”. The crime was 
an alleged attempt (and failure) to blow up the Chief Magistrate of the Presidency Court of Alipore.  
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organisational form of the Ganpati Utsava, Tilak combined these views with ‘a 
reconfigured and politicised form of urban public Hindu devotionalism’ 
(Bhatt, 2001, p. 32).94 In this way, Tilak prepared the ground for Hindutva in 
Maharashtra, inspiring figures such as V.D Savarkar and founder of the RSS 
Keshav Baliram Hedgewar (1889-1940) (Jaffelot, 2007, p. 85). For these 
reasons, Tilak remains an extremely popular figure of the anti-colonial 
struggle for Hindutva forces to this day.95 
 
In addition to the tag “extremists” Tilak and co were framed by the British at 
various stages as dangerous “fanatics”. The motivations of the extremist 
faction of the Congress and anti-imperialism of Tilak was painted as 
religiously inspired, irrational and dangerous to British rule. Closer 
examination reveals these motivations to be irrefutably political. 96 Tilak’s 
nationalist strategy was driven by political conviction, in so far as a rationalist 
logic of anti-colonial sentiment and personal interest in power was articulated 
through the language of Hindu assertion. This stream of nationalist agitation 
was situated firmly within the confines of rational political discussion and 
behaviour, and advanced through the political vehicle of the Indian National 
Congress. As we will see, the themes developed in the political street by 
elements of the extremist caucus of the Congress were readily translated into 
the civil disobedience movement, as the nationalist movement entered a most 
critical phase.  
                                                 
94 In his capacity as a journalist and political activist, primordialist views were widely disseminated 
through his editorship of two popular weekly newspapers Kesari (the Lion) published in Marathi and 
The Maharatta which was published in English.  
95 For instance, speaking of the greatness of Hindu culture, the second RSS leader (from 1940 to 1973) 
M.S Golwalkar, referenced Tilak in the same breath as the ‘great warriors and Emperors’ of the ‘Hindu 
Race’ (Golwalkar, 2007, p. 115). And indeed – in the context of the Ganpati Utsava celebrations – 
Tilak has been celebrated by the Sangh Parivar as founding father of the national liberation struggle – 
a project that is unfinished and is to be carried on by the Sangh themselves (Blom Hansen, 1999, p. 
263). 
96 A brief note on the idea of the fanatic. While the ‘fanatic’ has historically been aligned with the idea 
of religious encroachment into the secular public sphere of colonial-modernity, Alberto Toscano 
argues for a more nuanced reading that considers the label “fanaticism” under the heading of the 
politics of abstraction (Toscano, 2010, p. xii). “Figures of extremism” are rendered so at the hands of 
the state. In an era of colonial rule, the fanatic is configured as he/she who weaponises resources of 
religious expression and oppositionalism, against social forces of colonial rule and imperial 
expansion, no matter what their motivations (Toscano, 2010, pp. 14-15). I think we can consider the 
‘fanaticism’ of Tilak and co in this light.  
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3.3 The anti-Muslim character of civil disobedience  
 
Through a close analysis of the civil disobedience movement in Bombay,  
the aim of this section of the chapter is to reveal a picture of the Congress as 
deeply implicated in the growth and consolidation of Hindu nationalism. The 
failure of the Congress to take Muslim aspirations into account within the 
anti-colonial movement and their defacto definition of the nation as Hindu 
was significant in ‘generating Muslim separatist politics’ and ultimately paving 
the way to partition (Teltumbde, 2018, p. 380). In this regard, an important 
shift in the political strategy of the Congress can be traced to 1926, when the 
Hindu revivalist fringe of M.M Malaviya (1861-1946) attempted to take 
management of the party into their own hands. After acquiring a firm 
foothold, these actors effectively displaced Motilal Nehru’s Swaraj Party to 
become the Congress’ political voice (Tidrick, 2013, p. 211). The political 
origins of this fringe, the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, were firmly of the 
Hindu right, called for the liberation and organic unity of the “Hindu race” 
and championed national discipline and military regeneration as the means to 
combat Hindu ‘subordination’ and ‘emasculation’ (Jha, 2013, p. 120). 
Members of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha later went on the found the RSS 
in 1925 (see Ahmad, 2020). 
 
As we have seen, under the guidance of leaders such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak in 
Maharashtra (and Lala Lajpat Rai and Bipin Chandra Pal in Punjab and 
Bengal respectively97) an uncompromising struggle against imperialism was 
anchored in foundations of a highly orthodox Hinduism that drew upon, and 
openly affirmed the supposed superiority of ancient Hindu ‘Aryan’ civilisation 
                                                 
97 Lala Lajput Rai and Bal Gangadhar Tilak were joined by Bipan Chandra Pal to form the famous 
triumvirate of leading “extremist” nationalists that dominated the nationalist scene from 1905 until 
the end of the First World War. “Lal-Bal-Pal” were based in the Punjab, Maharashtra and Bengal 
respectively. Lai Lajput Rai (1865-1928) was a particularly influential politician at the national level, 
especially in relation to the increasingly saffron colouration of the Congress. A highly influential 
member of the party (and after his resignation in 1925, leader of the Hindu Mahasabha) Lajput Rai 
unflinchingly called for ‘a clear partition of India into a Muslim India and a non-Muslim India’.97 He 
lobbied for Hindu interests and consistently argued against what he saw as the ‘appeasement of 
Muslims’ (Bhatt, 2001, p. 70).  
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(Bhatt, 2001; Dutt, 1949, p. 303).98  In the era of Tilak, urban Hindu 
devotionalism (in the form of Ganpati Utsava) was mobilised to politically 
articulate primordial Hindu sensibilities and configure the cultural terrain of 
the political street, as Indian modernity took relatively stable form.  
 
The era of fully-fledged mass anti-colonial nationalism, however, came with 
the ascent of M.K Gandhi to become the defacto leader of the Indian National 
Congress. Prior to civil disobedience, the Indian national movement came into 
its own after the First World War, following the arrival of Gandhi from South 
Africa onto the Indian political scene. The Congress developed into a mass 
organisation under the tutelage of Gandhi between 1918 and 1923, moving 
into a position of unrivalled dominance as the primary vehicle of anti-colonial 
struggle. It is certainly true that during this period the nationalist movement 
broadened its horizons. Following Gandhi’s skilful construction of the non-
cooperation movement, the Congress gained a degree of support from 
significant sections of the Bombay Muslim community and ushered in a new-
era of mass nationalist politics (Kidambi, 2012).99 However, with the 
breakdown of non-cooperation through the 1920s, tensions between the 
increasingly powerful “Mahasabha wing” of the Congress, Congress Muslim’s 
and the Muslim League became more intense. As a result, the Congress high 
command was – not unfairly – attacked with the charge that swaraj was a 
thinly veiled cover for the ultimate political objective of ‘Hindu Raj’. 
Throughout this period, Hindu-Muslim tensions grew as the national 
movement failed to achieve communal unity (Habib, 1997, p. 43).  
 
Against this background, Gandhi’s hope was that the declaration of ‘complete 
independence’ (Purna Swaraj) as the full aim of the movement and launch of 
                                                 
98 Dutt is cited in Cashman (1975). 
99 Though Gandhi was the key architect, it should be pointed out that this broad wave of support was 
closely tied to the relation of Shaukat and Muhammad Ali, Abul Kalam Azad and their associates and 
followers to the Congress. Further still, it is worth noting that Gandhi’s formation mass politics under 
the banner of Hindu-Muslim unity unsettled other smaller minorities, such as the Parsi community 
(see Patel, 2018). 
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civil disobedience in 1929 at Lahore, would be a catalyst for leaders of 
different stripes to settle their differences and come together in a united anti-
colonial front (Hasan, 1985). In the event, while the Congress became the 
dominant force within the anti-colonial nationalist movement it remained 
very much ‘a party of parties and a movement of movements’ – more anti-
colonial front (inclusive of communists, Gandhians, liberals, right wingers and 
socialists of multiple religious and traditional dispositions) than united 
around one political position (Sinha, 2019, pp. 88-89). Yet alongside the 
development of the Congress as a mass anti-colonial front, in the pervasive 
atmosphere of civil disobedience and its aftermath, as the spirit of anti-
colonial resistance swept through the city an increasingly anti-Muslim 
character to the movement was revealed.  
 
The final section of this chapter (3.4) picks up the key theme of this chapter – 
the centrality of primordial Hindu mythology to the formation of the political 
street – in relation to the powerful communist movement in Bombay. First, let 
us turn to discuss the importance of the political street in what I argue to be 
the Congress’ ‘war of manoeuvre’ against British colonial rule. In doing so, 
first, I emphasise the role of Indian nationalist women and concomitant 
gendering of the political street and then, elaborate the dynamics of anti-
Muslim politics embedded within the logics of civil disobedience. 
 
Rallying around the flag 
 
By the 1930s, visions of the future Indian nation had become connected to the 
ceremonial salutation of the Indian flag. First proposed by Gandhi in 1921, two 
years later, a satyagraha was organised around a newly minted Indian 
tricolour flag with a spinning wheel emblazoned at its centre at Nagpur 
(Central Provinces).100 The protest lasted four months and kick started the life 
                                                 
100 The term satyagraha was coined by Gandhi and translates to something approximating “holding 
onto truth”. The idea was developed to express the practice of fearlessly, but non-violently, engaging 
in civil resistance.  
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of the flag as a potent political symbol representing the aspirations of the 
Indian nation (Virmani, 1999, p. 171). In Bombay, following a meeting of the 
All-India Congress Committee, it was declared that every last Sunday of each 
month would be officially designated “Flag Day”. A day to commemorate and 
celebrate the nation, “flag salutations”, as they came to be known over the next 
decades to independence, would become a permanent commemorative ritual 
in the nationalist calendar. As the nationalist movement grew more 
prominent, salutation of the new flag became a central feature of powerful 
rituals of collective representation and accelerating nationalist claims over the 
colonial city (Kidambi, 2012, p. 960).101 At the same time, in the late 1920s, 
rejection of the Simon Commission by the leadership of all the major parties – 
and the protests supporting the decision – overlapped with growing worker 
militancy in the Bombay mill districts. This created an increasingly explosive 
atmosphere in the run up to civil disobedience (Habib, 1997, p. 47). 
 
From the outset, the format of the civil disobedience movement was designed 
to intersect with the form and meaning of place. The methods of resistance 
were clearly outlined in advance and in Bombay, consisted of strikes (hartals); 
processions and parades; the manufacture of salt; picketing and boycotting; 
and passivity in the face of lathi charges by the police (Masselos, 1985, pp. 75-
77). Official accounts of civil disobedience declare the period 12 March – 6 
April 1930 and Gandhi’s Dandi satyagraha, or ‘salt march’, as pivotal to the 
struggle. The march took place at Dandi in modern day Gujarat but had an 
explosive effect in the city of Bombay. The aftermath of the Dandi satyagraha 
marked a step-up in intensity as civil disobedience was transformed into a 
wide-ranging coordinated campaign against the British Raj that continued – 
albeit sporadically and unevenly – well into the 1930s. The role of flag 
salutation ceremonies in public space (in particular on the Esplanade 
                                                 
101 Officially ‘The Indian Statutory Commission’ – the ‘Simon Commission’ – was set up by the British 
to study possibilities for constitutional reform, it was made up of seven British MPs that arrived in 
British India in 1928. The goals of the Simon Commission were of course antithetical to the cause of 
independence (Swaraj). 
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Maidan)102 became more intense during the civil disobedience period and 
increasingly became a focal point of collective struggle and growing patriotic 
sentiment.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the flag salutation ceremonies soon came to be viewed as a 
threat to British rule. The 1930s saw an escalation in the policing of the 
ceremonies in Bombay and the gatherings were frequently issued immediate 
banning orders (under Section 23(3) of the Bombay City Police Act). The 
colonial authorities deployed “elaborate police arrangements” to shut down 
the ceremonies and disperse the vast crowds they attracted.103 One such event 
culminated in the series of incidents on 21st June 1930 that came to be known 
as “Black Saturday”. Communications between the Governor of Bombay and 
Secretary of State for India bluntly outline the decision of the Congress to defy 
the ban:  
 
“following issue of order by Chief Presidency Magistrate 
prohibiting drilling of volunteers on Esplande Maidan in 
close proximity to Indian regiments, War Council of 
provincial Congress Committee decided to defy order and 
hold rally of volunteers previously arranged, at which 
Pandit Motill Nehru [Congress President] was to take 
salute.”104 
 
Before the rally could get properly started, the police ordered the crowds to 
disperse and charged. According to the police reports, approximately two-
hundred Indians “including five women” were injured.105 The reference to 
Congress women/female nationalist observers of the Flag Day ceremonies is 
significant here, and not just because women played a most important role in 
                                                 
102 Esplanade Maidan (now Azad Maidan) is the biggest and most central open space in south central 
Bombay. In the late-colonial period, it was at the geographical centre of colonial rule in the city.  
103 IOR/L/PJ/6/490: 28th December 1930 p. 10  
104 IOR/L/PJ/6/490: 28th December 1930 p. 10 
105 IOR/L/PJ/6/497: 3rd July 1930 p. 7.   
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the ongoing campaign. However tentatively, with Gandhi at the helm, the 
nationalist movement called into question the position of hitherto 
marginalised groups – women and Untouchables in particular – in relation to 
the nationalist struggle and the projected image of the future nation. 
Throughout the period of civil disobedience – from beginning to end – the 
support and participation of women, especially regarding the intensity and 
longevity of the struggle was critical. According to the dictates of the Congress, 
women were to be afforded a new-found dignity and role in society and 
Untouchables were to be brought closer into the Hindu fold, although there 
would be no inclusive critique of the patriarchal coordinates of Indian society 
or critique of caste respectively. These ‘reforms’ were real enough, but the 
stronger claim here is that the national movement failed to generate a broad 
critique of Indian social institutions; neither was there a critique of their 
integration with the norms and values of colonial society (Pearson 1979, pp. 
36-37).  
 
Indian womanhood was thus closely tied to the national question. Indeed, 
colonial-era texts long identified the poor treatment of Indian women as an 
index of India’s apparently low grade of civilisation (see for example, Mill, 
1975, pp. 280-281). In response, (male) Indian nationalists engaged in the 
discursive construction of a ‘new’ Indian woman distinct from stereotypes of 
‘Western’ women and also distinguished from ‘common’ lower caste and class 
Indian women – ‘new’ Indian woman was in turn subjected to a new 
patriarchy and placed as the representative of modern Indian culture 
(Chatterjee, 1989, p. 627). The process of Indian modernity – as colonial-
political domination of the subcontinent moved into a ‘relatively stable phase’ 
(Sarkar, 1989, p. xvi) – was marked by a distinctly gendered division of labour 
that revolved around the activities of the nationalist ‘middle classes’. As Sanjay 
Seth (2013, p. 278) points out,  
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‘the middle-class Indian male had perforce to engage with 
the colonial civil sphere in order to make a living, and the 
nationalist had to engage with it in order to acquire the 
scientific and technological skills needed if India were to 
liberate itself from foreign rule. In the process, cultural 
compromises were necessitated. All the more necessary 
then that the Indian woman, through her religious 
devotion and her “traditional” dress and demeanour, 
function as emblem and repository of an identity that was 
pure and unsullied’. 
 
The advent of Gandhian nationalism, then, marked a change in the discourse 
of the nation and its women, who as Seth (2013, p. 279) argues ‘signified an 
Indianness that had to be retained and preserved.’ Following the Dandi 
satyagraha, nationalist women took part in satyagraha raids on salt works and 
were the enabling force behind the picketing of foreign cloth and liquor shops 
(Raman, 2019).106 As Gail Pearson (1979, p. 273) explains:  
 
‘July [1930] marked a turning point in women’s 
participation. It saw the first arrest and sentencing of 
women who held office on the Bombay War Council, the 
body of the B.P.C.C [Bombay Provincial Congress 
Committee] that was directing civil disobedience, a further 
intensification of picketing, the first arrests but not yet 
sentencing of women picketers and the first mass arrest of 
women following a procession to celebrate Tilak’s 
anniversary’.  
 
                                                 
106 Alongside carefully selected Congress volunteers, female volunteer associations such as Desh 
Sevika Sangh and the Gujarati Hindu Stree Mandal organised the collection of seawater, manufacture 
of salt, and ‘sold and organised picketing of liquor and foreign cloth shops’ (Raman, 2019). 
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The conclusion of the working committee to step-up civil disobedience at the 
end of July caused the police to respond with an increasingly heavy hand. On 
October 26th, 1930, a notorious incident occurred during the Esplanade 
Maidan flag ceremony where female volunteers were accosted by police and 
dumped beyond the city limits. The Bombay government noted in internal 
correspondence that women were becoming increasingly instrumental in the 
capacity of the Congress to wage civil disobedience.107 That targeting women 
would become a strategy of the police to disrupt the protests seems logical in 
retrospect. Even so, the importance of nationalist agitation in relation to its 
audience is highlighted by the heavy repression at the hands of the colonial 
police, where observers (male or female) were treated as if they too were 
actors in civil disobedience (Masselos, 1985, p. 82).  
 
Following the accosting of the female Congress volunteers from Esplanade 
Maidan, the national movement and various figures of Bombay high society 
exploded in outrage of a particular kind. A requisition was signed by twenty-
six thousand persons to call a public meeting of protest against the ill-
treatment of the women by the police. A telegram was sent by Congress 
Chairman G.V Deshmukh to the Secretary of State for India that noted the 
conduct of the police to be “an insult to India’s womanhood and defiance of all 
decent civilised behaviour”.108 The sanctity of the woman’s sphere, projected 
within nationalist discourse as an object of national pride, was to be protected, 
as opposed to questioned and transformed (Pearson, 1979, p. 37). Women 
were thus actively and indeed centrally involved in nationalist political 
agitations. Yet, even so, it is crucial to point out that Gandhi ‘tried to change 
women’s position without transforming their relation to either the outer world 
of production or the inner world of family, sexuality and reproduction’ 
(Kishwar, 1986, p. 28; see also Tambe, 2009).   
 
                                                 
107 IOR/L/PJ/6/497 File 6383. p. 10  
108 IOR P&J 6718 p. 10.  
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The image of (Hindu) Indian woman as patriotic subject thus continued to be 
seen in relation to the maintenance and preservation of ‘Indianness’ and 
protection of the domestic sphere of custom and tradition (Seth, 2013). 
Outside of the home, ‘new’ nationalist woman became a marker for the nation 
itself – in opposition to sexualised ‘Westernised’ women (and the apparently 
vulgar, sexually promiscuous lower castes and classes). Out in the world, the 
purity of India’s women could be maintained, and their femininity preserved 
and honoured as de-sexualised mothers and goddesses (Chatterjee, 1989, p. 
630; see also Ramaswamy, 2010). In contemporary Mumbai, despite the 
visibility of women in the urban environment, as ‘symbolic markers’ of 
community and the nation and thereby objects of surveillance and heightened 
protection, at best, women continue to enjoy conditional access to urban 
public space (see Phadke et al, 2011, p. 43). The gendering of the political 
street as male public space, then, has a long history. 
 
Regarding the treatment of Dalits, while Gandhi explicitly recognised the 
“calculated degradation” to which upper caste Hindus have subjected “the 
depressed classes” for centuries, he vehemently opposed the proposition of 
granting them separate electorate. Gandhi decisively won this battle over the 
great Dalit leader B.R Ambedkar, with the eventual signing of the Poona Pact 
in 1932. Interestingly, however, the matter for Gandhi was not political, but 
one of “pure religion”. “Separate electorate”, Gandhi claimed, “is harmful for 
them and for Hinduism, whatever it may be from a political standpoint.”109 
Thus in 1932, as civil disobedience rolled on, following intense debate around 
the right to separate electorates (that would enable Untouchables to secure a 
number of representatives to speak on their behalf in the future legislatures) 
Gandhi set off to “fast unto death”, effectively forcing the climb-down of 
Ambedkar.110 The Congress position of ‘uplift’ and reintegration of 
                                                 
109 IOR/Mss Eur. E. 240.16. Correspondence between Gandhi and Sir Samuel Hoare. 
110 For a concise introduction to the debate on the question of caste between Gandhi and Ambedkar, 
albeit with more emphasis on Gandhi than Ambedkar, see Arundhati Roy’s (2014a) long form 
introduction “The Doctor and the Saint” to Ambedkar’s famous speech, The Annihilation of Caste. 
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Untouchables into the Hindu fold (under the paternalistic guidance of party 
workers) was firmly locked in place.  
 
The civil disobedience movement, then, was emblematic of a shifting interplay 
between social identities, spatial location and (Gandhian) nationalist 
mobilisation (Raman, 2019). Likewise, as we will see in chapter four in 
particular, in the context of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan, political logics of 
paternalism, patriarchy and caste hierarchy continue to shape the political 
street in important ways. Further still, it is crucial to note that the imperative 
to incorporate these two marginalised groups – under the umbrella of Hindu 
social order – shines a light on the increasingly precarious position of 
Muslims. What we see is that the (Hindu) political street radically sutures the 
heterogenious socio-spatial landscape of the city through the colonisation of 
space. For present purposes, the concept of the political street also helps make 
sense of the growing suspicions of Bombay Muslim’s to the medium and long-
term objectives of the Congress in the event of Purna Swaraj. I suggest below 
that this can be effectively read through the response of Bombay Muslims to 
the flag salutation ceremonies.  
 
Contesting the flag 
 
Many scholars have argued that in the course of independence the Congress 
made every effort to work together with Muslim groups (Graham, 1988; see 
also Guha, 2007).111 Over consideration of the communal problem per se, the 
aim of constructing a unified national identity – alongside self-government – 
according to these scholars, was the party’s primary aim. The Congress, it is 
claimed, must be noted for ‘its refusal to abandon secularist and pluralist 
principles’ (Graham, 1988). Yet, multiple revisionist histories have shown that 
Congress strategy with respect to the communal problem was limited to 
                                                 
111 This position has been represented within the writings of the so-called ‘Cambridge School’. See for 
example Low et al (1988).   
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moderate, diplomatic, attempts to resolve issues at the elite level (Ahmad, 
2004; Sarkar, 1989; Vanaik, 2017). Even so, between 1885-1947, agreement 
between Muslim politicians and the Congress was met only twice: the 
Lucknow Pact (1916) and the Khilafat/non-cooperation movement (1920-
1922). And indeed, ‘when these agreements from the top broke down, 
Congress appeared bereft of alternatives to resolve communal discord either at 
the elite or popular level’ (Singh, 1988, p. 191). Simply put, the nationalist 
activities of the Congress as they unfolded on the ground are not easily 
separated from the communalism that enveloped Indian society during the 
late-colonial period (Vanaik, 2017, p 77) 
 
Yet, it is perfectly possible to recognise that elements of the Congress high 
command exhibited secular inclinations. For instance, in The Discovery of 
India, Nehru claimed that “repeated efforts were made by the Congress as well 
as other organizations to settle this communal problem with the consent of the 
various groups concerned” (Nehru, 1956, p. 387). He continues: “religion, 
culture, language, the fundamental rights of the individual and the group, 
[are] all to be protected”. A brief glance at the writings of the high ranking 
Indian civil servant and Nehru’s close confidant, V.P Menon, suggests lament 
at the colonial imposition of separate electorates as effectively incentivising 
appeals to religious affiliation. Discussing the ‘goals of British policy’, Menon 
notes that the ‘extremist’ Hindu Mahasabha was established in the same year 
the All-India Muslim League held its first session – a direct result, he suggests, 
of Lord Minto’s backing of separate electoral representation in October 1906 
(Menon, 1979, pp. 9-10). Be that as it may, the idea that the Congress was 
‘unable to escape’ the ferment of communalism is problematic, above all for its 
omission of agency and rendering of the Congress as passive participant 
(Singh, 1988, p. 199; see also Vanaik, 2017, p. 77).  
 
Menon’s observation may well be true – it offers us a sound description of 
historical fact – but it does not recognise any deeper processes underway, 
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other than the formal implementation of British colonial policy. The unspoken 
aspect of Menon’s position involves taking the pro-Hindu measures of the 
Congress seriously. Perhaps above all, the rejection of a coalition with the 
Muslim League in the United Provinces (1937) contrary to the principles 
agreed within the Lucknow Pact (1916) was seen as particularly divisive 
(Sarkar, 1989, p. 353).112 
 
Understood as an effort towards the political reorganisation of space, as we 
have seen, civil disobedience, productively drew on the celebratory and 
commemorative rituals of the Flag Day salutations. This is not to say, of 
course, that political aesthetics of Hinduness were embedded within the new 
national flag. But rather, as we will see, that the Congress and its political 
actions in the city – including ceremonial salutations of the Indian flag – 
increasingly alienated the Muslim community. To give an example of 
contestations and alternative rituals of flag salutation in the city, we can look 
to numerous police reports of counter-demonstrations on the Esplanade 
Maidan.  
 
For instance, a police report from the late 1930s details “a group of 
Mohammadan volunteers” carrying the green crescent flag and chanting 
“Inquilab Zindabad!” an Urdu phrase translating to “Long live the 
Revolution!”.113 Inquilab Zindabad was coined by the Muslim Urdu poet and 
freedom fighter Maulana Hasrat Mohani in 1921 and popularised in 1929 by 
the atheist socialist revolutionary, Bhagat Singh.114 Another report monitoring 
the Flag Day ceremony, dated 13th November 1930, notes processions carrying 
Congress flags and separate processions carrying “red flags with the crescent 
of the Mohammadan’s”.115 While the Congress was certainly the central pillar 
                                                 
112 The Lucknow Pact was an agreement to allow ‘overrepresentation’ of religious minorities in 
provincial legislatures. Its historical importance was the cause of establishing good relations between 
the Congress and the Muslim League. 
113 IOR CD BL 28th Dec 1930, p. 10.  
114 Interestingly, in the hands of Hindutva forces, the iconography of Bhaghat Singh has since been 
incorporated into the pantheon of ‘Hindu’ nationalist freedom fighters.  
115 IOR CD/BL 1st December 1930, p. 11. 
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of the anti-colonial movement, evidently, they did not hold an exclusive 
monopoly over anticolonial/nationalist expression. Despite the attempts of the 
Congress to represent the Indian ‘people-as-a-whole’ large swathes of the 
population – including many Indian Muslims – remained outside of the grip 
of the movement (Sinha, 2019, p. 89). 
 
It is interesting to note, on the flip side, that during the Hindu Diwali festival 
celebrations of 1930, the Governor of Bombay reported to the Secretary of 
State for India that many of the city’s merchants had taken to hanging 
Congress flags, rather than the usual lamps outside their shops as a way to 
symbolise the victory of light over darkness, as is customary during Diwali.116  
As Robert Rahman Raman (2019, p. 273) has noted, Congress workers were 
mostly Gujarati Hindu and Jain merchants and ‘middle class’ Maharashtrians, 
it was these cadre that were central to the political spectacles of the 
movement: ‘the political infrastructure that underpinned the Civil 
Disobedience movement thus […] acquired a distinct ‘Hindu’ character’. 
Accordingly, like the socially engineered cultural production of Ganpati 
Utsava, we see evidence that the civil disobedience campaign was engaged in 
the production of nationalist common sense, disseminated through a distinctly 
Hindu friendly vernacular that worked to transform the ‘actual’ street into the 
political street. In other words, a new calendar of political festivals was being 
actively initiated by and in celebration of the Congress.  
 
Nevertheless, it would appear that this new political calendar found little 
space to incorporate the causes and customs of Bombay Muslims. The 
Congress War Council’s “Sholapur Martyr’s Day” is a particular case in point. 
The organisation of this day of commemoration and protest saw a significant 
stoppage of mills and an approximately eight thousand strong meeting 
opposite the Dinshaw Petit Mill in Lalbaug was held in connection with the 
                                                 
116 IOR P&J 6126 CD BL. pp. 9-10 
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execution of the Sholapur prisoners.117 In the evening, over five thousand 
gathered on the Esplanade Maidan to hear the War Council give an address.118 
However, throughout the day, Muslim volunteers had been touring the 
localities asking shop keepers and businesses not to support the Congress 
program of action. The official explanation was that while the Congress saw fit 
to honour the Sholapur Martyrs, they had done nothing to commemorate the 
death of the revered Muslim leader and leading figure of the Khalifat/non-
cooperation movement, Mohammad Ali Jauhar.119 Though only brief 
snapshots, in these accounts we should pause to appreciate the growing 
alienation and distance of Muslims from the Congress and growth of Hindu-
Muslim tensions as a result of the political orientation of the civil 
disobedience campaign.  
 
The production of Azad Maidan 
 
Prashant Kidambi (2012, p. 959) maintains that the impressive array of 
political agitations and resistance during non-cooperation worked towards a 
transformation of the spaces of the colonial city. Yet, to say that the events of 
civil disobedience in Bombay are similar is at once broadly correct and 
misleading. The constellation of daring political spectacle and ‘mass 
choreographed ritual’ that characterised civil disobedience after 1930, was 
indeed similar to the tactics deployed during non-cooperation between 1920 
and 1922. That being said, it was only after 1930 that the Congress began an 
attempt to lay claim to spaces of the city that had hitherto been the exclusive 
preserve of colonial elites. The vast Esplanade Maidan formed the centre of 
the British colonial establishment, both physically and symbolically. And as 
                                                 
117 After imposing martial law in the city of Sholapur the British authorities executed by hanging four 
anti-colonial nationalists for revolting against the regime on 12th January 1931.  
118 However, before the leaders of the War Council could take to a stool to speak, they were arrested, 
and the crowd was dispersed. Three protestors were shot at the earlier demo at Lalbaug and over the 
course of the day, 275 were reported injured. No doubt, connected to the heavy police repression 
throughout the day, around midnight it was reported that the police station at the junction of 
Sandhurt and Charni Road had been set on fire. 
119 IOR P&J 6126 CD 16th Jan 1931. p. 11  
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Kidambi (2012, p. 959) aptly explains, it is no coincidence that Esplanade 
Maidan became the ‘principle stage of nationalist spectacles and collective 
defiance and protest’. Accordingly, the Congress renamed Esplanade Maidan, 
‘Azad Maidan’ (‘Freedom Park’). During the civil disobedience campaign, then, 
the colonial authorities in Bombay were constantly challenged by attempts to 
disrupt the colonial ordering of physical space, where ‘native’ Indians had 
been hitherto denied equal rights to the city (see Raman, 2019).   
 
An instance of the Congress’ agitation that demands our attention, was the 
attempt of Congress leaders Vallabbhai ‘Sardar’ Patel (1875-1950) and Madan 
Mohan Malaviya to lead a mass procession in connection with the Tilak 
birthday celebrations, from Chaupati Road via Sandhurst Road to Azad 
Maidan.120 The proposed route along Hornby Road and Esplanade Road – 
dissecting the symbolic centre of the British establishment – was met with 
stern rejection by the Bombay police, who issued a prompt ban on the route 
under the powers invested in the Bombay Police Act (1902). Led by Patel and 
Malaviya the Congress defied the order. After being met with a police cordon 
on Hornby Road, the procession halted at the blockade and sat down in the 
road for the whole night. According to the court papers, at approximately 
6.00am when the Commissioner of Police arrived on the scene, he declared 
the procession an unlawful assembly and immediately arrested Patel, 
Malaviya and the other Congress leaders involved. The procession was 
promptly dispersed and according to the adjoining police report, “the smooth 
flow of traffic was promptly restored”.121 That the central node of anti-colonial 
struggle in Bombay became Azad Maidan is further evident given its choice as 
the venue for Gandhi’s address on arrival in Bombay 28th Jan 1931. Such was 
the hype generated around the figure of ‘the mahatma’122 that over one 
                                                 
120 Malaviya is perhaps most famous as four-time President of the Congress, less well known is his role 
as co-founder of the Hindu Mahasabha. Vallabhbhai “Sardar” Patel was India’s first Deputy Prime 
Minister, both were closely associated with the ‘Mahasabha wing’ (Hindu nationalist right wing) of the 
Party.  
121 IOR P&J 6129 CD 25 September 1930 p. 9  
122 Gandhi was known to many as the ‘Mahatma’, which means “Great Soul”. 
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hundred thousand people had gathered on the Maidan to witness Gandhi 
speak by 6.00pm. Unsurprisingly, the Congress volunteers made sure to 
distribute the tricolour flag on mass to the people streaming into the 
Maidan.123  
 
To summarise, I want to argue that the tricolour flag that was planted at the 
physical/symbolic centre of British colonial life in Bombay, was indicative of 
the anti-colonialism that the nationalist movement after 1930 came to 
represent. While competing anti-colonial nationalist projects and political 
subjectivities inhabited the same space in late-colonial Bombay, the aim of the 
Congress was to render a new political organisation of space through its 
transformation into a nationalist place of meaning. Moving through the 
physical space of the central city, the conceived and planned colonial spaces of 
the British Raj were challenged and overlaid with a new collective ‘lived’ sense 
of nationalist ownership. However, the sense of belonging that greeted Hindus 
was matched by the lived experience of alienation from the nationalist cause 
encountered the Muslim ‘Other’. 
 
The Congress, then, promoted elements of secular nationalism and elements 
of Hindu nationalism in its role as a movement of movements (Sinha, 2019; 
Vanaik, 2017). Production of a differential ‘national-popular’ space through 
civil disobedience was generated by living bodies; valorised through the 
knitting together of everyday micro-gestures; and scaled up through macro-
gestures of Congress ‘high politics’ as the nation was effectively performed in 
the streets and urban public spaces of colonial rule. Simply put, this process 
contributed to the formation of a distinctly Hindu “common sense” within the 
nationalist movement in late-colonial Bombay, that emerged to the detriment 
of Muslim public presence in the city. This was initiated not by coincidence, 
but by design. With this in mind, let us turn to the rise and fall of the 
                                                 
123 IOR P&J 6127 CD 27th Jan 1931. Interestingly, this statement appears to point to the priority of the 
colonial government in this situation, to maintain “order” in the city.   
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communist movement in the city, with specific reference to the place of 
primordial Hindu mythology in its structures. 
 
3.4 Communist street culture and its implosion 
 
Though it was not by any stretch of the imagination impossible to be a 
supporter of both, the major rival in terms of mass political organisation to the 
Congress in late-colonial Bombay was the Communist Party of India (CPI). 
The CPI was well established within the city’s textile industry – the production 
of solidarity took place between the factory, the neighbourhood and the street 
(Chandavarkar, 1994; 2009). In this final section of the chapter, I discuss the 
legacy for the political street of the gradual implosion of communist mass 
movement in the city. Specific attention is paid to the politics of Hindu social 
order, communalism and casteism that crystallised in the wake of its collapse. 
After the decline of the mills and the textile industry (discussed in chapter 
two) and collapse of communism as an organising force, Hindutva was ideally 
placed to fill the vacuum and become the ideology for a resurgent India after 
1991. Let us first turn to a discussion of communist street culture, its imprint 
on the city and its gradual implosion.  
 
In the opening decades of the twentieth century the city of Bombay was the 
epicentre of industrial capitalism in colonial India. Tightly intertwined with 
the political logics of the cold war, the central industrial district of Girangaon 
(literally: ‘village of the mills’) gave birth to radical urban dreams of a 
communist future. Two realities in the lives of the mill workers sewed these 
dreams together. First, the close communion generated through the hardships 
of the 12-hour working day and overcrowded living conditions of the factory 
tenements (chawls) that the workers had to endure. And second, the cultural 
production of regional forms of tamasha theatre within the district. Migrants 
from the Maharashtrian hinterlands, the mill workers brought their own 
regional forms of theatre with them. The discontents of urban industrial life 
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were accompanied by the establishment of strong community bonds and a 
sense of solidarity amongst the workers. Respite from the drudgery of the 
daily grind was found as attempts to deal with the mental, cultural and 
emotional well-being of the workers were made. After work, one ‘went to see a 
local play, to feel at one with his fellow beings’ (Gokhale, 1995, pp. 195-197). In 
this context, urban streets and public spaces were key to the production of 
civic community.  
 
If we take a long wave view of social change in the city, we see that the 
fortunes of Bombay labour owe as much to the rise and fall of the city’s 
industrial economy, as to the ebb and flow of rural connections and networks 
between the Maharashtrian hinterlands and the city. Indeed, as was pointed 
out in chapter two, the make-up of Bombay’s social formation has been shaped 
in large part through cognate patterns that persist to this day. From its 
inception, rural migrant labour powered the textile industry. And in this 
context, the concentration of the textile industry in the central area of 
Girangaon in the 1920s and 1930s generated powerful bonds of community 
(Chandavarkar, 1994; 2009).124 Deep relationships of mutual obligation, 
fostered by communist activism between the neighbourhood, the factory and 
the streets, were critical to the intense period of industrial action between 1918 
and 1947 that served in many respects as a catalyst in the anti-colonial 
struggle against British rule (Chandavarkar, 2009, pp. 125-127). Solidarity in 
the streets and utopian dreams of a ‘red’ future compacted into a powerful 
counter-movement to rival the mass nationalism of the Congress.  
 
In this regard, in the 1920s and 1930s, the theatre scene in Girangaon was 
buzzing with CPI activists. A tool of political education as well as 
entertainment, the primary aim of tamasha performances was to engage in 
                                                 
124 In addition to the theatre scene, working class institutions ranged from village organisations 
(gramastha mandals), sports clubs (krida mandals) and gymnasiums (vyayam shalas), to 
community dining houses (Khanavalis) and credit societies (path pedis). For a detailed exposition, 
see Ghadge (2016, p. 164). 
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the lives of workers (Ghadge, 2016). A popular form of Maharashtrian folk 
theatre, tamasha (derived from the Arabic ‘playful entertainment’), blends 
comedy, eroticism and music in a unique way. The narratives of performance 
lampoon and subvert established monopolies of social power ‘by presenting 
them in an inverted and often outrageously funny manner through typical 
characters and situations’ (Pandit, 2004, p. 466). Theatres such as the 
Hanuman Theatre in Lalbaug provided engaged and responsive audiences for 
CPI activists – tamasha became an important medium through which local 
cultural expression was combined with class politics to forge a radical sense of 
working-class solidarity. Popular performers, drawn primarily from the 
working classes, fashioned the tamasha tradition into a modified urban form 
of ‘people’s theatre’ or loknatya (Prakash, 2010, p. 213). This highly popular 
blend of local culture and radical politics produced a potent form of 
entertainment in an ‘Epic mode’.125 Its objective was ‘not so much to develop 
actions as to represent conditions, and to reveal them’.126 As we will see, albeit 
in contradictory ways, the ‘red flag’ over Girangaon ensured that the presence 
of the working classes was felt throughout the city. 
 
The seeds of this landscape were sown by the communists, their cadre and the 
popular support of workers. Indeed, outside of the factory, street life in 
communist Girangaon has been portrayed as a vibrant meeting place and 
home to multiple cultural identities. In the context of mass rural-to-urban 
migration, this has led to notions of a progressive “ruralisation” of the urban 
landscape.127 This implies that rural migrants possess a sense of ingrained 
tradition and that traditional rural cultures have been imported into the city in 
the form of ‘primordial’ identities and pre-established notions and practices of 
                                                 
125 The overtly political concerns of the tamasha-loknatya style is comparable to Bertolt Brecht’s “Epic 
theatre’. This observation has been made by the popular Tamasha writer and director P.L Deshpande. 
See for example, his well-known adaptation of Brecht’s Threepenny Opera (‘Tin paishacha tamasha’.)  
126 See Benjamin (1998, p. 4) on Brecht’s ‘Epic theatre’.  
127 This idea that ‘traditional’, ‘communal’ and inegalitarian peasant cultures are imported by rural 
migrants into the city, has been a central proposition of the Subaltern Studies collective. Consider for 
example Dipesh Chakrabarty’s (2000, p. 213) influential suggestion that power relations in Calcutta’s 
jute-mills (1890-1940) ‘arose out of a culture that was hierarchical and inegalitarian, subordinating 
the individual to imagined communities of a distinctly ‘pre-capitalist’ character.  
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custom and religion (see Chakrabarty, 1993). While there is a certain merit to 
this position, it is evident that folk-religious and caste customs actively shaped 
the lives of workers in relation to a particular sense of place. This is not to say 
that migrant communities somehow leave their sense of traditions, custom 
and subjectivity behind, but rather, that it is problematic to imply that the 
consciousness of community precludes the possibility of alternative foci of 
identity and modes of communication (see Bayat, 2010, pp. 186-188; Gooptu, 
2001, p. 188).128 For example, according to the popular Marathi folk singer 
Nivrutti Pawar, the district was ‘full of clean maidans’ (open squares). “When 
you walked down the streets, you would hear bhajans and kirtars” (Hindu 
devotional songs), “there were ‘rangoli’ artists that made beautiful paintings’ 
and sculptors working on Ganpati idols “for the Ganeshotsav in September”.129 
 
The vibrant grassroots public presence of the working classes shaped the 
political landscape and profoundly influenced the civic culture of the city. Yet 
Girangaon was a predominantly male space. In a similar vein to the Congress-
led nationalist movement, there was a strong and continuing attempt by adult 
males to maintain control over female livelihood and labour. However, the 
gendered nature of civic life in Girangaon also had much to do with the 
conditions of female employment. For instance, as legislation was introduced 
to limit the hours that women could work in the mills (1891) and maternity 
benefits were granted (1929), even moderate legislative protection resulted in 
management preference to exclude women from employment as far as 
possible to maintain flexibility in the market (Chandavarkar, 2009, p. 130). In 
                                                 
128 To take Chakrabarty’s argument as given is to render “traditional” culture timeless and static, 
alongside the implied logic that ‘religious community affiliations and community values’ remain 
enduringly powerful, to the extent that the poor draw upon them automatically (see Gooptu, 2001, p. 
186). The main difficulty with this form of reasoning is that it elides the ways in which rural migrants 
to the urban peripheries of the city create a new sense of identity – in place of the old – inextricably 
linked to a sense of place. The urban, then, does not represent the physical infrastructure of a given 
cityscape, its population or its geography. Nor is it simply a centre of production and distribution, a 
node within regional and global circuits. Instead, as Lefebvre (2003, p. 119) notes, the urban milieu is 
‘a place of encounter, assembly and simultaneity’ animated by multiple social processes, each defined 
by their own temporalities. In other words, migrant populations ‘internalise heterogeneous spatio-
temporalities depending upon how they orientate themselves between place of origin and settlement’ 
(Harvey, 1996, p. 52).  
129 Adarkar and Menon (2004, p. 120). 
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turn, low levels of formal employment consigned women to low-wage, low-
status, irregular ‘informal’ work outside of the mill complexes. An auxiliary 
effect was that in view of the low-status of women’s work, male workers were 
given to withdrawing the labour of their wives and daughters in times of 
economic security, as a mark of personal respectability (Chandavarkar, 2009, 
pp. 130-131). Taken together, the complex webs of social relations that defined 
the mill districts, from gendered relations and caste hierarchies, to kinship 
and village ties, enmeshed individuals in ‘communities of belonging’. Within 
these exchanges distinctive urban identities were forged.  
 
Political subjectivities in Girangaon were therefore actively constructed in the 
flux of modern industrial work culture and produced through relationships 
and networks of community between the workplace, the neighbourhood and 
the street (Chandavarkar, 1994; 2009). A further example is that according to 
Sitaram Jagtap, workers in the China (Standard) Mills in Sewri – a fully ‘red’ 
mill – would celebrate May Day outside the manager’s office with red flags and 
decorations and would put up pictures of pictures of Lenin, Stalin and Marx. 
The workers would then come and do namaskars (bow with hands together) 
‘in the traditional way, is if it were a [Hindu] puja’.130 The civic and political 
culture of the communists, then, was both implicitly and explicitly connected 
to religio-cultural practices of Hinduism – though ‘proletarian’ in their 
orientation.  
 
This is of course relatively unsurprising given that Hindus, though divided by 
caste, language, regional and sectarian identities, made up approximately two 
thirds of the city’s population and thus constituted a significant majority of the 
industrial working classes. As we will see, this demographic fact had serious 
political implications. In the intense communal political climate from the 
1920s and into the 1940s, under the sway of the Girni Kamgar Union (GKU), 
                                                 
130 At the time of interview, Sitaram Jagtap was a 77-year old senior office bearer of the communist 
Girni Kamgar Union (GKU). See Adarkar, & Menon (2004, p. 165). 
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the Hindu majority working class played a most important role in the 1929 
Hindu-Muslim riots. While recalling Gramsci’s (1971, pp. 325-326) maxim 
that common sense ‘takes countless different forms’, for many of the mill 
workers, their ‘Hinduness’ remained a key aspect of individual identity. Many 
workers were heavily involved in the riots, as fractures between Hindus and 
Muslims were weaponised by the mill owners. Let us turn to a discussion of 
the crystallisation of communalism and caste within the communist 
movement and its implications for the formation of the political street.  
 
Legacies of communalism  
 
According to the Bombay Riots Inquiry Committee launched in the aftermath 
of the Hindu-Muslim disturbances of 1929, the communists were largely 
responsible. Seconding this verdict, the Pearson Committee, appointed to 
investigate the origins of the riots, claimed that the communists and in 
particular the GKU were firmly to blame (Chandavarkar, 1994, p. 363). The 
communists certainly played a pivotal role in how the riots unfolded. But it is 
important to underscore the strong vested interests of the authorities and the 
mill owners in casting the GKU as the ultimate villain of the textile business – 
the GKU was conveniently framed as a force bent on bringing down the 
industry at all costs (Chandavarkar, 1994, p. 364). By contrast, it makes more 
sense to understand the nexus between the mill workers and communalism as 
having structural roots in the city’s political economy. The organisation of 
labour around gendered lines of kinship, caste and religion made the 
communalisation of conflicts between social groups in relation to the flux of 
employment levels and labour market competition far more likely. In the 
event, the underlying cause of the riots lay in the reaction of the mill owners to 
the militant resurgence of the lightning strike tactics deployed by the GKU in 
1928. The response of the mill owners was an attempt to fracture and 
undermine the strikes by recruiting Muslim workers to break the strikes 
(Chandavarkar, 1994, p. 422). This was not the first time such tactics had been 
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employed. Yet, on this occasion, the result was an explosive breakout of city-
wide riots.  
 
While it is evidently difficult to trace the precise act that set off the riots, 
according to the police reports on the April and May disturbances, beyond 
sporadic violence at the mill gates, “Hindu” and “Muslim” heads first clashed 
in the city on 23rd April 1929.131 On the day of the Hindu god Hanuman’s 
birthday (Hanuman Jayanti), an “unprovoked” attack was launched on a 
procession of Hindus on Suparibagh Road. On the approach to the Suparibagh 
Road mosque, the procession was attacked by a number of Muslims that came 
out of a lane adjacent to the mosque complex. The report claims that stones 
and wooden clubs (lathis) were put to use by both sides. Seemingly in 
response to the violence, reports came in that a Muslim youth had been 
assaulted opposite the showrooms of Turner Hoare & Co, further south on 
Suparibagh Road. The young man was found unconscious laying by the tram 
tracks bleeding from wounds to the head. He later died in hospital. Statements 
made on behalf of those in the procession claimed that a silver idol (valued at 
Rs.150) had been lifted from the ceremonial handbarrow (palkhi). All in all, 
during the ensuing rioting, thirteen people were reported injured three of 
which succumbed to their injuries (one Hindu and two Muslims).132 
 
The next episode of mass violence on 27th April 1929 was again connected to a 
Hindu palkhi procession but this time unfolded in the workers chawls at 
DeLisle Road. The procession was accompanied by Indian drums and cymbals 
and was led out from the Maruti Temple in front of the DeLisle Road chawls 
and scheduled to end at Parbhadevi Road. As the procession passed the 
Parbhadevi Road Mosque, the beating of drums and cymbals stopped, but 
many of the revellers continued shouting “Jai!”.133 A group of Muslims 
                                                 
131 It is worth reiterating here the point made in chapter two (2.2) regarding the problem with 
accepting a clear-cut dichotomy between “Hindus” and “Muslims”. 
132 IOR/L/PJ/6/1979 23 April 1929. File 1497  
133 The Hindi word ‘Jai” derived from the Sanskrit ‘Jaya’ means ‘victory’. When affixed to a cause it 
translates as a battle cry. For instance, “Jai Hind!” in translation reads “Victory to Hindustan!”.  
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standing on the other side of the road began to throw stones and soda water 
bottles at the Hindus. A series of stabbings ensued.134 Following the dispersal 
of the procession “stray assaults” continued into the night. At 1.00am on 28 
April “a small party of Mohammadans”, who were returning from a funeral 
were passing over the Curry Road bridge. As they reached the foot of the 
bridge, they were attacked by “a mob of Hindus”. One was killed on the spot 
and another later died of his injuries in hospital. During this bout of rioting 
twenty-one were seriously injured three of which died.135 Despite the 
simplistic rendering of the colonial police – of riots between “Hindus” and 
“Muslims” – taken as a whole, these examples demonstrate a clear territorial 
factor in the clashes. 
 
Recalling the argument set out in section one (3.2), we can see that these 
instances were not so much pitched battles as they were examples of violence 
against those seen to be invading the other groups ‘collective accustomed 
space’ (Masselos, 1985; 1991). This same pattern applies to the Bombay riots 
of 1992-1993. Following the demolition of the Babri Masjid on 6th December 
1992 at the hands of the Sangh Parivar at Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, thousands 
of Indian Muslims took to the streets in protest across the country. In the 
Bombay context the authorities reacted with particular brutality, killing 
almost two hundred protestors within just a few days. In this context, 
communal tensions were hugely exacerbated by Hindutva forces, as 
unsurprisingly the ruling Shiv Sena party proceeded to play a most important 
role in the ensuing riots (Blom Hansen, 2001, p. 121).136  In terms of the scope 
and scale of urban violence, the Bombay riots were aggressive, indiscriminate 
and traumatic. Additional to the key role of the Shiv Sena and the BJP, the 
                                                 
134 One Hindu man died on the spot and two more were taken to hospital. 
135 IOR/L/PJ/6/1979 27 April 1929. File 1497  
136 Although Sena leader Bal Thackeray framed the riots as “justified self-defence” and the violence 
perpetrated by Hindus as “spontaneous reaction”, Shiv Sena involvement in the riots was no mere 
happenstance. There is clear evidence of Shiv Sena preparing their activists and compiling lists on the 
precise location of Muslim residences and Muslim owned businesses (Blom Hansen, 2001, p. 124). 
Tellingly, in the end, Bal Thackeray and Shiv Sena officials were indicted by the Srikrishna 
Commission Report for organising and inciting violence against Bombay’s Muslim communities 
(Frontline, 1998).  
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Srikrishna Commission Report noted the complicity of the Bombay police, 
detailing the failure and reluctance to put a halt to ‘incidents of violence, 
looting and arson’. The report highlights the response of the police to Muslim 
victims as ‘cynical and utterly indifferent’. In particular, the lower levels of the 
police and fire brigade were called out for strong pro-Hindu, anti-Muslim bias 
(Frontline, 1998, p. 5). What this shows is that anti-Muslim sentiments had by 
this time become a pervasive aspect of majoritarian Hindu culture in the city.  
 
For Shiv Sena – like all Hindutva groups – politics is conducted along 
Schmittian lines of friend and enemy; Bombay/Mumbai Muslims have been 
long reduced in an extremely unsophisticated and simplistic way to the enemy 
of the “Hindu” form of existence.137 Alongside and frequently in collusion with 
the Sangh, Shiv Sena engages in the vulgar construction of Indian Muslims as 
a dangerous foreign element, ‘Other’ to Indian culture and society (see Van der 
Veer, 1994, p. 10). Like the above discussions of Ganpati Utsava and civil 
disobedience, what is important here is not the spectacle of violence in full 
force. But rather, the fact that the militant political logics that made these 
spectacular events possible, were cultivated and maintained in the everyday 
life of the political street. The micro context against which the 1992-1993 riots 
unfolded was the organisation of so-called maha aartis, mass outdoor prayers 
staged outside Hindu temples in response to the perceived Muslim show of 
strength represented by Friday prayers (namaz).138 A renewed sense of urban 
Hindu devotionalism, then, emerged from the sedimented primordial Hindu 
sensibilities that have long shaped urban experience in the city. 
 
Like the riots themselves, initially, Shiv Sena claimed that the maha aartis 
were “spontaneous” gatherings, although Manohar Joshi – Shiv Sena official 
                                                 
137  See Schmitt (1996). For an in-depth examination of the concept of ‘the enemy’ in the work of Carl 
Schmitt, see Balakrishnan (2006).  
138 As Gérard Heuzé (2000, pp. 242-243) notes, ‘the Shiv Sena management of mass pujas borrows its 
style from the pavement youth, particularly the loud music and the aggressive pattern of competition 
for space.’ Throughout the riots the Sena used these mass rituals ‘at first as a field for demonstrating 
its ability to manage the city, and to appear as an alternative power. Then, it [exploited] this privileged 
moment when the whole of space belonged to its youth as a kind of symbolic battlefield.’ 
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and later Chief Minister of Maharashtra (1995-1999) – later admitted that 
they were “organised by the Shiv Sena and the Bharatiya Janata Party” 
(Frontline, 1998, p. 3). Reinventing the aartis ceremony, in which Hindu 
devotees are offered light – usually a flame and almost always in the setting of 
a temple or home –Shiv Sena launched maha (grand) aartis, as mass 
congregational political events, publishing the schedules of the ceremonies 
and their location across the city in the Marathi newspaper and Sena 
mouthpiece Saamna (Zavos, 2007, p. 149). As in the case of the Ganpati 
Utsava, Hindu devotional practices were moved from the domestic setting into 
the political street. In the event, hundreds of maha aartis were performed at 
various locations within the city for the duration of the riots. The Srikrishna 
Commission Report was damming: maha aartis were explicitly connected to 
the unfolding communal violence. Following the performance of mass prayers, 
Hindu mobs spread out into the city in search of the Muslim ‘enemy’. The 
ultimate aim was ‘purification’ of the urban landscape through violence 
(Robinson, 2005, p. 75).  
 
In the same vein as the 1992-1993 riots, then, the political street was a most 
important arena for the disturbances of 1929. Though much smaller in scale, 
this is confirmed in so far as both the commissioned reports on the riots (of 
1928 and 1929) stated that the disturbances originated from within the 
workers chawls and spilled over into the streets. In addition to this, battles 
over accustomed space in the city streets spilled over into the official public 
institutions of the municipality. Take for example an interesting police 
statement on the fall out of the strikes that records the effect of communal 
strife on the local municipal primary schools. Here it is stated that “some 
Hindu students in the Hindu school attended the school with Red Badges on 
their coats, and as a countermove, some Muhammadan students in the 
adjoining Urdu school put on blue (mill owners) badges.” The report continues 
to note that some schools in the mill areas had been closed and were being 
guarded by the police. Students were reported to have been picketing their 
respective schools and “Hindu” students were said to be demanding the 
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removal of the Urdu school from their compound.139 Of course, there was – 
and remains – everyday cooperation between ‘Hindus’ and ‘Muslims’ in the 
city. Resentment and conviviality around collective religio-cultural identity 
exist side by side. However, while the 1929 riots were closely tied up to issues 
of economic vulnerability and the precarious nature of jobs within the 
industry, by and large these issues were expressed, and battles were fought, 
around the proxy of perceived threats to accustomed space.  
 
All being said, it must be recalled that the open violence and civic strife that 
pervaded the mill areas in the late-1920’s suited the objectives of the mill 
owners. The decision to bus in Muslim workers as strike breakers quickly 
fermented industrial dispute into explosive communal rioting (Bhattacharya, 
1981, p.42; Kidambi, 2012). Yet, either way, the involvement of mill workers in 
communal riots weakened the possibilities of solidarity between Hindu and 
Muslim communities. In the event, ‘Hinduness’ and allegiance to ‘Muslim 
brotherhood’ played an important role in the formation and fragmentation of 
working-class identities. On the matter of Hinduness – the centre focus of this 
thesis – in no place was the continuing importance of Hindu identity more 
obvious than in the everyday politics of caste in the mills. Let us turn to 
explore attitudes to the problem of caste within the communist movement and 
the actuality of ‘graded inequality’ manifest in the social relations of the mill 
workers.  
 
Legacies of caste 
 
A further and arguably more divisive division within the mill worker 
communities, then, was configured between caste Hindus and 
“Untouchables”. Between 1901 and 1921, the proportion of Dalits in Bombay 
city rose above the six to seven percent ratio that they constituted in the wider 
Bombay Presidency (Morris, 1960, p. 126). Unsurprisingly, some of this 
                                                 
139IOR/L/PJ/6/1979 ‘The Bombay Textile Workers Strike Statement no 10’. 29 July 1929. 
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growing urban population found employment in the textile industry. However, 
in the communist controlled mills, Dalits were relegated to less well 
remunerated departments of the factories and effectively barred from the 
better paid work in the weaving sheds. Hindu Maratha140 weavers refused to 
work with so-called Untouchables on the basis of the weaving process itself; 
workers had to wet the end of the thread with their own salvia to rethread the 
machines. As Chandavarkar (1994, p. 226) puts it, ‘each time a weft bobbin 
needed replacement, the yarn had to be sucked onto the shuttle.’ As per the 
rules of the caste system, Hindu workers, by virtue of working alongside 
Dalits, ‘risked defilement and pollution’.  
 
A 1940 survey of 37,600 mill workers published by the Bombay Millowners 
Association (approximately twenty five percent of the industry wide 
workforce) indicated that nearly fourteen percent of the workforce was drawn 
from “Untouchable groups”. Some seventy percent of Dalit males were 
employed in ring spinning and seventy-three percent of females were 
employed in winding and reeling departments – almost none were employed 
in the weaving sheds (Morris, 1960, p. 128). While the exclusion of Dalits 
secured the status of Marathas in their occupation, it was also an important 
indicator of the wider climate of city politics beyond the workplace 
(Chandavarkar, 1994, p. 227). Notwithstanding the rhetoric of solidarity 
emanating from the CPI high command, the practice of “Untouchability” in 
the communist controlled mills was not confined to the issue of weaving jobs. 
It was also manifest in the reservation and separation of drinking water for 
Dalit workers (Omvedt, 1994; Zelliot, 2013).  
 
This clash between the communists and the interests of Dalit workers is well 
referenced in the agitations of B.R Ambedkar and the Mahar (Dalit) 
                                                 
140 Marathas are a Marathi-speaking caste of peasant cultivators turned warriors that form the bulk 
population of Maharashtra.  
 146 
movement.141 On the exclusion of Dalits from the weaving sheds and in 
connection to the position of Dalit workers in relation to the 1928 strike, 
Ambedkar quarrelled with the communists. As he noted at the time:  
 
“this matter was brought up prominently by me. I said to 
the members of the union that if they did not recognise the 
right of the depressed classes to work in all the 
departments, I would rather dissuade the depressed 
classes from taking part in the strike. They [the CPI] 
afterwards consented, most reluctantly, to include this as 
one of their demands, and when they presented this to the 
millowners, the millowners very rightly snubbed them and 
said that if this was an injustice, they certainly were not 
responsible for it”.142    
 
Despite calling out this injustice, Ambedkar was rebuffed. No serious action 
was taken by the CPI for fear of offending caste Hindu workers (Teltumbde, 
2018, p. 107). In conjunction with the wave of strikes in the late-1920s, what 
Gail Omvedt calls the ‘problem of entry’ gained political traction over 
organising alongside the communists. Dalit workers were concerned with 
exclusion from employment and sought to remedy their situation. This took 
precedence over any consideration to throw their lot in with the communists. 
Indeed, Ambedkar condemned the 1929 strike and urged Dalits to go back to 
work. In the end, the strike ended in a huge loss for the GKU and Ambedkar 
held firm, stressing the continued discrimination against Dalit workers and 
their suffering (at the hands of money-lenders) that resulted as a major 
consequence of the strike (Omvedt, 1994, pp. 154-155; Zelliot, 2013).  
 
                                                 
141 The Mahar form a caste-cluster of Maharashtrian Dalits. Ambedkar was himself a Mahar. See 
Zelliot (2013). 
142 From Bahishkrut Bharat 3 May 1929. Cited in Omvedt (1994 p. 154). 
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The politics of caste therefore caused serious friction between mill workers. 
The point to take away here is that first and foremost, the communists saw the 
question of caste and the problem of untouchability as fundamentally 
unimportant. Additionally, while the communist movement acquired a mass 
base, the (predominantly Brahmin) upper caste intellectual and political 
leadership remained separate from the masses. Despite the attempts of 
workers and comrades residing in the mill districts to produce a communist 
counter movement to Congress-led nationalism, the upper caste leadership of 
the CPI continued to practice Hindu lifestyles. Close friendships remained 
within caste circles and marriage continued to conform to the hierarchical 
structure of the caste system. Revealingly, no critique of caste society was 
made within the literature of the movement (see Ilaiah, 2004, pp. 60-61). The 
practice of caste ran through the workplace and thus much of the membership, 
as ‘Untouchables’ effectively remained second-class citizens within the CPI. In 
other words, the Hindu chain of reasoning (sketched out in chapter two) 
continued to inform the everyday life of Bombay communism.   
 
Ambedkar’s criticism of the communist movement – of its failure to 
incorporate the concerns of Dalit workers as resting in the upper-caste origins 
of the communist high command is thereby highly instructive. “A bunch of 
Brahmin boys” as Ambedkar put it, the communists were prone to thinking 
about Marxism in Brahmanical terms, privileging the ‘paramountcy of the 
word (shabda pramanya)’. For Ambedkar, Marxism was considered by the 
intellectuals of the CPI in quasi-religious terms, ‘not [as] a blue print for 
creative application but akin to veda vakya (scriptural authority)’ (Teltumbde, 
2018, p. 113). And so, Ambedkar’s misgivings about Marxism were shaped in 
large part through interaction with the leadership of the Bombay communists, 
for whom the category of ‘caste’ was ‘unscientific’ and seen to be little more 
than a ‘superstructural’ division in the homogenous and revolutionary 
category of the ‘proletariat’ (Teltumbde, 2018, p. 103). A ‘superstructural’ 
element of the economic system, caste was seen as a ‘pre-modern’ feudal social 
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condition that would wither away with the inevitable advent of communist 
revolution (Teltumbde, 2018, p. 103). This state of affairs is further evident in 
the lack of attention to matters of caste discrimination and untouchability in 
the programmes of the two ‘mass-front’ movements of the time, the All-India 
Trade Union Congress (AITUC) and the Red Trade Union Congress (RTUC). It 
was not just the communists, but “official” socialist institutions in general that 
lacked a systematic program geared to fight casteism.143  
 
Matters of daily concern to Dalit communities, then, such as temple entry; 
access to public water tanks; better employment opportunities; social dignity; 
and so on, were non-issues for the communists. For this reason, as the 
communist movement fell into a state of collapse, it left the legacy of a 
retrenched working class (2.4) that was also fragmented by caste identity and 
communal sentiments. Continuing in the long tradition of city politics in 
Bombay, communist mobilisation was conducted along lines sympathetic to 
the cultural affinities of Hinduism (Shaikh, 2011, p. 69). In equal measure, 
rivalry between Hindu and Muslim workers was exploited and weaponised by 
the mill owners and communalist forces, further fragmenting the possibilities 
of solidarity between the working classes of the city. Muslims and Dalits 
remained largely outside of the communist fold. Simply put, the CPI-led 
workers movement failed to break with the dominant ‘Hindu chain of 
reasoning’ characteristic of nationalist politics in the city. In the end, common 
sense assumptions and sensibilities of ‘Hinduness’ were left intact and 
cultivated further still, with profound implications for the formation of the 




                                                 
143 Divisions between communists and the Ambedkarite Dalit movement have proven to be lasting. 
See for example Dalit activist-scholar Suraj Yengde (2016) on the continuing blindness/disregard of 
much of the Indian left for the caste question. For the Bombay context, mapping tensions between 
Ambedkarites and communists see the (1997) documentary-film Jai Bhim Comrade!  
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It was argued in chapter two that Hindu nationalism – of which Hindutva is 
the most prominent and influential variant – was formed in the tensions 
between India and Empire.  The present chapter has shown that the late-
colonial ‘internationalist moment’ (see Lewis, 2016; Raza et al, 2014) also gave 
rise to a powerful communist movement in Bombay that offered a counter 
position to the cultural nationalism of the Congress. In this chapter I have 
positioned three movements generated in and through the conjuncture of the 
late-colonial internationalist moment – as Indian modernity took a relatively 
stable form – as critical to the historical formation of the political street. 
Accordingly, it has been argued that Hindu mythology and anti-Muslim 
politics have been key to the formation of the (gendered) political street and 
represent important historical legacies that constitute the present.   
 
The chapter showed that by the 1890s, the annual Ganesh celebrations in 
Maharashtra had moved from the domestic sphere to urban public space 
under the political sponsorship of Congress ‘extremists’ most prominently, 
B.G Tilak. At this point, a specifically political dimension came to frame what 
had hitherto been a set of religio-cultural practices. Anti-colonial activism 
blended with an elite Brahmin-led militant Hinduism that was explicitly anti-
Muslim: Hindu martial identity was celebrated Muslim public presence was 
denigrated. What Ganpati Utsava represents is the beginnings of a form of 
Hindu urban devotionalism crafted towards political ends (see Bhatt, 2001). 
Unsurprisingly, B.G Tilak remains an icon of Hindutva forces in the present.  
 
Similarly, as the Congress officially moved towards a strategy of mass 
nationalist agitation against colonial rule, the streets and public spaces of the 
city became the primary venue of nationalist expression. Civil disobedience in 
the city was most important in this regard. While the civil disobedience 
movement was not explicitly ‘pro-Hindu’, it was racked by anti-Muslim 
sentiments.  Like Ganpati Utsava, civil disobedience was pivotal to the 
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formation of the a ‘tangible sense’ of nationalist identity (Kidambi, 2019) 
against colonial rule in the political street.  
 
Finally, whilst the primary counter-movement to Congr ess-led nationalism 
articulated an alternate ‘proletarian’ sense of identity, the CPI failed to depart 
from the Hindu chain of reasoning outlined in chapter two.  These three 
movements have left an indelible mark on the public culture of the political 
street. Having accounted for the social and historical context of street politics 
– and importance of the political street for nationalist political expression in 
Bombay – chapter four turns to a discussion of ‘new’ strategies of Hindutva 
politics. From this point of departure, the nexus of cleanliness, caste hierarchy 
and the beautification of urban space is the subject of the next chapter, which 
analyses Swachh Bharat Abhiyan in the context of the performance of the 




















Swachh Bharat Abhiyan: creating a culture of cleanliness 
 
 
“Mahatma Gandhi had launched a 
campaign for the independence of the 
country, which we know as ‘Satyagraha’ 
movement. Now Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi has launched a campaign of 
‘Swachhta’, which is known as 
‘Swachagarh’ and its success is being seen 
across the country.” 
– Rajnath Singh, BJP Minister for 
Defence144 
 
‘Sanitation is not just about pipes and 
toilets, drains and costings. It is peopled.’  
- Colin McFarlane (2019, p. 4) 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
 
The political street in Mumbai forms a venue and site where the public and 
private blur into one. Everyday life unfolds in every nook, corner and gully. 
The pavements and so-called ‘slums’ are dense with bodies. High rise blocks 
shoot up into the sky leaving dilapidated streets far below. In these contested 
spaces, the surplus wastes of the neighbourhood ‘seep in, coagulate and mount 
up’ (Mcfarlane, 2019, p. 15). The realities of everyday sanitation – sewer lines, 
public latrines septic tanks and drainage – form ‘the elementary grid for social 
relations in the city’; urban limits are set as the population is connected into 
one city-wide urban ecology (Chandavarkar, 2009, p. 31). From within the 
heterogeneous density of Mumbai’s urban sprawl, multiple ways of seeing 
sanitation and cleanliness arise. Stratified by social relations of class, caste 
and gender, Mumbaikars see the problem of sanitation in remarkably different 
ways. This produces a range of paradoxes and contradictions.  
                                                 
144 See ‘Swachh Bharat Abhiyan has become people’s movement, says Rajnath’, The Hindu, 8 
December, 2019, https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Delhi/swachh-bharat-abhiyan-has-
become-peoples-movement-says-rajnath/article30234087.ece, last accessed 12 May 2020. 
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The launch of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan in 2014 was an ambitions pitch by the 
newly minted Modi government to initiate a wide-ranging development and 
sanitation/cleanliness campaign and declare the nation open defecation free 
by Mahatma Gandhi’s birthday (and the 150-year anniversary of his death) on 
2nd October 2019. Alongside the elimination of open defecation, under the 
direction of Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, the corner stones of the 
Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (urban) mission include toilet construction, 
elimination of manual scavenging, investment in solid waste management and 
oversight and delivery of a wide-ranging public relations campaign. However, 
as the mission has moved past 2019, thousands of manual scavengers continue 
to descend into the sewers without proper protective gear on a daily basis.145 
This work is done by Dalits (‘Untouchables’) the lowest ‘depressed’, or 
‘backwards’ communities in India’s complex caste hierarchy. The work is 
humiliating, dangerous and reinforces social stigma and discrimination. Many 
die in the process.146  
 
Yet, the focus of Swachh Bharat has been the construction and ownership of 
toilets (over 100 million according to the government) while solid waste 
management has been relatively neglected; municipalities, Indian railway and 
state government agencies remain the largest employers of manual 
scavengers, either directly or through third party contractors. In 2017, Léo 
Heller, the UN special rapporteur on the Human rights to safe drinking water 
                                                 
145 Contract labourers that are employed to manually clean sewers and empty septic tanks, while doing 
the work of manual scavengers, are not considered as such by the government. In this thesis, I 
consider ‘urban sewage workers’ as manual scavengers in all but title. 
146 While manual scavenging is officially prohibited by law, the use of men and women for the cleaning 
of sewers and septic tanks was recognised as manual scavenging only in 2013, in the amended ‘The 
Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act’. Government data 
submitted to the Indian parliament in 2018, claimed that 323 sanitation workers have died on the job 
since 1993. On the flip side, data collected by the award-winning Sanitation Workers Liberation 
Mission (Safai Karamchari Andolan) notes at least 1,560 deaths during the same period. 
Data from: ‘Ramon Magsaysay Award: Indians who have won the award in the past’, The Indian 
Express, 27 July 2016, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20160727072001/http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-
india/ramon-magsaysay-award-2016-bezwada-wilson-and-tm-krishna-from-india-win-prestigious-
award-2938027/, last accessed 12 may 2020. See also, Nair (2017).   
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and sanitation, voiced concern that Swachh Bharat would fail to eliminate 
manual scavenging. Highlighting the link between caste and manual 
scavenging, he suggested that the mission “may involuntarily contribute to 
violating the fundamental principle of non-discrimination”.147 Modi’s flagship 
sanitation project, then, has neither ended open defecation nor eliminated 
manual scavenging. 
 
In this chapter, I claim that the missions’ success instead lies in its effective 
capture of Indian aspirations for cleaner cities (and towns and villages). It 
works as an effective platform for nationalist mobilisation and serves as a 
vehicle to co-opt the image and legacy of Mahatma Gandhi for the BJP (and 
away from the Congress). The chapter shows how Swachh Bharat Abhiyan 
works as a means of articulation for the ideology of Hindutva through the 
medium of the political street. In doing so, I account for the framework of 
cleanliness and sanitation – a seemingly innocuous set of everyday practices – 
and how it is deployed as a tool to mobilise diverse populations through the 
colonisation of urban public space.  
 
The argument of the chapter is therefore twofold: first, I argue that Swachh 
Bharat is not a totalising movement but one that piggybacks on the 
overwhelming desires of Mumbaikars for a cleaner city. On the back of the 
catastrophic pollution of urban society, Swachh Bharat figures as a means of 
articulation to offer the regeneration of urban society through spatial 
purification. Secondly, I argue that the iconography of Mahatma Gandhi holds 
the mission together. Swachh Bharat Abhiyan pivots on the ‘ambivalent 
                                                 
147 In his preliminary report, Heller (2017) was quite clear on the link between caste and manual 
scavenging, when he claimed that “given the generations-old practice of imposing sanitary tasks onto 
the lower castes, the growth in number of toilets raises concerns that manual scavenging will continue 
to be practiced in a caste-based, discriminatory fashion”. In other words, Heller claimed that the 
delivery of a constitutionally just, “Clean India”, would in the last instance, depend on the ability of 
the government to address the provision of solid waste management and eradicate manual 
scavenging. Article 14 of the Indian Constitution inscribes a basic ‘right to equality’ for all Indian 
citizens.  See ‘Why India needs to Address Caste-Based Manual Scavenging Before it Aims for A 
‘Swachh Bharat’, EPW Engage, 25 June 2018, https://www.epw.in/engage/article/why-india-needs-
address-caste-based-manual-scavenging-swacch-bharat, last accessed 12 May 2020. 
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iconography’ of Gandhi as a means to mobilise diverse populations. Simply 
put, Gandhi’s ambivalent and varying intellectual and ideological positions 
lend easily to mean all things to all people. As a result, Gandhi is appropriated 
by the BJP for political gain, his anti-Hindutva views are erased, and his image 
is transformed into a meme that aids the production of a sense of imagined 
(Hindu) political community.  
 
Taken together, these two aspects of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan appeal via the 
Hindu chain of reasoning as somewhat paradoxically, Hindutva is crystallised 
in the political street through a secular framework of cleanliness. Through the 
colonisation of urban public space Hindutva effectively draws energy through 
the Swachh Bharat Mission. At the same time, the mission generates a sense of 
imagined political community working together for a Hindutva-friendly ‘Clean 
India’. In what follows, these claims are substantiated by analysing urban 
aspirations for a clean city and the incorporation of beach clean-up campaigns 
into the ambit of Swachh Bharat (4.2), the role of caste and class in the making 
of Swachh Bharat, with special reference to the treatment of urban sanitation 
workers and goal of the mission to eliminate manual scavenging (4.3), and 
finally, the propaganda and symbolism of Gandhian iconography that 
underpin the mission (4.4). 
 
4.2 Towards a clean Mumbai 
 
As was argued in chapter two, the globalisation of neoliberalism in Mumbai 
has delivered an intensification of already deep seeded social stratification, 
around the axis of extremely wealthy individuals, those with access to formal 
employment housing, healthcare and savings, and a precarious and expanding 
urban poor connected to the informal economy. In the years after 1991, 
inequality has boomed, as gated communities with swimming pools have 
emerged in juxtaposition to sprawling slums without regular electricity or 
running water. The iconic symbol of this glaring inequality is of course Antilia, 
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the gargantuan twenty-seven story private residence of Mukesh Ambani, 
India’s richest man.148 Yet, this is simply the most extreme end of the scale. On 
the ground, Mumbai is peppered with gated apartment blocks; the close 
proximity of gated communities and ‘slums’ has become a defining feature of 
the city. The persistence of mass informal slum settlements has led to multiple 
claims from elite business and citizens groups that the city demands order.149 
 
As exchange and the circulation and flow of commodities, money and capital 
have become increasingly organised around a neoliberal schema of 
accumulation, so-called citizens groups have cropped up to demand 
beautification and the better management of urban space. The dreams of such 
groups – of Mumbai as a ‘global city’ – are haunted by the vast population of 
toilers, hawkers and pavement dwellers rendered superfluous in the transition 
                                                 
148 Antilia is over 400,000 square feet and twenty-seven stories tall. It boasts three helipads, a 
ballroom, 168 car garage, spa and temple and so on. The existence of the world’s second most valuable 
property (after London’s Buckingham Palace) in a city where over half the population lives in slums 
and on the pavement, has attracted attention to the extravagant excesses of India’s billionaire class 
and their apparent detachment from the hardship and poverty faced by a huge number of their fellow 
Indians. See Crabtree (2019).  
149 In terms of elite lobbing efforts, see the Vision Mumbai (2003) report commissioned by the 
business and industry group Bombay First (compiled and researched by global consultancy firm 
McKinsey & Company). Developed ‘with the active participation’ of the Municipal Corporation of 
Greater Mumbai (MCGM), Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA) and 
Government of Maharashtra (GoM). As well as ‘more than 30 key stakeholders (businesses and 
NGOs), the report argues that if Mumbai is to follow in the footsteps of Shanghai, Singapore (and 
London, New York and Tokyo) to become a “world-class city”, then government and citizens must 
dump incremental thinking and ‘undergo a change in mind-set’ to ‘convert [this] vision into reality’ 
(Bombay First, 2003, p. vii). On this axis, the proposition was to upgrade and optimise the city’s 
transport infrastructure, in order to support the construction of Central Business Districts (CBDs) and 
connect them to each other and with high-end residential areas (Bombay First, 2003, p. 16). Alongside 
the creation of Special Housing Zones (SHZs) and deregulation of land acquisition rules, reforms to 
the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) process – towards a “user charge” model – were flagged as 
key priorities. It was also stipulated that no new slums should be allowed to stand after the cut-off 
point of 1 January 1995 (Bombay First, 2003, p. 21-22). The reports core recommendations proved 
highly controversial, as critics pointed to the documents heavy skew to the benefit of commercial elites 
and property developers over slum dwellers, pavement dwellers and the urban poor. The Vision 
Mumbai dream was additionally criticised for its failure to consider issues of informal settlement and 
sanitation in any real depth. When the city’s slums are mentioned in any detail they figure more as 
markers ‘of the city’s “slippage” down the rankings of “top” Asian cities’. The explicit recommendation 
is that if Mumbai is to become a world-city its slums must be cleared (Graham et al, 2013, p. 117-118). 
The master theme that underpins Vision Mumbai is to create islands of (housing and commercial) 
excellence ‘through integrated development’, with particular focus on Bandra-Kurla and the former 
Port Trust and mill lands in central Mumbai. ‘Developed holistically’ to include high-end housing and 
apartments, open space, hospitals, retail developments and so on. It is claimed that such “islands of 
excellence” will become exemplary to the rest of the city and serve as magnets for the attraction of 
productive capital (Bombay First, 2003, p. 22).  
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from mills to malls (see chapter two, 2.4). Visions of disorder are both 
generated and re-enforced through popular culture, for example, in the 
Bollywood penchant for crime noir.150 Yet, for the most part, tensions around 
the control and management of urban public space – the political street –
index to a confrontation between those in the minority that see the streets as 
the ‘circuitry’ of the formal economy in which they walk, shop and commute, 
and the majority that reside, sleep and ply their trade in the streets. From this 
angle of vision, street hawkers tend to be at the forefront of attack as roaming 
vagrants that need discipline (see Anjaria, 2009, pp. 391-392; Rajagopal, 
2001, pp. 91-92). ‘Clogging the arteries of the city’, street vendors encroaching 
on precious public space are a problem that needs to be ‘cleaned up’. Outrage 
at the apparent ‘nuisance’ caused by hawkers and pavement dwellers dovetails 
with generalised indignation at the perceived slide of living standards in the 
city, overcrowding and breakdown of civic virtues, law and order.151 
Accordingly, though beautification and ‘clean up’ drives have a long history in 
postcolonial India,152 it is in the context of the neoliberal city that we must 
                                                 
150 Bollywood cinema offers a powerful archive of the city and window into the complexity and 
multiplicity of subjectivities, lived experience and modes of urban life in the city (Mazumdar, 2007, p. 
vxiii). Classic depictions of the popular imaginary of the Bombay/Mumbai underworld, street life, 
slums and pavements, include Mira Nair’s Salaam Bombay! (1988) and Ram Gopal Varma’s Satya 
(1998).  
151 Hawkers are roundly seen as a nuisance that is taking over the city, causing serious inconvenience 
and flouting the rules that ‘ordinary’ citizens have to abide by. Field note: 5/12/19. Informal 
interviews with ‘Prashant’ and ‘Om’. These views are frequently expressed on Twitter groups such as 
‘Bandra Community’ and ‘Roads of Mumbai’. See for example, Roads of Mumbai. 2019. ‘Dadar: 
Hawkers Paradise. No matter which footpath it is.’ Twitter, 7 December 
2019,https://twitter.com/RoadsOfMumbai/status/1203269449933033472, last accessed 9 January 
2020. See also Anjaria (2009) and Rajagopal (2001).  
152 The period known as ‘The Emergency” (1975-77) revolved around sentiments of ‘cleaning-up’ the 
undesirable elements of Indian society. On the morning of 26th June 1975, Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi declared a state of emergency under Article 352 of the constitution in response to prevailing 
‘internal disturbance’. The Emergency, claimed Mrs Gandhi, was a response to “the deep and 
widespread conspiracy which has been brewing ever since I began to introduce certain progressive 
measures of benefit to the common man and woman of India” (Guha, 2007, p. 493). The political 
reality of this period was characterised by the development and roll out of two highly controversial 
social policies: forced sterilisation under the rubric of ‘family planning’ and mass urban slum 
clearance, under the direction of Indira Gandhi and her son Sanjay. These directives were taken up 
with gusto by the government of Maharashtra. For instance, note Patrick Clibbens’ (2014, p. 56) 
account of the demolition and slum clearances in Bombay: ‘during the Emergency, in Bandra East 
alone, the state ‘“cleaned up” 29,000 square metres of land of workers’ hutment colonies. The land 
was re-allocated to the Maharashtra State Electricity Board, Indian Oil and the Oil and Natural Gas 
Commission, for office premises.’ The clearances in Bombay were not organised from the centre, but 
rather, by figures within the Bombay Municipal Corporation (BMC) and Government of Maharashtra. 
Furthermore, the connection between untrammelled slum clearance and civic discipline, as Clibbens 
correctly points out, dovetailed with the other key social policy of the era, forced sterilisation. The 
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consider how Swachh Bharat Abhiyan connects to urban aspirations and 
desires for a cleaner Mumbai.  
 
Despite the sheer size of the city, Mumbai doesn’t have much of a tourist 
economy to speak of. The liberalisation of India’s economy has brought great 
wealth to the city, but people do not come to its beaches to bake themselves on 
a sun lounger. They most certainly do not swim in the polluted waters of the 
Arabian sea. Instead, the city’s beaches are rare open public spaces in a dense 
and overcrowded city that cater in the main to a local crowd. The beach crowd 
consists of families and youngsters who come to stroll the sands, grab a bite to 
eat from food stalls, play a game of football or cricket. Akin to a coastal park, 
the urban beach is above all somewhere where people come and feel the 
breeze and escape the hustle and bustle of the city. A place where young 
couples come to be together, where intimacy is tolerated, and hearts are drawn 
in the sand. Groups of young men and boys come to loiter and smoke, as 
trader’s weave in between couples with baskets of wares on their head, 
appealing to the boys to buy a lolly for ‘their’ girl.153 For many, the beach is a 
place of recreation as well as somewhere to catch some precious sleep away 
from the noise of the city. The sound of birds replaces the sound of traffic and 
the cacophony of horns. Yet, if anything catches one’s attention in relation to 
Mumbai’s beaches, it is that like India itself, they are uniquely unclean 
(Teltumbde, 2018, p. 318). Plastic and waste cake the sand and many of the 
beaches in the city double up as sites for open defecation.   
 
Within the wider context of the push for a Swachh Bharat, desires for 
beautification and more sustainable forms of development have given birth to 
a vibrant beach clean-up movement in the city. In recent years, a series of 
beach clean-up movements have sprung up to tackle the waste and neglect of 
these spaces. By and large, the discourse of the groups that comprise the 
                                                 
explicit target: ‘as in so many of the policies of the Emergency, was the bodies of the urban poor – not 
their buildings’ (Clibbens, 2014, p. 56). Also see Gyan Prakash’s The Emergency Chronicles (2020).  
153 Field note: 21/12/19. Dadar Beach, central Mumbai.  
 158 
movement invariably revolves around the rallying cry to “beat plastic 
pollution”. The movement as a whole openly connects with the UN 
Environment Clean Seas Campaign and UN Sustainable Development goals 
set out for 2030.  
 
While not all of the groups that have sprung up in the city specifically connect 
with Swachh Bharat, as we will see in the following section, it is difficult to 
consider them in separation from the broad ambit of the mission. A high 
degree of autonomy and dissenting opinion marks out differences between the 
most significant groups. However, in the broader context of Swachh Bharat, 
the prowess of the BJP is evident to the extent that party strategy recognises 
and understands the overwhelming demand for cleaner urban public spaces 
(cities as well as towns and villages). By piggy backing the motivations of 
independent organisations and networks of individuals engaged in cleaning 
the city, the BJP gain an advantage. Accordingly, otherwise seemingly 
disperate groups are seen in the popular imaginary as grass roots ‘citizens 
movements’ that are honouring the call to cleanliness envisaged by the 
government – the ‘actual’ street is effectively sutured. I consider the politics of 
the three most prominent groups in turn. 
 
Cleaning the beach  
 
 
The contemporary drive to clean Mumbai’s beaches can be traced to October 
2015, when local Mumbai citizen Afroz Shah first stepped onto a plastic 
covered Versova beach with the intention to clean it up. By December 2016, 
after recruiting a small army of volunteers, significant headway had been 
made and Shah was honoured by the United Nations as a ‘Champion of the 
Earth’. The following May, Narendra Modi publicly recognised the efforts of 
“[his] friend Afroz Shah” in a speech made during his popular all-India radio 
show Maan ki Bhatt. The efforts of Shah and his army of volunteers, then, 
have attracted much attention. A lawyer by profession, Mr Shah is a shrewd 
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publicist. Alongside affluent local residents, the campaign has attracted many 
a famous face, from Bollywood royalty and the Swedish royal family, to a raft 
of powerful politicians and media personalities. On the political front, the BJP 
and Shiv Sena in particular moved quickly to back Shah’s campaign when 
(then) Maharashtra CM Devendra Fadnavis and Yuva Sena (Shiva Sena 
Youth) President Aditya Thackeray joined the clean-up, with official 
photographers and press and television cameras in tow. No doubt the 
campaign has been boosted significantly thanks to the location of the beach in 
Versova, a haven of the well-to-do. At Versova, desires for beautification, the 
world of celebrity and the political strategy of the ruling class meet on the 
ground. 
 
The mission to clean Mumbai’s beaches has drawn upon keen popular interest 
in the politics of ocean environmentalism and been driven by social media. 
Weekly schedules of the various weekend clean-ups are posted on Twitter and 
Instagram by each group detailing their time, place and date. Organisationally 
speaking, posts tend to be connected either directly or through reposting to 
Swachh Bharat hashtags. They frequently tag the Twitter handles of 
sympathetic politicians, UN Environment and Swachh Bharat goodwill 
ambassadors, as well as Narendra Modi himself.154 The combined effect is that 
a remarkably wide audience is reached.155 Many of the volunteers spoken to 
over the course of this research stated that they found their way to the beaches 
through the strong social media presence of the various groups. They were 
often particularly impressed by frequent celebrity endorsements. And indeed, 
it seems to have been the intervention of a Bollywood megastar that kick 
started the craze. In August 2017, Amitabh Bachchan joined the beach clean-
up at Versova, later donating an excavator and tractor to the efforts.156 By 
                                                 
154 Additional frequent examples include US actor and environmentalist Leonardo DiCaprio and 
Indian actress and UN environment/Swachh Bharat ambassador Dia Mirza. 
155 Afroz Shah alone has 48,000 followers on Twitter.  
156 It is difficult to quantify the omnipresence and popularity of Amitabh Bachchan in Mumbai. 
Besides staring in multiple Bollywood smash hits and hosting India’s version of ‘Who Wants to be A 
Millionaire?’ (Kaun Banega Crorepati) he is a well-known friend of the rich and powerful. His face is 
 160 
early September, almost simultaneously, a second wave of beach clean-up 
groups came into being. The different beach clean-up groups certainly partake 
in the same bourgeois environmentalist grammar – of beautification, the need 
to ‘beat’ plastic pollution, and so on – and organise along similar lines. 
However, while it is tempting to see the movement as a whole, in reality these 
groups have fomented quite different lines of attack. The beach clean-up 
movement is highly differentiated.  
 
Founded on 3rd September 2017, ‘Beach Warriors’ openly aligns itself with 
Swachh Bharat, regularly tagging the Swachh Bharat (urban) Twitter handle 
as well as the personal accounts of Narendra Modi and (now) Shiv Sena MLA 
Aditya Thackeray.157 The Swachh Bharat logo frequently appears pasted onto 
their promotional material.158 Like the other groups, Beach Warriors focuses 
on the matter of changing bad habits around plastic use and littering. 
However, Beach Warriors differs in so far as their founder, Chinu Kwatra, 
regularly draws a line between the issue of plastic pollution and the duty of 
citizens to ‘the nation’. Neglecting to recycle, as Mr Kwatra sees it, is not just 
to sabotage the environment, but to inhibit development – Beach Warriors, as 
a matter of duty, ‘want to see [their] Nation clean’.159 Unlike the group at 
Versova, which despite receiving the patronage of politicians and the rich and 
famous is relatively independent, under the direction of Chinu Kwatra, Beach 
Warriors is closely connected to the Shiv Sena.160 In particular, the group is 
close to the Shiv Sena affiliated “I Love Mumbai” foundation spearheaded by 
prominent Yuva Sena leader, Rahul N. Kanal. Unsurprisingly, the initial 
project undertaken by Beach Warriors – before spreading out to multiple 
                                                 
a constant in advertisements on buses, shopfronts and billboards in the city, where he puts his famous 
image to all sorts of products, from banking to noodles.  
157 Former Yuva Sena leader Aditya Thackeray is the grandson of Bal Thackeray and son of Uddav 
Thackeray. He was elected as MLA for Worli in October 2019. He also serves in his father’s cabinet as 
Minister for Tourism and Environment.  
158 The Swachh Bharat Logo is discussed in depth in the final section of this chapter (4.4) 
159 Kwatra, C. 2019. ‘Week:120 #BeatPlasticPollution. From Cuffe Parade to Malad. Beaches are 
getting cleaned & beautified every weekend’, Twitter, 8 December 2019, 
https://twitter.com/chinukofficial/status/1203723519109918720, last accessed 4 January 2020. 
160 Kwatra is a Shiv Sena member and supporter of Aditya Thackeray as well as a friend of prominent 
Yuva Sena Committee member Rahul N. Kanal.  
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beaches – was at Dadar beach, only a stone’s throw from Shiv Sena Bhavan 
(see figure 7).161 While Beach Warriors is of course not alone in receiving 




Figure 7: Beach Warriors home turf, Dadar Beach: notably the food stalls that line 
the beach are painted saffron and sport images of Shivaji, Ganesh and the Shiv Sena 
Tiger (photograph by the author).  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, the political patronage that characterises 
Beach Warriors is not shared by Mahim Beach Clean Up. The Mahim clean-up 
was launched by two local residents in September 2017, Indraneil Sengupta 
and Rabia Tewari. The explicit aim of the project is to clear, re-claim and 
transform a hitherto neglected stretch of beach from Mahim Causeway to 
Hinduja Hospital, into a space for recreation and community activities. Like 
the other groups Mahim Beach Clean Up firmly advocate ecological 
responsibility and the beautification of urban space. However, the group at 
Mahim stand out in their resistance to the idea of being closely aligned with 
                                                 
161 Shiv Sena Bhavan is the headquarters of the party organisation, located on the edge of Shivaji Park, 
Dadar, central Mumbai. 
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Swachh Bharat Abihyan. The view of the group is that Swachh Bharat has 
targeted a series of ‘VIP areas’ where the well-to-do move around the city. On 
the contrary, spaces of the city like Mahim Beach have suffered several 
decades of neglect. For these local activists, inequality is as a key concern. 
Their vision is of a clean open public space that offers entertainment for all, in 
a city where many cannot afford a concert or cinema ticket.162 The general 
view from Mahim Beach is that the BMC have plenty of money and that their 
support for the clean-ups – or lack of – is a simple matter of priorities.163  
 
When it comes to the praxis of Swachh Bharat, the Mahim group are keenly 
aware that there is a difference between what the government say and what 
they actually do. On this basis, their aim is the creation of an independent, 
grassroots community project that focuses on building community relations 
around the collective project of cleaning up the beach. The project has had 
some real and tangible success.164 To summarise, the extent to which the 
growing environmental movement in the city will tolerate the development of 
Swachh Bharat into a consistent fiction of ‘cleanliness’ over radical 
environmental action remains to be seen. All the same, what the three groups 
considered above have in common is that they think and operate in terms of 
the beautification of space and emphasise behavioural change and the 
importance of cleanliness, hygiene and sanitation. What is important, as will 
be discussed below, is that beach clean-up drives have come to play a key role 
                                                 
162 Field note: 26/01/20. Conversations with volunteers, Republic Day celebrations at Mahim Beach 
Clean Up.  
163 The majority of the waste and debris on the beaches of Mahim and Dadar comes from the Mithi 
river, a highly polluted eighteen kilometre stretch that begins at Borivali up in the Western suburbs 
and merges with the Arabian sea between Mahim and Bandra. The Mahim Beach group suggest that 
what is needed is a water filtration system. While a tractor and broken trailer with a handful of BMC 
workers at weekends has been allocated, there is a feeling that much more could be done.  
164 New volunteers are being attracted all the time including many people that work in the Mahim 
area, including staff from Hinduja Hospital. Small yet diverse music events are regularly hosted after 
the morning clean-ups. For example, on the one hand, around Christmas 2019 a local Christian choir 
performed a series of carols and a statement was made against the CAA and on the other, the 
entertainment provided after the Republic Day clean up came from Matunga Labour camp-based hip 
hop collective, M-Town Breakers. Most encouraging is the level of acceptance, appreciation and trust 
the clean-up movement has achieved with various local communities. While the aim is undoubtedly to 
clean the beach, the most impressive feat is the deep connections forged across lines of class, caste 
and community around a collective project. 
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within the narrative propaganda of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and formation of 
the contemporary political street. 
 
Creating a culture of cleanliness 
 
Alongside framing the mission with lofty rhetoric, the protagonists of Swachh 
Bharat in government have worked hard to create a competitive environment 
aimed at institutionalisation of the project. This has taken the form of Swachh 
Survekshan, a time bound twenty-eight day nationwide inter-city competition, 
billed as ‘the world’s largest cleanliness survey’. Swachh Survekshan began in 
2016 (initially covering seventy-three cities) and evolved in a series of stages, 
starting out as a ‘monitoring tool’ with the aim of becoming a ‘governance tool’ 
covering the entirety of urban India. The overall aim is to ‘institutionalise 
Swachhata’ by the 2020 round of the competition. In June 2019, Minister of 
State for Housing and Urban Affairs, Hardeep Singh Puri, announced a 
further initiative to assess urban cleanliness in three quarters, with each 
quarter carrying a weightage of two thousand marks to be added to the annual 
assessment conducted between January and February.165 The quarterly system 
is set to play an important role in grading and ranking, with each period 
weighted at twenty five percent, with six thousand overall marks at stake in 
the race for India’s cleanest city. The logic behind the ‘continuous 
Survekshan,’ according to the BJP, is to ensure the pattern of cities cleaning 
up just before the survey is broken and ‘changed behaviours’ are sustained 
(Ahuja, 2019).  
 
Swachh Survekshan and the goals of Swachh Bharat in Mumbai, connect on 
the ground through the activities of the BMC. In the main, BMC strategy has 
been to harness citizen participation (and enthusiasm) to top-down 
beautification projects. There are some indications that this strategy has 
                                                 
165 Singh Puri announced the quarters to run between April and June; July and September; and 
October and December.  
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served its purpose and captured the public mood. Take for instance the case of 
an online poll conducted by the popular actress, Swachh Bharat advocate and 
UN environment ambassador, Dia Mirza, which recorded 22.2% of 
respondents identifying with the claim “Swachh Bharat my right”, as opposed 
to 77.8% of respondents agreeing with the statement “Swachh Bharat my 
duty”.166 Enthusiasm for a clean India and the importance of individual 
responsibility is increasingly expressed in the vernacular of the government-
led mission. Under the premise of partnership, a further case in point is the 
BMC proposed budget of RS 3.57 crore towards a wide-ranging beautification 
project in association with Mahim Beach Clean Up group.167 The plan was 
hatched in November 2019 but formally launched on Sunday 12 January 2020 
to align with ‘National Youth Day’ on the birthday of Swami Vivekananda (see 
figure 8).  
 
 
                                                 
166 Mirza, D. 2019. ‘Had such an energising meeting again with @mybmcSWM and @Dighavkarkiran 
this morning along with the wonderful @pragyakapoor_’, Twitter, 24 December 2019, 
https://twitter.com/deespeak/status/1209366082043011072, last accessed 28 December 2019. 
167 1 crore is equal to RS 10,000,000. RS 3.57 crore is therefore RS 357,000,000. At the time of 
writing, £1 converts to approximately RS 0.94. RS 3.57 Crore is therefore roughly £3.7 million. 
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Figure 8: Shiv Sena inauguration rally – Mahim Beach Clean Up founders and 
regulars – and puja ceremony to celebrate the beautification plans (photographs by 
the author). 
 
On the morning of the 12th January 2020 hundreds of volunteers, supporters 
and a Bollywood celebrity crowd arrived at the beach to begin a somewhat 
ceremonial clean-up around Mahim police station at the Mahim Causeway 
end of the beach. A large team of BMC workers were deployed. Shiv Sena set 
up a stage just behind the beach for the planned inauguration of ‘Mahim 
Beach Beautification’ after the clean-up at around 11.00am. The team behind 
Mahim Beach Clean Up have celebrated the beautification plans as a ‘fine 
example of the joint efforts of citizens and authorities.168 However, competing 
visions over the future of the space quickly emerged. On the one hand, those 
working on the clean-up since September 2017 have advocated a minimalist 
approach that retains a ‘natural look’. On the other hand, Shiv Sena 
Corporator Miland Vaidya summarises the view of the BMC that the plan for 
Mahim should closely resemble the highly concretised ‘Bandstand’ at Bandra 
West.169 When push comes to shove the notion of partnership appears top-
heavy in favour of the BMC.  
 
                                                 
168 #MahimBeachCleanUp. 2020. ‘Our cleanup on Jan 12, Swami Vivekananda’s birthday, will witness 
the inauguration of a cherished dream’, Twitter, 9 January 2020, 
https://twitter.com/mahimbeach/status/1215253447231983616, last accessed 20 May 2020. 
169 Pinto, R. 2020. ‘#BMC begins #Mahim beach #beautification works from today, here are the works 
proposed to change the much neglected beach front’, Twitter, 12 January 2020, 
https://twitter.com/richapintoTOI/status/1216201918386593792, last accessed 22 January 2020. 
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In the week immediately following the inauguration, BMC efforts at Mahim 
commenced with the concreting of a large section of the beach, raising 
immediate concerns. While such a plan makes the beach easier to clean and 
for some is more aesthetically pleasing to the eye, it significantly reduces the 
space of the actual beach. However, these actions make more sense in light of 
the wider context of urban ‘regeneration’ being proposed by Shiv Sena and the 
BMC. Mahim Beach in fact figures in the plans of self-styled environmentalist 
Aditya Thackeray’s ‘pet project’ for the beautification of Mumbai’s ‘cultural 
spine’.170 The declared aim of which is to create a ‘cultural pathway’ between 
Dadar and Mahim, consisting of a uniform, levelled pavement, lined with 
water fountains, toilets, dustbins and concrete benches along a route linking 
key religious sites, from St Michaels Church at Prabhadevi, past Makdoom 
Shah Baba Dargah, Chaitiyabhoomi, and the Siddhivinayak Mandir at Mahim. 
The plan is to erect bollards to keep scooters and motorbikes at bay and 
facilitate the smooth flow of devotees that are said to frequent the sites.  
 
Taken together, then, the communications of Swachh Survekshan 2020 
connect the popular movement to clean the world’s oceans, ‘beat plastic 
pollution’ and clean-up Mumbai’s urban beaches. In Mumbai, the BMC has 
been a primary agent in the push to incorporate these themes into a model for 
sanitation/cleanliness and propagate the idea of ‘Swachhata as a lifestyle.’ As 
we will see with respect to the broad ‘all-India’ strategy of the BJP to 
communicate the mission of Swachh Bharat (urban) to the masses, the beach 
clean-up movement has been piggy backed, promoted and effectively 
metabolised by Narendra Modi himself.  
 
In a well-publicised media event during the informal India-China summit 
between Modi and President Xi Xinping in October 2019 in Tamil Nadu, 
Modi’s team released a soon to go viral three-minute video of Modi ‘plogging’ 
                                                 
170 Aditya Thackeray has made an image for himself as a keen environmentalist. To the delight of his 
supporters, he has showed an interest in the beach clean-up campaigns and participated on various 
occasions in well-publicised ‘cleanliness drives’ in the city.  
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at Mamallapuram Beach.171 Modi can be seen in the footage strolling barefoot 
along the beach, collecting up litter and water bottles into a plastic bag 
(seemingly given to him by his aides) before handing the bag over to a member 
of the beach hotel staff. In the Tweet launched from his official account, Modi 
implores Indian’s to “ensure our public places are clean and tidy” and “ensure 
we remain fit and healthy.”172 In a separate Tweet, four photos of Modi looking 
calm, contemplative and collected, enjoying a “refreshing walk and exercises 
in Mamallapuram, along the scenic coast” were posted the same morning (see 
figure 9).173 Taken as a whole, these posts reflect a keen desire on behalf of the 
Prime Minster and his office to link concerns with plastic pollution, 
beautification, health, fitness and production of the beach as a recreational 
space to Swachh Bharat Abihyan. In other words, BJP strategy seeks to 
accomplish connections between a relatively fluid form of bourgeois 
environmentalism, civic beautification campaigns and the praxis of Swachh 
Bharat as envisaged by the government. 
 
 
Figure 9: Modi ‘plogs’ at Mamallapuram Beach, Tamil Nadu.  
                                                 
171 “Plogging” describes the act of picking up plastic waste and litter while out jogging. Beginning as an 
organised activity in Sweden, the term was coined by the Swede Erik Ahlstrom in 2016, blending the 
Swedish word ‘plocka’ (to pick) with ‘jog’, plogging events are now popular in India as well as other 
countries.   
172 Modi, N. 2019. ‘Plogging at a beach in Mamallapuram this morning. It lasted over 30 minutes’, 
Twitter, 12 October, 2019, https://twitter.com/narendramodi/status/1182863814217420806, last 
accessed 20 May 2020.  
173 Modi, N. 2019.‘Refreshing walk and exercises in Mamallapuram, along the scenic coast’, Twitter, 12 
October 2019, https://twitter.com/narendramodi/status/1182863131606831104, last accessed 20 
May 2020.  
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To suggest that the beach clean-up movement has become an important aspect 
of the propaganda of Swachh Bharat in Mumbai is not to say that it is under 
the control of the BJP. But that appeal to the aspirations of Indian citizens is 
part of the strategy of the project. Public opinion is an important source of 
power and the net objective of Modi’s public relations drive here is to connect 
Swachh Bharat with environmental issues and bourgeois concerns over the 
management of urban public space, in a way that positions the ‘culture of 
cleanliness’ envisioned by the government in common sense terms. Most 
importantly, the aim of this strategy is to garner greater public support for the 
BJP. By engaging in a complex appropriation of bourgeois environmentalist 
claims to the city, Modi positions himself as leading a ‘people’s movement’ 
from the front. The communications strategy of the project, then, takes the 
form of a subtle war of position. Modi assumes a position of moral and 
cultural leadership as the government appears to have taken a lead on 
environmental issues. This is framed overall as part of a wider concern to 
establish a culture of cleanliness conducive to a ‘clean India’. The everyday 
bourgeois environmentalism of the beach clean-up movement is duly 
metabolised by Swachh Bharat.  
 
On this basis, the BJP has piggy backed the motivations of a wide range of 
actors. At the same time, framing their various commitments as overt pledges 
of allegiance to the (government-led) production of a Swachh Bharat. 
Beautification and vanity projects are buttressed by concerns over ‘plastic 
pollution’ of the city’s streets and beaches. Meanwhile, issues of ‘green 
gentrification’ and how to deal with the mass of working-class citizens whose 
livelihoods rest on ecologically dubious practices – notwithstanding their lack 
of access to sanitation infrastructure – are effectively sidestepped. What is 
important, then, is that the imagination and urban aspirations of Mumbaikars 
are captured by an underlying pitch for the beautification and ‘better 
management’ of urban space. Dissensus within the beach clean-up movement 
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is shoehorned into a streamlined narrative to approximate a unified projection 
of national-popular will. Accordingly, the affective register of the project 
evokes the proposition that ‘everyone must do their bit’ in pursuit of a clean 
India. The aim is an attempt to suture the actual differences and segregations 
of urban public space around a collective political project.  
 
This notion was succinctly expressed in a quotation from Beach Warriors 
founder Chinu Kwatra published in the Bombay Times. Labelling the 
celebrations launched to mark the 100th week of cleaning Dadar beach the ‘Big 
Mumbai Clean Up’, Kwatra told the press that the acronym for the event was a 
show of respect to the urban sanitation workers of the BMC. For Kwatra, BMC 
workers “strive and toil to keep our Mumbai city clean”. On this basis, he 
claimed to dedicate “July 21st as the day for Safai Karamcharis of BMC [sic] as 
these civic workers are our silent heroes”.174 Kwatra’s narrative mirrors a 
popular 2019 BMC promotional video produced by the BMC detailing ‘a day in 
the life of a Swachhata warrior’. The video shows an idealised picture of the 
life of Mr Kantilal Babriya, a BMC sweeper from M Ward in Chembur and 
presents his life as one of service to cleanliness, personal piety and 
commitment to the city and its people.175  In the next section, we see that in 
the register of Swachh Bharat, the narrative of the mission as collective 
endeavour connects with a political strategy for the management of urban 
public space through the reproduction of Hindu social order. Like the 
‘swachatta heroes’ on Mumbai’s beaches every weekend, the narrative follows 
that like Swachh Bharat’s celebrity cheerleaders and the Prime Minister 
himself, Safai Karamcharis too are ‘doing their bit’ towards a clean India. 
Making sense of this narrative and its connection to the Hindutva vision of 
                                                 
174 Bombay Times, Times of India 22nd July 2019, p.2 posted on the Twitter feed of Beach Warriors 
founder, Chinku Kwatra. See Kwatra, C. 2019. ‘Thank you Mumbaikars for making 
#BigMumbaiCleanup a super hit’, Twitter, 22 July 2019, 
https://twitter.com/chinukofficial/status/1153158355864576000, last accessed 20 May 2020. 
175 See the video, in this case shared by popular Bollywood actor Salman Khan. Khan, S. 2019. ‘Thank 
you Mumbaikars, for joining us each day to inch closer to the #SwachhMumbai of our dreams’, 
Twitter, 26 December 2019, https://twitter.com/BeingSalmanKhan/status/1210132240077856771, 
last accessed 20 May 2020. 
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samrasta, necessitates a more in-depth engagement with the history of 
sanitation in the city and its legacy in the present, to which we now turn.  
 
4.3 Everyone’s doing their bit: the casteism of Swachh Bharat  
 
Such was the disregard of colonial rule for its Indian subjects that in Bombay, 
the British developed sanitation infrastructure only in response to the 
outbreak of plague in 1896 (Kidambi, 2004). The construction of sewers and 
reconstruction of parts of the ‘old town’ was related to the desires of the state 
to manage the spread of infectious disease and quarantine the ‘natives’ in the 
instance of any future outbreaks. The foundational basis of Mumbai’s urban 
sanitation problem, then, dates back to the formation of Bombay out of seven 
islands, as rapid urban growth quickly outpaced the ‘sophistication of the 
towns infrastructure’ (Chandavarkar, 2009, p. 33). Initiatives to improve 
sanitation infrastructure water supply and sewerage were taken most seriously 
in the wealthy areas of the city. In these spaces, the price of land was high and 
the dominant classes – Indian elites and especially Europeans – had staked 
their claim (Chandavarkar, 2009, p. 47; see also Prashad, 2000).  
 
In the absence of rationally planned sewerage, ‘Hindu society’ as Gita 
Ramaswarmy (2005) argues, ‘found it convenient to force [Dalit] madigas and 
bhangis into manual scavenging’.176 While the roots of manual scavenging are 
in the caste system, the practice became institutionalised in British India 
following the creation of the first municipalities. Manual scavengers were 
employed to clean sewer lines and public toilets, as well as toilets and latrines 
located within private households (Swagata, 2019, p. 24). The pattern of 
inadequate sewers and drainage set in motion by British colonialism persists 
across the vast majority of the city to this day. As urban planning has been 
incrementally adjusted in the post-independence era to facilitate rudimentary 
sewage flow, a reconstituted regime of sewer maintenance has been instituted 
that continues to rely on the labour of manual scavengers. This history follows 
                                                 
176 Ramaswarmy (2005) is quoted in Viswanathan (2006). 
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a similar pattern to the development of sanitation infrastructures found in 
other Indian cities (see Chandavarkar, 1994; Kidambi, 2004; Sreenath, 2019). 
As does the contemporary history of manual scavenging’s reconstitution in 
twenty first century Mumbai around the institution of contractual and sub-
contractual networks.177  
 
While many labourers working for the BMC as street sweepers, garbage 
collectors and the like are contracted, those cleaning the city’s sewer lines and 
septic tanks are more often than not sub-contracted day labourers. Typically, a 
large construction/maintenance contract is awarded and certain elements of 
the work – for instance the cleaning of sewer lines – is sub-contracted. The 
corprator knows who the contractors are but the workers frequently don’t. 
They lack written contracts, pensions, access to health care and tend to be 
generally unaware of their rights. In short, they are given a task on a day rate, 
if they start asking questions, they quickly find that there is no work the next 
day.178 Despite this complex weave of sub-contractual relations, the practice of 
manual scavenging is in theory legally banned, according to legislation passed 
in 1993 and updated in 2013.179 
 
In contemporary Mumbai, two realities combine to perpetuate the persistence 
of manual scavenging in the city: cost and caste. There are strong cost 
incentives to hire manual scavenger’s sans protective equipment to complete 
the dangerous and unpleasant work of cleaning septic tanks and sewer lines. 
The rules of the 2013 Act are often flouted on the basis of ease and cost, thanks 
to the lack of strict inspection by local authorities, but also due to a general 
lack of concern for workers.180 Meanwhile, Dalits have always been available 
to perform manual, dirty and dangerous tasks. This ‘fact’ has to a large extent 
                                                 
177 See Sreenath (2019) on the issue of contemporary manual scavenging in Bengaluru.                                  
178 Interview with ‘Pooja’ 29/01/20, Safai Karamchari Andolan. Interview with ‘Antika’ 24.12.19, Safai 
Karamchari Andolan.  
179 The Employment of Manual Scavengers and Construction of Dry Latrines (Prohibition) Act, 1993, 
and The Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act 2013. 
180 Interview with ‘Pooja’ 29/01/20, Safai Karamchari Andolan. 
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been internalised amongst caste-Hindu communities – as well as Dalits 
themselves – as a common sense proposition in line with the Hindu chain of 
reasoning. Upper caste Hindus are used to having people do things for them; 
to serve and wait on them and perform the necessary but menial and mundane 
tasks of daily life. To many, tasks such as manual scavenging fail to jump out 
as all that different from the other “jobs” that are accorded to Dalits and the 
labouring castes. The average Indian is well aware of the ongoing practice of 
manual scavenging181. Though often without commotion deaths are reported 
in national and local newspapers and across news sites, manual scavenging in 
municipal areas and scavengers entering manholes on streets and septic tanks 
within housing complexes are common sights (Vishwanathan, 2006).  
 
This is not to say that the upper castes are necessarily cold and heartless when 
it comes to the issue of scavenging and the conditions Dalits and the lower 
classes as such. But rather, that the structural issue of caste (as well as those of 
class, gender and race) tend to be discussed without recognition of one’s 
privilege and personal responsibility for perpetuating it (see Yengde, 2019, p. 
331). As Assa Doron and Robin Jeffrey (2018) point out, caste ‘imparts a ritual 
power’ to human waste: ‘from early childhood, millions of people are 
presented with the idea that groups designated by their birth are the 
appropriate people to carry away human waste and other repugnant material’. 
For orthodox Hindus these ideas are backed by religious doctrine; for others, 
the practice of scavenging is simply passed from one generation to another 
(Doron and Jeffrey, 2018, pp. 99-100). Taken as a whole, the fact of the matter 
is that in Hinduism, caste hierarchy of labour is normalised. 
 
When it comes to enforcement of the law, a major sticking point for flouting 
the rules of the 2013 Act comes down to the matter of an extremely hazy 
definition of what actually constitutes manual scavenging in the first place. 
The Act gives definition of “Sanitation Workers” (Safai Karamcharis) as ‘any 
                                                 
181 Interview with ‘Pooja’ 22/12/19, Safai Karamchari Andolan. 
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person engaged in or employed for any sanitation work, other than domestic 
work’ (2.h) but fails to offer any precise description of manual scavenging.182  
The Act itself contains no detail on the bare minimum protections. Further 
still, there has been absolutely minimal action from the government to clarify 
the rules in the public domain. Rather than back the cause of livelihood and 
dignity of sanitation workers and support the manual scavenging ban through 
strict enforcement of the law and clarification of the rules, the BJP has gone to 
great lengths to spin a narrative that spiritualises sanitation workers. Led by 
Narendra Modi from the front, it is widely accepted that Safai Karamcharis are 
rightly – and justly – contributing to the creation of a clean India, they do 
their bit like everyone else. 
 
In doing so, Modi imitates and echoes Mahatma Gandhi’s controversial views 
on manual scavenging. Commenting on the bhangi (sweeper) Gandhi argued 
that manual scavenging was ‘a most honourable occupation’ and one of many 
vital services upon which Indian society was sustained. Indeed, in 1936, 
Gandhi suggested that  
 
‘a Bhangi does for society what a mother does for her baby. 
A mother washes her baby of dirt and insures his health. 
[…] the Bhangi protects and safeguards the health of the 
entire community by maintaining sanitation for it. The 
Brahmins duty is to look after the sanitation of the soul, 
the Bhangi’s that of the body of society.’183  
 
There is little distance, then, between Gandhi’s views on caste and of Hindutva 
ideals of samrasta. At Gandhi’s insistence, the (successful) aim of the Poona 
Pact (1932) was to deprive ‘Untouchables’ of the right to political 
representation through separate electorate granted to them at the 1931 Round 
                                                 
182 See Appendix 1 (2013 Act/rules.) 
183 Gandhi writes in Harijan, 28th November 1936, cited in Ramaswami (2005, p. 90).  
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Table Conference (Yengde, 2019, p. 142). Likewise, in the wake of the Poona 
Pact, Gandhi renamed Untouchables ‘Harijans’ (‘Children of God’) and 
commenced a long campaign to open temples to the ‘Harijans’ and further 
integrate them into the Hindu fold. At all costs, the primary aim was to 
‘Hinduise’ the Untouchables to counter the potential of their political 
awakening (Roy, 2014a, pp. 182-183). For Gandhi, manual scavenging and 
dignity were not mutually exclusive – the duty of the Bhangi was ‘sacred’ and 
‘pure’ – caste distinctions could be supported, and Untouchability could be 
opposed without any apparent contradiction (see Bhuyan, 2016). The social 
harmony platform (samrasta) of the RSS, geared to ‘integrate’ Dalits into 
Hindu society without disrupting the hierarchy of caste takes a remarkably 
similar tact. The idea behind it is unity, not equality (Palshikar, 2020, p. 179).  
 
This view of the virtues of the caste system and its occupational division of 
labour is shared by Modi, who like Gandhi has too has referred to manual 
scavenging in terms of a ‘spiritual experience’.184 In a collection of speeches 
titled KarmaYog, published in 2007 (but later withdrawn from circulation) 
Modi wrote of the balmikis, a community of manual scavengers, and claimed 
that he didn’t believe  
 
‘that they have been doing this job just to sustain their 
livelihood… At some point of time, somebody must have 
got the enlightenment that it is their duty to work for the 
entire society and the Gods; that they have to do this job 
bestowed upon them by the Gods; and that this job of 
cleaning should continue as an internal spiritual activity 
for centuries’ (Modi, 2007, pp. 48-49).185    
 
                                                 
184 Comparison of the striking resemblance between Gandhi’s comments on caste and manual 
scavenging and Modi’s commentary on the balmikis and his claim that manual scavenging is a 
‘spiritual experience’, has been made by Bhuyan (2016), Ramaswami (2005, p. 90) as well as Sagar 
(2017). See also Teltumbde (2018, pp. 332-333).  
185 Modi is quoted in Teltumbde (2018, p. 333).  
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In this context, it is unsurprising that the narrative propaganda of Swachh 
Bharat chooses to glorify sanitation workers, rather than condemn the 
continued existence of a dangerous and humiliating occupation. Further still, 
it is unsurprising that Gandhi is placed at the centre of the official discourse of 
cleanliness that underpins Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (Bhuyan, 2016). Of the five 
primary Swachh Bharat Abhiyan objectives what concerns us here is the 
pledge to ‘eliminate manual scavenging’ (2.1.2).186 The substance of the 
guidelines on ‘objective 2.1.2’ proclaim that the identification of all manual 
scavengers in urban areas is to be pursued at state level. Insanitary toilets 
linked to their employment are to be upgraded alongside ‘adequate’ 
rehabilitation of said manual scavengers.187 Yet there is a clear disconnect 
between the literature and leadership on the issue. For instance, quizzed by 
Sagar of The Caravan about the efforts to eradicate manual scavenging within 
the mission, Jagan Shah, Director of the National Institute of Urban Affairs 
simply replied “Aur usko jyada tawajjo nahi diya gaya” (It was not given 
much consideration)’ (Sagar, 2017).188 The professed aim to eradicate manual 
scavenging with the official literature is evidently not matched by the priorities 
of those in charge of the mission.  
 
It is of course correct to say that the construction of sanitary toilets is a key 
factor in the mission to eradicate manual scavenging. Yet as new toilets have 
been constructed they more often than not end up being cleaned by 
‘rehabilitated’ manual scavengers’.189 Despite their construction, many lack 
                                                 
186 Curiously, it should be noted that the elimination of manual scavenging does not feature as a 
mission goal in the Swachh Bharat (gramin) literature.  
187 See Appendix 1, p.10. 
188 As well as the Director of the National Institute of Urban Affairs, Jagan Shah is also a committee 
member of the major administrative body for Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (urban) – the National 
Advisory and Review Committee.   
189 For example, the Sulabh International Social Service Organisation, an NGO that is close to the 
government, has undertaken numerous projects in relation to toilet construction and the 
rehabilitation of manual scavengers. Founded in 1970 by the sociologist Dr Bindeshwar Pathak, 
Sulabh International is the premier organisation working on issues of sanitation and hygiene with 
government support. Sulabh Internationals roll out of Sulabh Suachalayas (‘conveniently available 
toilets’) as a replacement for dry latrines has been lauded as a success, with over six thousand built 
and approximately ten million Indians using them daily. However, the initiative has been criticised on 
the grounds that ‘liberated’ manual scavengers often continue to clean these toilets. The scheme leaves 
the caste-based occupation designation of manual scavengers/sanitation workers intact. 
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running water: a key fact that contributes to a lack of use and abandonment 
(Sagar, 2017). Equally important is investment in solid waste management – a 
component in the Government of India budget allocation which on the whole 
has been significantly lower than anticipated, as well as highly uneven across 
states (Deshpande and Kapur, 2018).190 Taken as a whole, then, what we see is 
that the government has reduced the question of manual scavenging to a 
matter of semantics. As a result, the problem of caste and its connection to 
manual scavenging is largely ignored, as sanitation work is glorified, 
spiritualised and normalised as part of the campaign for a clean India on the 
basis of the Hindu chain of reasoning.    
 
Swachh Bharat thus comprehensively fails to wash out the stain of caste-based 
responsibility for public sanitation from the city’s urban fabric. Instead, 
sanitation workers are rendered the ‘silent heroes’ of Swachh Bharat alongside 
the more prominent ‘public’ heroes including Prime Minister Modi himself.191 
Swachh Bharat does not entail the liberation of Dalits from chief responsibility 
for the sanitation of society. At best, it entails the reconfiguration of manual 
scavenging into the profession of urban sanitation work. The modus operandi 
of which, is that one group of people clean up after the majority for their 
livelihood. We have seen in chapter three that nationalism in 
Bombay/Mumbai has long been invested in the political street. Like other 
nationalist campaigns in the city’s history, through appeal to Hindu common 
sense Swachh Bharat has been enjoined as national duty. The sophistication of 
this manoeuvre in the context of Swachh Bharat is to codify a caste-based 
system of sanitation, cleanliness and public hygiene as a manifestation of 
national duty – all citizens must contribute to the goal of a Swachh Bharat as 
is applicable to their allotted role in the Hindu rashtra.  
 
                                                 
190 See Aggarwal (2019). 
191 In the case of the beach clean-up campaigns there is a dark irony in the attention showered on 
celebrity attendees while BMC sanitation workers silently collect and handle the waste that the 
volunteers have collected into buckets and piles, off camera. 
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The ‘culture of cleanliness’ propagated by Swachh Bharat, then, is mediated 
through the political street. Bodies are disciplined on mass and the ideology of 
Hindutva is crystallised through everyday experiences of consumption and 
waste. Taking a stand against ‘plastic pollution’, recycling and separating 
waste or volunteering for an hour or two at the weekend on Mumbai’s beaches 
is the duty of affluent upper caste Hindus. The duty of Dalit communities is to 
do the work seen as polluting within the Hindu social order. For certain 
communities, this means taking the primary responsibility for the nation’s 
filth. For others, this means putting their litter in the bin. Swachh Bharat 
operates in this way as a means of articulation to mobilise and unify diverse 
populations – across caste distinctions – towards the common cause of a clean 
India. As we have seen, platitudes honouring the work of Safai Karamcharis 
are forthcoming within the communicative matrix of Swachh Bharat. On the 
ground, however, the everyday life of those tasked with cleaning the city 
remains much the same. With this in mind, we turn to the geography of 
Swachh Bharat. 
 
The geography of Swachh Bharat 
 
We have seen that a reconstituted form of manual scavenging remains integral 
to the operation of Mumbai’s sanitation infrastructure in the full view of the 
authorities and at the instruction of the BMC. Yet, contrary to the objectives of 
Swachh Bharat, the rights of sanitation workers have not changed; manual 
scavenging has not been eradicated and the lives of sanitation workers remain 
much the same. During the course of this research, on route to a meeting of 
BMC workers in December 2019, a series of everyday problems faced by 
sanitation workers were pointed out to me by a local sanitary inspector. In 
downtown Mumbai, the density of old colonial-era buildings with newer 
buildings has resulted in a series of tight gullies that have been filled with 
refuse, excreta and waste. Raw sewage runs down the alleys and families of 
rats have taken residence amongst the filth. Yet these passages are expected to 
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be cleaned by hand. Illegal factories set up in residential buildings in the area 
(for example working with gold) throw acid and industrial waste onto the 
streets – sanitation workers have to clean it up.192 The BMC urges greater 
recycling but without the release of extra resources. Within a stone’s throw of 
a BMC sanitation workers office in the area, a wooden shack serves as a 
recycling hub. A man sorts through huge piles of dirty plastic, food, paper and 
waste by hand with no protective equipment. Violations of the 2013 Act 
regularly go unreported, and the concerns of sanitation workers are frequently 
ignored, yet these workers want their voices to be heard. 
 
The attempt to set up a newsletter published by a network of sanitation 
workers and activists in Mumbai corroborates this fact. The sanitation workers 
at the meeting are keen to tell their side of the story and inform others of their 
lives and struggles in the job. By publishing their newsletter, Kaamgaar 
Patrika (Workers Voice), they aim to raise issues that the mainstream 
newspapers and media channels neglect to report. Sanitation workers at the 
BMC wish to highlight the hardship and neglect they face, but more so, they 
wish to tell the stories of their grit and determination to strive for education 
and advancement.193 Yet, curiously, many sanitation workers do not reject the 
caste system and their occupational designation. They want to do the work 
and have imbibed their role. What they do want, is to do their job with the 
proper protection and safety measures in place. While evidently concerned 
with their safety and survival, they embody a radical pragmatism. Perhaps 
above all, for many sanitation workers the chief concern is social acceptance 
and dignity in work.194 They are hurt by the stigma and discrimination they 
face as sanitation workers. In a series of informal interviews, BMC workers 
explained to me that they believe what they do is important – that no one else 
can do it – and above all that they should be respected, not as scavengers, or 
                                                 
192 Field note: 14/12/19. Informal interviews with BMC workers.  
193 See appendix 2: ‘Editorial’, in: Kaamgaar Patrika. Jan 2019 Edition 1. Also see in particular, the 
testimony of Vijay Laxman Talekar pp. 4-5.  
194 Field note: 14/12/19. Informal interviews with BMC workers. See also Dubey and Nigam (2018). 
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“the trash guy”, but as cleaners and members of society that are critical to the 
functioning of the city.195 
 
As mentioned above, not all those doing the work of manual scavenging are 
lucky enough to find employment with the BMC. Informal sub-contracting in 
the city is widespread and highly dangerous. On 23rd December 2019, three 
manual scavengers, Vishwajeet Devnath (32), Santosh Kassekar (45) and 
Govind Sangram Charotiya (34), were hired by the Morya Cooperative 
Housing Society in Govandi, East Mumbai, to clean the complex’s septic tank. 
The three men passed out after descending into the manhole and inhaling 
toxic gases. Police and an ambulance were eventually called. However, the 
three men were pronounced dead on the scene and subsequently taken to 
Rajawadi Hospital for post-mortem. Such is the frequency of deaths in sewer 
lines and septic tanks that in the Mumbai Metropolitan Region (MMR) alone, 
that this incident marked the third instance of sanitation workers being killed 
in the same circumstances since October 2018.196 As the editors of Kaamgaar 
Patrika point out, when sanitation workers die “cleaning sewer lines, septic 
tanks, or sewage plants, the mainstream newspapers report it only once and 
briefly”.197 In the event of accident or death, it is even more rare that cases are 
subject to the full force of the law.  
 
Further still, the legally mandated government compensation earmarked for 
the families of victims of manual scavenging is rarely seen. In the absence of 
the authorities, activists and NGO’s pick up the slack. The aim is to gather 
evidence and connect the dots around what happened as quickly as possible, 
before the evidence is concealed. The process of investigation is difficult and 
convoluted.198 In the case of 23rd December 2019 at Govandi, the general plan 
                                                 
195 Field note: 14/12/19. Informal interviews with BMC workers. 
196 Interview with ‘Pooja’ 29/01/20, Safai Karamchari Andolan. Interview with ‘Antika’ 24.12.19, Safai 
Karamchari Andolan. 
197 Appendix 2 Editorial, p. 2.  
198 This account is based on my experience of accompanying SKA activists to the scene of the 2019 
Govandi death case. When we arrived on the scene, the Housing Society security guard attempted to 
shut everything down. Some angry looking residents hovered around watching over the security 
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of action was to file an accurate FIR against those in the Cooperative Housing 
Society responsible for hiring manual scavengers to clean the septic tanks; 
send the correct fact-finding documentation to relevant authorities; and to 
seek payment for the families of the victims.199 The mission of the activists 
involved, in this instance working with Safai Karamchari Andolan (SKA) is to 
hold the government to account and work with manual scavenging 
communities for social change. In the event, their main concern tends to be to 
sort out the payment for the families. More often than not, victims of manual 
scavenging leave behind a family without steady income that desperately need 
money to survive. As the example of the 2019 Govandi death case shows, 
manual scavenging in the city remains prevalent, while the rehabilitation of 
manual scavengers and adherence to the law remains elusive.  
 
Elite areas of the city from Marine Drive, to Versova beach have seen 
significant improvements in terms of the construction of public toilets, more 
efficient waste management and regular garbage collection. Meanwhile, slum 
areas continue to experience severe neglect. Though well over half the urban 
population reside within them, Mumbai slums do not have regular garbage 
collection, many have access to neither clean water nor adequate toilets. The 
residences of the victims at the Morya Cooperative Housing Society are set 
within dense winding alleyways and gullies. Local children play in dirty 
unsanitary conditions as traffic booms past mere meters away along highly 
polluted main roads. Garbage piles up and there are no toilet blocks in sight. 
                                                 
guard. When pushed, the security guard admitted that it was he that saw a hand down the manhole 
and “called the cops”. This is all the information we are able to glean. When we went to the police 
station – a mere six hundred yards from the scene – the police give a family address of one of the 
victims. When questioned about the 2013 Act, they say they don’t know anything about it. It turns out 
that despite the short distance from the scene, it took the police two hours to arrive at the Housing 
Society. Outside of the police station we finally got some more information and a phone number and 
address for one of the victim’s family from a group of men sitting outside. They are the friends and 
neighbours of one of the victims and are there to try and get his phone, which they say has lots of 
contacts and numbers for his wider family that they need to get in touch with. What is remarkable is 
that SKA is the only party in an official capacity that are interested in investigating the crime.  
199 Regarding the 23rd December 2019 Govandi case, the request was for relevant documentation to be 
sent onto the Chief Minister of Maharashtra; Social Justice Minster (at State and Union level); the 
National Commission for Safi Karamcharis, New Delhi; and National Commission for Safi 
Karamcharis, Maharashtra.  
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Well connected citizens groups that advocate for elite areas combine to get 
things done and have some success in holding the authorities to account, as 
the poor areas of the city continue to struggle. As one of the Govandi victims’ 
close relatives put it, in their neighbourhood, and for their community, 
Swachh Bharat is merely a formality.200 Many of the people that come from 
the areas that Swachh Bharat neglects clean for others in the areas where the 
mission has become a fixture of everyday life. They work in these areas as 
domestic servants and of course, as sanitation workers cleaning up the filth of 
the well-to-do. Simply put, while their residences are immaculate inside, the 
areas in which they live are severely neglected by the authorities.201  
 
As evidenced in the previous section of this chapter (4.2), while the BMC have 
money for beautification projects they fail to purchase the correct protective 
equipment for the sanitation workers they employ. If it is the case that 
everyone is doing their bit, then it is also the case that some are rewarded 
better than others. There is a clear distinction between who benefits from 
Swachh Bharat and who provides the services of Swachh Bharat. Like Gandhi, 
Modi cleans the feet of sanitation workers and the BMC glorifies their 
contribution to society in slick online videos. Meanwhile, manual scavengers 
continue to live in unsanitary conditions, toil and die under the cosh of 
systematic caste-based oppression. Platitudes are forthcoming but there is no 
dignity, no money and no interest from the government in manual scavengers 
and their rehabilitation on the ground. Instead, there is a coordinated political 
strategy for the production of vertical solidarity across caste lines, around the 
notion of an imagined political community of Hindus.  
 
Manual scavenging, then, is both a caste and class issue. The governments 
secular framework of cleanliness is class-based and casteist. The ethos of 
                                                 
200 Field note: 24.12.19. Govandi death case.  
201 Beyond the fact of frequently being very proud, hospitable people, it was pointed out to me that 
extra care to live in hygienic conditions is made, simply because manual scavengers cannot afford to 
become sick, given that they are often the only people bringing money into the household. Field note: 
24.12.19. Govandi death case. 
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Swachh Bharat – that “everyone is doing their bit” – is underpinned by a 
casteist mentality. Most importantly, the attempt to produce a culture of 
cleanliness associated with the mission fits closely with the samrasta 
principles outlined and propagated by the RSS.  In what follows, the final 
section of the chapter considers Swachh Bharat in terms of the colonisation of 
urban public space by the narrative propaganda of Gandhian iconography.  
 
4.4 Gandhian iconography and the colonisation of urban space 
 
The BJP has promoted Swachh Bharat Abhiyan at any opportunity: through 
celebrity endorsements, giant billboards and grand pronouncements. At the 
same time, Modi’s image – alongside that of Mahatma Gandhi – has become 
synonymous with the mission to the extent that it is hard to imagine it without 
him (Sagar, 2017). This final section of the chapter argues that a key means of 
articulation for the objectives of the mission – to crystallise Hindutva ideology 
through a secular framework of cleanliness and sanitation – pivots on the 
colonisation of urban streets and public spaces by Gandhian iconography. 
Pinned on the notion of fulfilling Gandhi’s dream of a clean India, we see that 
in the last instance Swachh Bharat Abhiyan is designed to embed the primacy 
of Hindutva and political supremacy of the RSS-BJP into a popular wide-
ranging and on-going sanitation campaign. The strategic ability to do so rests 
upon the propagation of master themes of discipline, cleanliness and imagined 
Hindu political community in connection to civic culture. The ultimate 
political goal of this strategy is to knit together the samrasta idea that all castes 
are equal, with the figure of Gandhi and narrative of creating a culture of 
cleanliness. The arena from which this strategy is mediated both in and 
through the political street.  
 
It is a telling fact that in launching Swachh Bharat, within the first few months 
of coming to power, Modi chose to allude to the crude and antiquated broom 
as the primary tool of sanitation, as opposed to modern technological 
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advancements such as suction pumps and high-pressure hoses (Sagar, 
2017).202 Further still, by launching the mission from a Dalit residential colony 
he (wittingly or unwittingly) reinforced the idea that the ‘lower orders’ are 
unclean.203 In this regard, the symbolism of the campaign launch confirmed 
the stereotypes associated with sanitation work harboured by dominant caste 
Hindus, as the key aspect of behavioural change that would presumably be 
targeted. Before discussing how diverse populations are mobilised through the 
propaganda of Swachh Bharat/Hindu rashtra, I offer a discussion of how this 
strategic pivot of the mission is furthered through the saturation of the 
political street with Gandhian symbols and signs.  
 
It is practically impossible to move freely about Mumbai without encountering 
the street-level messaging of the mission of Swachh Bharat. Infused with 
Gandhian iconography, the idea of a clean India as ‘Gandhi’s dream’ is 
strongly conveyed. This makes a lot of sense in terms of the branding of the 
project, Gandhi remains widely revered in India and his image and legacy is 
well known and admired internationally. On Gandhi’s own terms, cleanliness 
and sanitation were tightly intertwined with questions of morality and 
individual responsibility. Personal hygiene and public sanitation were seen as 
integral to health. And health, cleanliness, and hygiene, were directly related 
to themes of social order, to the extent that healthy individual bodies were 
seen as necessary for the production of a healthy nation (Tidrick, 2013, p. 
275). Gandhi’s famous (and often repeated) claim that ‘sanitation is more 
important than political freedom’ rested on the idea that self-rule could only 
be achieved through the production of a collective sense of hygiene and 
cleanliness.204 Sanitation was thus a ‘testing ground’ for Indian preparedness 
                                                 
202 Chandra Bhan Prasad, a Dalit activist and advisor to the Dalit Indian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry is quoted in conversation with Sargar (2017) of The Caravan. 
203 Modi officially launched the campaign on 2nd October 2014 by wielding a broom, sweeping the 
ground for the television cameras and journalists alongside Dalit sanitation workers from Valmiki 
colony, New Delhi. From this platform he enjoined Indians to take up brooms, dustpan and dusters in 
order to celebrate a ‘Swachh Bharat’ on the 150-year anniversary of Gandhi’s birthday 2nd October 
2019 (Sagar, 2017).  
204 This refrain has been frequently repeated in relation to Swachh Bharat. See for instance Union 
Minister of State for Housing and Urban Affairs, Hardeep Singh Puri in 2018. See Panaji (2018). 
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to achieve self-rule and the ability of Indians to demonstrate a collective sense 
of morally principled behaviour. As he articulated the importance of the self in 
the context of cleanliness, Gandhi made it clear that transformation of one’s 
self would be the necessary prerequisite for transformation of society and the 
nation (Joshi and Khattri, 2019, p. 213; p. 221).  
 
Critically, Gandhi called on upper caste Hindu’s to take on an element of 
responsibility in cleaning the streets so that cleaning, as a service in itself, 
might be seen in a more dignified light. He argued that the maintenance of 
cleanliness should not be the sole responsibility of “Untouchables”. However, 
while Gandhi attempted to confer dignity to the role of the manual scavenger 
– as discussed in the previous section of the chapter (4.3) – he did little to 
dislodge the continued existence of the practice, while strengthening the social 
relations of Hindu order that render one section of society as ‘Untouchable’ at 
the same time. The ‘unclean public domain’ remains, ‘primarily because there 
has been an inadequate response to the issue of untouchability’ (Rodrigues, 
2004, p. 119). 
 
Gandhi’s personal position on matters of cleanliness, then, was strongly 
moralistic as he cast himself in the role of paterfamilias of the nation. Simply 
put, the moralism of cleanliness was about mass mobilisation towards self-
rule (Joshi and Khattri, 2019). Accordingly, Gandhian iconography in the 
messaging of Swachh Bharat serves a purpose: to bring people together to 
forge a collective sense of cleanliness around the maxim of a disciplined moral 
(and indeed imagined national) community. The arena is the political street. 
For instance, the well-designed logo of the mission emblazoned with Gandhi’s 
spectacles joined together by the Indian tricolour flag, serves as a reminder 
that Swachh Bharat is backed by the moral authority of ‘the Mahatma’ and 
thus enjoins Indian citizens as a matter of patriotic duty. By connecting 
Swachh Bharat to the wisdom of Gandhi, the project and its stated objectives 
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are explicitly endorsed and legitimated by India’s premier postcolonial icon 












Figure 10: Swachh Bharat logo draped with BJP Flag at a busy junction near Dadar 
rail station (photograph by the author) 
 
In this context, Gandhi’s association with the Congress has hitherto been 
problematic for the BJP.205 In this regard, the launch of Swachh Bharat 
Abhiyan on the 150th anniversary of Gandhi’s birth represents a coordinated 
attempt to vie for his legacy and co-opt his image: Swachh Bharat is explicitly 
billed by Modi and the BJP as a ‘tribute to Mahatma Gandhi on his 150th 
birthday’ (see Joshua, 2014). Gandhi’s image is loaded with the symbolism of 
the nation; his austere loincloth (dhoti) identifies him with the impoverished 
masses and his famous spectacles are symbolic of his allegedly ‘moral’ and 
‘ethical’ vision of freedom. Use of Gandhi’s spectacles as the primary 
iconography of Swachh Bharat allows the BJP to make a claim to speak for the 
nation as a whole, while at the same time, reminding Indians that they are 
‘being watched’ (see Doron and Jeffery, 2018, p. 9; Jeffery, 2015, pp. 816-817). 
The deployment of Gandhian iconography captures the symbolic power of a 
man seen by many Indians as a great, internationally revered Hindu leader 
                                                 
205 Not least, as we see in the next section, owing to the fact that Gandhi’s assassin, Nathuram Godse 
was a member of the RSS (Jha, 2020). 
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and ‘father of the nation’. It also sets him up as a figure to which Modi can be 
compared. 
 
Through skilful use of Gandhian iconography, then, Swachh Bharat Abhiyan 
propagates a powerful vision of the nation. This primary iconography 
saturates the political street. It is visible in murals and assorted signage, 
strategically placed amidst an urban landscape of pavements and street 
corners teeming with activity. The social space of the street – the public 
domain at its most concrete – is a terrain of interaction, deliberation and 
contention. It is also the primary arena through which Hindu social order – 
and by extension the Hindu rashtra – is reproduced. At the level of discourse 
and symbolism in urban space, the reproduction of Gandhian iconography 
supports a vision of cleanliness within the public sphere that is fully consonant 
with the rules and norms of caste society. Gandhian ideas of cleanliness are 
attached to the health of the individual body and under the aegis of Swachh 
Bharat, they are extended into the political street.  
 
A particular case in point is Mumbai’s sprawling local rail network. With an 
estimated eight million people passing through it every day, the Mumbai 
‘local’ is the best and cheapest way to travel distance in the city, the average 
journey price being just RS 10 (20p). From open till close, wave after wave of 
human kinetic energy ebbs and flows through the platforms according to 
timetable. Carriages seemingly come and go on loop. The stations, platforms, 
concourses and trains of the Mumbai railways combine as nodes in a network, 
where the hustle and jostle of the streets is intensified and speeded up. The 
railways connect the city and unify its otherwise disparate parts. Dense with 
people in search of livelihood – like the streets themselves – the railways 
‘serve as a medium through which strangers or casual passers-by are able to 
establish latent communication with one another by recognising their mutual 
interests and shared sentiments’ (Bayat, 2010, p. 12). A space of individuation 
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and flow, competition and contemplative reflection blend into a paradoxical 
spatio-temporal rhythm.  
 
Rail is the locus of Mumbai’s transportation network and a place where the 
atomised individuals that constitute the city merge together – walking, 
working, sitting, loitering and watching. Large swathes of the marginalised 
and dispossessed, forced to live out their lives in urban public space and 
operate out in the open in search of subsistence and livelihood, experience the 
street as both primary arena of collective expression and the terrain of 
everyday life –neoliberal Mumbai is in this regard ‘the city inside-out’ (Bayat, 
2010, p. 12). Though not the street itself, the rail network forms the city’s 
connective tissue and the symbolism of Gandhi, configured into the messaging 
of Swachh Bharat, is invariably posted in every connecting space of the 
network (see figure 11). As a result, the iconography of an urbanised Gandhian 
spirituality, is presented as common sense to a wide cross section of 
Mumbaikars, as they go about their daily lives, and move in and out of the 





Figure 11: “It doesn’t require money to be neat, clean and dignified” – Swachh 
Bharat Abhiyan poster featuring the wisdom and iconography of Gandhi. “No 
spiting!” – Mural opposite the railway platform at marine lines station, South 
Mumbai. “Cleanliness is the only medicine to all diseases” – sign at the main 
concourse where the Central Railway connects with the Western line at Dadar 
Rail Station. Central Mumbai (photographs by the author). 
 
Gandhian motifs, then, delineate the narrative of Swachh Bharat and open up 
the prospect of embedding and inculcating ideas of cleanliness, sanitation and 
bodily hygiene in urban space. Cleanliness, discipline and moral community 
become ‘national’ values, of which Hindutva is positioned as the supreme 
expression. Placed in this context, the message that ‘everyone is doing their 
bit’ appeals to discourses of bourgeois environmentalism and the praxis of 
Hindu social order simultaneously. Regarded from the point of view that some 
are better rewarded than others for keeping India clean, the iconography of 
Gandhi assembles together different modes of sociality and powerfully embeds 
them within the political logics of Hindutva. The fundamental mission of 
Swachh Bharat is therefore to construct what Gramsci called ‘a secular sense 
of unity of faith,’ between ‘a conception of the world and corresponding norm 
of conduct’ (Gramsci, 1971, p. 326).  
 
In Swachh Bharat, we see that a Hindu conception of the world underpinned 
by Hindutva values and norms of conduct, is reproduced towards the 
maintenance of sanitation and cleanliness in support of the goal of a ‘clean 
India’. In other words, through Swachh Bharat, Hindutva is reproduced in the 
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political street within a secular framework of cleanliness that piggybacks on 
the desires of Mumbaikars for a clean city, and workable solutions to the 
catastrophic pollution of urban society they are faced with. As we will see, in 
this context Hindu bodies are disciplined at the same time as bourgeois 
sensibilities and reconstituted practices of manual scavenging are folded into a 
political strategy of spatial purification. The strategy as a whole can be seen in 
the motif that ‘cleanliness is next to godliness’. 
 
Cleanliness is next to godliness 
 
The notion that ‘cleanliness is next to godliness’ can be attributed to Gandhi’s 
famous claim that ‘we can no more gain god’s blessings with an unclean body 
than with an unclean mind. A clean body cannot reside in an unclean city’ 
(Gandhi, 1925, p. 399). On this note, it is worth pointing out that alongside 
Gandhi’s personal piety and somatic concerns were a set of extreme 
eccentricities (Anderson, 2013; Tidrick, 2013).206 For instance, a peculiar 
admixture of interests in self-control, celibacy and dietetics were very much 
part of his theory of national becoming. Gandhi’s ideas about cleanliness were 
no different. His Hinduism was blended with Occultist and Enlightenment 
themes in a powerful way. The degree to which Swachh Bharat develops the 
idea that ‘cleanliness is next to godliness’ and marries it with the idea of a 
‘science of sanitation’, is evident in one of the most popular official campaign 
videos of the mission.  
 
                                                 
206 The picture is in fact more complicated than Gandhi let on. Honed during his student days in late-
Victorian London through interaction with a range of Theosophists, occultists, vegetarians and 
spiritualists, Gandhi’s Hinduism was rediscovered and reconfigured in light of these formative sources 
(Tidrick, 2013). During his time in London Gandhi met and became friends with many prominent 
Theosophists of the day such as Blavatsky, Henry Steel Olcott and Annie Besant, figures that would 
prove to be lasting influences on his thought. He met Blavatsky in 1889, following her move from 
India to London and it was at this time that he became exposed to a ‘sacralised’ idea of politics 
propagated by the Theosophists ‘which combined social reform with personal spiritual growth’ 
(Tidrick, 2013, p. 20). Furthermore, it was at this moment of his life that he first encountered his 
beloved Bhagavadgītā, in the form of Edwin Arnold’s English translation, The Song Celestial. 
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Exploiting popular attraction to the frenetic world of Indian celebrity, the 
2016 ‘public service’ advert ‘Don’t Let Her Go’, staring Bollywood megastars 
Kangana Ranaut and Amitabh Bachchan was an instant viral hit.207 The plot of 
the ninety second clip shows various (Hindu) Indians, from householders to 
shopkeepers, on the one hand praying to Lakshmi, the goddess of wealth and 
prosperity and on the other, dumping their rubbish into the street. As acts of 
littering are committed, each individual character is shocked to see that the 
portraits of Lakshmi they have been praying to disappear.208 The clip 
concludes to reveal Kangana Ranaut dressed as a modern and glamourous 
avatar of Lakshmi, whisked away on the back of a motorbike, lotus flower and 
pot of gold in her hand (see figure 12). In the closing seconds of the video, the 
iconic voice of Amitabh Bachchan reminds the viewer that ‘cleanliness is next 
to godliness’. By taking a pledge, Bachchan claims that “we [can] all come 
together to make India a dream country; a clean country”.  In turn, “as an 
Indian”, Kangana Ranaut pledges to “keep [her] country clean”. The 
government, she claims, are doing their bit through the Swachh Bharat 
Abhiyan. She thanks the Prime Minister and calls on others to follow suit.  
 
                                                 
207 The advert also features a range of other popular Bollywood actors such as Isha Koppikar, Ravi 
Kishan & Omkar Kapoor. 
208 In Hindu mythology early notions of shree (‘that which is splendid) and Lakshmi (good fortune) 
that appear in the Vedas later coalesce in the Epics into the goddess Lakshmi. Lakshmi emerges in the 
Ramayana, as a figure of radiant beauty, sitting on a lotus flower from Vishnu’s churning of the ocean 
of milk – a foundational act in the creation of the universe. A prominent and popular Hindu goddess, 
Lakshmi brings wealth, good fortune and prosperity. But she is said to be ‘fickle’, she and the blessings 
she brings will leave anyone that is unjust and do not deserve her presence. In contemporary times, 
Lakshimi holds an important place within a variety of Hindu traditions across the subcontinent and 
Lakshimi puja (prayers) is offered as a part of Diwali celebrations. The idea in this context, is that if 
one does not keep a sound practice of household conduct, Lakshmi and the good fortune she brings 
will desert them. See the excellent episode on the popular BBC Radio 4 podcast In Our Time. 
‘Lakshmi’, In Our Time, 6 October 2016, 
https://open.spotify.com/episode/292Umfv3sTh8YgKYhY1O02?si=0KEbVqF_R1q_BhTNk86z2w, 




Figure 12: “#dontlethergo” Kangana Ranaut’s sexy and glamorous Lakshmi, 
the goddess of wealth and prosperity, turned Swachh Bharat ambassador.  
 
This popular video is emblematic of the politics of Swachh Bharat for two 
reasons. First of all, in the form of Kangana Ranaut’s Lakshmi, the message of 
‘Don’t Let Her Go’ – and thus, Swachh Bharat – connects cleanliness to wealth 
and prosperity of the individual, and in the last instance, to the prosperity of 
the nation, feeding into a sense of imagined political community. Second, at 
the same time, celebrity culture is harnessed to project consumption-based 
lifestyle choices as the life blood of modern India. At first glance, Don’t Let 
Her Go appears to neatly capture the deployment of Hindu norms and values 
towards the goals of Swachh Bharat. Closer reflection reveals the pivotal role 
of Swachh Bharat in the reproduction of Hindu social order.  
 
As the well-known motif of Lakshmi’s role in the domestic sphere – that if one 
cleans their house they will be rewarded with wealth and prosperity – is 
shifted to the urban sphere, the Hindutva view of the world and its 
corresponding notion of caste Hindu based social order is articulated with 
reference to the political street. Don’t Let Her Go therefore connects a secular 
framework of cleanliness via the Hindu chain of reasoning to urban 
aspirations and ideas of prosperity and wealth. The implicit suggestion is that 
all space is sacred, and wealth and prosperity will be awarded to those that 
seek to keep it clean and pure. Through the political street, urban aspirations 
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in the neoliberal city are connected with the vision of the nation propagated by 
Hindutva. Clean urban public space is connected to wealth and prosperity. At 
the same time, a vision of prosperity is forwarded and underpinned with 
reference to the common sense of the Hindu chain of reasoning.  
 
In the age of social media, the video has been shared millions of times and the 
hashtag #dontlethergo went viral. As Joseph Alter (1996, p. 314) has pointed 
out, Gandhi’s self-orientated ‘bio-morality’ of health was such that the nation 
was to be ‘reimagined one patient at a time’. The body was accordingly 
construed as the primary social unit of the nation:  
 
‘the various functions in the human body have their 
parallel in the corporate life of society. What I have 
said about the inner and outer cleanliness of the 
individual, therefore, applies to the whole society.’209 
 
For Gandhi the body was the primary site for practices of cleanliness. In the 
context of Swachh Bharat, a framework of cleanliness developed with 
reference to Gandhi’s teachings and his critique of unhygienic practices is 
extended in an attempt to generate a sense of imagined (Hindu) political 
community. On the ground, the propaganda of Swachh Bharat – the language 
of bodily discipline, cleanliness and purity associated with Gandhian discourse 
– connects seamlessly with the grammar of Hindutva and the RSS strategy for 
a unitary Hindu India.  
 
Yet, curiously, while Gandhi’s writings on cleanliness are fully compatible with 
the Hindu chain of reasoning, he was an enemy of the RSS and is ultimately 
despised by the RSS hardcore.210 Promotion of Gandhi’s ideas of cleanliness 
                                                 
209 Vivekananda is quoted in Alter, (1996, p. 315). 
210 Gandhi was killed by RSS member Nathuram Godse. Though the RSS has claimed that Godse left 
the organisation in the 1930s, records prove that this was not the case and he remained an active 
member at the time of Gandhi’s assassination (Jha, 2020). There have been several attempts to 
rehabilitate the image of Godse as a patriot (see Noorani, 2013). For instance, as recently as 
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and his image as the figurehead of a clean India is in this regard a shrewd 
move that allows the RSS to annihilate the elements of his legacy that they 
oppose. For example, his ideas on tolerance, harmony and protection of 
religious minorities – as opposed to open Hindu supremacy – are 
conveniently shifted into the background. As Gandhi becomes tightly 
combined with a Hindutva-friendly concept of sanitation and cleanliness, it 
becomes more difficult for the opposition to rehabilitate his other ideas and 
mobilise the image of the ‘father of the nation’ for alternative political ends in 
the future. The long-held near-exclusive association of Gandhi with the 
Congress is effectively challenged. 
 
The standard party line trotted out by the BJP is that Swachh Bharat is “a 
people’s movement”. Like “Gandiji” led India to Independence, it is argued 
that “Modiji” has launched a popular movement to lead India to cleanliness. 
This is lauded as a great achievement. Recalling the epigram to this chapter, it 
is worth quoting the claim of BJP Union Minster for Defence, Rajnath Singh: 
 
“Mahatma Gandhi had launched a campaign for the 
independence of the country, which we know as 
‘Satyagraha’ movement. Now Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi has launched a campaign of 
‘Swachhta’, which is known as ‘Swachagarh’ and its 
success is being seen across the country”.211 
 
The politics of Hindutva are accordingly reproduced through Swachh Bharat 
as Modi is placed as guide and leader of a popular people’s movement. Yet, 
India and its cities, even to the casual observer, remain notably unclean. I have 
argued in this chapter that the reason that Mumbai is so notably unclean lies 
                                                 
November 2019, the controversial BJP MP Pragya Thakur referred to Godse as a “Deshbhakt” 
(‘patriot’) in parliament after having previously done so on the 2019 election trail.  
211 See ‘Swachh Bharat Abhiyan has become people’s movement, says Rajnath’, The Hindu, 8 
December, 2019, https://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Delhi/swachh-bharat-abhiyan-has-
become-peoples-movement-says-rajnath/article30234087.ece, last accessed 12 May 2020. 
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on the one hand, in the failure of the state to provide adequate sanitation 
infrastructure and on the other, on the caste-based persistence of reliance on 
the manual labour of Dalits and the lower-castes to clean the city for everyone 
else. If the BJP’s visions of Swachh Bharat is taken seriously, it must be 
accepted that it is the ultimate responsibility of the Dalit manual scavenger to 
maintain cleanliness and clean up waste and filth in the civic realm 
(Teltumbde, 2018, pp. 320-321). What we see is that Swachh Bharat 
reconfigures caste-based social relations in order to reinforce them and does 
so from a position of moral and political leadership. The cleverness of the 
propaganda of Swachh Bharat has been to easily slot this discourse together 
with the desires of Mumbaikars for the beautification of the city and better 
management of urban space.  
 
We have seen in the first section of this chapter (4.2) that citizens movements 
place cleanliness and hygiene in a particular urban context, where waste and 
material debris are categorised as problems of individual responsibility to be 
solved by collective litter picking the city’s beaches and beauty spots. 
Meanwhile, there is little to no recognition in the propaganda of Swachh 
Bharat of the issue of caste hierarchy driving the reproduction of filth in the 
city. The objective to eliminate manual scavenging set out in the literature of 
Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (urban) has not been taken seriously (4.3). In this 
context, the exploitation of labouring Dalits is invisibilised within the praxis of 
Swachh Bharat. This final section of the chapter (4.4) has shown that as 
Gandhi is set up as a ‘meme’ for the nation that means all things to all people, 
Swachh Bharat doubles up as a Hindutva-friendly ‘means of articulation’ to 
mobilise diverse populations. Meanwhile, through the colonisation of urban 
space, Gandhi’s image and legacy are appropriated by the Sangh to the 





This chapter has argued that the primary motivations of Swachh Bharat are 
twofold: the better management of urban space and reinforcement of Hindu 
social order. Through the praxis of Swachh Bharat, the motif that cleanliness 
is next to godliness connects the Hindu chain of reasoning to a secular 
framework of cleanliness that is mediated through the political street. By way 
of a discussion of the beach clean-up movement in Mumbai, it was argued that 
the praxis of Swachh Bharat connects with popular bourgeois 
environmentalist practices, wants, needs and desires for a beautified city. At 
the same time, Swachh Bharat disseminates the samrasta narrative that 
everyone is doing their bit. Here manual scavenging is not seen as a problem 
to be solved. Instead, sanitation workers are ultimately treated as a resource to 
be exploited – beyond superficial appraisal, Swachh Bharat Abhiyan has failed 
to change their status. Further still, it was shown that the geography of 
Swachh Bharat is highly uneven. Despite the lauded successes of the mission, 
Mumbai remains a city where elite areas have become relatively clean and are 
increasingly connected to sanitation infrastructures, while slum areas 
continue to experience severe neglect at the hands of the state.  
 
The BMC spends money on beautification projects but has no money – or 
rather, political will – to improve the conditions of BMC workers. Meanwhile, 
sanitation workers that come from the outer limits and slum areas of the city – 
employed both formally and informally– are employed to clean the filth of 
those that reside in up-market areas. Informally contracted labourers that are 
employed to manually clean toilets and/or sewers and septic tanks, while 
doing the work of manual scavengers, are not considered as such by the 
authorities or within the official literature. Instead of a coordinated attempt to 
eliminate manual scavenging, the government pushes a narrative that glorifies 
the work of sanitation workers. At the same time, it fails to condemn the 
humiliating and dangerous working practices that shape their everyday lives. 
While there has been considerable investment in toilet and construction and 
solid waste management, these efforts have been stunted by the casteist 
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nature of Swachh Bharat (see Coffey and Spears, 2017; Doron and Jeffery, 
2018). Instead, the energies of the BJP have focused on the mass production 
of narrative propaganda towards the performance of the Hindu nation in the 
street.  
 
The final section of the chapter fleshed out what I take to be the major 
objective powering Swachh Bharat Abhiyan: mass communication, political 
messaging and the Gandhian branding of the mission. Here it was argued that 
ultimately, the terrain of Swachh Bharat is the political street. The political 
ideology of Hindutva becomes crystallised in and through urban public space 
as bourgeois environmentalism and Dalit sacrifice are metabolised into a 
Gandhian narrative of cleanliness and community participation. 
Consequently, Swachh Bharat reveals a coordinated political strategy that 
offers a (fictional) path to a ‘clean India’ modelled on harmony between castes. 
In the last instance, then, the mission is more about political mobilisation 
towards the production of imagined political community, than it is about 
‘development’ and sanitation. Swachh Bharat Abhiyan draws energy from the 
catastrophic pollution of urban society and offers its regeneration through 
spatial purification. By piggy backing on the overwhelming desires of 
Mumbaikars for a clean city, the mission serves as a means of articulation for 
the crystallisation of Hindutva. The links between consumption-based lifestyle 
choices, caste hierarchy and Hindutva in neoliberal Mumbai are therefore 
complex but real. In the next chapter, I locate the politics of Hindutva and 








International Day of Yoga: the street politics of spectacle 
 
‘By self-development with the help of yoga 
each morning, we will be dedicated to the 
progress and prosperity of the nation the 
entire day.’  
- Baba Ramdev (2009)212  
 
‘Up, India, and conquer the world with your 
spirituality. Spirituality must conquer the West.’  
- Swami Vivekananda, (1960 [1897])213 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Inauguration of the United Nations International Day of Yoga has been 
presented by the BJP as legitimate proof that India is the historical and 
spiritual home of yoga. In a short space of time, yoga has been transformed 
from an obscure practice to a multibillion-dollar industry. As yoga has become 
a valuable global commodity, studios do business in practically every major 
city and town on the planet (see Thurston and Bloyce, 2020). In a world 
seemingly devoid of meaning, there appears to be an increasing desire for 
ancient wisdom and knowledge of authentic pasts. An integrated practice of 
wellness and wellbeing, yoga postures (āsana) and breathing (prānāyāma) 
have become fully integrated into the ‘matrix of 21st century self-care and 
globalised fitness branding and marketing’ (Alter, 2004, p. 73). Yet, despite 
yoga’s global reach within this matrix, India remains the global centre for 
teacher training and yoga tourism. In this context, the global popularity of 
yoga has become a source of great pride for many Indians.  
 
Pride in yoga dovetails with Indian desires to gain recognition and respect 
from the world at large, especially the Anglosphere. On the back of the global 
                                                 
212 Ramdev is quoted in Sarbacker (2014, p. 362) 
213 Vivekananda is quoted in Thomas Blom Hansen (1999, p. 69). 
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commodification of yoga, the BJP is keen to make use of the potential of yoga 
as an instrument of Indian soft power on the world stage. According to 
Narendra Modi, yoga is India’s gift to the world. It “is not just about exercise 
[but] is a way to discover oneness with yourself, the world and nature.”214 In 
India and around the world, the International Day of Yoga has emerged as an 
annual mass gathering of choreographed bodies, breathing and moving in 
concert in urban public space. 
 
In this chapter I build on the argument of chapter four to claim that in the 
same way as Swachh Bharat, what the BJP are doing with the promotion of 
yoga, is generating a sense of Hindu nationalism via the production of 
imagined community. The idea of ‘Eastern’ Indian spirituality in opposition to 
the materialism of ‘the West’ is employed to demarcate difference through 
spectacle and mobilise the diverse population of India in the face of neoliberal 
globalisation.215 Yoga, according to the Sangh, is a pertinent vehicle to achieve 
this aim. Through the International Day of Yoga as mass street level spectacle, 
Hindutva forces promote yoga practice to fire up nostalgia for an imagined 
glorious past and thorough the mobilisation of ‘yoga bodies’ in the political 
street, reinforce Hindutva values as universal and supreme, at the same time 
situating India ‘in the world’. I claim that the International Day of Yoga in the 
political street represents a colonisation of urban public space by Hindutva. As 
the nation is performed in the street, Hinduism is framed as a world-dynamic 
force and the ‘yogic way of life’ is positioned as a passage to the restoration of 
Hindu national pride. 
 
The political strategy towards this end is to connect contemporary desires for 
self-care with the production of a patriotic Hindutva ethos around the 
achievements and benefits of yoga as an indigenous system of health and 
wellness. By according a prominent place to the ‘yogic body’ in its philosophy 
                                                 
214 For Modi’s speech to the United Nations see United Nations. 2020. International Day of Yoga 21 
June, UN.org, https://www.un.org/en/observances/yoga-day, last accessed 1 October 2020.  
215 See for example, Longkumer (2018) on the promotion of yoga by Baba Ramdev in Nagaland. 
 199 
of action, the International Day of Yoga has been modelled to generate a sense 
of imagined political community in celebration of the Hindu rashtra. I make 
these claims in relation to the increasingly standardised, nationalistic yoga of 
Hindutva (5.2). Building on this argument, in the next section of the chapter 
(5.3), I discuss the 2019 International Day of Yoga in Mumbai and the 
promotion of yoga by Narendra Modi with special reference to digital media 
strategy. Finally, I move on to discuss the concept of Hinduism as a ‘world-
dynamic’ force and its role in the production of an imagined community of 
Hindus in relation to the International Day of Yoga (5.4).  
 
5.2 Hindutva and the standardisation of yoga 
 
Derived from the Sanskrit root word ‘yuj’, yoga combines the notions to ‘yoke’ 
and ‘union’ to refer to the practice of ‘aiming towards an extraordinary state of 
consciousness, usually defined as the ultimate union with the divine’ (Godrej, 
2016, p. 774). The foundational text of classical yoga philosophy, the Yoga 
Sutras of Patañjali was compiled somewhere between the first century BCE 
and fourth century CE. The Sutras are grounded in sāmkhya philosophy, a 
materialist and decidedly non-theistic school of thought, that regards the 
universe as consisting of dual elements of prakriti (matter) and purusha 
(consciousness).216 The idea of God and concept of higher power came much 
later. Theism was introduced into yoga philosophy through the Srimad 
Bhagwad Gita (assembled between the forth and second century BCE) in the 
form of the Vedānta school of ‘Hindu’ philosophy (Bartley, 2019). The 
contemporary popular model of yoga that places a religiously inspired vision 
of God at the centre, comes from this point of inflection, albeit drawing heavily 
from the ‘neo-Vedanta’ of Swami Vivekananda (Johar, 2015).217 From this 
lineage, the problematic claim of yoga as ‘Hindu’ arises.  
                                                 
216 See ‘LG35 – Karen O’Brien-Kop -Purusha and Prakriti’, Lonely Guru Podcast, 20 November 2016, 
http://www.trueryan.com/lonelyguru/, last accessed 24 May 2020.  
217 The late-colonial association of yoga with Hinduism is tied to the formation of modern Vedānta 
philosophy and the formation of the Brahmo Samaj in Bengal, 1828. In this context it is important to 
note that the nexus of Hinduism and yoga was mediated through the colonial encounter. With the real 
 200 
In what follows, I take a contrary position and argue that yoga has never 
existed as a ‘fixed primordial entity’ and neither is it representative of a 
pristine Vedic lineage (Alter, 2004, p. 4). Rooted in late-colonial themes, its 
‘origins’ are highly syncretic and eclectic in form.218 The contemporary 
politicisation of yoga is rooted in the late-colonial history of Indian 
nationalism, eugenics and race as opposed to some form of pristine cultural 
tradition of Vedic Hinduism, as is claimed by Hindutva ideologues. This 
section of the chapter unfolds in two parts. First, I focus on the 
standardisation of yoga around Hindutva values at the all-India level of the 
Indian Yoga Association (IYA) and second, I discuss the nexus of Hindutva, 
yoga and its standardisation, with special reference to The Yoga Institute at 
Santa Cruz in Mumbai, a famous yoga school with close relations to the Sangh 
Parivar.  
 
Founded by the renowned yoga guru B.K.S Iyengar in 1980, the IYA is a self-
regulating body and presents itself as India’s leading yoga association. Core 
functions of the association include the provision of facilities for research into 
yoga, organisation of seminars and conferences, granting of accreditation to 
                                                 
technological and perceived cultural superiority of the British colonisers – and Christian missions in 
the region – a deep sense of disillusionment developed within elite intellectual circles of the Bengali 
Brahmin community. The presence of Christianity pushed the community to engage in a period of 
prolonged soul searching, regarding the nature and form of their own religious doctrine and practice. 
Reflecting on the culture of the missionaries in their midst, Christianity was identified as universally 
open to all genders, cultures and people of all social status. Hinduism was, on the contrary, 
fragmented and racked with divisions. The Hindu caste system allowed only those of the twice born 
varnas to participate in the orthodox Vedic religion. Further still, the Brahmin community lamented 
that while missionaries were able to draw on the New Testament to propagate their message in neatly 
bound copies, the vast literature of the Vedas could not be distilled into one easily reproducible book. 
In response, a series of reforms were suggested. For instance, the extraction of the Bhagavadgītā 
from the Mahābhārata to mirror the use of the New Testament by Christian missionaries (Bartley, 
2019, p. 2). Alongside the production of a reformist ‘monotheistic’ Hinduism, the Brahmo Samaj 
sought to set the philosophy of yoga as a cornerstone of Indian ‘national’ culture. And so, the Brahmo 
Samaj brought a universal vision of God into view within a reformed Hinduism. Most critically, the 
Brahmo Samaj introduced the belief in and worship of brahman – ‘the Eternal Unsearchable and 
Immutable Being who is the author and preserver of the universe’ (Bartley, 2019, p. 5). The bond 
between Hinduism and yoga was carried forth to the masses especially through the work of the 
Brahmo Samaj’s most famous son, Swami Vivekananda – the primary figure responsible for casting 
yoga as the inner kernel of Indian (read: Hindu) spirituality (Van der Veer, 2001, p. 73).  
218 While certainly ‘culturally South Asian’ the story of the late-nineteenth century ‘yoga renaissance’ is 
intimately connected to the global political currents of the late-colonial era in British India (Jain, 
2015, p. 18). The colonial-modern revival of interest in yoga ‘was born of symbiotic relations between 
modern Vedāntic philosophy, Western occultism, the politics of nationalism, and, in the case of 
modern postural yoga, systems of modern physical culture’ (De Michelis, 2008, p. 20). 
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institutions and facilitation of yoga classes and teacher training. At the centre 
of the IYA’s operational remit is the oversight of yoga teacher training and 
instruction in line with the Yoga Certification Board (YCB) and ‘Voluntary 
Certification of Yoga Professionals’ launched by the Ministry of AYUSH in 
2016.219 Since the rise of Narendra Modi and following his championing of the 
‘yogic way of life’, the IYA has been somewhat rejuvenated. According to the 
Association’s website the driving force of the IYA’s mission is “acceptance of 
responsibility” in relation to Modi’s call to spread the message of yoga. The 
stated aim of the association is to make “the vision of the Hon’ble Prime 
Minister into a reality.”220 
 
Hindutva’s offensive into the world of yoga connects the political domain to 
the institutionalisation of yoga practice. The IYA has a role in policy making: 
many of its most prominent members sit on government committees that 
concern themselves with the promotion and development of yoga. At first 
glance, the association appears diverse in terms of membership and 
representation. For example, a number of different linages of yoga are 
represented in the makeup of the IYA board membership, from the tradition 
of yoga for ‘householders’ represented by Senior Vice President Hansaji 
Yogendra, Director of The Yoga Institute in Mumbai, to the yoga philosophy of 
Governing Council member Gurudev Sri Sri Ravi Shankarji, founder of the 
‘Art of Living Foundation’, a self-described NGO offering stress alleviation and 
self-development programs based on yogic principles. Unsurprisingly, in this 
context, the primary objective of the IYA is listed as “maintaining and 
promoting the different Indian Yoga traditions”.221 Yet, this claim is 
immediately undermined by the high degree of political influence exercised 
                                                 
219 The YCB is functionally autonomous and operates under the aegis of the Morarji Desai National 
Institute of Yoga based in New Delhi. The National Institute acts as the coordinating agency for 
research, development and promotion of yoga in India. 
220 See: ‘About us’, yogaiya.in, http://www.yogaiya.in/iya/about-us, last accessed 12 May 2020.   
221 See: ‘About- Indian Yoga Association’, yogaiya.in, http://www.yogaiya.in/about/ , last accessed 12 
May 2020.    
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across the two levels of oversight. The political cohesion that connects the 
heads of the Executive Council and Governing Council is striking.  
 
The current President of the Executive Council is Dr H.R Nagendra, who took 
over in early 2018 from Secretary General of Kaivalyadhama Yoga Institute, 
Shri O.P Tiwari ji. Nagendra’s yoga career officially began in 1975, when he 
joined the RSS-founded Vivekananda Kendra as a full-time worker and yoga 
educator.222 The Vivekananda Kendra was founded in 1973 when RSS worker 
Eknath Ranade was personally selected by then RSS head, M.S ‘Guruji’ 
Golwalkar, to organise and coordinate the centenary celebrations of Swami 
Vivekananda’s birth (Beckerlegge, 2014, p. 329). Vivekananda Kendra is a self-
described “spiritually orientated service mission” influenced by the praxis of 
Swami Vivekananda and the Ramakrishna Math and Mission, but also by the 
organisational strategies and politics of the RSS. The focus of their activities is 
the promotion of the ‘yoga way of life’. As Dr Nagendra moved up through the 
organisation, he became involved in devising yoga education and yoga therapy 
training for the Kendra’s cadre. Through this cadre, the Kendra’s yoga 
outreach program is disseminated at the community level, through social work 
based out of its various branches, and through various yoga camps, festivals 
and health drives (Beckerlegge, 2014, pp. 338-339). Though still closely 
associated with the Kendra, Nagendra now serves as president of the Swami 
Vivekananda Yoga Anusandhana Samsthana (SVYAS) in Bengaluru and as 
Chancellor of SVYAS Yoga University. Nagendra is one of the most preeminent 
promoters and gurus of yoga within RSS circles.  
 
He is most famous, however, for his role as personal yoga guru to Narendra 
Modi, and as a leading figure in the push for establishing an International Day 
of Yoga. The Prime Minister has long claimed to be inspired by Swami 
Vivekananda’s blend of Hindu spiritualism and national resurgence, at one 
                                                 
222 Nagendra is a former mechanical engineer that worked for NASA and Harvard University in the 
United States.  
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point (unsuccessfully) applying to become a monk in the Ramakrishna 
Mission (see Dasgupta, 2019).223 In an article published in the RSS newspaper 
Organiser, Nagendra reveals that he has been working with Modi since 1987. 
He points out that the government’s setting up of the YCB aims to bring 
uniformity to yoga courses both in India and globally. He further claims that 
both the International Day of Yoga and ‘the protocol’ will ‘bring the right 
direction’ to the trend in the West of promoting yoga āsana practice in 
separation from ‘yogic principles’. He laments that the separation of yoga from 
its Hindu/Vedic origins ‘is like disconnecting [a] tree from its roots, and 
emphatically states that ‘yoga is a revolution in the making to bring health, 
harmony, peace, etc. across the globe’.224 Modi’s trust in Nagendra and the 
new-found prominence of the IYA and its mission shows in the leading role 
the Association played in coordinating and designing the ‘ideal module’ for the 
inaugural International Day of Yoga celebrations in 2015 (see figure 13).225 
 
 
Figure 13: The inaugural International Day of Yoga celebrations, 21st June 2015, New 
Delhi. On Narendra Modi’s left sits Dr Nagendra. To Modi’s far right is Hansaji 
Yogendra next to Baba Ramdev in saffron robes. In the last instance, the format and 
                                                 
223 In the end, Modi was rejected and continued his career in the RSS before being parachuted into the 
upper echelons of the BJP as Chief Minister of Gujarat in 2002.  
224 See ‘Yoga is a revolution in the making to bring health, harmony, peace, etc. across the globe’: Dr 
HR Nagendra, Yoga Consultant to Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Organiser, 20 June 2019, 
https://www.organiser.org/Encyc/2019/6/20/Yoga-is-a-revolution-in-the-making-Dr-HR-
Nagendra.html, last accessed 12 May 2020. 
225 See ‘Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of Executive Council of The Indian Yoga Association Held on 12th 
Feb 2015’, Indian Yoga Association, http://www.yogaiya.in/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/6th-
meeting-of-ec.pdf, last accessed 12 May 2020.  
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presentation of the flagship International Day of Yoga was entrusted to the 
leadership of the IYA.  
 
The tightening grip of Hindutva forces over an increasingly centralised and 
standardised yoga is further evidenced in the significant reorganisation of the 
IYA during the course of February 2017. In terms of administration, the 
former Advisory Board was renamed as the Governing Council. The new 
Governing Council was then earmarked to become ‘the supreme body for 
policy and decision making’, with the Executive Council responsible for the 
execution of its decisions.226 What is significant here is that the unanimously 
nominated Chairman of the new Governing Council was another close 
confidant of the Prime Minister, yoga guru and celebrity business mogul Baba 
Ramdev.227 Under the official name Yogrishi Swami Ramdev Ji, ‘Swami’, or 
‘Baba’ Ramdev, found fame as a talented and charismatic yoga teacher and 
godman in a televangelist mode on Indian morning television in the early 
2000s.228 At present, expertly conjoining worlds of religion, business and 
politics, Ramdev moves seamlessly from television studios to preside over 
mass yoga camps (yog shivir), mingling with the rich and powerful yet 
seemingly accessible to ordinary Indians. He is without doubt, the most 
recognisable face of Indian yoga in the twenty first century.  
 
Baba Ramdev is simultaneously the most influential yoga teacher in India, a 
mega-celebrity with global reach, and one of the most vocal cheerleaders for 
                                                 
226 See ‘Minutes of the Second (Special) Meeting of the General Body of the Indian Yoga Association 
Held on 8th March, 2017’, Indian Yoga Association, http://www.yogaiya.in/gb_moms/, last accessed 
12 May 2020.  
227 Born Ramakrishna Yadav in a small village in Haryana, the young Yadav is said to have begun the 
study of Sanskrit and yoga at 14 years old. While not much is known about Ramdev’s early life, what is 
important regarding his backstory, is the carefully honed projection that he has lived the life of a 
Hindu ascetic since childhood. 
228 Ramdev’s morning show proved a massive hit and with his business partner Balkrishna Subedi, 
Ramdev went on to buy the channel. From this point on, he gained a mass following, holding huge 
outdoor yoga camps (yog shivir) across India and teaching yoga to popular celebrities. Additionally, 
he has become extremely influential in his role as billion-dollar co-owner with Balkrishna of Patanjali 
Ayurved Ltd, India’s fastest growing FMCG company. Patanjali produces Ayurveda products aimed at 
the ‘Hindu consumer’ and cultivates a strong “Make in India” swadeshi message. Ramdev’s image has 
become synonymous with Ayurveda and yoga through slick advertising campaigns and the use of his 
image to market Patanjali’s wide range of commodities. 
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Narendra Modi across the Indian media landscape. Crucially, his politics have 
long been sympathetic to and fully compatible with the politics of the Sangh 
(Jaffrelot, 2011).229 From the days when he had not yet emerged as one of 
India’s most recognisable faces, Ramdev’s yoga teachings have disseminated a 
clear message of duty towards the nation.230 For instance, within perhaps the 
key medium of his communication – television – Ramdev spreads yoga 
practice as televised spectacle as he ruminates on yoga philosophy and applies 
āsana and prānāyāma to the details and problems of everyday life. During his 
performances, the audience are treated to charismatic instruction in basic 
mantra performance, including the chanting of om, popular Vedic (Hindu) 
mantras and basic meditation techniques (Sarbacker, 2014, p.356). The real 
innovation of Ramdev’s practice is that it is remarkably straightforward. 
Postures are simplified so that practically anyone can do them, and individual 
poses are designated as treatment for specific diseases. Yoga is framed 
simultaneously as a religious pursuit and as a rigorous methodology to 
improve one’s health (Crair, 2018). At the same time, yoga is rendered as a 
political and nationalist act. Critically, for Baba Ramdev, yoga is at the 
absolute core of the struggle for national awakening, of which there is no 
higher duty. As he explains: 
 
‘after self-development with the help of yoga each morning 
I want to fill myself with energy so as to help the nations 
development. After self-awakening with the help of yoga, I 
want to take ahead the holy mission of national 
awakening. The question arises in a number of people’s 
                                                 
229 Despite protestation to the contrary, as Christophe Jaffrelot (2011) points out, Ramdev has long 
been backed by the Sangh Parivar and has been involved with the Sangh for at least the same period of 
time. For more than half a decade prior to 2011, the RSS mouthpiece Organiser had enthusiastically 
backed his actions.  
230 Ramdev’s first openly ‘political’ move was in 2011, when he rode the wave of the rising national 
anti-corruption movement. After announcing that he would go on hunger strike unless the Congress 
government beefed up anti-corruption laws, Ramdev led a 60,000-strong rally at Delhi that was later 
violently broken up by the police. In the end, Ramdev attempted to escape disguised as a woman but 
was eventually arrested. The BJP were among the first to support him and condemn the police action 
as ‘anti-democratic’. 
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minds about the relationship between yoga and the 
nation’s progress. So, I want to make it clear that without 
self-progress, the nation’s progress is impossible. Hence, 
by self-development with the help of yoga each morning, 
we will be dedicated to the progress and prosperity of the 
nation the entire day. Yoga and nationalism are not two 
different philosophies but are two sides of the same coin!’ 
(Ramdev, 2009, pp. 13-14).  
 
Through propagation of a ‘scientific Vedic paradigm’ and yogic regimen of 
health and wellness, for Baba Ramdev, restoration of the body is connected to 
restoration of the health of the nation (Gupta and Copeman, 2019). At the 
same time, the nexus of yoga and nationalism also has a flip side: ‘those who 
do not love the soil, culture, civilization, and the people of the nation have no 
right to stay in this country’ (Ramdev, 2009, p. 16). Ramdev’s mission to 
shape and discipline the national body through yoga is repeatedly buttressed 
with ‘Hindu’ cultural references, including invocations of Krishna, Ram and 
various parables and idioms of the Ramayāna and Mahābhārata’ 
(Chakraborty, 2006, p. 389). Within Ramdev’s vision of the Hindu nation is 
the conviction that ninety nine percent of Indian Muslims were converted. 
Speaking on the Ram Janmabhoomi issue, he has even gone as far as to claim 
that Lord Ram is a revered figure for Indian Muslims. Accordingly, the matter 
of building the Ram temple at the former site of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya 
should be viewed “from [a] perspective of national unity”.231 In this context, 
Ramdev’s physical, spiritual and political regimen is intimately tied to 
Hindutva visions of the nation. 
 
                                                 
231 India Today. 2019. ‘Exclusive: Lord Ram revered by Muslims too, 99% Muslims in India are 
converted, says Ramdev’. India Today. 16 November 2019, 
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/99-muslims-in-india-are-converted-ramdev-1619625-2019-
11-16, last accessed 20 September 2020. 
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In the Indian Yoga Association, then, the Sangh Parivar has built an 
institution – manned by the leading lights of Indian yoga – to align the ‘yogic 
way of life’ with the political goals of Hindutva. Indeed, the extent of the 
ambition of the IYA is revealed in the minutes of the 18th April 2018 General 
Council meeting, where Chairman Ramdev voiced the concern that until the 
IYA has a legal identity, it will not be able to bring any fundamental change in 
the world of yoga. It was noted that currently the IYA is a private body unlike 
legal entities such as the Bar Council of India and Medical Council of India. 
President Nagendra supported this concern and it was resolved that a letter of 
request on the matter would be delivered personally by the Nagendra to the 
Prime Minister.232 According to the mission statement on their website, it is 
the mission of the IYA to “bring together all institutes of Yoga under one 
umbrella who are committed to promotion and advancement of Yoga and its 
application across the world.”233 We have seen that behind the stated aim to 
maintain and promote ‘different’ traditions of yoga is a more powerful drive to 
standardise otherwise relatively disparate lineages under the umbrella of the 
Sangh. Let us turn to a discussion of what this looks like on the ground in 
Mumbai, with reference to the praxis of The Yoga Institute, at Santa Cruz.234 
 
‘Householder’ yoga in the city 
 
A once relatively apolitical institute researching and teaching ‘householder’ 
yoga to affluent upper caste Bombay citizens; in the Modi era, the Yoga 
Institute at Santa Cruz has become closely involved in the promotion and 
teaching of a nationalistic program of yoga education. This move in a more 
political direction emanated in large part from the emergence of Director 
                                                 
232 See ‘Minutes of the Second Meeting of Governing Council of the Indian Yoga Association Held on 
29th April 2018’, Indian Yoga Association, http://www.yogaiya.in/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/minutes-of-meeting-29th-april-2018.pdf, last accessed 12 May 2020.   
233 See ‘About - Indian Yoga Association’, yogaiya.in, http://www.yogaiya.in/about/ , last accessed 12 
May 2020.    
234 The following account draws in large part on participation in The Yoga Institutes seven days 
Introduction to the ‘Yoga Way of life course’ conducted in English. Out of fifty participants in the 
seven-day camp (including myself) forty-seven were Indian.  
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Hansa Yogendra and the promotion of her son Hrishi Yogendra to Vice-
Director and lead in business operations, following the death of father of the 
family, previous Director Jayadeva Yogendra in 2018.235 “Hansaji”, as she is 
affectionately known, is styled as the “First Lady of Yoga” and much is made at 
the Institute of her appearance at the inaugural 2015 International Day of 
Yoga alongside the Prime Minster, Baba Ramdev, Dr Nagendra and Shri Shri 
Ravi Shankar (see figure 12). As mentioned above, Hansaji is the Vice-
President of the IYA. The Yoga Institute was the first centre for yoga education 
to be certified by the ministry of AYUSH to teach and accredit students. In 
2018, the Institute was awarded the prestigious Prime Minster’s Award for 
Outstanding Contribution for Promotion and Development of Yoga, further 
enhancing The Yoga Institutes nation-wide reputation for excellence in yoga 
education. 
 
Yet, The Yoga Institute has not always been this way inclined. Notably, while 
many credit Swami Vivekananda as ‘the creator of fully fledged modern yoga’ 
(De Michelis, 2004, p. 90), others point to the prominent role of ‘less known 
figures such as [founder of the Yoga Institute] Shri Yogendra, who [instead] 
explicitly linked Yoga to health and fitness’ (Alter, 2004, pp. 27-28). 236 
Manibhai Haribhai Desai, who would later take the name Shri Yogendra, 
connected yoga with physical culture and rebranded its practice as scientific 
physical exercise. Yogendra’s mission was to research and design a curative 
yoga therapy for affluent, upper caste Bombay society. He was heavily 
influenced by European trends in physical culture and at the centre of the 
popularisation of yoga as the ‘science and art of living’ in the city (Yogendra, 
1997, p. 24). In a nutshell, Yogendra’s approach was to define yoga in relation 
to science, medicine and physical fitness via questions of religion, education 
                                                 
235 Interviews with ‘Virat’ and ‘Sachin’ at The Yoga Institute, 27/12/19.   
236 Other figures influential in the formation of postural yoga in the same period include gurus such as 
Swami Kuvalayānanda (Pune district, Maharashtra) and Tirumalai Krishnamacharya (Mysore, 
Karnataka). 
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and psychology.237 Although not immune to claiming that his approach was 
based in the preservation of ‘ancient’ yogic traditions, and harbouring a keen 
interest in late-colonial racial science,238 Yogendra was relatively clear that his 
practice aimed at the ‘modification of āsana and prānāyāma into the rubric of 
therapy and rhythmic exercise’ (Alter, 2014, p. 73).  
 
Change is certainly afoot at The Yoga Institute, but not in all areas. For 
instance, the demographic remains firmly upper caste householders:239 Hindi 
and English are spoken interchangeably by most and a significant amount of 
the courses offered at the Institute are conducted in English. The Yoga 
Institute is a hive of activity. There are consistently overlapping Ministry of 
AYUSH certified Teacher Training courses going on that vary in length, from 
the one-month course to the three-month, seven months, one and two-year 
courses. Various health camps, half-day camps and the popular “21 Days 
Better Living Course” operate daily, in addition to multiple daily regular 
classes. Monday to Saturday from 6.00am to 8.00pm the campus is buzzing 
and on an average day, hundreds of people move in and through The Institutes 
studios. While education in yoga āsana remains an important part of the 
programmes offered, the ethos of instruction centres upon an explicit 
                                                 
237 As Suzanne Newcombe (2017, p. 11) notes, ‘perhaps one of Yogendra’s lasting legacies was the 
normalisation of a secularised Yoga, primarily addressing the physical complaints of Indian 
householders, including women, while also referencing Patñjali’s Yoga Sūtra as the basis of this 
approach to Yoga.’ 
238 The significance of Yogendra’s practice is that it blended concerns with mental and moral hygiene 
with a strong emphasis on the cultivation of the physical body. In particular, Yogendra held a special 
interest in the potential for racial self-improvement through yoga. That is, an interest in the 
interconnection between physical education and yoga and the possibilities it held for what he called 
‘yoga eugenicism’ (Singleton, 2007, p. 135). In short, Yogendra (1997, p. 42) was of the opinion that 
‘unless conscious and purposive physical education is applied, the individual and therefore the race is 
likely to suffer from the consequences of gradual deterioration’. Physical inheritance could be 
improved through yoga eugenics, not just for the individual, but ‘for the benefit of posteriority’ 
(Yogendra, 1997, p. 43). For Yogendra, then, the aim of yoga physical education was not the ‘bestial 
urge’ to ‘bulging muscles and robust physique’, but rather, ‘physiological soundness – pure radiant 
health conducive to immunity against disease and the promotion of longevity’ (Yogendra, 1997, p. 44). 
Yoga was the answer to physical decadence and a roadmap for inter-generational uplift. As Alter 
(2014, p. 63) notes, ‘Yogendra’s eclectic, idiosyncratic, and holistic philosophy of evolutionary self-
development based on rhythmic exercises proved to be a message with specific gravity’.  
239 When those at The Yoga Institute talk about the ‘householder’ what they mean is ‘middle class’ 
professionals. A simple glance at the price list of classes, courses and programmes demonstrates that 
in a city where (officially) around 55% live in informal ‘slum’ settlements, the city’s urban poor are 
effectively priced out.  
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pushback against the idea of yoga as simply postural practice. According to the 
Institute’s contemporary teachings, the purpose of yoga āsana is to bring the 
mind steady, through execution of rhythmic breathing (prānāyāma).240 In the 
mission to bring yoga to the householder and make the ‘yogic way of life’ 
widely accessible, the target is training of the mind, as opposed to an 
aesthetics of bodily fitness. The ‘yogic way of life’ thus centres on the practice 
of prānāyāma, kiryas (cleansing practices), āsana, and as we will see, a range 
of self-help techniques and ‘attitude training’. What has shifted at The Yoga 
Institute can be summarised as a tilt towards a ‘neo-Hindu’ orientation to yoga 
therapy, alongside the traditional psycho-somatic approach developed by Sri 
Yogendra in the 1920s (see De Michalis, 2004). 
 
Sunday mornings at the Institute host the weekly “Satsang” between 9.30 and 
10.30am, consisting of a lecture followed by Q&A hosted by Hansaji that is 
free, open to the public and gathers large crowds. According to the Institutes 
brochure: “in Sanskrit ‘sat’ means ‘truth’ and ‘sang’ means together”. The aim 
of the “interactive session” is to “try to understand the meaning and reality of 
life based on the various topics related to Yoga and well-being.” These lectures 
offer a platform for dissemination of the core teachings and philosophy of the 
Institute. For example, the topic for the 29th December 2019 Satsang is “The 
Concept of Duty.” The prelude to Hansaji’s lecture is a skit performed by 
young students from the teacher training programs that highlights the 
necessity of doing ones’ duty over indulgence in social media, consumption 
and smart phone-mediated reality. There are two families in the skit. One is 
detached and faces daily problems and arguments and the other is 
harmonious, loving and regularly read the Bhagavadgītā. The latter are 
consequently able to fulfil their “duty” while the former struggle along. In the 
final scene, it turns out that both fathers of each family are in the Indian Army 
and when they get called up to serve, only the father from the pious and 
harmonious family unit is able to properly do his duty for the nation. The final 
                                                 
240 Interview: Hansaji Yogendra at The Yoga Institute, 13/01/20.  
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message is narrated: “India is the motherland and [our] duty is towards the 
nation”. In her subsequent lecture, Hansaji explains that only by doing our 
duty can we maintain health and gain wealth and prosperity. The hierarchy of 
one’s duties is explained as first of all, to one’s self, second, to our family, 
third, towards society and forth, to the nation.241  
 
The centrality of one’s ‘responsibility in life’ within the teachings of The Yoga 
Institute is primarily elaborated through the concept of ‘Karma Yoga’. The 
principle that actions in life should be performed according to the concept of 
duty, Karma Yoga is both a regular session at The Yoga Institute and a concept 
that pervades the various “better living” programs and workshops that the 
Institute offers. It teaches that what is needed for change in one’s life, boils 
down to the application of three principles: duty, dedication and devotion. 
Things must be done on the basis of duty, as opposed to desire and dedication 
must be practiced and applied to one’s daily actions. The principle of devotion 
holds that if one does not have faith in a higher reality, application of the first 
two principles will not be possible. Devotion keeps one grounded. Ones’ 
relationship with divinity/higher power is therefore the most important 
relationship in life. Without it, the Karma Yoga sessions reiterate, “your life 
will be shaky. If you keep this relationship to a higher power dear you will 
prosper and gain peace of mind”.242 The good Karma Yogi, in short, is in touch 
with their being-in-the-world and this guides everything they do.243  
 
While the format of Karma Yoga in this mode appears to be plucked more 
from the “12-step” tradition of self-help244 than the Vedas, the concept is 
infused by a Hindu idiom and duty is explicitly related to the Hindu concept of 
Dharma.245 The overriding message of Karma Yoga is belief in the self, to “do 
                                                 
241 Field note: 29/12/19. Satsang at The Yoga Institute.  
242 Field note: 1/1/20. Karma yoga session.  
243 Field note: 2/1/20. Karma yoga session. 
244 See for example Brand (2017).  
245 Dharma has a range of meanings in South Asian religions. At the Yoga Institute it was equated with 
personal duty and the correct moral way of living in accordance with one’s place in the universe. The 
concept was frequently discussed with reference to Arjuna’s duty according to the Ramayana   
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your duty” and “avoid being a flag without a pole”. Multiple references in the 
Karma Yoga sessions are made to the Bhagavadgītā and the story of Krishna 
and Arjuna. The necessity of righteous war is articulated as the corner stone of 
Dharmic duty. Like Arjuna’s duty in the Ramayana, Karma Yoga is about 
being committed to one’s “role”. This ethic is duly extended to the modern 
world of work, where it is claimed that “even if you are working in an 
organisation for money, you can still have the attitude of Karma Yoga.”246  
 
In another popular story, Hansaji explains that all people have a place within 
society. Using the metaphor of chapatti bread and how it arrives at one’s table, 
it is explained that there are those thinking types that have marketed and 
conceived of the product. Then those that are strong that guard the wheat in 
the fields. Then the trader, predisposed to commerce. Finally, there are those 
that make the chapatti. Hansaji rounds off the story with the observation that 
“people used to call these Varnas – Brahmin; Kshatriya; Vaishya; Shudra – 
but now we say aptitude.” It is made clear that these distinctions remain one 
and the same thing. Either way, it is taught that the guidance from the Vedas 
outlines the necessity to gives one’s action to the world in terms of Dharmic 
duty. Practical solutions to everyday problems are animated by nostalgia for 
the (fictional) glories of the Vedic past and unified faith in a scientific Vedic 
paradigm as the key to a better future. The various parables communicated 
reveal an underlying view of how people in society with different “aptitudes” 
are linked together and how they combine to serve society. More so, what is 
revealed is a philosophy of yoga consistent with both the Dharmic principles of 
Hindu scripture and the samrasta vision of the RSS. 
 
If these brief vignettes appear anecdotal then the broader political networks in 
which the Institute has become embedded demonstrate close relations with 
                                                 
246 Field note: 29/12/19. Karma yoga session. A brief glance at the Institutes corporate brochure 
illustrates this in a clear message: “Yoga is excellence in work.” Karma Yoga at the Institute generally 
takes the form of life coaching and attitude training, based in positive psychology, but hinged on the 
parables of the Ramayana. 
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the Sangh. The ‘101-year anniversary’ of the Institute and twenty-five years 
working with BMC schools’ celebrations on 28th December 2019 are revealing. 
The guest of honour was Governor of Maharashtra and senior RSS man 
Bhagat Singh Koshy (see figure 14). Before governor Koshy arrived, the entire 
ground floor studio and the central garden of the Institute was decked out with 
chairs draped in white cloth with saffron sashes. The windows were garlanded 
with saffron flowers, and giant banners baring the faces of Hansaji and Koshy 
were set around the garden, and either side of the stage in the main stage. The 
gates to the Institute were draped in saffron silks. As the crowds gathered and 
the seating area around the main stage filled out, people began to settle down 
and the ceremony opened with some stretching and meditation, followed by a 
Hare Krishna mantra. This was followed by a rendition of the Indian national 
anthem and the chant of “Bharat mata ki jai!!” (‘Victory to Mother India’) 
favoured by Hindutva forces. There was then a Hindu lighting of the lamp 
ceremony.247 Before being shown around the premises by Hrishi Yogendra, 
Governor Koshy entered the stage to rapturous applause. Koshy’s key note 
speech served as the highlight of the ceremony. A charismatic speaker, Koshy 
effortlessly flitted between English and Hindi to highlight his points, 
concluding that: 
 
“Yoga means union with the almighty. With yourself. 
Material progress, credit goes to the West. Undoubtedly. 
But material progress is not enough. What are your 
contributions to the society? Let us spend some time for 
yoga, higher experiences beyond the material. For society 
and atman [the divine]”.248 
 
                                                 
247 The lighting of the lamp denotes the expelling of darkness but moreover, light depicts the presence 
of god.  
248 Field note: 28/12/19. 101-year celebrations at The Yoga Institute. 
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Figure 14: Hrishi Yogendra gives the Governor of Maharashtra a guided tour of The 
Yoga Institute before the ceremony begins. Note that Bhagat Singh Koshy wears the 
black cap of the RSS (photograph by the author). 
 
Koshy’s speech and the message that the most important aspect of life is 
spiritual connection with the divine, highlights efforts – through yoga – to 
calibrate Hindutva in a globalising world to face inevitable engagement with 
‘the West’. Simply put, the idea of Indian spirituality as innate is a handy way 
of staking an Indian (read: Hindu) claim to ‘difference’ in the world. At the 
same time, focus on Hinduism and the divine as paramount, effectively shifts 
attention from the fact that material progress (in education, healthcare, 
sanitation etc.) has failed to reach vast swathes of the Indian population (see 
Drèze and Sen, 2013). 
 
In Mumbai there are myriad tensions and stresses in the workplace; life in the 
city is hectic, dirty, noisy and polluted. Mumbaikars suffer from overcrowding 
and a distinct lack of green space.249 Meanwhile, yoga is ideally placed for 
those that seek spiritual and religio-spiritual support to deal with hectic urban 
lifestyles. Not just as a form of exercise but as a holistic, indigenous technology 
                                                 
249 The sentiment that the city is overcrowded and polluted was echoed by many of the practitioners I 
studied with at The Yoga Institute. A series of agitations and protests have been launched against the 
lack of green space and threat posed to those that remain. During my time in the city the most 
prominent was ongoing protest against the cutting of nearly 3000 trees in Aarey Colony, known as 
Mumbai’s “green lung”. See Reuters. 2019. Protests, petitions as green spaces in Indian cities vanish. 
Todayonline.com, 13 October 2019, https://www.todayonline.com/world/protests-petitions-green-
spaces-indian-cities-vanish, last accessed 2 October 2020. 
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of wellbeing (see Jaffrelot, 2011). Yoga teaches that it is futile to concentrate 
on trying to change the world and others – suffering will ensue regardless. 
Stresses are part of life and the practice of yoga makes one strong enough to 
deal with these stresses.250 The aim of yoga, therefore, is not to intervene in 
the external world but to intervene and work on ‘the self’.  
 
In this context, the teachings of The Yoga Institute are highly effective in so far 
as they inject meaning into the abstraction and alienation that characterises 
everyday urban life. Daily practice of yoga, then, takes the form of a passive, 
introverted and personal technology of the self. At the same time, upper caste 
Hindu ideas are positioned as the universal and supreme antidote to the so-
called materialism of ‘the West’. As we will see in the following section, in the 
yog shivir model of the International Day of Yoga, yoga practice is 
transfigured into a powerful spatial politics and participatory spectacle of 
collective breathing (prānāyāma) and postural gymnastics (āsana). The result, 
I claim, is that as the nation is performed in the street (at home and abroad), 
Hindutva becomes effective through a colonisation of urban public space and 
the status of Hinduism as a ‘world-dynamic’ force is affirmed.  
 
5.2 The 2019 International Day of Yoga 
 
The International Day of Yoga pivots on the simple idea that on 21st June every 
year, millions of people from all over the world step onto their yoga mats to 
exercise in celebration of the restorative physical and spiritual prowess of yoga 
– India’s gift to the world.251 Though initiated by Narendra Modi at the United 
Nations, curiously, the idea for an International Day of Yoga itself was taken 
from a Portuguese yoga guru, Suryananda Maha Raja (Born Jorge Veiga e 
Castro). Yogi Suryananda had been campaigning on the issue for fourteen 
                                                 
250 Field note: 29/12/19. Karma yoga session.  
251 In addition to International Day of Yoga celebrations across the subcontinent, from mass yog shivir 
at Sri Kanteerara Stadium in Bengaluru, to Boarder Security Force (BSF) personnel performing yoga 
āsana in Jammu and Kashimir, a whole range of mass celebrations took place in some of the world’s 
most famous places, from beneath the Effiel Tower in Paris, to Times Square, New York City.   
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years prior to 2015, though the prospect appears to have become more 
realistic once taken up by Dr Nagendra after the two met in the early 2000s 
(Puri, 2019).252  
In terms of the organisation of the celebrations on the ground – the mass 
public practice of yoga āsana – the International Day of Yoga has a long 
precedent. The phenomenon of yog shivr – mass public yoga camps – likely 
stems from the integration of the teachings of Swami Vivekananda and his 
contemporaries with the emerging practice of modern postural yoga. As 
Joseph Alter (2004, p. 36-37) notes, on the basis of its derivation from the 
Sanskrit, shivir ‘has martial connotations’. What is important is that the 
performative aspect of shivir is spectacular; cultural values are reproduced 
and ‘aggressively’ disseminated through mass regimented practice. In many 
ways these camps resemble a form of mass puja (prayer). The mass āsana 
practice of the International Day of Yoga is hence not new. But rather, a 
scaled-up version of coordinated yog shivir under one (nationalist) umbrella. 
In Mumbai, several large events and numerous smaller events comprised the 
celebrations on 21st June 2019. Celebrations took place all over the city, from a 
prestigious event at the Nehru Science Centre put on by Iyengar Yogashraya, 
to a spectacular mediatised display by Indian Navy personnel on the deck of a 
decommissioned aircraft carrier off shore, as well as large events at 
government departments, universities and municipal schools. Large 
commercial events took place at Shivaji Park, Dadar, and the Seawoods Grand 
Central Mall (Navi Mumbai). One of the biggest and most popular events of 
the day was The Yoga Institute/Times of India organised ‘Yoga by the Bay’, an 
enormous yog shivir on the Mumbai water front at Marine Drive, a 1.3km 
coastal stretch between Kililachand Chowk and Marine Drive flyover. The 
Yoga by the Bay event featured over fifteen thousand Mumbaikars collectively 
                                                 
252 See also ‘The men behind International Day of Yoga’, Rediff.com, 11 June 2015, 
https://www.rediff.com/news/report/the-men-behind-international-day-of-yoga/20150611.htm, last 
accessed 12 May 2020. 
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breathing and performing yoga āsana in unison (see figure 15).253 Here we see 
examples of the theatrical colonisation of urban space in the form of the 
International Day of Yoga. The difference and segregations of the actual street 
are sutured as the political street is forged through yoga. Due to its sheer scale 
and the huge media publicity it garnered across the country, Yoga by the Bay 
in particular demonstrates the importance of the relationship between such 
events and the street spaces of their performance.  
 
 
Figure 15: “Yoga by the Bay” International Day of Yoga celebrations in and 
through the political street. Organised by The Yoga Institute, Marine drive 21st 
June 2019.  
 
As Henri Lefebvre pointed out, meaning is defined ‘through habit of action’ – 
through engagement in practical relationships and ‘interaction between 
‘subjects’ and their space and surroundings’ (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 18; Määttänen, 
2007). Rhythmic, choreographed bodies moving and breathing in 
coordination produce a powerful psychosomatic experience. In terms of mass 
public forms of yoga, in the case the International Day of Yoga, both language 
                                                 
253 Media Brief. 2019. Times of India co-organizes massive ‘Yoga By The Bay’ celebration with the 
Yoga Institute. Media Brief. 21 June 2019, https://www.mediabrief.com/times-of-india-yoga-by-the-
bay-5th-idy/, last accessed 20 September 2020. 
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and context, discourse and physicality, are instrumental in the formation of 
sociocultural meaning (Hausner, 2013, p. 112). In the context of the political 
street and its reproduction, this plays neatly into the strategy of the BJP to 
generate a sense of imagined political community.  
 
To be sure, a major attraction of yoga practice relates to its clear benefits 
towards greatly increased mental wellness, physical strength and flexibility. In 
this regard, since winning power in 2014 the BJP have moved quickly to 
develop yoga, alongside Ayurvedic medicine into a central pillar of India’s 
‘preventative healthcare and wellness system.’ For instance, in Modi’s speech 
to mark the second International Day of Yoga in 2016, he claimed that “there 
is no health insurance with zero budget, but yoga gives health assurance on 
zero budget”. Modi’s speech gives the strong impression that yoga should be 
seen as a practical alternative to investments in primary healthcare.254 And 
indeed, among many it is a popular and accessible choice.255 Yet there is more 
to the promotion of yoga than personal well-being and health. Most 
importantly, the International Day of Yoga takes the form of a ‘colonisation’ of 
urban public space by Hindutva values. By propagating an indigenous form of 
(Hindu) cultural expression in urban streets, the multi-billion-dollar yoga 
industry is harnessed to Hindu national pride and international influence.  
 
As “Hindu” bodies are marked out and ‘ideology is bound to practice’ – in the 
mode of the International Day of Yoga, yoga āsana affects affiliation to 
Hindutva values and transfigures them into national values. Accordingly, the 
fictional reality of the Hindu rashtra – a consecrated space – is produced 
above all, in and through the political street (see Lefebvre, 1991, p. 215). At the 
same time, through the popular performance of mass public yoga, Modi is able 
to position India as a spiritual leader and yoga as the nations gift to the world. 
                                                 
254 See ‘Yoga Gives Health on zero budget: Modi’, Business Standard, 21 June 2016, 
https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/yoga-gives-health-on-zero-budget-modi-
116062100127_1.html, last accessed 12 May 2020. 
255 Field note: 29/12/19.Karma yoga session.  
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Yoga brings people together and caters to the psychological and mental 
stresses of everyday life in the modern world. For this reason, in the Indian 
context, it is also ‘the perfect vehicle to create a shared national consciousness’ 
(Suri, 2015).  
 
The global popularity of yoga, its commercialisation and its embrace by 
celebrity fitness culture is therefore an important aspect of its appeal. In this 
regard, celebrity is never far from politics and public life in India and tellingly, 
the star of the 2019 International Day of Yoga in Mumbai was a Bollywood 
actress and television personality. On the 2019 International Day of Yoga, 
actress and reality television star Shilpa Shetty Kundra led the most high-
profile event in the city (see figure 16). Beginning at 7.00am, the celebrations 
consisted of a morning yoga session for paramilitary and police officials from 
the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) and Central Reserve Police Force 
(CRPF) at the Gateway of India in south Mumbai. A live stream video of the 
session and the “huge turnout” was posted to Shilpa Shetty’s popular 
Instagram account. The video received over half a million views and the event 
was widely reported in the press. Though led by Shetty Kundra, the event was 
organised by Patanjali Yog Samiti Mumbai, a local chapter of Baba Ramdev’s 
Bharat Swabhiman Movement.256 Just in case the organisation behind the 
event was unclear, alongside the logo of the International Day of Yoga and 
insignia of the Mumbai Port Trust – who provided access to the land where 
the session took place – large images of Ramdev in a saffron loin cloth 
performing the twelve-step Surya Namaskar (‘Sun Salutation’) sequence were 
spread along a large banner across the front of the stage. 
 
                                                 
256 On Bharat Swabhiman, see Copeman and Gupta (2019).  
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Figure 16: Shilpa Shetty Kundra leads the 2019 International Day of Yoga 
mass demonstration at the Gateway of India, Mumbai. Note the images of 
Baba Ramdev performing the Surya Namaskar sequence on the stage banner.   
 
Close relations between Shilpa Shetty and Baba Ramdev go back to at least 
January 2016, where they demonstrated a number of yoga āsana together and 
talked on stage about the various benefits of yoga at one of Ramdev’s five-day 
yoga camps in Mumbai. At one point during their exchange, Shetty mocks 
‘Westerners’ and their claims to “do yoga”.257 She shows a keen interest in the 
‘higher values’ of authentic yoga practice and pays tribute to its ‘Indian’ roots. 
Alongside promotion of both her own and Ramdev’s various business 
ventures, Shetty Kundra took time to express her admiration for ‘Baba ji’, his 
authentic teaching of yoga and its benefits as a system of total health. Yoga 
was praised as a practice of great learning, where mind, body and soul come 
together.258  
 
In many respects Shilpa Shetty is highly representative of the aspirations of 
urban India. Cosmopolitan, stylish and successful, she appears as a 
commodified archetype of the “modern” Indian woman – glamourous and 
                                                 
257 See Shilpa Shetty Kundra’s comments @50 seconds. ‘Swami Ramdev and Shilpa Shetty Practicing 
Yoga at Mumbai’, You Tube, 20 January 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TTY2QvaOWfQ, 
last accessed 12 May 2020. 
258 Again, see ‘Swami Ramdev and Shilpa Shetty Practicing Yoga at Mumbai’, You Tube, 20 January 
2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TTY2QvaOWfQ, last accessed 12 May 2020. 
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successful, but dutifully wedded to upper caste Hindu social custom.259 Shilpa 
Shetty is a keen advocate for healthy living and in recent years has dedicated 
her time to the promotion of business ventures based on the monetisation of 
healthy eating, fitness and lifestyle brands.260 The message underpinning 
Shilpa Shetty Kundra’s public image – and for that matter Baba Ramdev’s – is 
that success, happiness and peace of mind are best achieved through yoga and 
connection to God. As this example demonstrates, it is in effect India’s 
modern-day gurus and celebrities that have brought yoga to the masses. 
Piggybacking on the fact that yoga has been commodified, branded and sold 
globally as a fashionable lifestyle choice, the Modi government has 
successfully jumped on the bandwagon to appropriate and position yoga as an 
integral part of Hindu culture and a triumphant aspect of national pride.  
 
Taken as a whole, then, the union of Bollywood stardom with Patanjali Yog 
Samiti Mumbai, points to the 2019 Gateway of India International Day of Yoga 
session as a concrete expression of the way that capitalism finds expression in 
different spaces, and how the spiritual has become political through yoga. The 
global popularity of yoga is a source of pride for aspirational Hindus that are 
looking to assert their place in the world.261 Through the International Day of 
Yoga (Hindu) India is pictured as the historical and spiritual home of yoga. 
Hence while the idea of yoga as health wellness is forwarded, it ‘would be a 
mistake’ to view yoga in separation from the broader politics of ‘saffronisation’ 
and attempts to sideline Muslim and Christian cultural traditions (Puri, 2019, 
p. 329). Plugged into the global matrix of fitness and wellbeing Hindu values 
are presented as universal and supreme. A standardised, theistic yoga has 
                                                 
259 For discussion of the ‘new’ Indian woman see for example, Lau (2006) and Thapan (2004). On the 
negotiation of middle classed Indian women in the public spaces of Mumbai, see Phadke et al (2011, 
pp. 32-34). 
260 Last staring in a Bollywood film in 2007, the main trust of Shilpa Shetty’s current work is 
encapsulated in the promotion of her yoga and fitness app where she suggests distinct regimens as a 
cure to particular ailments or undesirable physical traits. For example, specific āsanas for a flatter 
stomach.  
261 Field note: 3/01/20. group discussion/Karma yoga workshop at The Yoga Institute. The idea of the 
International Day of Yoga as promoting awareness and consciousness of the ‘true essence’ of yoga to 
‘Westerners’, as a way of life and union of mind-body-soul (as opposed to a type of exercise) was 
popularly held by practitioners at The Yoga Institute. 
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been claimed and propagated by Hindutva forces and tied to the politico-
theistic ambitions of the BJP (Johar, 2015). As we will see, an important way 
that this strategy takes form is in Narendra Modi’s popularisation of the 
International Day of Yoga, through the propagation of his own cult of 
personality and savvy utilisation of methods of commercialised celebrity 
culture.  
 
Yoga with Modi 
 
Modi’s public demeanour frequently – and often successfully – draws on 
extravagant theatrics (Manor, 2019, pp. 120-121). A carefully cultivated aspect 
of his performative routine is to come across as a Hindu ascetic and long 
practicing yogi (see figure 17). In an age of digital consumption and social 
media, Modi and his team have been noted for their tech savvy approach to 
political campaigning and engagement with Indian celebrities (Chapter one; 
see also, Sinha, 2018). Accordingly, the digital terrain is a crucial platform for 
Modi’s promotion of Yoga.262 In the run up to the 2019 International Day of 
Yoga a series of videos with a digital likeness of Modi demonstrating a number 
of popular āsana were posted to his social media accounts. “Yoga with Modi” 
achieved its aim – it received extensive coverage in domestic and international 
media and generated all manner of online attention.  
 
                                                 
262 At the time of writing Modi has 48.5 million followers on Twitter, 43.6 million followers on 
Facebook and 24.7 million followers on Instagram. Analysis undertaken by the website Scroll.in 
shows that in the run up to the 2019 General Elections, between October 2018 and March 2019, 
Modi’s 2,143 tweets (one tweet every two hours) were retweeted 7.7 million times and received 32.4 
million likes. Global capital has been long circling the subcontinent on the pretence of India’s 
potential to be the first ‘truly mobile digital society’. From 2014 to 2018 projections compiled by 
Google state that India’s internet population had almost doubled to 430 million (Mazumdar and 





Figure 17: Modi meditates in a Himalayan holy cave for the cameras.  
 
While there is little doubt that Modi is indeed a long-term yoga enthusiast, 
what should be noted here is the consistency of BJP strategy: Hindu pride in 
the global popularity and commodification of yoga is harnessed to the master 
narrative of the rebirth of a golden Vedic age under the supreme leadership of 
Narendra Modi. As we see in the final section of this chapter, drawing on ideas 
of Vedic-Hindu destiny and the world-dynamic force of Hinduism, yoga is 
skilfully configured towards the production of imagined political community. 
At the same time, the International Day of Yoga provides the perfect vehicle 
for a mass political spectacle of choreographed bodies in urban space.  
 
Choreographed bodies as an aspect of physical culture (from gymnastics to 
yoga) have historically played the role of an empty signifier: in this context 
political meaning is ‘both contested and forged through specific uses of forms’ 
and manipulated by ideological projects (Tumblety, 2013, p. 711; 722). Here, 
yoga acts to enmesh the spaces of its performance – and by extension ‘the 
nation’ – within a collective shared experience, based in active participation in 
the spectacle and its transmission to a global audience. Accordingly, street 
performance grounded in the ambience of the political street folds into 
international mediatised spectacle. It is in this context that the staged 
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spectacles that comprise the International Day of Yoga are used to generate a 
sense of Hinduness that is mobilised by Modi as part of the media strategy of 
the BJP. 
 
Take for instance the narrative built around the popular yoga āsana Surya 
Namaskar that is articulated in Yoga with Modi. Digital Modi begins by 
assuming his well-rehearsed familiar role as paterfamilias of the nation: 
 
“Have you made Surya Namaskar a part of your routine? 
Do watch this video to know why it is a good idea to do so 
and the advantages that come with regularly practicing it. 
#YogaDay2019”.263  
 
Much has been made of the ‘ancient wisdom’ of yoga by Modi and his 
collaborators and true to form, Surya Namaskar is claimed as part of India’s 
Vedic heritage.264 Incorporating twelve yoga āsanas into a flowing sequence, 
the ‘salute to the sun’, or ‘sun salutation’ (sūryanamaskār) has become 
perhaps the most iconic sequence of contemporary yoga practice. To be sure, 
evidence of Surya Namaskar’s ancient roots is thin on the ground.265 
                                                 
263 Modi, N. 2019. ‘Have you made Surya Namaskar a part of your routine?’, Twitter, 19 June 2019, 
‘https://twitter.com/narendramodi/status/1141176917216960515?lang=en, last accessed 20 May 
2020.   
264 According to “Hindu” folklore and popular yogic wisdom, the energetic knowledge of the sun 
(sūrya) doubles as the soul of the universe, the body is part of the universe, and thus part of the sun. 
265 As far as textual evidence goes, the earliest reference to Surya Namaskar is found in the 
Hathapradipikajyotsha of Brahmānanda (1.61) – a nineteenth century reading of the seminal 
Hathapradipika. In this text Surya Namaskar is stated to be something that causes affliction to the 
body: it is associated with body building and is not classified as ‘yoga’. We find support for these 
claims in the writings of Shri Yogendra. For Yogendra, ‘Surya namaskars or prostrates to the sun – a 
form of gymnastics attached to the sun worship in India” were “indiscriminately mixed up with yoga 
physical training by the ill-informed”. See Kaplish (2018). Research in the field of yoga studies has 
shown that Surya Namaskar dates to the late-1930s, emerging in its contemporary form largely thanks 
to the patronage of the Raja of Aundh, Pratinidhi Pant in 1938. A devoted physical culturalist and 
follower of the popular European body builder, Eugene Sandow, Pant was an important figure in the 
popularisation of the sequence as part of an Indian body building regimen – from outside the Indian 
cultural traditions of yoga – based on the incorporation of non-Indian practices (Singleton, 2010, p. 
124). Thus, while it is fair to say that the ‘salutation of the sun’ has a well-established lineage in south 
Asia, the practice of Surya Namaskar demonstrated by Modi emerged within the contemporary yoga 
milieu in syncretic fashion: one-part regimen of gymnastic physical culture and one-part Hindu 
prostration to the sun. What matters, of course, is not facts but the fictional consistency of the 
narrative. 
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Nonetheless, in recent years, Surya Namaskar has been deliberately politicised 
at various levels as a Hindu call to prayer.266 It is vigorously promoted by Baba 
Ramdev, BJP politicians and even takes centre stage to welcome visitors to 
India in the form of a huge sculpture at Indira Gandhi International Airport in 
New Delhi.  
 
Wearing a saffron coloured t-shirt and olive-green tracksuit bottoms, digital 
Modi proceeds to run through the sequence of āsanas that comprise Surya 
Namaskar (see figure 18). In the English version of the video (it is also posted 
in Hindi) a male, American accented voiceover narrates and explains the 
routine of eight yogic postures as it should be performed in a sequence of 
twelve steps. The Sanskrit names of each āsana are detailed and the precise 
instructions are sandwiched between offerings of ‘yogic wisdom’. At the 
beginning of the video, it is explained that “Surya Namaskar helps in the 
harmonious development of our body, keeping our mind focused and 
sharpening our intelligence.” To conclude the instructional, a further segment 
details the scientific credentials and health benefits of the sequence: 
 
“Surya Namaskar increases the capacity of your lungs, 
Surya Namaskar improves metabolism and has found to 
be very useful in the management of diabetes. Surya 
                                                 
266 For example, Yogi Adityanāth, the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh and leader of the Nāth 
Sampradāya (order) of Yogis, claimed in 2015 that those who want to avoid Yoga should “leave 
Hindustan” and that those opposing Surya Namaskar should drown themselves in the sea (Ali, 2015). 
In Mumbai, in 2016, the BJP-Shiv Sena controlled BMC ruled that yoga and Surya Namaskar would 
become mandatory in all civic schools in Mumbai. While the BJP Corporator Dilip Patel claimed to 
the Times of India that there was no foul play involved, as “Yoga is internationally accepted as the best 
exercise” and that “bringing it into the religious ambit is a political tactic by the opposition”. BMC 
Corporator Rais Sheikh of the Samajwadi Party fervently objected, claiming that “making Surya 
Namaskar compulsory in schools is a way to promote Hindutva as its origin lies in the Hindu god 
Surya (sun). See ‘Surya Namaskar to be must in Mum corporation schools’ Times of India, 25 August, 
2016, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Surya-Namaskar-to-be-must-in-Mum-corporation-
schools/articleshow/53852723.cms, last accessed 12 May 2020. In 2017, Yogi Adityanāth again 
courted controversy by claiming that Surya Namaskar was similar to Muslim prayers (namaz) and 
that those that looked to oppose it were attempting to divide the country on religious lines. See ‘Surya 
namaskar similar to namaz: Yogi Adityanath’, Live Mint, 29 March 2017, 
https://www.livemint.com/Politics/gqbE6FxzxuzsbGwKYUXJ9O/Surya-namaskar-similar-to-
Namaz-Yogi-Adityanath.html, last accessed 12 May 2020. The promotion of the Surya Namaskar 
sequence as a foundational yogic exercise and technical method of health and wellbeing, then, in fact 
doubles up as a ritualised sequence of gestures imbibed with political meaning. 
 226 
Namaskar regulates the secretions of endrocrine glands. 
Surya Namaskar helps to manage your weight and helps to 
strengthen your spine and back muscles.” 
 
Finally, alongside collected thumbnail pictures of digital Modi performing 
each āsana – and a reiteration of each āsana’s Sanskrit name – the narrator 
claims that: “regular practice of Surya Namaskar helps in de-toxification of 
your body, removes laziness thus revitalising the entire body”. Evidently, 
health and wellness are foregrounded here. However, at the same time, it is 
worth noting that Yoga with Modi points to a daily regime of physical 
discipline that fits seamlessly with the regular paramilitary mass drills that 
comprise the exercise routines of the RSS (Alter, 2004, p. 174).  
 
 
Figure 18: “Yoga with Modi” digital Modi performs ashwasanchalanāsana 
within a variation of the Surya Namaskar sequence.  
 
Indeed, Surya Namaskar and variations of the “Hindu push-up” have long 
been incorporated into the callisthenic training of RSS paramilitaries. 
According to the RSS, ‘expressed in the simplest terms the ideal of the Sangh 
is to carry the nation to the pinnacle of glory through organizing the entire 
society.’267 Towards this end, in the daily morning drills of RSS shakhas 
(units) swayamsevaks (volunteers) perform a mix of martial arts training 
                                                 
267 RSS. 2020. ‘Know us’, https://www.rss.org, last accessed 21 September 2020.   
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(judo, karate, indigenous forms) and weapons training (drills with the lathi 
and wooden swords); prayers and yoga including Surya Namaskar – 
instructions are issued in Sanskrit (see figure 19).268 Further still, in recent 
years, Surya Namaskar has been actively promoted by the RSS in wider society 
in relation to the International Day of Yoga and its daily performance in 
schools.269 In the modern congruence of aerobics, athleticism, physical fitness 
and yoga,270 that is evident in the promotion of Surya Namaskar by Modi, the 
RSS, and figures such as Baba Ramdev, Surya Namaskar becomes a collective 
practice analogous to salutation of the ‘Motherland’ (Bharat Mata).  
 
 
Figure 19: RSS cadres perform bhujangāsana within a variation of the Surya 
Namaskar sequence in mass drill formation. 
                                                 
268 India Today. 2014. With 53 organizations linked to it, RSS operate in almost every field of human 
activity. India Today. 20 March 2014, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-
story/story/19790331-with-53-organizations-linked-to-it-rss-operate-in-almost-every-field-of-
human-activity-821888-2014-03-20, last accessed 21 September 2020. 
269 See for instance, Singh. R. 2015. RSS throws its weight behind Surya Namaskar, Hindustan Times, 
18 March 2015, https://www.hindustantimes.com/jaipur/rss-throws-its-weight-behind-surya-
namaskar/story-4nnAEWdorlcZUUXZZfUfaM.html, last accessed 21 September 2020. 
270 Of course, the roots of modern yoga overlap with the development of physical culture movements 
such as callisthenics and body building. As we have seen, the late nineteenth century revival of Indian 
yoga was not simply a revival of interest in ancient Vedic wisdom, but a late-colonial revival, replete 
with concerns with body, health and physicality. Not only did motifs of Indian physical strength and 
fitness become key expressions of cultural politics – as images representing Grecian ideals of strength 
and vitality became symbolically important to the Indian anti-colonial struggle (Singleton, 2010, p. 
95), yoga itself became intertwined with notions of physical cultural revival.  
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At first glance, Yoga with Modi presents Surya Namaskar as legitimate on the 
basis of its rational scientific qualities and therapeutic and curative utility. The 
sequence is apparently presented in neutral universal terms. However, the 
emphasis placed on Sanskrit words, the opening yogic wisdom on the role of 
yoga in the “harmonious development” of the body and Modi’s saffron 
coloured t-shirt, akin to the saffron robes worn by Hindu ascetics, are all 
revealing of the motivation to create an imagined political community within 
the rubric of the Hindu chain of reasoning. In this mode, yoga is presented as 
a series of ritualised gestures that are generative of space, context and 
meaning, compatible both with Hindu-spiritual and ritual elements, and the 
commodification and commercialisation of globalised fitness and wellness 
industries. Here we see the extent to which a standardised and globally 
recognised configuration of yoga under the ambit of the Sangh has become 
tied to the politico-theistic ambitions of the BJP (Johar, 2015). Furthermore, 
mass public yoga practice acts as a platform to connect urban life and the 
performance of the nation in the street to the (fictional) reality of Hinduism as 
a ‘world-dynamic’ force, to which we now turn. 
 
5.4 Hinduism (as world dynamic force) towards the production of 
imagined community 
 
Key to the promotion of the International Day of Yoga celebrations has been 
the desire of Narendra Modi to transform India into a revered ‘vishwa guru’ – 
a spiritual leader, reformer and ‘guru’ to the world.271 Such pronouncements 
hark to an earlier era of Indian internationalism underpinned by the 
conviction that the spiritual wisdom of ‘the East’ – and India in particular – 
                                                 
271 See Dhamija, B. 2017. How to be Vishwa Guru: India must stop squandering its strengths and help 
solve today’s global problems. Times of India, 24 November 2017. 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/how-to-be-vishwa-guru-india-must-stop-
squandering-its-strengths-and-help-solve-todays-global-problems/, last accessed 28 September 
2020. 
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had much to teach the world.272 As we saw in chapter two (2.2), Swami 
Vivekananda, for instance, claimed that all religious paths were accepted by 
Hinduism and appeared on an evolutionary scale, from the ‘low ideas of 
idolatry’ to the ‘spiritual heights of Vedanta philosophy’ – the true 
Hinduism.273 The mass inaugural 2015 International Day of Yoga celebration 
in New Delhi led by Modi and the modern gurus of the IYA began with the Rig 
Vedic prayer samgacchadhwam samvadadhwam samvo manamsi janatam 
(“May you move in harmony, speak in one voice; let your minds be in 
agreement; just as the ancient gods shared their portion of sacrifice.”) This 
same prayer opens RSS meetings.274 Though the opening prayer has since 
been dropped from subsequent official main events, the language of yoga 
(Sanskrit), practice of Surya Namaskar and chanting of om remain common 
place within vernacular celebrations (Puri, 2019, p. 330).  
 
The crown jewel of all Vivekananda’s claims was the categorically esoteric idea 
that the slow burning conflicts between religions that have hitherto suffused 
world history could only be resolved by Hinduism. Accordingly, when 
Vivekananda travelled to America and the wider world he envisioned the 
creation of a ‘new order of humanity’ (Beckerlegge, 2013, Killingly, 2014). In 
the contemporary neoliberal era yoga has the propensity to earn (Hindu) India 
respect. In this regard, it is no coincidence that Modi is an open admirer of 
Vivekananda and that he is projected by the Sangh as a Hindutva icon.  
 
The motto of the 2019 International Day of Yoga set out by Modi was “yoga for 
peace, harmony and progress”. In this context, it is far from insignificant that 
                                                 
272 Famous adherents to this set of ideas included a wide range of thinkers and intellectuals, from 
Mahatma Gandhi to Rabindranath Tagore and Swami Vivekananda. Taken together, the attempts of 
various thinkers to universalise Hinduism were underwritten by the idea that the Vedas represented 
the ‘one true religion of humanity’ (see Bhatt, 2001, p. 17).  
273 Vivekananda is quoted in Beckerlegge (2013, p. 450). Vivekananda’s chief objective was to present 
a rationalised version of yogic religious spirituality to the world and did so by suggesting that his 
teachings were ostensibly “pure” and “authentic” and above all, geared to the ‘spiritual improvement 
of all mankind’ (Newcombe, 2017, p 7). 
274 ‘The men behind International Day of Yoga’, Rediff.com, 11 June 2015, 
https://www.rediff.com/news/report/the-men-behind-international-day-of-yoga/20150611.htm, last 
accessed 12 May 2020. 
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Modi’s speech rounded upon the idea of yogic values as universal values. 
Dedicating the annual celebrations to ideals of unity and harmony, concluding 
his speech, Modi summarised a set of key themes:  
 
“I urge you all to embrace yoga and make it an integral 
part of your daily routine. Yoga is ancient. And moral. It is 
constant and evolving. For centuries the essence of Yoga 
has remained the same: healthy body, stable mind, spirit 
of oneness.  
 
Yoga also furthers unity among people and in our society. 
This can heal several challenges that our world faces.  
 
Friends: peace [and] harmony have always been 
associated with yoga. On the occasion of the 5th 
International Yoga Day, let our motto be: yoga for peace 
harmony and progress.”275  
 
Yoga, then, is subtly framed as crucially relevant in the modern world to the 
extent that (Hindu) spirituality presents a workable solution to the 
degradations of (Western) material culture:  
     
“friends: the importance of practicing Yoga is greater than 
perhaps ever before. We live in a time when disease is 
related to lifestyle and stress are [sic] increasing. This 
comes with the fast routines and pressure at the 
workplace.”276 
 
                                                 
275 See Modi, N. 2019. ‘World over, the first rays of the sun being welcomed by enthusiastic Yoga 
practitioners would be a delightful sight’, Twitter, 21 June 2019, 
https://twitter.com/narendramodi/status/1141988189898338305, last accessed 20 October 2020. 
276 ibid. 
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In the twenty first century, the so-called ‘world-historical’ mission of 
Hinduism launches off the back of the global commodification of yoga and 
desires for wellness in the face of accelerated conditions of alienation and 
loneliness: a condition that remains the ‘basic experience of the modern world’ 
(Arendt, 2017). Modi’s appeal to spiritual themes and ideals of individual well-
being through the practice of yoga fits well with globalised concerns with 
health, fitness and wellness. Most importantly, it taps into desires to ‘restore’ 
Hindu pride. Yoga, in this regard, is used to generate a sense of imagined 
political community and demarcate Indian ‘difference’ and place in the world. 
The implicit message is that through the dissemination of ‘ancient’ Hindu 
culture, it is possible to heal and teach all ‘others’.  
 
In this context, expectedly, the votaries of the International Day of Yoga have 
much to say about the issue of self-care in the modern world. Take for 
instance, Baba Ramdev’s claim that ‘loneliness [and] incompleteness are the 
biggest problems in our lives.’ Ramdev never tires of the teaching that while 
yoga is ‘scientific physical exercise’, above and beyond, it is a philosophy and 
way of life: ‘each and every breath is yoga’ – whatever one does in one’s life 
‘with purity, with love. This is called yoga’.277 This powerful and appealing 
theme, that yoga can replace the afflictions and addictions of modern urban 
life (Western materialism and its discontents) is also present in Modi’s 2019 
speech, in his claim to be pained when reading “about bright young man and 
women [sic], being affected by substance abuse; alcoholism; diabetes.”278 It is 
strongly hinted at that ‘Western’ afflictions spread by colonialism, rapacious 
consumerism and imperialism continue to animate the contemporary world. 
“Yoga”, Modi boldly asserts, “offers solutions to these problems.”279  
 
                                                 
277 See ‘Swami Ramdev addressing Press Conference in London, UK |22 June 2018, You Tube, 22 June 
2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6OiCcBpu-6o, last accessed 20 October 2020. 
278 See Modi, N. 2019. ‘World over, the first rays of the sun being welcomed by enthusiastic Yoga 
practitioners would be a delightful sight’, Twitter, 21 June 2019, 
https://twitter.com/narendramodi/status/1141988189898338305, last accessed 20 October 2020. 
279 Ibid. 
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The idea that ‘Eastern’ (read: Hindu) spirituality – and yoga in particular – 
can teach the world how to live better is not of course new. To be sure, the 
proposition that ‘Eastern’ Indian spirituality is superior to ‘Western’ 
materialism, has long been a motif of Indian nationalist expression. Even the 
alleged scion of Indian secularism, Jawaharlal Nehru, for instance, strongly 
believed that ‘Indian spirituality’ – the centre piece of Indian culture – had 
entered into a long period of degradation, from the golden Upanishadic age’, 
to its contemporary subsumption and subjugation by ‘Western materialism’ 
(Blom Hansen, 1999, p. 68). Nehru himself was a keen yoga practitioner, 
wrote about it in his Discovery of India, promoted yoga internationally and 
moved to include the practice of yoga in Indian health and physical education 
(see Chintha, 2020).  
 
Thus, for nationalists of all stripes, replication of a binary of ‘Eastern 
spirituality’ and ‘Western materialism’ has long been a useful way of 
demarcating Indian difference in the face colonisation, imperialism and 
latterly, the globalisation of neoliberalism. Modi is in this regard no different – 
spiritual themes are deeply embedded in his discourse of the global utility of 
yoga. Like Vivekananda in America, in claiming to return yoga to its (Hindu) 
Indian roots, the International Day of Yoga represents an attempt by the 
Sangh to place yoga practice beyond the physical and spiritual development of 
the individual, and towards the solution of the deepest concerns of 
humankind. The primary motive driving this narrative is the production of an 
(imagined) political community of Hindus at home.  
 
We saw in chapter two (2.2) that the spiritual prowess of Hinduism, in 
juxtaposition to other religio-philosophical systems, has long been framed by 
nationalists on the subcontinent as the central pillar of Indian greatness – the 
global realisation of this ‘Indian spirit’ amounts to the ‘world-historical’ 
mission of Hinduism (Blom Hansen, 1999, p. 69). Evidently, these sentiments 
retain a central space within the contemporary ideology of Hindutva. For 
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instance, according to Baba Ramdev (2008, p. 9), a complete philosophy of 
life appropriate for the Indian nation and the world can be defined in one 
word. Solutions for world peace are failing and people have become ‘entangled 
in the web of half-truths’ circulated by religions from ‘Christianity or Islam’ 
and ‘Buddhisam [sic] or Jainism’. The word for the ‘magical solution that will 
protect each one’s national pride, religious belief and is free from any selfish 
interest or greed’ is ‘Yog’ – Yoga ‘is not a cult or theory but complete way of 
life’. Swami Vivekananda’s logic is thus reconfigured but comes in different 
forms. From a different angle, but very much endorsing the same message, 
Hansaji of The Yoga Institute, claims that in the event of the global and 
universal practice of yoga, “all religion [and] chaos would stop”. While once 
useful, the time for Christianity and Islam is now over and should give way for 
the “religion of humanity”.280 That religion is Hinduism and the vehicle for its 
realisation as a world-dynamic force is Hindutva.  
 
Yet, in the last instance, the narrative of yoga as a vehicle for the ‘world-
historical’ mission of Hinduism rests upon the consolidation of imagined 
community in the political street. Speaking of the right to the city, Henri 
Lefebvre (1970, p. 30)281 claimed that ‘in the street – and enabled by it – a 
group of inhabitants can manifest itself and appropriate the street, they can 
achieve an appropriated space-time’. In the same way, between the studio, 
household, digital media strategy and the political street, the spectacle of the 
International Day of Yoga works towards the production of the imagined 
community of the Hindu nation. Recalling the Gateway of India celebrations 
and Yoga by the Bay (5.3), we see how ordinary daily lives merge in the 
political street into the spectacle of the International Day of Yoga. In 
celebration of the International Day of Yoga, Hindutva values crystallise 
through a remarkable colonisation of urban public space. Looking out to the 
sea, imbibed with an idea of Indias place in the world, thousands of 
                                                 
280 Interview with Hansaji Yogendra at The Yoga Institute, 13/01/20. 
281 Lefebvre is quoted in Purcell (2013, p. 149).  
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Mumbaikars meditated on Modi’s mantra of “yoga for peace, harmony and 
progress” and the power of yoga as a ‘world-dynamic’ force. 
 
The street spaces of spectacular yoga performance, then, serve as venues for 
the extension of ‘passive networks’ that allow for instantaneous 
communication and the recognition of commonalities. As Bayat (2017, pp. 
104-105) makes clear, urban streets thus become spaces of political 
expression. Shared identities are recognised ‘without necessarily establishing 
an active or deliberate communication and without being part of an 
organisation’ (Bayat, 2017, p.105). The political street therefore signifies a 
powerful symbolic utterance that ‘goes beyond the physicality of the streets to 
convey collective sentiments of nation [and] community’ (Bayat, 2010, p. 13). 
Though resting on the physicality of bodies in motion, the politics of the 
International Day of Yoga are above all, spectacular. Yoga is suffused with 
political symbolism that is used to generate a sense of Hindutva values as 
universal and supreme that is in turn disseminated by Modi as an integral part 
of his media strategy and profile. In summary, yoga in the political streets of 
Mumbai serves as a powerful ‘means of articulation’ to yoke together an 
imagined community of Hindus and their being-in-the-world. As this thesis 
has hopefully made clear, what is important is not the facts of the story, but 




In the concluding chapter of the thesis I recap and elaborate on the main 
themes of the thesis (6.2) before returning to the question of ‘the sacred’, 
nationalism and the city discussed in the literature review section of chapter 
one (6.3). Subsequently, I offer some concluding thoughts and opinions with 
special reference to perceived shortcomings of the thesis and the openings for 
further research that have been generated as a result (6.4). For now, let us 
briefly summarise the arguments and conclusions of the present chapter. 
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Since 2014 there has been a visible campaign for the standardisation of yoga 
that frames Hindutva values as universal and supreme. Narendra Modi has 
been at the forefront of this political strategy, flanked by a series of popular 
and powerful figures in the world of Indian yoga. This strategy has culminated 
most prominently in the inauguration of the International Day of Yoga. The 
segregations and differences of the actual street are sutured as the abstraction 
of the political street is reproduced. This chapter has argued that the primary 
motivation propelling the promotion of yoga by Hindutva forces is to connect 
a contemporary sense of imagined political community to nostalgia for a 
(fictional) glorious Hindu past. In doing so, the goal is to draw on the global 
commodification of yoga and incorporate urban aspirations and desires for 
self-care and wellness into the production of the Hindu rashtra. In this 
context, through the spectacle of the International Day of Yoga, Hindutva is 
grounded in everyday life. The nation is performed in the street. 
 
As a result, the ‘yogic way of life’ is developed as a powerful aspect of the 
political project for restoration of Hindu pride and realisation of the ‘world-
historical’ mission of Hinduism as powerful elements in the production of an 
imagined community of Hindus. The mission of the RSS-BJP to restore Hindu 
pride and India’s place in the world propels the popularity of yoga onwards 
and upwards. At the same time, by looking outward and playing up the idea of 
Hinduism as a ‘world-dynamic force’ and ‘Eastern’ (Hindu) spirituality as 
India’s gift to the world, the idea of Hindutva as destined to a higher purpose 
is projected at home (see Bhatt, 2001, p. 15).  
 
According to the teachings of modern yoga, daily practice takes the form of an 
introverted and personal technology of the self. And indeed, for many, yoga is 
experienced as a beautiful, restorative and transformative practice. This 
chapter has argued that in the International Day of Yoga, yoga becomes a 
spectacular form of spatial politics open to all, as performance of the nation in 
the street doubles up as (political) spectacle and ‘means of articulation’ to 
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propagate the formation of an imagined political community of Hindus. 
Hindutva becomes effective in the International Day of Yoga through a 
spectacular colonisation of urban public space. Through ‘Yoga with Modi’ and 
the celebrity endorsement of yoga practice, promotion of the ‘yogic way of life’ 
straddles business, religion and politics. The key objective of the 
standardisation of yoga around Hindutva themes has been to claim India as 
the historical and spiritual home of yoga. Accordingly, the International Day of 
Yoga has been developed into an instrument of soft power connected to the 
late-colonial imaginary of Hinduism as a world-dynamic force, towards the 
























Conclusions to a story of the political street 
 
‘There is a politics of space because 
space is political.’  
– Henri Lefebvre, (1973, p. 59)282 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The overarching concern of this thesis has been to better understand how the 
politics of Hindutva are reproduced, through apparently uncontroversial 
spaces and seemingly innocuous everyday practices, in and through the 
political street. Creative performative politics have long been deployed 
towards the formation of a tangible sense of nationalist identity in the streets 
and public spaces of the city. As Indian modernity took apparently stable form 
under colonial rule, powerful counter movements – in Bombay, the Congress 
and the CPI in particular – emerged in opposition. In chapter three, it was 
argued that in the case of Ganpati Utsava and civil disobedience, the ‘means of 
articulation’ was the politicisation of religio-cultural ‘difference’ through the 
(de)colonisation of colonial urban space in the city. While the nationalism of 
the Congress as it was transformed into a mass movement was certainly anti-
colonial, it was also underpinned by anti-Muslim, pro-Hindu tendencies. As 
for the CPI, dominant caste visions (and praxis) of a ‘red’ communist Bombay 
were paradoxically wedded to the reproduction of Hindu social order. Hindu-
Marxist popular movement and the anti-colonial nationalism of the Congress 
gave birth to the coordinates of an exclusionary Hindu politics, that would 
have a lasting legacy in the political street.   
 
This legacy has been extended and reconfigured by Hindutva forces after 2014 
in the shape of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and the International Day of Yoga. 
Through an examination of these two case studies, the thesis has understood 
                                                 
282 Lefebvre is quoted in Elden (2007, p. 107). 
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the politics of Hindutva in the city of Mumbai as a political strategy geared 
towards the production of an imagined political community of Hindus. The 
nation is performed in the city’s streets and public spaces as urban aspirations, 
everyday experiences and the nuances of ‘the sacred’ are folded into the 
imagined vision of a unitary Hindu nation. The thesis has empirically 
demonstrated that Swachh Bharat and the International Day of Yoga work to 
‘suture’ together diverse populations (see de Leon, Desai and Tuğal, 2015. 2) 
against a background of social cleavages of caste and class in neoliberal India. 
In chapter one, Hindutva was situated, further still, as an exemplary case of 
far-right politics and a conceptual pivot to better explore how ‘religion’, 
political economy and far-right resurgence connect in the twenty first century. 
 
This chapter proceeds to answer the interlocking set of questions put forth in 
the introduction to the thesis (1.2):  
 
How and why is the ideology of Hindutva so effective? what tools are 
used to mobilise diverse populations towards the production of 
imagined community in the political streets of Mumbai? And what 
role, if any, does the ‘colonisation’ of urban public spaces play? 
 
The aim of the following section (6.2) of this concluding chapter is to restate, 
synthesise and contextualise the argument of the thesis, outlining its key 
themes and the overall contribution of the research. Following this, I take 
some space to return to the existing literature on religion, nationalism and the 
city (see 1.4) and outline the ways that the thesis has contributed to and 
enhanced existing scholarship (6.3). Finally, (6.4) I take stock of the 
shortcomings of the thesis and offer some concluding thoughts, emerging 
questions and orientations for future research.  
 
6.2 Performing the nation in the street 
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The crystallisation of Hindutva politics through the performance of the nation 
in the street constitutes the golden thread of this thesis. As was argued in 
chapter two, the social and economic instability peculiar to geographical 
iterations of post-Fordist neoliberal capitalism gave birth to new wants, needs 
and desires. After 1980, the Congress moved to an open political strategy of 
‘soft’ Hindutva albeit maintaining a rhetoric of secular values when politically 
expedient to do so. The decline of the Congress as a potent political force 
coincided with the rise of upper caste desires for conservative restoration in 
the last instance spearheaded by the RSS. In these circumstances, a ‘new’ right 
to the city emerged. Above all, the shift towards a neoliberal pattern of 
accumulation signalled a change in the ways that urban communities engage 
with politics, the urban is experienced, and thus political strategy is shaped. In 
this context, my claim has been that as the nation is performed in the street, in 
the form of Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and the International Day of Yoga. By way 
of a colonisation of urban streets and public spaces, Hindutva politics 
crystallise and within apparently uncontroversial spaces and everyday 
practices.   
 
Nationalism in Bombay/Mumbai has always invested heavily in the street and 
the grand Congress-led ‘high’ politics of anti-colonial struggle set the scene. 
Themes of discipline, moral community and the idea of Hinduism as a ‘world-
dynamic’ force – emanating from a distinct Hindu chain of reasoning – 
emerged through the colonial encounter and became concrete through the 
politics of the street. This was empirically demonstrated through analysis of 
three movements in the making of the political street. Street politics, protests 
and performances, from Ganpati Utsava, the civil disobedience movement and 
the Bombay communist movement, were critical in the formation of anti-
colonial struggle in the city. But moreover, contributed in a powerful way to 
the production of a tangible national identity expressed in a Hindu vernacular. 
Alongside the birth of Hindutva in the writings of V.D Savarkar, within the 
Hindu Mahasabha and following the formation of the RSS in 1925, formation 
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of the ‘Hindu’ political street had already begun between the birth of anti-
colonialism and exclusionary Hindu nationalism. Primordial Hindu 
mythology and anti-Muslim sentiments were set in motion as the crucible of a 
Hindu chain of reasoning that has shaped Indian nationalist thought from the 
late-colonial period to the present.  
 
The underlying contribution of the thesis, then, has been to highlight struggles 
in and through the political street as critical to the production of 
contemporary forms of Hindutva politics that converge in the performance of 
the nation. More specifically, the thesis has demonstrated that in the context 
of the urban rhythms of neoliberalism, the imagined community of the Hindu 
rashtra, restoration of Hindu pride and idea of Hinduism as a ‘world-dynamic’ 
force has been yoked to the everyday urban aspirations of Mumbaikars. As 
poverty is attributed to the individual and the state is absolved of 
responsibility, nationalist, bourgeois claims to the city proliferate (Phadke et 
al, 2011, p. 36). Against the background of neoliberal urbanism and its 
discontents, aspirations and desires for the management of urban space 
unfold in visions of ‘clean’ streets, beautification and disciplined bodies – 
above all, the ‘lower orders’ are put in their place. In this context, Hindutva 
has become effective as it has become progressively aligned with a growing 
sense of national-popular will. The effect is that the moral and political 
leadership of the BJP regime of Narendra Modi is legitimised. And 
accordingly, the political program and world-view of the RSS is accepted as 
common sense. Piggy backing the aspirations and desires of ‘ordinary’ Indians 
the imagined community of Hindus takes form. 
 
It was argued in chapter two that following the emergence of neoliberal 
urbanity - exemplified in Mumbai in the shift from mills to malls - social 
worlds of labour and the qualities of everyday life radically changed, albeit 
over a gradual and uneven process of transformation. As Sudhir Patwardhan’s 
painting Lower Parel (figure 4) neatly depicts, Fordist, collectivist modes of 
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life crumbled as individualised, entrepreneurial practices became dominant. 
The consistency of a shift in Congress politics to ‘soft’ Hindutva, from Indira, 
to Rajiv, and now Rahul Gandhi has coincided with the rise of a specifically 
neoliberal urbanity in Mumbai. Against this backdrop, desires for 
beautification, the better management of urban space, cleanliness and 
sanitation were piggy backed by the BJP in the form of Swachh Bharat 
Abhiyan. At the same time, in the International Day of Yoga we see that 
individual and collective desires for health, fitness and wellness converge with 
aspirations for Hindu culture to be globally respected and India to emerge as 
‘Vishwa Guru’ to the world. 
 
Focusing on Swachh Bharat Abhiyan, chapter four elaborated the ways that 
Hindutva politics draw upon the urban aspirations and desires of large 
swathes of (predominantly caste Hindu) Mumbaikars for the management of 
urban space and reinforcement of caste-based Hindu social order. In the case 
of Swachh Bharat, bourgeois environmentalism and the reconstituted practice 
of manual scavenging are metabolised into the coherent narrative of a ‘clean 
India’. Swachh Bharat also reveals a powerful class component in the politics 
of Hindutva. Legitimised by the iconography of Gandhi and led from the front 
by Narendra Modi, desires for cleanliness and beautification are unevenly 
realised in the city. The up-market areas of Mumbai have seen significant 
improvement in terms of general appearance, garbage collection and 
connection to sanitation infrastructure. The city’s bourgeoning slums, 
meanwhile, continue to be neglected by the state. While the sanitation workers 
that come from these areas are ‘officially’ glorified, they continue to live in the 
same conditions and their working day remains the same. The overarching 
concern of the project is coordination of a political strategy that connects 
Gandhian narratives of cleanliness to the project for a ‘Swachh Bharat’ 
modelled on the RSS samrasta vison of harmony between castes. Swachh 
Bharat, then, is less about cleaning up the city and improving public health 
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infrastructure, as it is about the production of Hindu moral community 
through performance of the nation in the street.  
 
The imagined community of Hindutva is a powerful abstraction that 
meaningfully connects to the stresses and anxieties of everyday life; it 
propagates restoration of the Hindu rashtra constructs a sense of the national-
popular will that rests on an escape from reality. The myth of a fictional golden 
past on the verge of restoration consists of a ‘revolt against realism’ (Arendt, 
2017, pp. 460-461). Hindutva aims at the production of an imagined 
community of Hindus and looks to situate India in the world as an 
internationally revered spiritual leader. Like the foreign Muslim ‘enemy’ of 
early Congress-led mass politics in Bombay (Ganpati Utsava), this strategy 
pivots on identification of an imagined enemy in the form of ‘anti-national 
elements’.  
 
Yet, paradoxically, in the 1992-1993 Bombay riots, extreme violence against 
Muslims was cultivated in the everyday, through mass outdoor prayers and 
definition of a symbolic battlefield between friend and enemy. A coordinated 
political strategy was generated to mobilise devastating communal rioting. 
Hindu devotional practices in the political street were swiftly weaponised (see 
chapter three). Recalling the introduction to the thesis (1.1) and discussion of 
the ideology of Hindutva (2.2), we have seen that Hindutva is a violent 
ideology. Hindutva crystallises in the political street as a powerful abstraction 
albeit with concrete effects: xenophobia and violence. While Swachh Bharat 
and the International Day of Yoga appear as banal and innocuous they 
nonetheless connect to the omnipresent threat of violence at the core of 
Hindutva politics.  
 
In consideration of the politics of ‘anti-nationalism’, chapter five noted these 
themes in the politicisation of yoga. From Baba Ramdev’s (2009, p. 16) claim 
that ‘those who do not love the soil, culture, civilization, and the people of the 
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nation have no right to stay in this country’, to Yogi Adityanāth’s invective, 
that those opposing Surya Namaskar should drown themselves in the sea’ (Ali, 
2015). Everyday yoga practice is connected to nostalgia for a (fictional) ancient 
Hindu past and restoration of a glorious Hindu future. All opposition is ‘anti-
national’. Similarly, Swachh Bharat has been dogged by claims of coercion, 
harassment and violence against lower castes, Dalits and Dalit women in 
particular, that continue to practice open defecation. At the same time as 
Swachh Bharat has failed to deal with the caste-based roots of India’s 
sanitation crisis, it has fuelled the idea that all must do their bit for a cleaner 
India. Hindutva envisions a caste-based moral community of Hindus, in the 
case of Swachh Bharat, unified around a casteist ‘culture of cleanliness’. Those 
seen as not contributing to a ‘Clean India’ are anti-national and therefore 
deserving of violence.   
 
It was argued in chapter two that while the Hindu chain of reasoning has long 
structured the politics of the Indian National Congress, the ‘soft’ Hindutva 
position of the party became progressively more explicit after 1980. This 
opened up a political space for Hindutva to enter the political mainstream and 
aided the rise of the BJP to power. Yet, as chapters four and five have shown, 
despite claims of the BJP to represent Hindu religious aspiration, instead, the 
project for an imagined political community of Hindus is articulated through a 
secular framework of cleanliness and bourgeois wants for a clean city on the 
one hand, and the commodification of yoga and its insertion into the global 
matrix of health and fitness on the other. In short, we must look to India’s 
political economy and its attendant social cleavages to understand why 
Hindutva has been so effective after 2014. An understanding of the means of 
articulation deployed by Hindutva forces – in the context of neoliberal 
urbanity – is therefore more fruitful than to simply note the idea of India as 
unique and emphasise its ‘difference’ per se (see for example, Derickson, 2014; 
Parnell and Robinson, 2012; Roy, 2015; Roy and Ong, 2011). Hindutva must 
therefore be considered in the context of the globalisation of neoliberalism.  
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What this means, is that the global conjuncture of conditions is critical. Suhas 
Palshikar (2019. p. 113) is thus, in my view, correct to note that   
 
‘in all probability, a new political idiom, a new political 
elite, and a new political culture are shaping in 
contemporary India. As the societal arena goes through 
more and more changes, the possibility of the present 
moment turning into a new hegemony becomes stronger’.  
 
Yet all being said, the conclusions of this thesis also underline the fragility of 
Hindutva politics. Resistance to the nationalism of the Congress in the late-
colonial period was assembled by the Communist Party of India in the streets 
and neighbourhoods of central Bombay. Utopian ideas of a transformation of 
everyday life were compacted by solidarity in the political street. In the end, 
the movement was hamstrung by communal division and the persistence of 
caste relations and the refusal of the CPI high command to confront the 
realities of ‘graded inequality’ (see chapter three). Nonetheless, the findings of 
this study suggest that pockets of resistance to the narrative of Swachh Bharat 
– and thereby the Hindu rashtra – are evident in elements of the bourgeois 
environmentalist movement as well as the anti-caste politics of anti-manual 
scavenging movements (see chapter four). What this shows is that the 
abstraction of Hindutva is at constant risk of being uncovered and potential 
shifts in social alliances, between Dalit communities and Muslims, for 
example, render it fragile as a ‘total’ ideology. It is also true, as James Manor 
(2019, p. 120) has argued, that ‘Indian voters are sophisticated enough to see 
the ironic contrast between [Modi’s] dazzling theatrics and the drab realities 
that they face’. As the everyday standards of living for the ‘slum dwellers’ and 
‘lower orders’ of Mumbai – and indeed, India as a whole – are further 
imperilled by BJP rule, the risk of Modi appearing without clothes and 
Hindutva as antithetical to the pressing needs of Indian citizens increases.    
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Based on a case study of Mumbai, this thesis has demonstrated that the 
politics of Hindutva increasingly crystallise in seemingly uncontroversial 
urban public spaces through theatrical performance of the nation in the street. 
This has been grounded in a close examination of the BJPs flagship projects, 
Swachh Bharat Abihyan and the International Day of Yoga. While Hindutva 
forces have in many ways appropriated diverse ‘Hindu’ cultural traditions, 
they have done so through the presentation of a politicised, nationalist sense 
of ‘Hinduness’ that hinges above all on principles of disciplined bodies, Hindu 
political/moral community, and the idea of Hinduism as world-dynamic force. 
More specifically, the theatrical, performative politics of Hindutva that have 
emerged under Modi examined within this thesis meaningfully connect with 
the aspirations of urban India in the twenty first century. Swachh Bharat and 
the International Day of Yoga address creeping anxieties of everyday life and 
stoke long-held desires for the restoration of Hindu pride and the (allegedly 
rightful) place of India in the world. This has aided the production of a 
relatively stable social formation where corporate interests, the professional 
classes, and the urban poor have been able to rally around the idea of a strong 
Hindu rashtra as the road to a prosperous (neoliberal) future.   
 
Counter-movement in the political street 
 
By contrast, the problem of solidarity in the streets outside of the performance 
of the nation in the street has become apparent in the series of protests that 
followed the passing of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in December 
2019. The CAA enshrines ‘faith’ as an article of citizenship in a way that 
distinguishes between ‘Indian’ and ‘foreign’ religions. With Parsis and 
Christians listed as faiths that are coterminous with Indian citizenship, Indian 
Muslims have been marked out as the exception. Mirroring the Israeli law of 
return (passed in 1950) giving Jews the right to claim Israeli citizenship, the 
CAA fast tracks citizenship of illegal immigrants from Nepal, Bangladesh and 
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Pakistan, provided they are not Muslims (Fazal, 2020).283 The bulk of anti-
CAA protestors are unsurprisingly Indian Muslims. But importantly, Muslim 
communities were substantially flanked by students, civil rights activists and 
large swathes of progressive Indians.  
 
The protests have represented an assertive Muslim presence in urban public 
space – thus mounting a challenge to the Hindu political street – but also have 
been subject to radically uneven policing, with Muslim areas predictably on 
the sharp end of police brutality (Fazal, 2020). In Mumbai, a mass twenty-five 
thousand strong student-led protest took place at August Kranti Maidan on 
19th December 2020. In the following days, further protests were largely 
suppressed. Meanwhile, pro-CAA protests were allowed to go ahead (see 
figure 20). Despite the mass, cross-class dimension to the anti-CAA protests 
that hit the streets, the BJP quickly developed an aggressive communal 
narrative to split the crowd. As the protests intensified, Modi provocatively 
claimed that those people “creating violence” could be “identified by their 
clothes” – a clear reference to Indian Muslims.284 The protests were quickly 
picked apart by pro-Hindutva forces with ‘anti-national’ elements identified as 
the driving force. Between loyalist media and bodies on the streets, it was 
quickly demonstrated that alternative performances of the nation in the street 
are a threat that is taken seriously by Hindutva groups. Though in Mumbai 
anti-Muslim violence following anti-CAA protests has been sporadic and light, 
the furious violence unleashed against protesters and Muslims in New Delhi 
                                                 
283 Attempts by the government to reassure Indian Muslims have rung hollow. Many have pointed to 
the well-publicised fact that after mentioning the citizenship of Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Jain and 
Christian migrants in India at a BJP Rally, Home Minister Amit Shah went onto claim that the CAA 
was needed ‘to flush out the infiltrators from our country’. See Shah, A. 2019. ‘First, we will bring 
Citizenship Amendment Bill’, Twitter, 22 April 2019, 
https://twitter.com/AmitShah/status/1120275890871521280, last accessed 13 June 2020. 
284 See Johari, A. 2019. ‘As Modi talks of identifying violent protestors by their clothes, what should 
Indian Muslims do?’, Scroll.in, 17 December 2019, https://scroll.in/article/947024/as-modi-talks-of-
identifying-violent-protesters-by-their-clothes-indian-muslims-face-a-double-bind, last accessed 12 
May 2020.  
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Figure 20: A busy pro-CAA demonstration outside Dadar Railway station, 
central Mumbai, December 2019 (photograph by the author). 
 
Performing the nation in the context of COVID-19 
 
The power of Hindutva in the political street is further evident following the 
radical shift in urban experience in the wake of the spread of COVID-19 to 
India. On 24th March 2020, Narendra Modi announced that the entire country 
would be placed under lockdown to prevent the spread of coronavirus, with all 
shops, non-essential industry, restaurants and eateries closing with immediate 
effect. The haphazard implementation of the lockdown hit the urban poor 
hard, owing to a serious lack of provisions for migrant workers and 
widespread use of police violence to keep people of the streets 
(Venkataramakrishnan, 2020). The result on the ground in Mumbai was panic 
and the mass exodus of millions of daily wage workers from the city.286 With 
                                                 
285 The brutal violence after 23 February 2020 in north east Delhi began following a speech by BJP 
activist Kapil Mishra threatening protestors. The events comprise the deadliest religious violence in 
the capital since the anti-Sikh pogroms that spread through the city after the assassination of Indira 
Gandhi by her two Sikh bodyguards in 1984 (Tantray, 2020).  
286 Bose (2020).  
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no way to feed their families for the duration of the lockdown, migrant 
workers across the country were forced to exit Indian cities and head back to 
their villages. With over ninety percent of the Indian workforce finding their 
livelihood in the informal sector (ILO, 2019) and given the serious lack of 
available and/or affordable transport, for many workers, the only viable 
option was to walk often hundreds of miles with frequently devastating 
consequences.287 
 
In response to the evident chaos that ensued, Modi took the tone of patriarch-
in-chief and justified the harsh measures as a decision made for the good of 
‘the people’. To be sure, contrition for the unnecessary pain suffered by the 
poor would have amounted to an admission of poor planning. And in the 
event, as Rohan Venkataramakrishnan (2020) points out, ‘Modi’s penchant 
for grand announcements, rather than careful policy making, doesn’t allow for 
this’. The realities of India’s reliance on private health care and woefully 
inadequate public health system means that the country faces a serious and 
daunting challenge to contain and combat the effects of COVID-19.  
 
Concurrently, reports of Hindutva groups drinking Gaumutra (cow urine) for 
protection against coronavirus proliferate. Gaumutra has long been advertised 
by Hindutva forces as a cure to various ailments and disease, more recently 
receiving strong patronage as a scientifically legitimate product under the 
Modi government (Penkar, 2020). Likewise, the Indian Yoga Association has 
called for ‘synchronised global prayers’ to protect against COVID-19 that 
consist of Sanskrit mantras aimed at the ‘powering up’ of one’s immune 
system.288 Unsurprisingly, concerted efforts have been made by Hindutva 
forces to step up attacks on Indian Muslims through mass disinformation; 
accusing Muslims of being ‘super-spreaders’, questioning the ‘intentions’ of 
Muslim gatherings and spreading rumours of the formation of various sinister 
                                                 
287 See Ellis-Petersen and Chaurasia (2020). 
288 See Indian Yoga Association, 2020. Synchronised Global Prayers: IYA Protocol for COVID- 19. 
YogaIYA.in, http://www.yogaiya.in/sgp/, last accessed 20 June 2020. 
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plots to infect Hindus (Banaji and Bhat, 2020). In the specific context of the 
virus itself, the Modi government has characteristically prioritised propaganda 
over public health concerns. 
 
In October 2020, the BJP released official protocol for using Ayurveda and 
yoga for the prevention and treatment of COVID-19. The “evidence-based 
protocol” released by the Ministry of AYUSH recommends the consumption of 
ashwagandha (Indian ginseng) guduchi (heart-leaved moonseed), pippali 
(long pepper), turmeric milk and the performance of yoga to treat 
asymptomatic and mild COVID-19. This follows Modi’s public championing of 
‘traditional’ ways to boost the immune system and direction that people follow 
guidelines issued by AYUSH to avoid contracting COVID-19 since the 
beginning of the pandemic. In April 2020, in an address to the nation at the 
beginning of the crisis, Modi asked that people “drink hot water and kadha 
[herbs] frequently” to avoid contracting the virus.289 At time of writing, India 
is currently second to the United States in terms of national caseloads and 
third behind the United States and Brazil in terms of COVID-19 deaths.290   
 
In the early stages of the government’s response to the pandemic, in place of 
clear outlines around the steps the BJP would be taking to tackle the outbreak 
and evident economic fallout of the necessary actions, Modi announced a 
fourteen-hour compulsory “Janata curfew” (People’s curfew) on 22nd March 
2020 between 7am and 9pm. At 5pm the PM requested that Indian’s come to 
their doorways, balconies and windows and ‘keep clapping hands and ringing 
bells for five mins to salute [essential workers] and encourage them’.291 As 
Modi’s Taali-thaali bajao (clap your hands) initiative took place and tens of 
                                                 
289 See Thacker (2020).  
290 Gutiérrez and Clarke, 2020. Coronavirus world map: which countries have the most Covid cases 
and deaths?, The Guardian, 20 October 2020, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/20/coronavirus-world-map-which-countries-have-
the-most-covid-cases-and-deaths, last accessed 20 October 2020.  
291 India Today, 2020. What is Janata Curfew: A curfew of the people, by the people, for the people to fight coronavirus, 
India Today, 20 March 2020, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/janata-curfew-to-fight-coronavirus-pm-modi-
urges-citizens-to-stay-off-roads-from-7-am-to-9-pm-on-sunday-1657581-2020-03-19, last accessed 20 June 2020. 
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millions of Indians erupted into raucous applause, millions of migrant 
workers simultaneously fled India’s cities with bags slung over their shoulders 
and their children in their arms. The events have been labelled by some as the 
greatest exodus since partition.292 
 
To mark the halfway date in the first phase of India’s nationwide three-week 
lockdown (25th March - 14th April 2020) Modi exhorted the nation to follow 
his lead and  
 
“on the 5th of April, at 9pm, turn off all the lights in your 
homes, stand at your doors or in your balconies, and 
light candles or diyas, torches or mobile flashlights for 9 
minutes. I repeat, light candles or diyas, torches or 
mobile flashlights.”293 
 
Like Taali-thaali bajao the ‘9pmfor9minutes’ gesture went viral on social 
media and attracted a great deal of participation. In the context of COVID-
19, the focus on theatrical performances of national unity overlooking urban 
streets has taken place against the backdrop of a serious lack of 
transparency, dire lack of testing and serious shortages of protective gear for 
frontline medical workers. The effect on the ground has been that affluent, 
wealthy Indians are able to stay safe and remain within their homes, while 
the ‘lopsided lockdown’ hits the urban poor with full force (see Drèze, 2020). 
Meanwhile, the project of Modi’s BJP for the transformation of India into a 
Hindu rashtra is advanced through performance of the nation in the street. 
(see figure 21).  
 
                                                 
292 Ellis-Petersen and Chaurasia (2020). 
293 Modi is quoted in, The Wire, 2020. Hidden in Plain Sight in Modi's New Coronavirus Action Call, a 
Pattern of Nines, The Wire, 3 April 2020, https://thewire.in/politics/narendra-modi-nine-covid-19-
lights, Last accessed 20 June 2020.   
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Figure 21: “India Right Now! #9pm9minutes”. Migrant workers flood out of 
India’s city’s as affluent residents light candles, diyas, torches and mobile 
flashlights.  Tweeted by Congress MLA Salman Nizami, 5th April 2020.294 
 
6.3 Rethinking nationalism, ‘the sacred’ and the street. 
 
How, then, has this thesis contributed to and enhanced scholarly discussion of 
religion (‘the sacred’), nationalism and the city? The close study of Swachh 
Bharat Abhiyan in chapter four demonstrated that the project in Mumbai to 
create a ‘culture of cleanliness’ has been premised on reconstituting the caste 
culture of Hinduism and piggybacking urban desires for a clean city. This has 
been done through execution of a political strategy to intertwine ‘religion’ (in 
the form of the Hindu chain of reasoning) with secular social and political 
desires for health, sanitation and cleanliness. Swachh Bharat pivots between 
sacralisation, meaning making and the realm of everyday practices to connect 
bourgeois environmentalism with a reconstituted form of manual scavenging. 
Though unstable in design, in effect, all manner of everyday practices aimed at 
cleaning up the city are folded into the samsrata vision of the RSS. What this 
means, is that imagined political community is generated through the 
colonisation of urban public space by Hindutva. 
 
                                                 
294 Nizami, S. 2020. ‘India right now! #9pm9minutes’, Twitter, 5 April 2020 
https://twitter.com/SalmanNizami_/status/1246823137154482180, last accessed 20 June 2020. 
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In this regard, it appears quite correct to point to ‘unofficially sacred’ spaces of 
religio-cultural expression in the city and the fact that religion is always in 
some way connected to the making of place. What this thesis shows is that 
‘religion’ is never outside of the social relations of political economy (see Della 
Dora, 2015; Kong, 2010, p. 769). In particular, the thesis has shown that urban 
aspirations and bourgeois claims to the city have been connected up to the 
politico-theistic ambitions of the BJP. In practice, narratives of divine action, 
transcendent presence and supernatural reality that Justin Tsé (2014, p. 202) 
talks about are compacted, subsumed and rendered by Hindutva into 
performance of the nation in the street. In short, we see that religion, or ‘the 
sacred’ is embedded within the rhythms of everyday life: spectacular, 
theatrical performance of the nation in the street leverages Hindu ‘common 
sense’ to structure social cleavages based in cultural ‘difference’ to generate a 
sense of imagined political community (see de Leon, Desai and Tuğal, 2015, p. 
2). 
 
Chapter five offered further support to the work of Alev Çinar (2005), Banu 
Gökariksel (2009) and Jenny B. White (2002) in their readings of the religious 
body as transfigured through performative practices. In a similar vein to these 
writers, Henri Lefebvre understood that all human societies are founded on 
repetition, that the time of accumulation, rationality and work actively 
dominates circadian rhythms. Meanwhile, alongside Catherine Régulier, he 
also powerfully argued that religious cosmologies intertwine subjective 
meaning with everyday urban experience (Lefebvre and Régulier, 2004, p. 73). 
What Gramsci (1971, p. 326) called a ‘secular sense of a unity of faith between 
a conception of the world and a corresponding norm of conduct’ is grounded 
through yoga and configured as an antidote to the perceived excess of 
‘Western’ materialist society and stresses of everyday life. At the same time as 
yoga offers a passage for India to become ‘Vishwa Guru’ to the world, it 
generates a sense of imagined political community at home. Apparently 
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diverse and independent assemblages of bodies in urban public space are in 
the last instance coordinated by the RSS.  
 
Swachh Bharat Abhiyan is emblematic of the launch of Hindutva forces into a 
coordinated political strategy to meaningfully connect the project for a Hindu 
rashtra to desires for the better management of urban public space, social 
order and caste hierarchy. Urban aspirations, including those of large swathes 
of the urban poor for rejuvenation and Hindu pride, fire up enthusiasm for the 
national project. Correctly, Deshpande (2000, p. 198) notes that ‘mundane, 
everyday experiences’ – in this case of cleanliness and sanitation – are 
recruited to the cause. Yet, as we have seen, the intimate inhabited spaces that 
constitute the ‘banality of neighbourliness’ are dialectically produced as 
opposed to heterotopic. The geography of Swachh Bharat is reflective of class 
struggle and capitalist social relations. Most importantly, Hindutva is 
crystallised through a secular framework of cleanliness. In this respect, Van 
der Veer et al miss the point when they suggest that ‘urban aspirations’ and 
thus the articulation of Hindutva in the political street should be considered in 
separation from matters of ‘class’ and ‘the economy’ (Van der Veer, 2015, 
pp.3-4). 
 
Instead, this thesis has argued that the ideology of Hindutva becomes 
increasingly effective through the theatrical performance of the nation in the 
street, as diverse populations are mobilised through the colonisation of urban 
public space. Everyday practices of ‘the sacred’ and (neoliberal) urban 
aspirations converge in Swachh Bharat and the International Day of Yoga. The 
consequence is that simplified, upper caste ruling class ideas become the 
‘common sense’ language of Hindu national pride and ‘national-popular’ will. 
The International Day of Yoga is a primary example of this. From the city’s so-
called ‘slums’ on the banks of the Mithi river to the up-market 
neighbourhoods of Malibar Hill, everyday yoga practice has been championed 
as the answer to health and wellness on the one hand, and national prosperity 
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and international recognition on the other. Despite its complex history, as 
Jyoti Puri (2019, p. 330) makes clear, the language of yoga is Sanskrit and 
through the practice of Surya Namaskar and chanting of om, the yoga body is 
rendered saffron. The power of the political street as a supreme venue of 
nationalist politics is revealed in the annual congregation of thousands of 
bodies breathing, moving and performing the Hindu nation in unison.  
 
This thesis has advanced current understandings of religion, nationalism and 
the street by illustrating the active role of theatrical, performative politics in 
urban public spaces. Routine, frequently mundane performances of everyday 
piety, meaningfully connect to ideas of nationalist restoration, and in turn feed 
into the crystallisation and reproduction of Hindutva through the spectacular 
colonisation of urban space. ‘Religion’ is therefore both negotiated and 
mediated at various scales, from the body to the street, the city and the nation. 
As in the case of the International Day of Yoga, ‘unofficially sacred’ embodied 
spatial practice reverberates at the scale of the international. Further still, this 
research has illustrated that neither urban aspirations or religious practices 
are ever ‘outside’ of capitalist social relations. By contrast, it has been argued 
that, ultimately, contemporary Hindutva takes shape within the horizon of 
(neoliberal) capitalist accumulation. Accepting this analysis, however, as we 
will see, leaves some unanswered questions.  
 
6.4 Closing thoughts and questions 
 
On 29th January 2018, Outlook India reported that a Mumbai-based art 
project had been set up to paint over two hundred and eighty-five houses and 
transform Jaffar Baba Colony in Bandra West. The result was set to be ‘an 
explosion of rainbow hues that would be visible from afar, stretching from one 
dwelling to the next in a wave of unexpected energy.’295 Led by artist and 
                                                 
295 See ‘Artist showcases slums through Misaal Mumbai Initiative’, Outlook,  29 January 2018, 
https://www.outlookindia.com/newsscroll/artist-showcases-slums-through-misaal-mumbai-
initiative/1241134, last accessed 6 May 2020.  
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social activist Rouble Nagi, ‘Misaal Mumbai’ has generated a great deal of 
publicity and support. Particular praise has come in for the joint mission of 
the project to bring more ‘colour’ to the cities ‘slums’ on the one hand and 
‘change mind-sets’ on the other. Misaal Mumbai is openly specified as an 
‘intervention’, the aim of which is to spur further social change. Local people 
from the area are employed and drafted in as volunteers to paint houses and 
waterproof roofs against the heavy monsoon rains. The project is in 
collaboration with Swachh Bharat Abihiyan.296 For Rouble Nagi, who also set 
up the similar ‘Paint Dharavi’ project in 2016, Misaal Mumbai is not just about 
colourful makeovers, but ‘uplift’ and the ‘betterment’ of slum dwellers. It is 
about ‘creating awareness about cleanliness, good health and hygiene.’297 The 
novelty of Misaal Mumbai is to combine social work with art.  
 
In this regard, an overarching concern of the project – which has now been 
extended to several areas of the city – is the provision of workshops and 
centres for women that focus on up-skilling and self-development. The aim, 
Ms Nagi explains, is that “while [women] look after the family and their kids at 
home, they can also work and support their family”. The stated objective is 
female empowerment through self-sufficiency. Most notably, the route to 
empowerment, according to Misaal Mumbai, is that these women remain 
within the home. Yet, problematically, despite the fact that greater access to 
public space is a critical aspect of citizenship still denied to the vast majority of 
women in the city, equality of access to urban public space is not on the 
agenda (see Phadke et al, 2011).298  
                                                 
296 ibid. 
297 See ‘Rouble Nagi: Giving A Colourful Makeover To Mumbai Slums | Misaal Mumbai’, You Tube, 3 
April 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ys70Pb2XlzA, last accessed 4 May 2020. See also, 
‘Painting One Slum At A Time’, You Tube, 28 March 2018, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7G1QZmzmols, last accessed 4 May 2020.  
298 There are interesting parallels here with the devaluation of women’s work examined by Jenny B. 
White in her study of small-scale community production in Istanbul. White finds that ‘employed’ by 
their husbands and family members, migrant women in Istanbul’s urban squatter neighbourhoods 
frequently engage in piece work from their homes and in consequence, serve as a pool of cheap labour 
for international markets. Through this process, ‘liberation’ from the home is illusive, as the 
‘emotional and economic interdependence’ of the Turkish family, alongside its ‘authoritarian and 
patriarchal character’ is reconstituted in the city (White, 1994, p. 9). 
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At various points this thesis has discussed the patriarchal and gendered 
coordinates of Hindutva and accounted for the gendered dimensions of the 
political street. However, these questions remain largely unexplored within 
the research. This might reasonably be viewed as a significant omission. 
However, it also creates a set of openings for further research. Though affluent 
and educated women in particular are increasingly demanding the right to 
access public space in contemporary Indian cities, to a large extent, 
experiences of ‘enclosure’ persist regardless of class, caste or religion (see 
Butcher, 2017; Roy and Ong, 2011). Interestingly in this regard, despite the 
progressive, cosmopolitan hue of Misaal Mumbai, the Rouble Nagi Art 
Foundation is supported by and enjoys close access to the high command of 
the RSS (see figure 22). 
 
 
Figure 22: “without commitment, u will never start, but more importantly, 
without consistency, u will never finish.” Rouble Nagi Tweets about her 
meeting with RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat.299   
                                                 
299 Nagi, R. 2019. ‘without commitment, u will never start, but more importantly, without consistency, 
u will never finish. It’s never easy. Keep working, keep striving, never give up, fall down, get up again. 
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Chapter one touched on the fact that the everyday spaces that constitute the 
political street have definable gendered limits. This is so at a number of levels, 
for instance, conservative ideas of the ‘safety’ of women in public space are 
commonly articulated to reinforce limits to access. Unlike their male 
counterparts the access of women to public spaces requires legitimate purpose 
(Phadke, et al, 2011, p. 32). Overall, a pervasive sense that Indian women 
belong in private spaces, as wives and mothers, hangs in the air. As Shilpa 
Phadke, Sameera Khan and Shipa Ranade (2011, pp. 64-69) observe in their 
study of women and risk on the streets of Mumbai, women and girls are 
‘tentative and watchful’ in their occupation of public space. They ‘manufacture 
purpose’, choosing bus stops and railway stations as waiting points, walk in a 
purposefully ‘goal-orientated’ manner, and deploy religiosity and the 
symbolism of marriage to ‘create a bubble of private domestic space’ as they 
traverse and ‘transgress’ into public spaces. By contrast, caste Hindu men in 
particular, congregate and loiter without apparent purpose. They hang out and 
drink chai, are loud, assertive, and inhabit all manner of public spaces with a 
notable sense of entitlement and ease. There is evidently further research to be 
done and a lot more to be said, then, about gender and the political street in 
relation to the politics of Hindutva. 
 
It is of course certainly true that since the 1980s, Hindu nationalist women 
have engaged in their own assertive negotiations with urban public space. 
Various groups have developed their own discourses of the Hindu nation from 
within the Sangh Parivar, that overlap with the ideas generated by the 
dominant ‘men’s wings’ in both complimentary and antagonistic ways (see 
Bacchetta, 2004, p. 3). It should therefore be noted that women are prominent 
and constitute a formidable force within the Hindutva movement in their own 
                                                 
Ease is a greater threat to progress than hardship. @DrMohanBhagwat ji @RSSorg’, Twitter, 19 
December 2019, https://twitter.com/ROUBLENAGI/status/1207503632368885761/photo/4, last 
accessed 5 July 2020. 
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right (Bachhetta, 2004; Mehta, 2017; Menon, 2010; Sarkar, 2001). 
Nonetheless, it would also appear that Hindutva forces attempt to construct 
particular typologies of ‘Hindu woman’ at multiple levels – each with varying 
degrees of conditional access to public space.  
 
Hindutva’s conservative restoration constantly grapples with the market-
driven objectification and sexualisation of women and where the place of the 
so-called ‘modern’ Hindu woman fits into their world-view. Recalling chapter 
five (5.2), Shilpa Shetty Kundra in some ways represents a possible 
negotiation for elements of the Sangh; modern and glamourous but wedded to 
the primacy of Hindu tradition and the context of ‘the nation’ in her public 
pronouncements. Likewise, Rouble Nagi, in her self-identification as 
‘startlingly modern and intrinsically Indian’ is also met with apparent 
approval from the RSS high command. A further instance of negotiation 
afforded to affluent upper caste women appears to come in the form of 
Kangana Ranult’s Lakshmi in ‘Don’t Let Her Go’ (4.4). On the flip side, a much 
stronger sense of oppressive, neo-traditionalist ‘empowerment’ – that 
dovetails with confinement within the home – seems to be deemed 
appropriate with regards to the lower castes and urban poor.  
 
A further possible point of contention within this thesis is that the 
heterosexuality of the disciplined (male) Hindu body is taken more or less 
given. To be sure, the RSS understands the primary social unit of the Hindu 
nation to be a hyper-masculine, heteronormative male. However, on closer 
inspection, this is more complex than it seems. Simple binaries do not easily 
apply. For example, the modern archetype of ‘Hindu nationalist man’, 
Narendra Modi, is frequently cast as possessing upper caste qualities, an 
intellectual (Brahmin) and politician-general (Kshatriya) in equal measure. 
Loyal media and government communications never tire of boasting of the 
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‘56-inch chest’ of India’s paterfamilias-in-chief.300 Even more so, Modi is 
alluded to as a ‘self-made’ man. Only through his love of the nation, was he 
able to rise from lowly beginnings selling tea with his father to Prime Minister 
and leader of a resurgent India. Yet, somewhat curiously, he is simultaneously 
presented as a sanyasi, yogi and ascetic of sorts, with a ‘delicate soul’. Modi 
often comes across as emotional and cries in public remarkably often, such is 
his professed love for the nation and attachment to the poor. These latter 
traits, as Paola Bacchetta (2019, p. 393) points out, are ‘uniformly regarded as 
effeminate in the West’. The so-called masculinity of Hindutva and how this 
relates to the political street thus requires closer examination.  
 
Finally, the contours of a thesis that examines the politics of Hindutva in the 
city streets of Mumbai, opens up space for further research into possible 
sources of resistance and the potential of a counter movement to the politics of 
Hindu supremacy. A perpetual sticking point for Hindutva politics is how to 
accommodate, pacify and absorb Dalits into the Hindu fold. As we have seen 
(chapter two) from the early stages of its formation the RSS saw the rise of 
anti-Brahmin ideology among the ‘lower’ and ‘depressed’ castes as a major 
threat to the integrity of Hindu society (Bhatt, 2001, p. 117). From the second 
RSS sarsanghchalak, M.S Golwalkar, to the third supreme leader, Madhukar 
Dattatreya Deoras, the RSS has long made efforts to cultivate the loyalty of 
Dalits and so-called ‘Other Backward Class’ (OBCs) lower castes to the cause 
of the Hindu rashtra (see Donthi, 2018). Indeed, current RSS chief Mohan 
Bhagwat is keen to stress the same ideas of ‘integration’ of Dalits and OBCs 
with the claim that all Indians are Hindu and familiar depiction of the 
common (foreign) Muslim enemy.301 What the Sangh is interested in is not 
equality and social democracy (samaanta) but social harmony between castes 
                                                 
300 See ‘Modi is the man with 56-inch chest: Amit Shah’, The Hindu, 28 April 2019, 
https://www.thehindu.com/elections/lok-sabha-2019/modi-is-the-man-with-56-inch-
chest/article26973945.ece, last accessed 8 May 2020. 
301 See ‘130 crore Indians are Hindu society: Mohan Bhagwat’, The Hindu, 25 December, 2019 
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/130-crore-indians-are-hindu-society-mohan-
bhagwat/article30397898.ece, last accessed 12 May 2020. 
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(samrasta) towards the model ‘one people, one nation, one leader’ 
(Teltumbde, 2018, p. 44).  
 
In the context of resistance, one such line of possible inquiry comes in the 
form of the political possibilities of Dalit activism in relation to global anti-
racist movements. Broadly speaking, Dalit activism has always been 
international. In the 1940s, for instance, B.R Ambedkar contacted American 
activist-intellectual W.E.B Du Bois to ask for a copy of the June 1946 
statement made by the National Negro Congress (NNC) to the United Nations. 
In his letter, Ambedkar recognised that ‘there is so much similarity between 
the Untouchables of India and the position of the Negroes in America that the 
study of the latter is not only natural but necessary’. Du Bois replied that he 
was familiar with Ambedkar’s name and expressed ‘every sympathy with the 
Untouchables of India’. He enclosed the copy of the statement and promised 
to forward a more comprehensive statement planned by the National 
Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP). Before 
Ambedkar’s time, in 1873 anti-caste social activist Jyotirao Phule penned his 
polemical work Gulamgiri (slavery) to include a dedication to the American 
abolitionist movement (Desai, 2014).  
 
Connections between Dalits and the struggles of black people in the United 
States took a more revolutionary turn with the formation of the Dalit Panthers 
in 1972, a social movement that took place within the city streets. With the 
Black Panther movement as their evident inspiration, according to the 1973 
Dalit Panther manifesto, India’s struggle was against class and caste rule in 
solidarity with the global black power movement and revolutionary struggles 
of the ‘Third Dalit World’ in ‘Vietnam, Cambodia, Africa and the like’. 
Congress rule was depicted as a continuation of the old ‘Hindu feudalism’ that 
had kept ‘Dalits deprived of power, wealth and status for thousands of years.’ 
The wider context of the American imperialist enemy was acknowledged. 
Critically, ‘Dalits’ were broadly defined as ‘neo-Buddhists, the working people, 
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the landless and poor peasants, women and all those who are being exploited 
politically, economically and in the name of religion’.302 The Dalit Panthers 
were thereby presented as the vanguard of a grand revolutionary-progressive 
coalition. International solidarity was to be grounded in revolutionary struggle 
in and through the political street (Slate, 2012).  
 
Based on this rich internationalist history, a series of questions for the 
contemporary conjuncture emerge: on the matter of international solidarity 
for anti-caste politics on the one hand, and the state of anti-racist politics in 
India on the other. For example, despite the existence of rampant police 
brutality, pervasive caste-discrimination and ‘colourism’ on the Indian 
subcontinent, the reaction to the latest wave of Black Lives Matter protests, in 
the wake of the killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police officer Derek 
Chauvin in May 2020, has been remarkably muted. Anti-Muslim and casteist 
attitudes within the Indian police are common. ‘Black’ Indian lives – 
predominantly Muslim and Dalit – are routinely lost as a result of police 
brutality and ‘encounter killings’ as well as at the hands of ‘cow vigilante’ 
mobs, effectively given carte blanche by politicians and law enforcement. 
Despite the frequency of events, killings, lynching and other assorted atrocities 
have repeatedly failed to elicit widespread condemnation from the Indian 
public at large.  
 
Perhaps most important to this apparent disavowal is the pervasive view that 
race and caste cannot be fruitfully compared. Issues of racism and casteism 
are further complicated within Indian society by the wide-spread obsession 
with fair skin. Its contemporary manifestation is most obvious in the 
glorification of light skinned celebrities, models and the expansive cosmetics 
market for ‘fairness’ products. Though tightly connected, prejudice and 
                                                 
302 Dailt Panthers Manifesto. 1973. Appendix-II Dalit Panthers Manifesto (Bombay, 1973), 
groundxero.in, https://www.groundxero.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/DPManifesto.pdf, last 
accessed 20 June 2020. 
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discrimination based on skin tone exists in contemporary India as relatively 
autonomous from class and the notion of high caste Indians as ‘fair’ (Mishra, 
2015, pp. 732-733). This seemingly pervasive way of thinking about race and 
caste in India, was neatly demonstrated following the series of events that 
unfolded in August 2001, at the United Nations “World Conference Against 
Racism” in Durban, South Africa.  
 
Controversy arose at the Durban conference as the Government of India, 
flanked by several sympathetic eminent sociologists, shut down the attempt by 
the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR) to highlight the 
congruence between casteism and racism as a matter of human rights (Berg, 
2007, p. 9). According to the Atal Vajpayee-led BJP government, first of all, 
caste was not equal to race and second, caste was a matter of purely domestic 
concern. In this manner, ‘any attempts at an international conference to 
pronounce on it [were seen as] tantamount to an infringement on state 
sovereignty (Krishna, 2015, p. 140). The events at Durban demonstrate the 
way that the BJP were effectively able to out flank efforts to gain the 
international recognition for Dalit rights as human rights and disavow the 
strong parallels between racism and casteism. The eventual outcome also 
points to the problematic absence of strong connections between 
internationalist solidarity and the political street. Though further research is 
evidently necessary, it would appear that a counter-project to Hindutva would 
do well to connect to and draw from global anti-racist street politics, the likes 
of what we have seen in the United States.  
 
Hindutva in global context 
 
It was noted in chapter one that Hindutva is but one instance of contemporary 
‘religious’ far-right resurgence. Most similar to the Indian historical 
experience, especially after 1980, is that of contemporary Turkey and the rise 
to power of President Recep Tayipp Erdoğan and the AKP. We have seen in 
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this thesis that socioeconomic structures shape conditions of political 
possibility. In this regard, the rise of Islamic populism in Turkey is too a tale of 
the city, its streets and its public spaces. In both India and Turkey, amidst the 
uneven endings of the cold war, the 1980s and 1990s gave birth to a rapid 
acceleration of urban poverty and inequality, alongside the emergence of a 
rejuvenated religious right-wing as a formidable political paradigm. Escalating 
urban poverty stemmed from the coordinated reduction of state capacity 
under the aegis of Structural Adjustment Programmes’ (SAPs) implemented 
by domestic governments, the World Bank, and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) (UNHABITAT, 2003, pp. 43-45). Mass rural-urban migration in 
this period contributed to the rise of informal urban subsistence economies in 
the poorest areas of the city - the chawls (tenements) and zopadpattis (slums) 
of Mumbai and the gecekondus (informal settlements) of Istanbul.  
 
By 1994, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had become the first elected Islamist Mayor of 
the city. In 1995, Bombay became Mumbai under BJP-Shiv Sena leadership. 
By 1998, the Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party in Turkey had been banned by the 
military for violating principles of secularism. In the same year, Shiv Sena 
entered into the ruling national coalition government – the BJP-led National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA). Remarkably similar to the politics of the RSS and 
rise to power of Narendra Modi, the social and intellectual base of Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan’s politics is the Khalidi-Naksibandi order, a Turkish Islamic 
Sufi organisation that acted as an ‘incubator’ for political Islam through the 
years of Kemalist oppression after 1924 (Yavuz, 2003, p. 141).303 After 1980 in 
particular, the networks of the Naksibandi order served as a powerful political 
                                                 
303 Sufi orders were officially banned by Mustafa Kemal by March 1924, under legal code 587. 
Subjected to severe repression, their influence and membership went into decline (Mardin, 1993). 
However, in being pushed underground, the Naksibandi’s adapted their strategies to a long-term 
struggle, mobilising their followers through promotion of esoteric internal religiosity. As religious 
education was outlawed in Turkey (the madrassa system), many students of the order went abroad to 
study in Islamic centres such as ‘Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus and Medina’ coming into contact with 
Salafi Islamist thinking and the teaching and practices of the Muslim Brotherhood (Cornell, 2015). 
Subject to the new political climate of the Republic, many Naksibandi’s took “cover” in the new state-
owned mosques and took up jobs in the bureaucracy, the Directorate of Religious Affairs, in 
particular. Covering themselves as the “mosque community”, according to Hakan Yavuz (2003, p 140) 
many mosques in Turkey can effectively be seen as “lodges” of the Naksibandi order to this day. 
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vehicle for the advance of political Islam in Istanbul. The foremost intellectual 
of Turkish political Islam, was the Naksibandi shayk and leader of the 
Iskendepaşa mosque in Istanbul’s Fatih district, Mehmet Zahit Kotku (1897-
1980).304 Soon after taking leadership of the Iskendepaşa community in 1952, 
the mosque was transformed from somewhere that elders ‘came to sit and 
pray’ to a centre of education for young people and a hub of influence within 
the developing political scene. From here, Kotku acted as a spiritual guide for 
Turkeys post-war generation of Islamist leaders and intellectuals. From future 
ministers Korkut Özal, Lütfü Doğan and Fehim Adak, to future prime 
ministers and presidents, Turgut Özal, Necmettin Erbakan and Erdoğan 
himself (Yavuz, 2003, p. 141). The ideology of political Islam in Turkey that 
grew out of the Iskendepaşa community, the Milli Görüş, or ‘National View’ 
movement, is anchored in racialised ideas of blood and soil, the notion of 
“Great Turkey” (Büyük Türkiye), spiritual rejuvenation and romanticisation of 
the unity of state and nation.305  
 
The Khalidi-Naksibandi order and the Iskenderpaşa community in particular, 
then, have played a key role in the development of a nationalist form of Islam 
that resonates in present far-right political currents in Turkey. Remarkably 
congruent with the RSS, in terms of political strategy, those associated with 
Milli Görüş have propagated an incremental, long-view strategy of cultural 
transformation as a necessary pre-requisite to political power.306 After 2002 
the newly formed AKP began to dominate the political scene and since 2013, 
following Erdoğan’s increased powers as President, the AKP has brazenly 
                                                 
304 To be clear, Memhet Kotku is far from the sole Islamist intellectual of note in Turkish history. The 
importance of another totemic figure, Said Nursi (1877-1960) his tafsir on the Qur’an, the Risale-i-
nur and his followers, the Nurcu movement are highly relevant. For present purposes I defend the 
focus on Kotku on the basis of his proximity to state power. 
305 Political manifestations of Milli Görüş have run from the succession of Erbakan-led Islamist 
parties after 1983 – the Refah (Welfare) Party and, Fazilet (Virtue) Party – to the triumph in 2002 of 
Erdoğan’s AKP. 
306 The role of Kotku is clear here to the extent that he cautioned his disciples ‘against premature 
attempts to establish an Islamic state in Turkey and stated preference for the moral and cultural 
reorientation of Turkish society as a goal’ (Algar, 1990, p. 143). For an in-depth discussion of the long-
term vison of the RSS (see Ahmad, 2015).   
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crushed dissent and neutered the opposition, while maintaining a facade of 
democratic competition. In a remarkably similar way to the politics of 
Hindutva, nationalist propaganda of a golden ‘Neo-Ottoman’ age pivots on the 
idea of the untapped potential of the Turks – an Islamic civilisation – unjustly 
held back hitherto by the oppressive imposition of Western ‘secular’ values by 
Mustafa Kemal. Thus, a further project emerges. How similar are these cases? 
On the basis of this thesis and analysis of Hindutva politics by way of 
performance of the nation in the street, what can one case tell us about the 
other? Can this lens be effectively expended to other cases of religious far-right 
politics? How do these exemplary cases compare, for instance, with the 
politics of Likud under the consolidated leadership of Benjamin Netanyahu as 
Prime Minister of the State of Israel? 
 
Focusing on the city of Mumbai, this thesis has offered an account of Hindutva 
in the political street. The street is an arena of complex interaction, urban 
aspirations and desires. Through Swachh Bharat Abhiyan and the 
International Day of Yoga, desires for a resurgent India are brought into 
alliance around the signifier of a strong Hindu nation. Hindu ‘difference’ is 
demarcated in the face of neoliberal globalisation and the Indian people are 
afforded ‘a sense of having a place in the world’ (Arendt, 2017, p. 466). We 
have seen that Swachh Bharat and the International Day of Yoga are tightly 
intertwined with a political strategy for the recognition of India on the world 
stage and the revival of its past mythical glory; for the beautification and 
‘purification’ of urban space; and the desire of Indian citizens to participate in 
globalised bourgeois lifestyle choices. The ‘new’ theatrical and performative 
strategies of Hindutva politics taking shape under the leadership of Narendra 
Modi, generate a sense of Hindu political and moral community that 
converges in the colonisation of urban space and performance of the nation in 
the street. My hope is that this thesis and the openings it has created, can be 
placed within and extend existing discussions of the politics of the far-right in 
the neoliberal city. More specifically, of course, I hope to have advanced 
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understandings of the historical and sociological development of Hindutva in 
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